Introduction

Launched in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has recalibrated the geopolitics of connectivity, cooperation, and strategic development assistance through its sheer scale, market-imperialist ambitions, and the geopolitical heft attached to the massive investments and loans under the Belt and Road cooperation framework.^[1] Between 2013 and 2024, China’s state and private companies, executed and developed over 20,000 projects across 150 countries.^[2] In the same time period, Chinese state banks and companies as well as the private sector, invested, loaned, and executed construction contracts worth US$1.174 trillion.^[3]

As the BRI’s geographical scope expanded from eight countries in 2013 to 150 countries in 2024, the breadth of economic sectors encompassed within the Belt and Road cooperation framework grew in parallel.^[4] BRI’s economic engagement patterns today have undergone a paradigm shift from their initial stages. While BRI’s initial years were dominated by big-ticket economic engagement in the conventional energy and transport sectors, its current priorities are aimed at “small, sustainable, and beautiful” projects in the green energy, technology, and metals and mining sectors.^[5] BRI’s evolution also necessitated the creation of sub-initiatives such as the Digital Silk Road (DSR) and the Health Silk Road.^[6]

Of these sub-initiatives, the DSR has emerged as a priority sub-stream of BRI. Launched in 2017 as a key component of BRI, the DSR promotes ICT cooperation and digital infrastructure development, especially in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs). Backed by Chinese state banks and private and state tech firms, Beijing signed DSR cooperation agreements with around 40 countries, with 24 of them in the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific DSR cooperation agreements committed US$22 billion in investments, loans, construction contracts, and technological exports.^[7]

The DSR also includes Chinese-sponsored overseas hi-tech manufacturing hubs and smart cities that amalgamate the DSR’s ICT cooperation across various domains such as surveillance, undersea cables, 5G/4G cooperation, hi-tech manufacturing, BeiDou navigation systems, cloud computing, and cooperation in artificial intelligence (AI), with traditional BRI infrastructure development.

Table 1: Identified Chinese Smart Cities Technology Exports 

Technology Category	Product Type	Chinese Companies Involved
Surveillance	IP cameras, CCTV, DVR, NVR, video management systems, police body cameras, traffic surveillance systems, facial recognition, IR cameras, licence plate recognition	Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, Shenzhen ZNV, Megvii, Kedacom, Cloudwalk, Uniview, E-Hualu, Yitu
Network Infrastructure	Backbone networks, wi-fi, high-speed networks, 3G, 4G, and 5G infrastructure, LTE networks	Huawei, ZTE, H3C
Big Data	Cloud networks, data centres, servers	Huawei, Alibaba, Tencent, Sugon, Inspur, Sangfor, iSoftStone, ChinaSoft
Fintech	Mobile payment applications, automated payment systems	Huawei, Ping’an, Panda Electronics
Energy	Smart grid, smart meters, advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)	Huawei, ZTE, CEIEC
Integrated Platforms	Emergency response systems, ‘safe city’ solutions, unified urban operation platforms, command centres, dispatching systems, and call centres	Huawei, ZTE, Dahua, Alibaba, Kedacom, Shenzhen ZNV
Municipal Services	Smart parking, traffic management and control systems, bus systems, smart streetlamps, smart waste management	Huawei, Hikvision, Dahua, Kedacom, Gosuncn, E-Hualu, Panda Electronics, Founder International, Carsmart, TelChina, Shenzhen ZNV, iSoftStone

Source: US-China Economic and Security Review Commission^[8]

The breadth of Chinese smart city technology exports spans an array of sectors—from surveillance systems and 5G infrastructure to fintech, municipal services, and integrated emergency platforms. This reflects the expansive global reach of Chinese firms, with 398 documented cases of smart city technology exports by 34 different companies across 106 countries.^[9] The DSR instrumentalises the development of smart cities as a “strategic opportunity,” enabling Chinese state-supported companies, such as Huawei and ZTE, to lead large-scale deployments, particularly in developing nations, where low-cost solutions, backed by state-owned lenders such as the Export-Import Bank of China (China Eximbank), have proved especially effective.^[10]

Meanwhile, in developed countries, Chinese firms are forging partnerships and establishing joint laboratories—tactics that not only expand market share but also serve to promote Chinese standards and soften perceptions about their role in sensitive infrastructure.^[11] Though transparency around data governance in these projects remains limited, access to vast, cross-border datasets clearly strengthens the competitive edge of Chinese firms. It may also contribute to the state-aligned intelligence efforts.^[12] These strategies exemplify how commercial technology exports fulfil China’s broader strategic objectives under the DSR.

The DSR’s Smart Cities and their Strategic Objectives

China presents its DSR smart cities as mutually beneficial modernisation efforts. However, these projects concurrently advance Beijing’s multiple strategic goals. Under the DSR cooperation framework, Beijing packages technologies―from 5G networks and cloud computing to AI-enabled surveillance―as part of the broader BRI infrastructure push (see Table 1).

Chinese state and private firms, often backed by state policy banks and development funds, have built or contracted smart city solutions, such as traffic management, unified emergency platforms, public safety surveillance, and data centres, in 26 Indo-Pacific countries. As Table 1 shows, major Chinese vendors (Huawei, ZTE, Alibaba, Dahua, Hikvision, and others) supply numerous digital products, from IP cameras and 5G base stations to integrated city operations centres, in projects spanning Asia, Africa, and Europe. This diffusion of technology into foreign cities advances China’s economic and strategic objectives in several interlinked ways.

Table 2: Chinese DSR Smart Cities Projects Across the Indo-Pacific  

City/Project	Chinese Companies Involved	Technology Categories	BRI/DSR Link	Estimated Project Cost (in US$ billions)
Islamabad/ Lahore Smart Cities, Pakistan	Huawei, China State Construction (CSCEC), China Harbour Engineering (CHEC)	Surveillance, Network Infrastructure, Municipal Services	CPEC	2.5
Melaka Gateway, Malaysia	PowerChina, Shandong Developers	Municipal Services, Energy, Big Data	Maritime BRI	10.5
New Administrative Capital, Egypt	CSCEC, Huawei	Surveillance, Integrated Platforms, Smart Grid	African BRI flagship	3.4
Konza Technopolis, Kenya	Huawei, China Telecom	Network Infrastructure, Big Data, Surveillance	DSR-aligned	14.5
Colombo Port City, Sri Lanka	CHEC	Municipal Services, Integrated Platforms, Energy	Maritime BRI	1.4
Vientiane Smart City, Laos	Huawei	Network Infrastructure, Surveillance, Municipal Services	Connected to China–Laos Railway	Undisclosed
Addis Ababa Smart Infrastructure, Ethiopia	Huawei	Network Infrastructure, Surveillance, Big Data	BRI-backed	Undisclosed
Smart Luanda, Angola	Huawei, ZTE	Surveillance, Smart Grid, Municipal Services	BRI infrastructure funding	0.5
Smart Dubai (select projects), the UAE	Alibaba Cloud, Huawei	Big Data, Integrated Platforms, Fintech	DSR-aligned	Undisclosed
Eastern Economic Corridor Smart Cities, Thailand	Huawei	Municipal Services, Surveillance, Network Infrastructure	Maritime BRI	11.23
Purbachal Smart City, Bangladesh	PowerChina, Huawei	Energy, Municipal Services, Surveillance	BRI urban infra	1.2

Sources: AidData’s China Global Development Finance Dataset 3.0,^[13] AEI’s China Global Investment Tracker,^[14] and IISS China Connects^[15]

DSR smart cities create export markets for Chinese tech champions and absorb domestic overcapacity. A key DSR policy objective involves addressing industrial overcapacity by internationalising China’s firms. In practice, the smart city push aligns with government plans, such as ‘Made in China 2025’, to promote Chinese leadership in 5G, AI, and IoT.^[16] By 2022, China had formalised some 22 DSR cooperation MoUs, along with numerous additional agreements focused on the digital economy.^[17] Between 2017 and 2020, every Southeast Asian country saw Chinese DSR investment in telecoms, 5G, data centres, fintech, and more, led by firms such as Huawei, Alibaba, and ZTE.^[18]

These deals send Chinese products and engineers abroad and rely on Chinese-funded construction and loans. For instance, Malaysian and Thai smart city initiatives―such as Kuala Lumpur’s City Brain and Thailand’s Eastern Economic Corridor―have adopted Chinese 5G and cloud systems to optimise traffic and public services, effectively tying those local economies to Chinese technology providers. This export-driven model sustains China’s tech sector growth and spurs innovation through scale, while simultaneously fostering dependencies―partner cities become reliant on Chinese hardware, software, and technical support.

Smart city projects also advance China’s geoeconomic strategy. By integrating partner economies into a China-led digital ecosystem, Beijing can expand the yuan’s international role and forge new financial ties.^[19] Chinese firms often bundle financing– via the China Eximbank, the Silk Road Fund, or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank–with technology exports, locking countries into Chinese loans and standards.^[20],[21] China is engaging in economic statecraft that enhances its regional influence and accelerates cross-border e-commerce in yuan.

The growing adoption of Chinese digital payments and trade settlement mechanisms in local economies can undercut the influence of the US dollar. In Africa, for instance, China now finances more ICT infrastructure than all other multilateral agencies combined–a trend echoed across parts of Asia.^[22] In effect, DSR smart cities bind recipient governments into Sino-centric networks, creating export opportunities for China, while also enabling Beijing to exert financial and data leverage in future negotiations—what can be termed the “power to hurt” through connectivity.^[23]

Smart city diplomacy also bolsters China’s foreign policy objectives. Building a smart city or digital hub with China provides host governments with visible, high-tech assistance that can deepen bilateral ties. China has institutionalised the DSR through MoUs and cooperative forums: by 2022, it had signed dozens of DSR and e-commerce agreements across Asia and beyond.^[24] Hosting Chinese smart city projects can thus be portrayed as stepping stones in the Belt and Road partnerships. These projects often export Chinese ideas about governance and cyberspace norms. Chinese leaders explicitly promote “cyber-sovereignty”^[1]—the idea that each state should follow China’s model of internet control—through DSR initiatives.

China uses digital infrastructure diplomacy to help create international norms that conform to its conception of the future digital world. The spread of Chinese-built smart cities encourages the adoption of Chinese technical standards and regulations in surveillance, data management, and urban governance. It also gives Beijing a voice in regional digital forums. Smart cities are not just projects but flagships of China’s vision: they showcase Chinese technology and subtly promote its regulatory model as an alternative to Western cyber standards.

Smart city infrastructure can also serve long-term strategic and security objectives. Integrating Chinese surveillance cameras, data centres, and command-control systems into a city creates dependencies that can be leveraged.^[25] Chinese firms gain access to vast amounts of data―from video feeds to traffic patterns―and intimate knowledge of urban operations. These technologies provide Beijing with potential tools for influence or pressure.

Infrastructure projects framed as economic development or connectivity initiatives can also serve as instruments of compellence. For instance, digital networks and surveillance systems could, in a crisis, be used to disrupt an adversary’s communications or monitor dissidents. In regions such as the Indo-Pacific, where data flows and smart governance tools are sensitive, the Chinese dominance in smart city technology creates concerns about a digital dependency trap. Countries hoping to ‘leapfrog’ with smart city solutions may inadvertently grant Beijing strategic leverage in the absence of viable alternatives. Collectively, these objectives reinforce one another: smart city projects improve infrastructure but also knit partner cities into a China-centric economic, technical, and security architecture. Table 1 illustrates China’s broad toolkit―from smart street lamps and CCTV cameras to 5G networks and AI command centres―being exported globally.

Under the Belt and Road framework, the DSR also advances economic statecraft: it opens markets for Chinese companies and currency, spreads Chinese technical standards and norms, and positions China as the indispensable provider of urban technology. In the Indo-Pacific, where digital competition is intense, China’s lead in smart city exports—backed by state financing and diplomatic deals—allows it to extend influence into cities, from Kuala Lumpur to Manila. In sum, China’s DSR smart cities are designed not just to modernise foreign urban areas, but also to project Chinese power and embed partner economies within China’s strategic orbit.

Key interconnected objectives of DSR smart city projects include: export markets for Chinese tech firms; alleviating domestic overcapacity; boosting Chinese technology leadership; deepening economic ties via Chinese financing and trade; promoting the yuan and China’s digital platforms; tying countries into China-led digital supply chains; strengthening bilateral ties through technology aid; exporting Chinese governance models such as ‘cyber-sovereignty’; securing influence in regional digital governance institutions; gaining access to foreign data and networks for intelligence; and creating dependencies—weaponised interdependence—that can be leveraged politically. These aims overlap: for example, financing deals invariably benefit Chinese companies and bind a partner’s infrastructure to China. By weaving smart city technology with loans, standards-setting, and high-profile visits, China advances a comprehensive statecraft strategy under the DSR cooperation framework.

Geopolitical and Geoeconomic Implications

The DSR’s smart cities initiative is aimed at weaving Chinese IT and telecommunications deep into partner economies. China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology suggests that the digital sector made up 41.6 percent (US$7.1 trillion) of the Chinese GDP in 2021.^[26] While Beijing portrays the DSR as a way to help partners fill a “digital gap”, in practice, it bundles state support with Chinese tech champions (Huawei, Alibaba, ZTE, and others) to export networks, cloud systems, and surveillance solutions. In pursuit of its great power ambitions, Beijing’s strategic objective under the DSR is to establish a China-centric global tech framework, promoting its model of ‘cyber-sovereignty’ and aiming to supplant current internet standards.

China has steadily turned strategy into reality, especially across Southeast and South Asia. Collectively, the DSR economic engagement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies amounted to US$10.3 billion.^[27] Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia together accounted for over half of these deployments.^[28] Most investments have come via Chinese private tech firms: Huawei, Alibaba, and ZTE together led roughly 79 percent of Southeast Asia’s smart city and data centre contracts.^[29]

Beijing’s investments and loans have been hefty. For instance, Huawei secured a US$172.5-million contract for Kenya’s Konza smart city data centre,^[30] while China Development Bank is bankrolling urban ICT hubs in Pakistan and Malaysia (often co-financed with local partners).^{[31],[32],[33]} Chinese companies have also built much of the Indo-Pacific’s telecom backbone: undersea cables now carry Beijing’s influence, e.g. a US$22-million Maldives—Sri Lanka cable and 15 others developed by Huawei’s HMN unit; Chinese carriers push 5G networks into cities, from Jakarta to Manila; and Chinese cloud/data centres proliferate across the region.^[34] These successes show that China has largely realised its economic goals—overseas markets, tech exports, and innovation partnerships have all multiplied under the DSR.

The strategic and geopolitical effects of this buildup are intertwined with the economic side. By embedding Chinese hardware and software into critical infrastructure, China gains influence in those states’ governance. Chinese firms are now central providers of 5G, surveillance, and fibre networks across the Indo-Pacific. A case in point is Maldives, whose network-connected facilities (partly built by Huawei) are a key node in China’s planned maritime digital route.^[35] Pakistan's new smart city projects are tied closely to Beijing, and projects, such as the new Pakistan–East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) cable, land at Chinese-controlled ports (Karachi/Gwadar) on their way to East Africa.^[36] Such linkages allow Beijing to project power under the guise of development—by building deep connectivity, China becomes the economic leader in the region’s geopolitics. There is also a governance dimension: the DSR imports Chinese digital norms, reinforcing a model of tightly controlled internet and mass surveillance in partner countries.

These associations have boosted China’s goals. Profits from DSR projects (telco contracts, tech exports) flow back to China, strengthening its ICT sector. At the same time, partner countries often shoulder Chinese loans or long-term obligations. High-profile cases such as Pakistan illustrate this tension: Islamabad’s exposure to Chinese BRI/DSR loans is estimated at US$28 billion (22.48 percent of its external debt), granting Beijing economic leverage.^[37] Other governments are concerned they have traded control over data and network assets for development aid. Thus, while China’s companies reap market share and China accrues economic benefits, many DSR recipients find themselves economically tied to Beijing. These outcomes encapsulate the DSR’s geoeconomic logic: Chinese investment in digital infrastructure serves as a bid for lasting influence and integrated value chains (from smartphones to big data) in Asia.

The overall picture is mixed. There is no doubt China has achieved substantial reach—its technology is embedded in many Asia-Pacific cities and Chinese platforms (cloud services, mobile payments, mapping apps) now dominate many BRI partner markets. But this advance has provoked caution and competition. Some projects have slowed or been restructured amidst national security concerns, with local leaders becoming wary of “back doors” embedded in Chinese systems.^[38] For example, Malaysia paused parts of Huawei’s AI rollout^[39] and the Philippines has openly sought to diversify its tech partnerships over security fears. The DSR’s rise has also prompted countries to seek alternative digital suppliers and norms—today’s connectivity contest is as much about strategic autonomy as about economics.

In response, Western democracies and India have stepped up their own connectivity and development schemes. Europe’s Global Gateway, launched in 2021, explicitly mobilises up to US$450 billion by 2027 for secure digital, transport, and energy links as an alternative to Chinese BRI projects.^[40] Likewise, the US, Japan, and Australia use their Indo-Pacific frameworks to fund telecom and data projects on open standards.^[41] India, traditionally wary of China’s digital rise, is expanding its digital partnerships with neighbours and investing in regional ICT infrastructure—most notably through the extension of the BharatNet optical fibre network into Bangladesh and the internationalisation of its Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) model. Examples also include India’s submarine cable upgrades in the Maldives and support for ICT-enabled port digitalisation in Sri Lanka, underscoring New Delhi’s effort to anchor regional digital ecosystems.

India’s long-standing separation of economic and security policy is now changing under the pressure from the DSR. New Delhi’s historic refusal to integrate these domains now risks allowing the DSR to become a more dominant conduit for regional tech partnerships. Beijing’s smart cities initiative under the DSR has largely met its geoeconomic objectives across Asia. However, it has also triggered a strategic response: India and the West are actively fortifying their own connectivity networks and governance models to counterbalance China’s influence.

Conclusion

The DSR’s smart cities initiative has become a cornerstone of China’s strategic push in the Indo-Pacific, demonstrating considerable success in advancing Beijing’s interlinked economic, geoeconomic, and geopolitical objectives. Through tech exports, infrastructure financing, and promotion of its digital standards, China has not only opened lucrative markets for its tech giants, but has also created long-term dependencies across regional urban governance systems. The strategic leverage gained from such integration—and ranging from access to data to influence over norms—has allowed Beijing to expand its digital footprint with remarkable efficiency, particularly in Southeast Asia, where Chinese firms dominate smart infrastructure development.

However, this expansion has also triggered strategic recalibrations. The perception of growing digital dependency on China, coupled with concerns over surveillance, data sovereignty, and coercive leverage, has led many Indo-Pacific countries to reassess their engagement. Some projects have been delayed, scaled down, or restructured, reflecting the growing scrutiny of Chinese influence. At the same time, China’s assertiveness has galvanised responses from other regional actors. India is reconfiguring its economic and strategic engagement to assert digital autonomy in South Asia, while the West—through initiatives such as the Global Gateway and the Indo-Pacific Partnerships—has sought to offer competitive, transparent alternatives.

The future of digital connectivity in the Indo-Pacific will likely be shaped not by one dominant actor, but by an evolving balance between Chinese-led initiatives and alternative frameworks that prioritise transparency, trust, and strategic resilience.

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Sameer Patil is Director, Centre for Security, Strategy and Technology, Observer Research Foundation.

Prithvi Gupta is former Junior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation.

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All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.

Endnotes

^[1] China has consistently advanced the principle of “cyber sovereignty,” which asserts that each state has the right to govern, regulate, and control its domestic cyberspace in line with national laws and security priorities. This framework underpins Beijing’s approach to internet governance, legitimising state-led control of digital infrastructure, data flows, and online content while resisting Western advocacy for a globally open and interoperable internet. See Rogier Creemers, “Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 103 (2017): 85–100; Samm Sacks, “Beijing Wants to Rewrite the Rules of the Internet,” The Atlantic, June 18, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/06/zte-huawei-china-trump-trade-cyber/563033.

^[1] Yu Jie and Jon Wallace, What China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Means for the World, Chatham House, September 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/what-chinas-belt-and-road-initiative-bri.

^[2] Belt and Road Reboot: Beijing’s Bid to Reorient Globalisation, AidData, https://www.aiddata.org/publications/belt-and-road-reboot.

^[3] Prithvi Gupta, “China’s Belt and Road After the 3rd Forum: Reform or Rebrand?,” Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/english/expert-speak/belt-and-road-reforms-sustainability-strategy-and-soft-power.

^[4] Green Finance & Development Center, Countries of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), https://greenfdc.org/countries-of-the-belt-and-road-initiative-bri/.

^[5] Gupta, “China’s Belt and Road After the 3rd Forum: Reform or Rebrand?”

^[6] The Health Silk Road is a component of China’s BRI aimed at enhancing international cooperation in public health, particularly through medical aid, pandemic response, and health infrastructure development. It gained prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic as China supplied vaccines, medical equipment, and expertise to partner countries, particularly in the Global South.

^[7] Patil and Gupta, The Digital Silk Road in the Indo-Pacific.

^[8] Atha et al., China’s Smart Cities Development.

^[9] Atha et al., China’s Smart Cities Development.

^[10] Jacob J. Lew et al., China’s Belt and Road: Implications for the United States, Council on Foreign Relations, Task Force Report No. 79, April 2021, https://www.cfr.org/task-force-report/chinas-belt-and-road-implications-for-the-united-states/findings

^[11] Jonathan E. Hillman, The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).

^[12] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road.

^[13] “China’s Overseas Development Finance,” Global Development Policy Center, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/.

^[14] “China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.

^[15] International Institute for Strategic Studies, China Connects, https://chinaconnects.iiss.org/.

^[16] Jost Wübbeke et al., Made in China 2025, London, MERICS, 2016, https://merics.org/en/report/made-china-2025.

^[17] State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “China’s Digital Silk Road Spurs Global Cooperation,” Press Release, October 11, 2023, https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202310/11/content_WS6526994fc6d0868f4e8e024a.html.

^[18] Jonathan E. Hillman, The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).

^[19] John A. Matthews, “China’s Long Term Trade and Currency Goals: The Belt Road Initiative,” Journal Article,ResearchGate, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/389904511_China's_Long_Term_Trade_and_Currency_Goals_The_Belt_Road_Initiative.

^[20]  Export-Import Bank of China, “China Daily: China Eximbank backs BRI cooperation,” November 13, 2024, http://english.eximbank.gov.cn/News/NewsR/202411/t20241113_61949.html.

^[21] Richard Bluhm et al., “How Chinese Development Finance Supports Economic Growth and Reduces Inequality: A Subnational Analysis,” Journal of Policy Modeling (2024), https://www.richard-bluhm.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Chinese_aid_and_inequality_WEB.pdf

^[22] Tim Zajontz, Africa’s Railway Renaissance: The Belt and Road Initiative and the Struggle for Transport Infrastructure in Africa (Cham: Springer, 2024), https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-44449-4.

^[23] The “power to hurt” through connectivity refers to a state's ability to exploit digital and infrastructural dependencies to coerce or punish others, such as by restricting access to critical networks or data flows. In the context of DSR smart cities, this leverage stems from China's control over the digital infrastructure it exports, allowing it to influence recipient states’ behaviour.

^[24] Export-Import Bank of China, “News Release.”

^[25] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road.

^[26] China Daily, “BRI Projects Help Drive Digital Transformation,” China Daily, July 30, 2022, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202207/30/WS62e4ef9ca310fd2b29e6f520.html.

^[27] “China Global Investment Tracker,” American Enterprise Institute, https://www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/.

^[28] Wang Zheng, China’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) in Southeast Asia: Progress and Challenges, ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute, https://fulcrum.sg/chinas-digital-silk-road-dsr-in-southeast-asia-progress-and-challenges/.

^[29] Lew et al., China’s Belt and Road.

^[30] Kenyan Wall Street, “Huawei to Develop Konza Data Centre and Smart City,” https://kenyanwallstreet.com/huawei-to-develop-konza-data-centre%EF%BB%BF-and-smart-city/.

^[31] Galib Bashirov, Shahram Akbarzadeh, Ihsan Yilmaz, and Zahid Shahab Ahmed, “Diffusion of Digital Authoritarian Practices in China’s Neighbourhood: The Cases of Iran and Pakistan,” Democratization 32, no. 1 (2025), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13510347.2025.2504588.

^[32] Adrija Chatterjee and Megha Mittal, “Why China’s $70-Billion Infra Investment in Pakistan Has More to Do with India,” Moneycontrol, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/business/why-china-s-70-billion-infra-investment-in-pakistan-has-more-to-do-with-india-13025824.html.

^[33] Wang, China’s Digital Silk Road in Southeast Asia.

^[34] Patil and Gupta, The Digital Silk Road in the Indo-Pacific.

^[35] Patil and Gupta, The Digital Silk Road in the Indo-Pacific

^[36] Thomas Blaubach, Connecting Beijing’s Global Infrastructure: The Peace Cable in the Middle East and North Africa,Middle East Institute, https://mei.edu/publications/connecting-beijings-global-infrastructure-peace-cable-middle-east-and-north-africa.

^[37] “China’s Overseas Development Finance,” Global Development Policy Center, https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinas-overseas-development-finance/.

^[38] Hillman, The Digital Silk Road.

^[39] "Malaysia Backtracks on Huawei AI Deal," Bloomberg News, May 20, 2025, https://www.bangkokpost.com/business/general/3030290/malaysia-backtracks-on-huawei-ai-deal

^[40] European Commission, Global Gateway Overview, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-gateway/global-gateway-overview_en.

^[41] Sameer Patil and Tanya Aggarwal, The Road to 5G Innovation: Exploring O-RAN Through Experimentation, Observer Research Foundation, https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-road-to-5g-innovation-exploring-o-ran-through-experimentation.

• International Affairs
• China
• India
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• belt road initiative
• BRI economic engagement
• china digital silk road
• china digital silk road initiative
• china smart city technology
• chinese dsr smart cities projects
• digital silk road initiative
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• dsr smart cities
• indo pacific economic framework
• indo pacific economic framework

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