The US expects reciprocity from allies even as it seeks to inject stability into its bilateral relationship with China. Grey-zone tactics are on the rise as conflicts simmer
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The key interventions at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore last week underscored a reality that has been steadily gaining ground over the past decade: the post-Cold War international order is no longer the organizing framework of global politics. The assumptions that shaped that era-deep economic interdependence, the primacy of multilateral institutions, and the expectation that a rules-based order could mitigate geopolitical competition-are increasingly being challenged by the return of hard power, strategic rivalry, and national interest-driven statecraft.
What emerged from the dialogue was not merely a discussion about regional security but a broader reflection on the character of a changing international system.
The address by US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reflected a significant evolution in American strategic thinking.
Washington's message was unambiguous: alliances remain central to US strategy, but they must be built on reciprocity rather than dependence. The emphasis was no longer on the United States acting as the principal guarantor of security, but on allies assuming greater responsibility for their own defence.
The effectiveness of alliances, from this perspective, will increasingly be measured by tangible contributions to deterrence and operational readiness rather than declarations of political solidarity.
The underlying logic is straightforward. As strategic competition with China intensifies, Washington seeks capable partners rather than security dependents. Hegseth's emphasis on military capability over diplomatic symbolism captured this shift. The effectiveness of alliances, from this perspective, will increasingly be measured by tangible contributions to deterrence and operational readiness rather than declarations of political solidarity.
At the same time, the United States signalled a willingness to pursue a more stable and predictable relationship with China. Competition remains the defining feature of the bilateral relationship, but both sides appear increasingly conscious of the risks associated with unmanaged rivalry. The focus on establishing guardrails reflects a shared recognition that strategic competition must not be allowed to escalate inadvertently into conflict.
A second major theme was the growing crisis of strategic trust. Vietnamese President To Lam highlighted how challenges to international order, economic development, and political confidence are reinforcing one another. The result is an international environment marked by uncertainty and heightened insecurity.
This erosion of trust is also transforming the nature of conflict itself. Australian Defence Minister Richard Marles drew attention to the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, particularly fibre-optic cables that sustain the global digital economy. Incidents in the Baltic Sea and around Taiwan have demonstrated how states can employ coercive tools below the threshold of conventional warfare.
The implications are significant. Security competition is no longer confined to territorial disputes or military deployments. It increasingly extends to cyberspace, critical infrastructure, supply chains, and the maritime commons. The distinction between war and peace is becoming progressively blurred as states exploit grey-zone tactics to advance strategic objectives while avoiding direct military confrontation.
For middle and smaller states, the weakening of multilateral mechanisms has generated a renewed sense of vulnerability. One of the most striking observations came from Singapore's Defence Minister Chan Chun Sing, who argued that relevance in contemporary geopolitics can no longer be taken for granted.
His warning that states not at the table risk finding themselves on the menu captures a growing concern among many countries: great-power competition is narrowing strategic space for smaller actors. Yet the response advocated by Singapore was not alignment with one bloc against another. Instead, it was a call for greater resilience, stronger national capabilities, and diversified partnerships.
The message resonates beyond Southeast Asia. As the international system becomes more contested, strategic autonomy is increasingly linked to a state's ability to generate credible economic, technological, and military capacity. Dependence, rather than geography, is emerging as the principal source of vulnerability.
Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi offered perhaps the clearest articulation of how middle powers are adapting to an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific. His intervention reflected Japan's ongoing transition from a security consumer to a security provider-a process that has accelerated amid concerns over China's military rise and growing uncertainty about the long-term trajectory of American commitments in the region. By drawing attention to China's expanding military capabilities and lack of transparency, he sought to frame Japan's military modernisation as a necessary contribution to regional stability rather than a source of instability.
Japanese Defence Minister Shinjiro Koizumi offered perhaps the clearest articulation of how middle powers are adapting to an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.
More significantly, Koizumi's remarks underscored a broader trend in Indo-Pacific security politics: deterrence is increasingly becoming a collective enterprise. He warned that divisions among like-minded states weaken deterrence and create opportunities for revisionist actors to exploit strategic fractures. In this sense, Japan views security not simply through the lens of its bilateral alliance with the United States but through a wider network of partnerships spanning Australia, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, and the Quad framework.
If the United States is recalibrating its alliance commitments and China is pressing for a greater role in regional governance, Japan increasingly sees itself as a pivotal stabilising actor in the Indo-Pacific. The message from Koizumi was clear: preserving a free and open regional order will require not only American leadership but also greater strategic activism from America's allies and partners.
China used the dialogue to reinforce its long-standing argument that the existing international order requires reform to better reflect contemporary distributions of power. Beijing presented itself as a defender of stability and multilateralism, while criticising what it characterises as exclusionary blocs and Cold War-style thinking.
More importantly, Chinese representatives sought to project confidence in China's role as a major power capable of shaping global governance. The emphasis on adherence to the UN Charter and support for a more inclusive international architecture reflects Beijing's broader effort to legitimise its growing influence.
Notably, the exchanges between Chinese and American officials suggested a more measured tone than in recent years. While strategic rivalry remains intense, both sides appeared willing to invest in mechanisms that reduce uncertainty and prevent crises from spiralling out of control. In a period of profound geopolitical flux, even limited stability between the world's two largest powers carries significant implications for the wider international system.
India's intervention at the 2026 Shangri-La Dialogue reflected a characteristic feature of its contemporary foreign policy: the pursuit of strategic autonomy amid intensifying great-power competition. Rather than framing regional security through the lens of bloc politics, New Delhi emphasised the importance of a stable, secure, and inclusive Indo-Pacific anchored in sovereignty, resilience, and multipolarity. A notable aspect of India's engagement was its simultaneous outreach to a wide range of security actors. On the sidelines of the dialogue, Indian Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh reaffirmed defence cooperation with the United States while also engaging senior NATO officials, reflecting India's growing comfort with issue-based partnerships that stop short of formal alliance commitments. This approach highlights New Delhi's belief that strategic flexibility, rather than rigid alignment, remains its greatest geopolitical asset.
While Washington is encouraging greater coalition-building to balance China, and Beijing is advocating alternative models of global governance, India continues to position itself as an independent pole in the international system.
More broadly, India's presence underscored the emergence of a distinct middle path in Indo-Pacific geopolitics. While Washington is encouraging greater coalition-building to balance China, and Beijing is advocating alternative models of global governance, India continues to position itself as an independent pole in the international system. Its emphasis on maritime security, connectivity, supply-chain resilience, and capacity-building for smaller states reflects a vision of regional order that is neither explicitly anti-China nor dependent on American leadership.
India's strategic message at Shangri-La was that the future of the Indo-Pacific cannot be determined solely by the trajectory of U.S.-China relations. The region's stability will increasingly depend on the agency of regional stakeholders capable of shaping outcomes rather than merely responding to them. In that regard, India's intervention reflected a broader ambition: to act not simply as a balancing power, but as a consequential shaper of the emerging Asian order.
The discussions at Shangri-La this year underline an international order defined less by universal norms and more by competitive coexistence. Ideological alignments are giving way to transactional partnerships. Security guarantees are increasingly tied to burden-sharing. And the credibility of international rules is becoming inseparable from the material power available to enforce them.
The dialogue ultimately revealed a world in transition. The language of co-operation remains important, but it now coexists with a renewed emphasis on deterrence, military preparedness, and strategic resilience. For states large and small, security can no longer be treated as a secondary consideration. It has become the central currency of international politics in an era where uncertainty, rather than stability, is the defining feature of the global order.
This commentary originally appeared in Moneycontrol.
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Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at ...
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