Author : Amrita Narlikar

Originally Published The Indian Express Published on May 20, 2026

The old DDA-related concerns remain unaddressed. Chinese overcapacity cannot be solved by trade measures alone. National security barely features in WTO discussions. Planetary rights are scarcely present in trade debates.

What the WTO’s Recent Ministerial Conference Means for Development

It is impossible not to smile darkly, when the results of a G2 summit are discrepant readouts: it seems that Presidents Trump and Xi cannot publicly agree on what was agreed during their recent talks. At least the good news appears to be that they are not colluding over a fool’s endeavour to divide up the world into new spheres of influence. But this is also no time to gloat. Global instability is not about to diminish. For the rest of the world, multilateral institutions matter more than ever. So it is fair to ask: what does the latest ministerial conference of the World Trade Organization (WTO) – MC 14 – held in Yaoundé, Cameroon, mean for development?

Although some hardliners maintain that the WTO is not a development organization and should never have strayed into this complex area, the Agreement establishing the WTO suggests otherwise. It acknowledges the importance of trade in achieving key development goals such as economic growth, poverty alleviation, improvement in living standards, while also protecting the environment. Besides, for an organization that prides itself for being member-driven, it is impossible to ignore “the” priority issue for a great majority of its 166 members.

For some time now, development talks in the WTO have focused on streamlining Special and Differential Treatment. But there are four other aspects, which demand urgent attention.

First, priority must be given to the role that international trade can play in the promotion of economic development and poverty alleviation. The “needs and interests” of developing countries should be placed “at the heart of the WTO.”  WTO nerds will recall these words from the Doha Ministerial Declaration (2001). Unfortunately – the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) – the unprecedented trade round according centrality to development concerns, died a slow and inglorious death. Issues raised by developing countries during the DDA negotiations (e.g. agriculture and non-agricultural market access in developed countries, food security, access to medicines) – some a carryover from the Uruguay Round – still need resolution.

The second challenge derives ironically from a WTO success: China became a full member in 2001, swiftly learning how to use/play the rules. Add to this its political system, state-led investment and industrial policy, and overcapacity in Chinese manufacturing and cheap exports followed. This has global ramifications. Despite some advantages that accrue to developing countries (e.g. cheaper intermediate products), their manufacturing base in key areas gets undercut by China, while depressed prices globally (likely to worsen as developed countries institutionalise their own industrial policies) deliver a double whammy to their development aspirations. If the US and China strike a bilateral deal on this in the future, developing countries will be even harder hit.

Third, economic interdependence - which the post-World War II order religiously promoted in the name of prosperity, peace, and development - can now be weaponized. In this new world, how does a developing country manage access to food and energy, when strategic chokepoints are affected by war? Or, when a major exporter of grain or rare earth minerals imposes export controls? Or, protect its citizens, and national defence systems, against cyber security threats, surveillance and data misuse? These non-hypothetical dangers affect all countries, but developing countries are worse affected because of difficult choices they face: e.g. buy cheap but risky technologies, or exercise caution and thereby risk a deepening digital divide?  To address these threats, national security needs to be factored into trade equations, much more systematically than current rules allow.

Recognition is slowly growing that anthropocentric perspectives on development have caused immense damage to the environment, and also shot humans in the foot.

Fourth, “development” can no longer be restricted to humans alone, and must include planetary concerns. Recognition is slowly growing that anthropocentric perspectives on development have caused immense damage to the environment, and also shot humans in the foot. Pandemics caused by keeping innocent animals in brutal conditions in wet markets, or transporting them as “live exports” on journeys that maim and kill – all part and parcel of a gung-ho, anthropocentric globalisation – are deadly examples. To thrive, we need models of growth and trade that honour the deeply intertwined existence of all beings. To enable this, a deep ecology perspective on development is necessary.

On all four levels, MC 14 has not delivered. The old DDA-related concerns remain unaddressed. Chinese overcapacity cannot be solved by trade measures alone. National security barely features in WTO discussions, with economic security, being prioritised. Planetary rights are scarcely present in trade debates. Ideally, one organization should be mandated to handle these interlinked trade problems: address currency rates and wages, enable trade-offs between economic and security goals, and incorporate more-than-human rights for a new development paradigm. But such a mandate far exceeds that of the WTO’s. Short of establishing a World Government – a near impossibility in the best of times, and a certain impossibility at present – what can the WTO do to address the existential concerns that people and planet face today?

First, the sooner the WTO and its members recognize that “politics” – long regarded as a dirty word in Geneva – is here to stay, the greater the chance that they will be able to acknowledge deep-rooted (sometimes civilizational) differences and develop innovative solutions. These could include taking a tiered approach to MFN and also plurilaterals.

Second, just how disengaged the global public is from trade debates is clear from the perfunctory media coverage MC14 received. A big mistake at MC 14 was to kick the can back to Geneva – a sure-shot recipe to take trade matters even further away from the public eye. The 1990s and early 2000s may have been a golden era for liberal, technocratic solutions, but that time is now long gone. Without political support from the organization and member countries, as well as buy-in from a global citizenry, technically sound solutions to development problems will not fly.

Third, for the WTO to catch up with altered empirical realities, it must become intellectually inclusive. A disciplinary dominance of Economics and Law in its Secretariat (as well as wider network) no longer suffices. Prioritisation of efficiency and compliance, at the expense of fundamental questions of power and ethics, is one of the reasons for the mess that the WTO is in today. Interdisciplinary research, which also includes historians, political scientists, philosophers (and natural scientists, depending on specific issue-areas), will enable the paradigm shift that is needed. And may also end up injecting new life and meaning into the WTO.


This commentary originally appeared in The Indian Express.

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Author

Amrita Narlikar

Amrita Narlikar

Dr. Amrita Narlikar’s research expertise lies in the areas of international negotiation, World Trade Organization, multilateralism, and India’s foreign policy & strategic thought. Amrita is Distinguished ...

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