A decade after its launch, the FOIP framework is less about creating a preferred regional order and more about helping partners cope with an increasingly unpredictable one
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The idea of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) has now been in circulation for more than a decade. Like many Japanese strategic concepts, it began as a grand geographical vision, evolved into a diplomatic framework, and is now becoming something rather more practical – a mechanism for managing risk in an increasingly unstable international order. The recent update unveiled by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi in Hanoi in May 2026 reflects this evolution. FOIP is no longer primarily about shaping the regional order. It is increasingly about helping Japan and its partners navigate a region defined by strategic fragmentation, economic coercion, technological competition, and uncertainty about the durability of American primacy. The updated framework introduces three priority areas – building economic infrastructure for the age of AI and data, strengthening economic opportunities through public-private collaboration and rule-making, and deepening security cooperation for regional stability.
FOIP is no longer primarily about shaping the regional order. It is increasingly about helping Japan and its partners navigate a region defined by strategic fragmentation, economic coercion, technological competition, and uncertainty about the durability of American primacy.
The origins of FOIP lie with Shinzo Abe, who first articulated the intellectual foundations of the concept in his 2007 “Confluence of the Two Seas” speech before the Indian Parliament. The central proposition was that the Indian and Pacific Oceans should be viewed as a single strategic space connected through trade, maritime routes, and shared political interests. The concept acquired official form in 2016, amid mounting concerns in Tokyo regarding China’s expanding military presence in the East and South China Seas and its growing willingness to challenge established maritime norms. FOIP sought to promote the rule of law, freedom of navigation, connectivity, and capacity-building while avoiding the appearance of an overt containment strategy. Its ambiguity was deliberate. Japan sought to reassure regional states while simultaneously creating a framework for collectively managing concerns about China.
The first phase of FOIP was characterised by optimism. The regional environment largely appeared to be manageable. The United States remained committed to maintaining a favourable balance of power, China’s economic growth continued to underpin regional prosperity, and many states sought ways to balance Beijing without openly confronting it. Japan invested heavily in infrastructure financing, maritime domain awareness, coast guard capacity-building, and development assistance across Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region. More importantly, FOIP succeeded in changing the language of geopolitics. The “Asia-Pacific” gradually gave way to the “Indo-Pacific” as the dominant strategic framework. Governments ranging from the United States and Australia to India and several European powers adopted Indo-Pacific strategies of their own. In this sense, FOIP achieved one of Japan’s longstanding diplomatic ambitions: it reshaped how policymakers conceptualised regional geography and strategic competition.
Yet FOIP’s early success also concealed important limitations. The concept generated diplomatic consensus but did not fundamentally alter the regional balance of power. Southeast Asian states welcomed Japanese investment and maritime assistance but remained reluctant to align themselves explicitly against China. ASEAN responded with its own “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP),” a framework designed to preserve strategic autonomy and prevent the region from becoming polarised. Meanwhile, Chinese economic influence continued to expand despite Japanese and Western efforts to provide alternatives. FOIP was therefore successful as a diplomatic narrative but less effective as an instrument for reshaping regional power dynamics. Its appeal often rested on the fact that different participants interpreted it differently.
The 2026 update under Takaichi represents the most significant recalibration of FOIP since its inception. While retaining the language of openness, inclusivity, and the rule of law, the framework is now heavily focused on economic security.
A second phase emerged under Prime Minister Fumio Kishida. In March 2023, during a speech in New Delhi, Kishida announced a “New Plan for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” This version broadened FOIP considerably. Instead of focusing primarily on maritime security and strategic balancing, Kishida proposed four pillars: principles for peace and rules for prosperity; addressing challenges in an Indo-Pacific way; multi-layered connectivity; and extending efforts for security and the safe use of the sea to the air. The language became more inclusive and developmental. Climate change, public health, digital governance, and economic resilience featured prominently. The shift reflected a growing recognition that many countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Pacific were less interested in geopolitical competition than in infrastructure, sustainable development, and economic growth. FOIP, therefore, evolved from a strategic concept into a broader framework for delivering public goods.
Kishida’s revision also revealed a subtle but important change in Japanese thinking. Earlier versions of FOIP were rooted in assumptions about a relatively stable liberal international order. The 2023 update reflected a world increasingly shaped by geopolitical shocks, including the COVID-19 pandemic, supply-chain disruptions, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Resilience emerged as a recurring theme. Japan began emphasising economic security, diversification of supply chains, and the protection of critical technologies. These concerns would become even more prominent in the next phase of FOIP’s evolution.
The 2026 update under Takaichi represents the most significant recalibration of FOIP since its inception. While retaining the language of openness, inclusivity, and the rule of law, the framework is now heavily focused on economic security. Developing economic infrastructure appropriate for an AI-driven economy, strengthening supply-chain resilience for energy and critical minerals, generating growth opportunities through rule-making and public-private collaboration, and strengthening security partnerships throughout the region are some of the new priorities. Rather than promoting a vision of regional order, the updated FOIP is concerned with managing vulnerability within an increasingly uncertain order.
This shift reflects two broader realities. The first is China’s growing capacity to leverage economic interdependence for strategic purposes. Japanese concerns about rare earths, semiconductors, critical minerals, and technological dependence now sit alongside traditional maritime security concerns. The second reality is the uncertainty surrounding the United States: Takaichi’s update comes at a time of persistent regional anxiety over the reliability of American alliance commitments and the future direction of US strategy in Asia. As a result, Japan has increasingly pursued a networked approach involving partnerships with countries such as Vietnam, Australia, the Philippines, and India. The objective is not necessarily to contain China but to create overlapping structures of resilience that reduce exposure to geopolitical shocks.
Abe’s FOIP was conceived during a period when many policymakers still believed that regional order could be shaped through the steady expansion of liberal norms and institutions. Takaichi’s FOIP reflects a more sceptical age. The assumption now is not that rules will inevitably prevail, but that resilience must be built in anticipation of disruption.
In practical terms, FOIP has achieved mixed results. It has successfully institutionalised Japan’s role as a leading provider of maritime capacity-building, infrastructure assistance, and strategic connectivity. It has also facilitated new mechanisms such as Japan’s expanding Official Security Assistance (OSA) programme and growing defence partnerships with Southeast Asian states. The Philippines, Vietnam, and other regional actors increasingly view Japan as a critical security partner. At the same time, the framework still suffers from structural limitations. Japan lacks the financial and military resources necessary to shape regional outcomes independently.
The future trajectory of FOIP is therefore likely to centre less on traditional maritime strategy and more on economic and technological governance. Supply chains, digital infrastructure, AI regulation, critical minerals, energy security, and industrial resilience are emerging as the new pillars of Indo-Pacific order. Security cooperation will remain important, particularly as tensions persist in the South China Sea and around Taiwan, but FOIP increasingly resembles a framework for managing interdependence rather than merely balancing power.
There is also a deeper transformation underway. Abe’s FOIP was conceived during a period when many policymakers still believed that regional order could be shaped through the steady expansion of liberal norms and institutions. Takaichi’s FOIP reflects a more sceptical age. The assumption now is not that rules will inevitably prevail, but that resilience must be built in anticipation of disruption. In that sense, the updated FOIP is less an expression of strategic confidence than of strategic adaptation.
Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. She covers the Indo-Pacific region, with a focus on Japan’s role in the region. ...
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