Ocean governance must shift from protecting chokepoints to building resilient, cooperative maritime networks across the Global South
This piece is part of the series 'Governing the Oceans: Rethinking Access and Equity'
Since 28 February 2026, the rising geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz, have heightened concerns over the vulnerability of critical maritime chokepoints that underpin the global oil supply chain. Recent security incidents and threats to navigation have also disrupted shipping patterns and increased risks to eastbound energy flows. This is especially consequential because Gulf oil exporters remain highly dependent on Asian demand, with major consumers such as China and India driving that demand.
The region accounts for around 71.6 percent of exports from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), highlighting its importance to global energy stability. In 2023, the Persian Gulf exported an average of 19.71 million barrels of oil per day, led by Saudi Arabia (6.66 mb/d), Iraq (3.47 mb/d), the United Arab Emirates (2.65 mb/d), Kuwait (1.57 mb/d), and Iran (1.32 mb/d). Declining Western dependence on Gulf oil, particularly in the United States (US) and Europe, has led to a structural reorientation of energy trade towards Asia. This shift has reshaped logistical networks connecting the Gulf with Asian markets while simultaneously increasing the geopolitical significance of key sea lanes. It also highlights the urgent need for cooperative governance to secure critical maritime energy corridors and ensure stability in an increasingly fragmented global order.
In the global oil distribution network, the Strait of Hormuz serves as a critical maritime gateway. Since the Persian Gulf hosts some of the world’s largest oil exporters, three major global oil corridors originate from this single maritime node.
Despite decades of international cooperation frameworks, chokepoints remain inherently vulnerable due to fragmented governance, weak enforcement mechanisms, competing national interests, and the absence of binding global security architectures capable of coordinating rapid, unified responses.
The Asian corridor extends from the Strait of Hormuz to the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean, passing via the Malacca Strait towards East Asia. The European corridor connects the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab el-Mandeb, through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, towards the European Union. The Atlantic corridor starts from the Strait of Hormuz, either via the Cape of Good Hope or through the Suez Canal, towards the Atlantic and North America.
Hence, the heavy reliance on a single maritime gateway highlights the strategic vulnerability of global oil supply chains. Despite decades of international cooperation frameworks, chokepoints remain inherently vulnerable due to fragmented governance, weak enforcement mechanisms, competing national interests, and the absence of binding global security architectures capable of coordinating rapid, unified responses.
Several initiatives announced by countries have sought to enhance connectivity and strengthen cooperation on a transcontinental scale to improve the flow of goods and services across global supply chains. Governments have invested significantly in developing existing and new infrastructure, particularly maritime port infrastructure. New projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) reflect this, alongside emerging cooperative frameworks among the Global South. New forms of competition have also emerged, centred on building resilient and diversified global distribution channels. For example, the Middle Corridor has gained prominence as an alternative to traditional Eurasian routes, enabling cargo flows between Asia and Europe via Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the Caucasus, thereby reducing reliance on single chokepoints and politically sensitive transit regions. Bilateral and regional agreements have also been signed to facilitate trade flows, such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
A New Ocean Governance Approach for the Global South (NOGAS) must be developed to better integrate regional maritime governance frameworks with national policy priorities.
Despite these efforts, maritime corridors, especially critical chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz, continue to face several challenges. These include the absence of a cohesive maritime governance framework, misaligned national interests, persistent geopolitical tensions, differing national priorities, and unequal access to and control over key corridors. For example, major corridor initiatives such as China’s BRI and the proposed India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) face governance-related challenges, as they are primarily driven by bilateral or loosely coordinated agreements and lack unified regulatory frameworks, binding dispute resolution mechanisms, and institutionalised coordination structures necessary for long-term operational resilience and security.
Policy measures can be advanced to strengthen the resilience and governance of maritime corridors. These include transformation of seaports into digital hubs, identifying alternative maritime routes, diversifying participation in existing corridors, adopting key international agreements such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), adopted in 1982 and in force since 1994, and expanding multimodal utilisation. Efforts should also focus on broadening participation and reforming governance mechanisms within key corridors to ensure more inclusive and equitable access.
A New Ocean Governance Approach for the Global South (NOGAS) must be developed to better integrate regional maritime governance frameworks with national policy priorities. The current disconnect between these dimensions often leads to coordination failures and conflicts, as seen in the tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz. In essence, NOGAS reframes ocean governance from a reactive, chokepoint security model to a proactive, corridor-wide resilience architecture led by the Global South.
Regarding cooperation between the Global South and the Global North, countries are increasingly forming groupings based on shared interests and mutual benefits. However, the national policies of member states are often not embedded within these cooperative frameworks, nor are their national priorities the same. In turn, these factors affect maritime connectivity patterns and trade flows while weakening the resilience of such corridors.
There is also a need to include more countries in the corridor to reengineer international logistics networks, enhance accessibility and connectivity, and integrate more maritime hubs.
As a transformative initiative, the IMEC is often presented as an example of Global South-led cooperation. However, it is based mainly on linkages between some of the fastest-growing economic regions, rather than on an institutionalised governance mechanism. This results in participating countries operating with different national priorities, limiting policy coherence within the corridor.
In the context of the tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, such initiatives must review their investment strategies. There is a greater need to expand pipeline infrastructure and tanker storage capacity than to focus solely on increasing port quay length.
There is also a need to include more countries in the corridor to reengineer international logistics networks, enhance accessibility and connectivity, and integrate more maritime hubs. Strengthening legal and technological frameworks will also be essential to ensure the secure, efficient, and resilient implementation of the corridor.
Existing corridors and proposed connectivity initiatives must consider geography as a variable risk factor. This requires reassessing maritime corridor design in terms of network architecture, the alignment of members’ priorities, and the coherence of national policies within broader cooperation systems. In addition, there is a need to establish clearer governance structures that can effectively coordinate stakeholder interests. The inclusion of private sector actors and international organisations is key to enhancing coordination, improving efficiency, and reducing systemic risks across maritime supply chains.
Khaled EL Sakty is Dean of the College of International Transport and Logistics in Cairo.
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Prof. Khaled EL Sakty is a distinguished expert in transport, logistics, and supply chain management, with extensive academic and consultancy experience across Egypt and the ...
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