Border securitisation may sharpen India-Bangladesh tensions, but renewed momentum on Teesta offers a pathway to restore trust and stability
On 9 May 2026, a new government took charge in West Bengal following a sweeping electoral victory. Among the key promises in the new ruling party BJP’s manifesto to the Bengal populace, national security tops the list, echoing a long-standing concern of the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance government at the centre about alleged illegal infiltration from Bangladesh through the unfenced and less guarded portions of West Bengal’s border. The subsequent swift measures undertaken by the new West Bengal state government have fuelled anxiety among some hardliners in Bangladesh. West Bengal is, after all, more than just another Indian state for Bangladesh, sharing common resources, several family connections, and a history of partition. Hence, “any strain on one side quickly reverberates to the other.” In such political circumstances, it is important not only to analyse the impact of these developments on Bangladesh but also to identify areas where cooperation can be increased to help stabilise bilateral ties and enhance goodwill among people.
West Bengal is, after all, more than just another Indian state for Bangladesh, sharing common resources, several family connections, and a history of partition. Hence, “any strain on one side quickly reverberates to the other.”
The West Bengal state government has instructed the “illegal immigrants” to be arrested and handed over to the Border Security Force (BSF) for deportation. It has also approved the transfer of land to the BSF in the border districts to fence the remaining parts of the India-Bangladesh boundary, within 45 days of forming the government. Of West Bengal’s entire border with Bangladesh, nearly 1,600 km is already fenced, while the remaining 600 km remains open. In the first instalment, 27 km has been handed over to the BSF, of which 18 km is for fencing and 9 km for the construction of BSF outposts and necessary infrastructure. More land will be transferred, with all expenses paid by the centre and the BSF.
The state government has also approved the handover of 120 acres of the Siliguri Corridor in north Bengal to the centre for national security. The narrow strip of land connecting India’s Northeast with the rest of the country is known as the ‘Chicken’s Neck’ for its strategic vulnerability. In the past few years, New Delhi has become especially apprehensive of its sanctity due to several developments in Bangladesh. These include controversial statements by Muhammad Yunus, Chief Adviser of the former interim government of Bangladesh, about the territorial vulnerability of India’s Northeast, his reported exchange with China to develop an airbase at Lalmonirhat and the acceptance of Beijing’s offer to execute the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. Both projects risked bringing China closer to the Indian border. The Teesta project is also being pursued by the current Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government in Dhaka, fuelling concerns in New Delhi about strategic sensitivities.
While the Indian government deems the above measures necessary to strengthen national security and development, hardline groups in Bangladesh interpret them otherwise. The speed with which the new government has moved on border fencing, purported deportation, land transfers, and security-related decisions has sharpened these anxieties. Demolition drives targeting “illegal” properties in West Bengal have also fed into this narrative, allowing agitators to frame domestic law-and-order measures in cross-border terms.
As water is a state subject and bilateral decisions are a matter of central jurisdiction under the Indian Constitution, the Teesta issue became embroiled in a federal deadlock, making it impossible to settle.
For the Tarique Rahman administration, which came to power in February 2026 after nearly a year and a half of domestic unrest and political turmoil, the problem is twofold. Dhaka has long maintained that the alleged illegal migration into India is overstated and has hence refused to accept deportees without clear proof of their Bangladeshi citizenship. A surge in their number poses a structural challenge to the BNP government, straining border management systems. At the same time, provocative digital content can inflame public agitation in a country where anti-India sentiment has remained politically salient in recent months. This could undermine the BNP government’s legitimacy and its attempts to cultivate a functional relationship with New Delhi. This not only indicates the need for India and Bangladesh to strengthen their cooperation in managing deportations, but also to identify areas of cooperation that can function as confidence-building measures for people on both sides of the border. One such area is the dispute over the Teesta River.
Among the 54 transboundary rivers shared by India and Bangladesh, the Teesta flows southwards, from the hills of Sikkim and northern West Bengal to the relatively low-lying Rangpur Division in Bangladesh. As the primary river flowing through northern Bangladesh, it supports the agricultural needs of over 10 million people, producing 14 percent of the nation’s crop production. However, Bangladeshi experts are of the view that Indian dams constructed upstream have depleted the discharge into their country, hindering the irrigation of over 100,000 hectares of land. Before the dams were built, nearly 6,710 cusecs (cubic feet per second) flowed into the country, which has currently been reduced to only 1,200-1,500 cusecs during the dry season, receiving 200-300 cusecs at times. This is far less than the national requirement of 5000 cusecs per day. Naturally, both countries have sought to arrive at a resolution.
In 1983, an ad hoc agreement was reached at the 25th Joint River Commission, by which Bangladesh would receive 36 percent of Teesta’s waters. But its terms were unfulfilled. Another agreement was reached in 2011, allocating 42.5 percent of the water to India and 37.5 percent to Bangladesh. However, the agreement could not be formalised due to objections from West Bengal’s previous regime, which argued that the state’s growing water needs and declining river flows made the proposed arrangement untenable. Hence, sharing more water with Bangladesh would affect the people in West Bengal. As water is a state subject and bilateral decisions are a matter of central jurisdiction under the Indian Constitution, the Teesta issue became embroiled in a federal deadlock, making it impossible to settle.
Refocusing attention on resolving the Teesta issue will not only help New Delhi mitigate anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh but also raise the Tarique Rahman government’s popular legitimacy.
Consequently, this has been one of the longest-standing issues of contention between Dhaka and New Delhi, spurring anti-Indian sentiments among sections in Bangladesh. It is therefore not surprising that China’s offer to build a multipurpose barrage and dredge and embank portions of the Teesta to form a single manageable channel was accepted over India’s similar offer by Dhaka’s interim administration and the subsequent BNP government. However, with the centre-state alignment now greater between New Delhi and West Bengal than ever before, there are likely to be fewer political hurdles in resolving the Teesta issue. If such a settlement leads to a mutually beneficial water-sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh, it will not only be a significant diplomatic victory for both governments but also help to restore public goodwill.
Refocusing attention on resolving the Teesta issue will not only help New Delhi mitigate anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh but also raise the Tarique Rahman government’s popular legitimacy. Hence, in this moment of diplomatic strain, India and Bangladesh must rethink political narratives that amplify suspicion and grievance and instead foreground shared interests, river diplomacy and people-centric gains, so that contentious issues are managed without allowing public sentiment to slide into hostility.
Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow at Observer Research Foundation (ORF), Kolkata with the Strategic Studies Programme. Her area of research is India’s eastern maritime ...
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