A year after Operation Sindoor, Pakistan’s calibrated external outreach and carefully curated victory narrative mask deepening political, economic, and security faultlines at home, raising questions about the durability of its projected resurgence
On 6-7 May, 2025, India launched precision air strikes on terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), marking a 'new normal' in the bilateral relationship and redefining the escalatory dynamics of any future conflict between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. The conflict also played out in the narrative domain, with both countries dispatching delegations to major world capitals to make their case globally. Islamabad’s recollection of the events of last year has continued to build a narrative of victory, aimed at bolstering its image both domestically and internationally.
At a press conference marking one year since the conclusion of what Pakistan calls 'Marka-i-Haq' (Battle of Truth), the Director General of Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, extolled Pakistan's performance in the conflict. He listed ten 'strategic consequences' of the conflict, which he claimed have elevated Islamabad's diplomatic standing — reflected in its role as a mediator in the Iran war and the recent warming of ties with the US.
A central feature of Pakistan's self-portrayal over the past year is the narrative of victory: the purported dismantling of India's accusations and what Islamabad portrays as the superiority of its armed forces over India's, particularly in the air and at sea. The messaging emphasises the restraint Pakistan claims to have exercised despite its supposed capability to inflict greater damage on the Indian side, and presents this as evidence of the Pakistani military's maturity and its 'strategic culture.' The country's political leadership also speaks of a perceptible shift in how Pakistan is viewed by the world, crediting their call for an independent investigation into the Pahalgam attacks as having burnished their claims of non-involvement. They position Islamabad as a victim of terrorism that shields the international community from militant attacks. The synchronised messaging from the civilian and military leadership, bolstered by support in the information domain from the younger Gen Z population — as noted by the country's Information Minister — has driven the perpetuation of this narrative at a global level.
Islamabad claims the conflict established deterrence and presents itself as the net security stabiliser of the region. This self-image as security stabiliser is, however, an attempt to appropriate a role long associated with India's established position in the region.
Pakistan claims that India's military actions and its own response neutralised New Delhi's ability to blame Islamabad for orchestrating terrorism, while also exposing what it describes as the politicisation of the Indian military, India's tendency to externalise its internal problems, and the duplicity of the Indian media. The messaging from Pakistan's defence establishment focuses on how the country is one step ahead in preparing for the next war, and that its growing international relevance renders India's attempts to isolate it moot. Simultaneously, Islamabad claims the conflict established deterrence and presents itself as the net security stabiliser of the region. This self-image as security stabiliser is, however, an attempt to appropriate a role long associated with India's established position in the region. The narrative has found traction in Pakistani media, where it is being linked to Islamabad's growing diplomatic relevance.
On 10 May, 2025, when the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan became public, Donald Trump's post on Truth Social claiming an instrumental role in ending the hostilities between the two nuclear-armed neighbours became the far bigger story. While India rejected any US role in brokering the ceasefire — in keeping with its longstanding refusal of third-party mediation in its bilateral dispute with Pakistan — Islamabad had no such qualms. Pakistan's Interior Minister claimed at a press conference that the Indian leadership had pleaded with the US for a ceasefire multiple times before Islamabad relented.
In subsequent weeks, ties between the US and Pakistan — which had been on a fast-deteriorating trajectory under President Biden as well as during the first Trump administration — received a fresh lease of life. The country's newly elevated Field Marshal Asim Munir travelled to Washington for a meeting with Trump in June, after which Pakistan nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize. This growing bonhomie with Washington, with another visit by Munir in August 2025, has been further strengthened by Islamabad’s participation in the Board of Peace formed by the US, and by its deepening ties with Saudi Arabia, marked by the signing of a mutual defence pact.
These diplomatic exaltations were put to the test with the outbreak of the US-Israel war on Iran in early 2026. The conflict's indirect consequences rippled across much of the world in the form of energy shocks, supply disruptions, and inflationary pressures. For Pakistan, the war brought both opportunities and challenges, compounding existing structural vulnerabilities. The country emerged as an official mediator, hosting the first round of talks in Islamabad in April.
For Islamabad, the mediation serves as a means of underscoring its global relevance — a “prestige project” of sorts for a nation wrought with multiple challenges. While the role has allowed Pakistan to project influence, the failure of the two sides to reach a settlement till now and the rapidly shifting dynamics of the conflict have carried costs. The United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) decision to recall a US$3.5 billion loan, alongside reports of the mass deportation of predominantly Shia Pakistani workers, reflects the strains in the Pakistan-UAE relationship. Abu Dhabi is said to be sceptical of Pakistan’s neutrality in the conflict, and Islamabad’s growing closeness with Saudi Arabia reflects these changed dynamics.
Pakistan's "victory against India" narrative has dual objectives: to clamp down on critics within the country, and to project an image of stability abroad. The ISPR highlighted the synergy between different stakeholders within the country as a byproduct of the conflict, terming it the 'Bunyan-un-Marsoos effect.' But as the country banks on its growing external importance, far less attention has been paid to internal dynamics. In the immediate aftermath of the May 2025 crisis, there was a rally-around-the-flag effect, with deeper structural issues obscured beneath the euphoria of the conclusion of a conflict with India.
Pakistan's "victory against India" narrative has dual objectives: to clamp down on critics within the country, and to project an image of stability abroad.
One year later, the socio-political, economic, and security situation remains precarious, with developments in the region and beyond compounding the difficulty. The coalition government led by Shehbaz Sharif has completed two years in power. In these two years, the boundaries between democracy and military rule have all but blurred, with the promulgation of the 27th constitutional amendment in November 2025 further institutionalising the military's grip on the country's polity. As the fragile PML-N and PPP coalition navigates governing a military-civilian “hybrid model,” PTI leader Imran Khan has remained in prison since August 2023. Over 40 PTI leaders were sentenced to ten years in March 2026 for their participation in the May 2023 protests against the military, with the number of party members convicted reaching hundreds. Both the PTI and the Jamaat-e-Islami have called for marches against the government's inefficiency and criticised its decision to join the Board of Peace. The PTI government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa also adopted a resolution against the federal government on Pakistan’s inclusion in the organisation.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved another staff-level agreement in March this year, attaching 11 additional conditions, including approval of the federal budget. It also revised down its growth outlook for the country, now projecting GDP growth of 3.5 percent and inflation of 8.4 percent for the next fiscal year. The current account deficit is also expected to widen, with total external debt exceeding US$138 billion in 2025 and an expected rollover of US$12 billion in the fiscal year. The decline in foreign exchange inflows, the persistence of unscheduled load shedding — rebranded as the ‘Peak Relief Hours Strategy’ — and the absence of any concerted effort to foster sustainable growth, with the country merely substituting one form of financing for another (a US$3 billion Saudi rollover), do not bode well for the economy.
The internal security situation has also deteriorated sharply. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 2026, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan are the two provinces most affected by militancy, accounting for 74 percent of attacks and 67 percent of deaths in 2025. The number of lives lost to terrorism in Pakistan is now at its highest since 2013, reaching 1,139 in 2025. Both the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) have increased the frequency and scale of their attacks since the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in 2021, with Islamabad's ties with Kabul also at their lowest ebb.
In the short run, Pakistan will likely continue to leverage the diplomatic momentum generated by the West Asia crisis to bolster its credentials as a responsible middle power. The longer-term implications, however, may prove more consequential, as internal fractures deepen and the external environment grows more unpredictable.
The military's growing consolidation of power may give the impression that these overlapping challenges and the volatile external environment will be effectively managed by the establishment. In the short run, Pakistan will likely continue to leverage the diplomatic momentum generated by the West Asia crisis to bolster its credentials as a responsible middle power. The longer-term implications, however, may prove more consequential, as internal fractures deepen and the external environment grows more unpredictable. For India, the events of last year have further underscored the importance of sustaining its campaign, both military and diplomatic, against Pakistan's tacit support for terrorism directed at the country.
Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Shivam Shekhawat is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses primarily on India’s neighbourhood- particularly tracking the security, political and economic ...
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