The Russia–India–China trilateral, once envisioned as a cornerstone of Eurasian cooperation, has lost relevance as strategic mistrust, divergent interests, and shifting geopolitical realities render the format obsolete.
Image Source: Twitter via @MEAIndia
Every year, Russian officials and experts commemorate the legacy of former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov and revisit his concept of the Russia-India-China (RIC) ‘strategic triangle,’ which he proposed during his visit to New Delhi in December 1998. After several years of dormancy, the case for the re-emergence of the RIC has surfaced against the backdrop of India-China normalisation and the India-US spat over US President Donald Trump’s imposition of tariffs on Indian exports. While there may indeed be an impulse in Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing to get together and discuss their responses to global uncertainties and regional issues, the long-term viability of this format remains questionable.
Initially, both Beijing and New Delhi responded coldly to Primakov’s proposal to form a triangle. First, the concept was presented rather vaguely, with no further details on the scope for trilateral cooperation outlined in any official Russian document or statement. Second, India’s rationale behind the Pokhran-II nuclear test in May 1998 revealed the intrinsic differences between India and China, making it clear that there was no strategic trust between the two countries. Third, both China and India viewed the ‘strategic triangle’ as a means of counterbalancing the United States, and were wary of the constraints that trilateral engagement might impose on their foreign policies.
Despite all the obstacles, the foreign ministers of the three countries convened for the first time on the sidelines of the United Nations (UN) General Assembly in September 2003. Between 2003 and 2021, the format showed impressive regularity, with 19 consecutive rounds of consultations taking place at the highest diplomatic level. This consistency was seen as a sign of the RIC’s continued relevance, particularly given that the meetings were held regardless of the occasional tensions between India and China. The RIC also expanded to encompass various mechanisms, including consultations between national security advisers, ministerial meetings, business and youth forums, and Track 2 dialogues.
The RIC leaders’ summit in Saint Petersburg in 2006 paved the way for the formation of the Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC) group later that year. To some extent, deliberations within BRIC, which expanded to include South Africa following its accession in 2011, overshadowed the trilateral agenda. The key difference was that, as all three are part of Eurasia, they focused more on regional affairs in their interactions. While there were some instances where Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing found common ground, their consultations rarely led to substantive outcomes beyond mere statements. Moreover, on issues like terrorism, China refused to cooperate with India and continued to block its case in other platforms, including the UN, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).
The RIC also expanded to encompass various mechanisms, including consultations between national security advisers, ministerial meetings, business and youth forums, and Track 2 dialogues.
In December 2018, Moscow initiated the trilateral summit on the sidelines of the G20 in Buenos Aires. In the face of deteriorating relations with the West, the Russian leadership viewed this as a useful platform for addressing not only Eurasian affairs but also as a means to reform global governance. In particular, President Vladimir Putin proposed “jointly defending the principles of fair and honest competition in global trade and finance, and promoting the formation of an international economic relations system that is free from protectionism and politically motivated restrictions.”
By making leader-level talks a regular practice, Russia hoped to breathe new life into the format. At one point, it appeared that this plan would pay off, as India picked up the baton to organise the trilateral summit at the G20 in Osaka in June 2019, though stressing its ‘informal’ status. That was arguably the highest point of the RIC’s story. Following the clashes in the Galwan Valley in May-June 2020 and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, things started to fall apart. While Moscow has advocated for the restoration of ministerial meetings, the RIC has effectively ceased to exist beyond sporadic Track 2 convenings.
Although RIC meetings were recognised as a means of coordinating positions on regional and global issues, the trilateral format never evolved into a genuinely strategic forum. First, there was a mismatch in visions: Moscow envisaged the RIC as a platform for shaping a new world order, whereas China was averse to India’s push for ‘reformed multilateralism’ and New Delhi’s seat at the global high table.
Second, downturns in the India-China relationship limited the scope of RIC interactions, preventing the three countries from deepening their engagement. As the interests of the troika members were not fully aligned, any RIC gathering came down to a meticulous quest to reconcile viewpoints.
Although RIC meetings were recognised as a means of coordinating positions on regional and global issues, the trilateral format never evolved into a genuinely strategic forum.
Third, with the increasing alignment in Russian and Chinese global and regional outlooks, India began to feel like an outlier within the RIC. Moscow and Beijing persistently made a case for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and its integration with other Eurasian projects, seeking to rope India in. This revealed a fundamental misunderstanding of India’s opposition, which stemmed from concerns over the violation of its sovereignty. Curiously, while “respect for sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs” appeared to be the bedrock on which the three countries were coming together, in practice, they interpreted sovereignty-related issues very differently.
On paper, the RIC troika could play a key role in shaping the principles of a Eurasian security architecture – something that remains absent in contrast to the Euro-Atlantic region. Following Putin’s address to the Federal Assembly in February 2024, Moscow appears to be the most interested in advancing this discussion. In that speech, the Russian president signalled his intention to discuss this issue with partners and associations across the region, though thus far it has remained confined to the Russia-China dialogue. It is unclear whether Moscow’s principles of indivisible security, shared responsibility, non-dominance, and multidimensional security will resonate with other regional players, particularly at a time when Russia itself is involved in a military conflict at the heart of Eurasia.
Additionally, expectations of the RIC within academia are often significantly inflated and unrealistic. This is particularly evident in Moscow’s conviction that bringing New Delhi and Beijing together would normalise their relations and foster a more harmonious regional situation in Eurasia. This belief stems from Russian experts’ suggestion that Moscow should help reduce tensions between India and China, and that the RIC could serve as a forum for interaction and conflict resolution between the two countries.
It must be acknowledged that the RIC’s contribution to Indian foreign policy has been rather restricted.
Since the last RIC ministerial videoconference in November 2021, the geopolitical landscape in Eurasia has undergone profound shifts. Bogged down in its war with Ukraine, Russia has lost its political sway in both Central Asia and the South Caucasus. In Afghanistan, each of the three countries has established its own terms of engagement with the Taliban government, with Moscow being the only capital to officially recognise the regime in Kabul. The fault lines in their approaches to the Middle East have also become more apparent. The three countries reacted differently to the Hamas attack on Israel in October 2023, the subsequent war in Gaza, and the 12-day war between Israel and Iran in June 2024. These differences have been evident at the BRICS and SCO forums, hindering the consensus required for joint statements.
When it comes to economic projects, there is certainly no dearth of ideas for trilateral cooperation. In theory, Moscow, New Delhi, and Beijing could cooperate in various geographies, such as the Arctic, Central Asia, and the Russian Far East, as well as across sectors, ranging from energy and agriculture to investment and transport connectivity. This would, however, require a greater degree of trust between India and China, as well as for them to disregard sanctions against Russia — reflecting Russia’s wishful thinking.
All of these factors indicate the low feasibility of resurrecting the RIC. Even in terms of signalling to Trump, the RIC’s relevance is questionable. All three countries are involved in negotiations with the Trump administration, but there is little alignment in their positions vis-à-vis the United States. While Moscow seeks to appease Trump to secure favourable outcomes in Ukraine, China and India are navigating trade talks to sustain economic ties with the US and prevent relations from deteriorating further.
Although the RIC concept continues to generate buzz in diplomatic and academic circles — given the centrality of the three Eurasian powers to many regional issues — the momentum for a meaningful trilateral partnership appears to have passed.
It must be acknowledged that the RIC’s contribution to Indian foreign policy has been rather restricted. Over the past few years, New Delhi has cultivated its own approach to engaging with various partners across Eurasian sub-regions, aiming to curb Chinese influence while avoiding reliance on Russian backing. Therefore, even if India chooses not to re-engage with the RIC, it is unlikely to experience any form of ‘geopolitical loneliness’ in the region.
Although the RIC concept continues to generate buzz in diplomatic and academic circles — given the centrality of the three Eurasian powers to many regional issues — the momentum for a meaningful trilateral partnership appears to have passed.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Aleksei Zakharov is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the geopolitics and geo-economics of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific, with particular ...
Read More +
PREV
