India–Bangladesh Fishermen Disputes: A Humanitarian Test for Renewed Ties

Complementarities in governance are essential among neighbouring countries to optimise shared resources and address common concerns for mutual benefit. As Tarique Rahman consolidates his position as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh, restoring amity with India has therefore become a priority. Ties between Dhaka and New Delhi had been strained under the interim government that ruled Bangladesh for nearly eighteen months before the current administration was elected in February 2026. Its politics had been regime-driven, geared towards securing popular legitimacy in the absence of a legal mandate rather than serving national interests. However, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government is not a temporary arrangement and has the responsibility to serve its electorate, which includes maintaining stable and prosperous ties with the neighbourhood. At the same time, it has also had a troubled past with India and is therefore cautious in its outreach. For similar reasons, New Delhi, long an ally of the Awami League, is also keen to proceed carefully as it recalibrates its partnership with BNP-ruled Dhaka. In such a situation, it is important to identify humanitarian areas of cooperation that are significant for bilateral relations but not politically controversial.

Complementarities in governance are essential among neighbouring countries to optimise shared resources and address common concerns for mutual benefit. 

One such potent area of transnational concern is fishermen’s transgression across adjacent maritime zones in the Bay of Bengal. The two countries share a contiguous coastline that frames this semi-enclosed sea to the north, and their sovereign waters were delimited in 2014 following a verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. However, despite the demarcation, the media of both countries continue to report unlawful trespasses by fishers into each other’s maritime zones. While these incidents are less frequent than those in the shared waters of India and Sri Lanka, such transgressions and consequent arrests are irritants in Indo-Bangladesh relations and have the potential to jeopardise goodwill between the two countries. Moreover, as Sri Lanka’s experience demonstrates, once fishers’ arrests become entangled with nationalism, coastal politics, and maritime enforcement, they can acquire statist overtones and begin to damage bilateral relations, especially when these are already fragile.

Causes of Transgression

Intentional transgressions by fishermen between India and Bangladesh occur for three reasons:

1. Search for a more abundant catch: Many commercially valuable fish species are migratory, while others are located in particular parts of the sea, such as the popular Bombay Duck. Hence, fishers often cross maritime boundaries in the hope of securing a better or more specific catch. This especially happens during periods when fish stocks have been depleted by overfishing. In such cases, Indian fishing trawlers often encroach into Bangladesh’s waters, and vice versa, to target Hilsa, a prized fish in both countries. The Coast Guard is often tasked with preventing such activity.
   
   
2. Divergences in fishing bans: Even twelve years after the settlement of the maritime boundary, there remains a lack of complementarity in fishing bans between the neighbouring countries, forcing fishers to cross boundaries. Bangladesh enforces a 22-day seasonal fishing ban on Hilsa every October, while neighbouring West Bengal imposes a ban, tentatively between September 15 and October 24. States along India’s east coast also impose a 61-day fishing ban from 15 April to 14 June, whereas Bangladesh historically implemented a 65-day ban from 20 May to 23 July on all types of marine fishing. As a result of these diverging bans, fishers, especially those dependent on a single livelihood, cross maritime borders to catch fish. This not only defeats the conservation purposes of the bans but also culminates in arrests and imprisonment, which in turn affect bilateral ties.
   
   
3. Familial linkages: Communities, especially those living along the India–Bangladesh border, often share familial ties. Historically, they fished together, sharing the maritime space until Partition separated them in 1947. In 2012, a report entitled Scoping Study on Migrant Fishers and Transboundary Fishing in the Bay of Bengal by the Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem Project revealed that communities sharing cultural and linguistic similarities, as well as familial ties, do not report illegal border crossings.

When fishers are arrested for transgression, the consequences can be severe: loss of livelihood, heavy fines, and, in some cases, prolonged imprisonment in a foreign jail as legal proceedings drag on for months. However, as both countries are signatories to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), it is expected that their national laws governing preventive and punitive measures toward transgressing fishers will ensure a rule-based order.

Whose Rule-Based Order?

The UNCLOS, which came into effect in 1994, differentiates between a ‘territorial sea’ and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) regarding the punishment of trespassers. This is because a country’s territorial sea is an extension of its territory, and illegal fishing in this area is considered a national security threat. In such areas, the state exercises full legal sovereignty and can punish intruders under its national laws. In the EEZ, coastal states do not exercise full sovereignty, but they enjoy sovereign rights to exploit, explore, manage, and conserve marine resources. Here, UNCLOS permits coastal states to enforce their fisheries laws by taking necessary measures such as boarding, inspection, arrest, and legal proceedings against vessels in violation. However, the arrested vessels and crew should be released promptly after a reasonable bond or security is posted. It discourages imprisonment or corporal punishment for fisheries violations unless the countries concerned have agreed otherwise.

The imprisonment of Indian fishers in Bangladesh’s EEZ can lead to future disputes between the two governments. This underscores the need for a bilateral agreement on punitive measures for fishers illegally entering each other’s EEZs.

The Maritime Zones of India Act of 1981, although enacted almost ten years before UNCLOS, complies with it by distinguishing between fishers caught in its territorial sea and those in its EEZ. However, Bangladesh’s Marine Fisheries Act of 2020 states that any illegal fishing vessels found in the “Bangladesh Marine Fishing Space”, a blanket term encompassing the territorial sea and EEZ, will be subject to imprisonment, fines, or both. This creates tension with UNCLOS, especially if the same punitive provisions are applied uniformly to violations in both the territorial sea and the EEZ. Nonetheless, the imprisonment of Indian fishers in Bangladesh’s EEZ can lead to future disputes between the two governments. This underscores the need for a bilateral agreement on punitive measures for fishers illegally entering each other’s EEZs.

Bilateral Bottlenecks

India and Bangladesh have only rudimentary arrangements in place to prevent transgression; both were signed in June 2015. The first is a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between their Coast Guards on the “Establishment of Collaborative Relationship to Combat Transnational Illegal Activities at Sea and Develop Regional Cooperation.” The objective is to improve maritime safety cooperation, which includes preventing fishers from crossing boundaries. The second is an MoU on the Blue Economy, which also highlights the need to address unintentional crossings of the international maritime boundary by fishers and to facilitate their early release. The two countries also agreed to establish a Joint Working Group on Blue Economy and Maritime Cooperation, but it remains on paper. However, MoUs do not create the same level of enforceable obligation as treaties; their implementation depends largely on political will.

The delay in formalising these MoUs into agreements may be attributed to multiple factors. Foremost among them is that the Blue Economy is still a nascent concept in both countries, and even then, it is aligned more with resource security than humanitarian concerns surrounding fishermen's arrests.

The delay in formalising these MoUs into agreements may be attributed to multiple factors. Foremost among them is that the Blue Economy is still a nascent concept in both countries, and even then, it is aligned more with resource security than humanitarian concerns surrounding fishermen's arrests. Hence, without clearly articulated policy directives, neither country can make any legal commitments. Secondly, the low number of cases has prevented policymakers from expediting the necessary action to prevent fishermen’s transgressions. Hence, neither India nor Bangladesh has felt the urgency to enforce stronger measures to prevent such illegal activities. However, there is no guarantee that the situation will remain benign, and it could be aggravated during moments of bilateral strain, as experienced during the interim government’s tenure.

From Crisis to Confidence Building

Even during moments of strain, fishermen-related cooperation has shown its value as a diplomatic icebreaker. Indeed, between 3 and 5 January 2025, two fishing vessels, “FV Laila-2” and “FV Meghna-5”, and 90 Bangladeshi fishermen were repatriated to Bangladesh. In exchange, India received six of its detained fishing boats and 95 fishermen and crew members. The handovers were facilitated by the respective Coast Guards of the two countries. This validates the initial claim that, often during periods of bilateral tension, cooperation on humanitarian issues serves as a necessary diplomatic thaw for renewed engagement. Tarique Rahman’s government also appears to be invested in the matter, as it recently revised the fishing ban period to April 15–June 11, bringing it closer to India’s east-coast ban calendar. For New Delhi, this is a strategic moment to deepen ties with Bangladesh through joint action on maritime livelihood governance. Synchronised fishing bans, early-release protocols, joint fisher databases, Coast Guard hotlines, GPS and navigation support, and a legally backed bilateral agreement on EEZ-related fisheries violations are thus necessary areas of mutual consideration.

Synchronised fishing bans, early-release protocols, joint fisher databases, Coast Guard hotlines, GPS and navigation support, and a legally backed bilateral agreement on EEZ-related fisheries violations are thus necessary areas of mutual consideration.

Such cooperation would allow India to demonstrate that its maritime vision is not limited to naval security or trade connectivity but extends to the welfare of coastal communities. This would not only help realise the Maritime India Vision 2047’s prescription to strengthen the country’s Blue Economy but will also enable it to move beyond Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) towards Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR). The latter is an evolution expanding SAGAR’s focus beyond the Indian Ocean Region to a broader global, maritime, and strategic partnership specifically targeting the Global South. For India and Bangladesh, then, protecting fishers from becoming casualties of maritime transgression becomes a meaningful test of whether their renewed partnership can place people, not just geopolitics, at the centre of Bay of Bengal cooperation.

Sohini Bose is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.

Note: This Expert Speak is based on the author’s earlier work, “Finding Solutions to Fishermen Transgressions in the India-Bangladesh Maritime Space”, Observer Research Foundation, Occasional Paper No. 331, 10 September 2021, available here.

A version of this Expert Speak was also presented by the author at the seminar on ‘Coordination and Collaboration with Regional Countries for a Rules-Based Order Promoting the Hon’ble Prime Minister’s Vision of Transforming “Sagar to MAHASAGAR”’, organised by the Indian Coast Guard (North East Region) on 8 May 2026 at its Kolkata headquarters.

• Neighbourhood
• India
• Neighbourhood
• Bangladesh
• Bay of Bengal cooperation
• Blue economy
• Cross-border fishing arrests
• Fishermen transgression
• Fishing ban coordination
• India-Bangladesh relations
• Maritime boundary disputes
• Maritime India Vision 2047
• Maritime livelihood governance

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