The Africa Forward summit in Nairobi signals a decisive shift in France–Africa relations—from military engagement to trade and investment-oriented partnership amid changing dynamics in the Sahel and beyond
On 11–12 May, France and Kenya jointly hosted the first Africa–France summit in Nairobi, notably held outside the Francophone world. The ‘Africa Forward’ summit brought together numerous African heads of state, French President Emmanuel Macron, and representatives of global institutions to advance a shared development agenda. This marks a paradigmatic shift in France’s approach towards the African continent, moving away from longstanding military engagements in francophone Africa and towards new avenues of cooperation more closely aligned with emerging markets.
France’s legacy engagements with the Sahel appear to be a thing of the past, as noted by President Macron during his visit to Nairobi. After withdrawing militarily from Mali in 2022, Paris is now watching from afar as the country grapples with deepening political and military instability, with the Russia-backed military junta battling a growing jihadist and separatist insurgency around Bamako.
The ‘Africa Forward’ summit brought together numerous African heads of state, French President Emmanuel Macron, and representatives of global institutions to advance a shared development agenda.
The contrast between Nairobi and Bamako could not be starker and encapsulates the new dynamics of France–Africa relations: less security-driven, more commercially and business-oriented.
Franco-African ties have long been heavily militarised, shaped by the enduring legacy of post-independence French involvement in African affairs from the 1960s onwards. While Paris granted most of its former African colonies formal independence during this period, it maintained a strong defence footprint in these territories. In the Cold War context, this was primarily aimed at keeping the region out of Soviet influence while ensuring continued access to resource extraction.
Known as “Françafrique”, this system revived post-colonial ties under a veneer of respectability and sovereignty while sustaining highly unequal relations that largely favoured Paris, which remained intent on retaining influence over its former colonies. With this approach, France was able to directly interfere in the domestic affairs of host countries and intervene when needed to prop up and defend ruling regimes in a weak and unstable environment.
During the Cold War Era, France directly intervened in multiple African countries, including Chad, Gabon, and Cameroon, backed by strong defence agreements. This heavy-handed approach led to more than 50 military operations in Francophone Africa between 1964 and 2014, often under the guise of ‘stability’ and in response to perceived coup attempts. France was thus seen as the ‘policeman’ of Africa, a position that set it apart from other major powers.
In addition, the French army trained local armies based on its model. This was enabled by a network of bases ranging from Dakar to Djibouti and Diego-Suarez, where more than 20,000 French soldiers were stationed in the 1970s.
This influence continued well after the Cold War ended and even experienced a revival in the 2010s, as the rise of African jihadist groups threatened Sahelian capitals and pushed Paris into military intervention. Between 2013 and 2022, there was a second peak of French presence in Africa, with 5,500 French army personnel — as well as European Union (EU) and African Union forces — deployed across several Sahel countries to counter the transnational jihadist threat under Operations Serval and Barkhane.
Growing discontent was evident in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, with public opinion frequently criticising a perceived “neo-colonial” French presence. At the same time, progress against jihadist groups remained fleeting and easily reversible, owing in large part to the weakness of regional standing armies and the consolidation of these groups under a single umbrella, the Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM).
Between 2013 and 2022, there was a second peak of French presence in Africa, with 5,500 French army personnel — as well as European Union (EU) and African Union forces — deployed across several Sahel countries to counter the transnational jihadist threat under Operations Serval and Barkhane.
In 2017, newly elected French President Emmanuel Macron called for a reset of France–Africa ties, arguing that there is no such thing as an “Africa policy” from Paris and that the relationship had to be based on mutual understanding and focused on building economic links. The application of this new “non-doctrine” was soon put to the test following a series of coups in Mali (2020 and 2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Gabon and Niger (2023), all of which saw French influence and military presence directly or indirectly challenged. Hence, by 2022, French military personnel in Africa had fallen to 6,000. These coups marked a turning point away from “Françafrique” and contributed to a new model of bilateral partnership in the Sahel, based less on defence agreements and basing rights and more on cooperation in training and counter-terrorism. The French army then began its withdrawal from the Sahel, first from Mali in 2022, followed by Niger and Burkina Faso in 2023.
In line with this ‘new era’, President Macron went further in a 2023 speech, suggesting a drastic reduction in the number of French troops still stationed on the continent. This withdrawal was completed in 2025, with the remaining French military bases returned to the host countries and French personnel evacuated in Chad, Senegal, Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire. The French contingent in the Central African Republic had already been withdrawn in 2022.
Following this structural reform, the French Army presence in Africa now consists of small ‘liaison detachments’ in Abidjan and Libreville, with around 80 soldiers in Côte d’Ivoire and 100 in Gabon. At the same time, a French Africa Command was created in Paris in 2024 to oversee this reduced presence. It is also capable of mobilising additional troops from metropolitan France if required by partners, while continuing to support counter-terrorism and training with local forces. With this significant change, the only remaining full-fledged French military base in Africa is now in Djibouti, with around 1,500 French personnel from the Army, Navy and Air Force (including Mirage 2000 aircraft based there), enabling power projection in East Africa and the Indo-Pacific.
France’s decades-old strategic relations with Africa have been turned upside down in the span of a few years. External operations (or OPEX) have become a taboo subject in Paris, and the era of large-scale French military deployments in Africa — such as Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire (2002–2015) and Operation Barkhane in Mali (2014–2022) — now appears to be a relic of the past. While success was clear in Côte d’Ivoire, the French endeavour in the Sahel delivered mixed results, with some voices more critical and even describing it as a failure. This reflected an uphill task requiring greater capabilities and engagement with domestic political solutions that lay beyond France’s remit and within that of the host states (such as reconciliation between Tuaregs and Bambaras in Mali).
Following the 2020s coups, the Sahelian juntas are now led by nationalist and sovereignist rulers vehemently hostile to cooperation with Paris, with popular opinion backing this shift and the region’s capitals now doubling down on defence partnerships with Moscow. However, this support has recently proved fledgling and ineffective in Mali, with the rebel jihadist alliance now blockading the capital, Bamako.
France is now looking away from the Sahel quagmire and towards new emerging partners and continental heavyweights in East and West Africa. This is a much-needed reordering, as Paris has for too long neglected its trade and economic ties with Africa, which represent around 2 percent of France’s external trade, while France's market share in Africa has halved over the past two decades, as China has become, by far, the continent's largest trading partner.
France is now looking away from the Sahel quagmire and towards new emerging partners and continental heavyweights in East and West Africa.
This is symbolised by President Macron’s recent visits to countries such as Nigeria, Kenya and Ethiopia, where France is hoping to strengthen economic and trade ties with these fast-growing markets. Nigeria and South Africa are France’s largest trading partners on the continent, so the shift is warranted. Nonetheless, Côte d’Ivoire ranks third, a sign that France will not give up investing in its francophone partners.
As a sign of these changing times, President Macron’s visit to Nairobi for the Africa Forward summit was marked by a bonanza of investments for French firms in Africa, with over € 14 billion (US$16.4 billion )to be spent in the coming years in
energy, AI, and agriculture. French telecom giant Orange announced it will double its digital centres on the continent from 50 to 100. At the same time, the shipping line CMA CGM committed to modernising one of Mombasa’s port terminals.
This renewed impetus comes as French multinational companies have been ramping up their presence in the continent’s major economies. TotalEnergies is poised to invest US$ 6 billion in Nigeria’s oil and gas sector. In Côte d’Ivoire, a consortium of French firms is building the Abidjan metro, one of the largest projects of its kind in West Africa. Lastly, in Ethiopia, France is the third-largest investor, with heavy involvement in retail (Carrefour) and agribusiness (Lesaffre).
Hence, while France has erred in its decades-long over-militarised approach towards Africa, the time seems ripe for a reset with the continent, focused on trade, technology and people-to-people exchanges.
Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. His research focuses on the India-EU and India-France security and defence ...
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