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Guillaume Gandelin, “The Case for India-France Cooperation in the South-Western Indian Ocean,” ORF Issue Brief No. 876, Observer Research Foundation, May 2026.
Global attention to the Indian Ocean Region is typically focused only on its northwest because of issues such as Somali and Houthi piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, interstate rivalry between Iran and its southern neighbours, and the disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. In comparison, the south-western Indian Ocean (SWIO) receives limited attention despite facing equally critical challenges, as it is somewhat distant from the centres of geopolitical and economic rivalry. The SWIO is best understood as the area surrounding the Mozambique Channel, bounded by the Horn of Africa (north), the Cape of Good Hope (south), the island of Madagascar (east), and the coastal hinterland of Mozambique, Tanzania, and Kenya (west).
Figure 1: The SWIO and the Mozambique Channel
Source: D. Jacquard, SIRPA, Marine Nationale[1]
The SWIO is particularly important for two of the main stakeholders in the Indian Ocean: India and France. Both states take a keen interest in the region’s stability and prosperity.
For France, the SWIO is the strongest element of its Indo-Pacific strategy, given the location of its territories of Réunion (the richest and most populated of France’s overseas territories), Mayotte, and the inhabited Scattered Islands and French Southern and Antarctic Lands in the Mozambique Channel and the Antarctic Ocean. From a French perspective, the strategic imperative is to prioritise the well-being and interests of its million-plus citizens living in the area, combined with a partnership-based approach towards regional actors.
Meanwhile, for India, the SWIO is a key area of focus and operation for its Navy. Several of the region’s states have had deep, trusted strategic partnerships with India to diversify away from dependence on the major powers. India is seen as a credible development partner for countries such as Tanzania and Mozambique, which are seeking to tackle development challenges through a Global South approach.
This brief assesses the potential for cooperation between India and France in the SWIO. It also considers the criticality of the Mozambique Channel to both countries’ strategic interests and approaches to the region, and argues that they can leverage their complementarities to benefit the region’s development and security needs.
The IOR, encompassing 20 percent of the world’s water surface, is home to more than three billion people across over 33 nations (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: The Indian Ocean Region
Source: C. Bouchard[2]
The region is a vital artery for global trade,[3] as two-thirds of the world’s oil and one-third of cargo traffic pass through its sea lanes. The presence of several critical entry points to the IOR—the Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab el Mandeb straits and the Mozambique Channel (see Figure 3)—highlights its importance in energy and maritime trade flows as well as the IOR’s ‘closed’ nature compared to the ‘open’ oceans such as the Pacific and the Atlantic. The IOR serves as a transit hub for a significant volume of extra-regional trade.[4] For instance, 80 percent of China’s oil passes through the IOR, particularly the Malacca Strait.[5]
Figure 3: SLOCs and Chokepoints in the IOR
Source: C. Bouchard, 2008[6]
Due to this unique position as a global passageway, the IOR is central to great-power interests: China’s only overseas military base is in Djibouti, while the US relies on its longstanding presence in Diego Garcia to project its forces in the region and beyond. Regional actors are also keen to augment their role as security providers; India is viewed as a local hegemon due to its location and political, economic, and military heft in the IOR.[7]
Yet, despite its strategic importance as a whole, the IOR can best be viewed as a group of sub-regions: the SWIO, the north-west Indian Ocean, and the north-eastern Indian Ocean (the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Strait) are the critical nodes.[8]
About 5,000 ships cross the Mozambique Channel annually, with 30 percent of the world’s oil trade by volume transiting through the route.[9] The majority of these transits occur south of the Channel, from the Cape of Good Hope to Asian markets, a route that has gained significance following Houthi attacks in the Red Sea.[10] Additionally, the region has the potential to become an energy hub, with an estimated 150 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves, the third largest in Africa,[11] mostly found in the Rovuma basin off the coast of northern Mozambique. In the coming decade, the country could become one of Africa’s leading gas producers; indeed, Mozambique's gas production has doubled over the past decade and is poised for further growth. Similarly, Tanzania is seeing significant developments in liquefied natural gas (LNG), with an upcoming US$42-billion project at Lindi.[12]
China is a key player in this region. In the SWIO, it is cementing ties with many countries through numerous infrastructure projects, including ports (such as Kenya’s Mombasa[13] and Tanzania’s Bagamoyo ports[14]), railways (such as the Mombasa–Nairobi line[15] and the revitalisation of the Tanzania-Zambia line[16]), and highways (such as the Nairobi Expressway[17]). China’s increased presence in the region is the result of a decades-long endeavour that began in the early 2000s with the ‘Go Out’ strategy[a] and was institutionalised through the regular Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, most recently held in Beijing in September 2024.[18]
China’s growing military footprint in East Africa is a concern for other regional powers, particularly France and India. Tanzania has emerged as the hub of Chinese military activities in the region: through arms transfers,[19] large-scale joint military exercises (such as Peace and Unity held in 2024[b],[20]), and a joint training academy in Mapinga.[21] Beijing is now actively pursuing a defence cooperation with Dodoma.[22]
Political instability in the SWIO countries is another area of concern, with risks of potential spillover effects on transnational crime, trafficking, piracy, and terrorism. Recent years have seen youth in the region revolt against perceived corrupt and authoritarian leadership, including in Mozambique,[23] Tanzania,[24] and Madagascar.[25] These socio-political upheavals add a layer of complexity and should drive India and France to evolve their dealings with local and regional actors to address the issues affecting the region.
France has several overseas territories in the IOR (see Figure 4), of which Réunion is the most populous—with 900,000 inhabitants, more than many sovereign IOR nations, including Seychelles and the Maldives. It is also the richest, with a GDP of about US$25 billion, higher than those of the surrounding countries, including Mauritius and Mozambique.[26] Réunion, Mayotte, and the smaller, uninhabited Scattered Islands (located in the Mozambique Channel) constitute a strategic region that allows France to project itself as a European, African, and Indian Ocean nation altogether.
Figure 4: French Territories in the Indian Ocean Region
Source: Paco Milhiet, The Diplomat, 2025[27]
To better integrate and connect these territories with their immediate neighbours, France promoted the establishment of the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC) in the mid-1980s.[28] First envisioned through the lens of economic and trade linkages, the IOC has now begun to include maritime security initiatives to better monitor and coordinate maritime issues between its member states. This is being done through the creation of a regional information fusion centre (in Madagascar) and with the use of the Indo-Pacific Regional Information Sharing (IORIS) maritime domain awareness (MDA) tool.[c]
Given China’s presence in a region previously viewed as France’s backyard, Paris appears to be abandoning its previous interventionist approach and adopting a new focus on maritime cooperation, trade, and people-to-people exchanges between its SWIO overseas territories and the surrounding countries. France’s commitment to the region’s economic prosperity was on display in the spring of 2025 when President Emmanuel Macron made a maiden tour of the SWIO and co-chaired the 5th IOC summit in Madagascar.[29] Through this renewed presence, France is seeking to reaffirm its status as a resident power and its commitment to the region’s stability, particularly through initiatives such as the Indian Ocean Academy, based in Réunion, which focuses on maritime, regional, domestic, and civil security.[30]
To achieve a closer partnership with the region and enhance regional capacity-building, strengthening defence cooperation is an imperative (see Figure 5). France’s military presence in the region is visible through the Forces armées de la zone sud de l’océan Indien (FAZSOI),[d] which are mostly stationed in Réunion, with a small contingent operating from Mayotte. FAZSOI constitutes France’s largest overseas military presence, with close to 2,000 personnel from the air force, army, and navy, and the military port of Réunion is the country’s third largest after Toulon and Brest, hosting six units and more than 500 sailors.[31] This active military presence allows France to act as a regional first responder in the event of natural disasters and launch quick humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) operations. For instance, in February 2026, FAZSOI was quick to send supplies via air to the affected areas in Madagascar in the aftermath of Cyclone Fytia.[32]
Figure 5: French Military Presence in the Indian Ocean Region
Source: Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique[33]
Additionally, over the next few years, the military facilities in Réunion will be equipped with new ships (such as Offshore Patrol Vessels) and aircraft (such as the Falcon 50 Albatros) to enhance surveillance of France’s exclusive economic zones (EEZs).
Through these dedicated platforms, France will be better able to monitor and tackle hybrid threats, such as illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing, piracy, smuggling, and trafficking, in cooperation with regional navies and armed forces with which it has a longstanding collaboration, including Seychelles, Mauritius, the Comoros, and Madagascar. Notably, in 2025, these countries participated alongside the FAZSOI in a multinational exercise (TULIPE) aimed at bolstering interoperability among their armed forces to enable quicker intervention amid crises.[34]
Importantly, France’s renewed outreach to the region comes amidst certain diplomatic disputes with countries in the region: with the Comoros over the sovereignty of Mayotte, with Madagascar over the Scattered Islands, and with Mauritius over the atoll of Tromelin. While unresolved, these disagreements have been handled through dedicated political channels, such as a bilateral joint commission in the case of Madagascar.[35]
The SWIO and East Africa represent India’s most dynamic area of economic cooperation with the continent. Indeed, the first two of India’s top five trade partners in Africa are in the SWIO: South Africa and Tanzania. While South Africa trades significantly more with China than with India, New Delhi holds a competitive advantage in Tanzania, due to its exports of pharmaceuticals, machinery, and petroleum products. The Indian diaspora, numbering around 55,000 in Tanzania, also plays a role in bolstering these ties.[36] Additionally, Mauritius is the second largest source of foreign direct investment to India (after Singapore), accounting for 9 percent of all FDI to India in FY 2024-2025.
Diplomatic ties are also strong. The African Union became a full member of the G20 during India’s presidency in 2023. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Ethiopia and South Africa in December 2025. Further, the next India-Africa Forum Summit will be held in mid-2026, aligning with both regions' long-term strategic visions: ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ for India and ‘Agenda 2063’ for Africa. The partnership is broad-based, covering critical minerals, supply chain resilience, human capital, and digital public infrastructure (DPI). India has a competitive edge in technology and can offer its expertise in DPI—exemplified by India Stack, UPI, and Aadhaar—to its African partners.
The emerging economies in the SWIO that are located closest to India’s shores, such as Tanzania, Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Uganda, have all recorded GDP growth of 6 percent or more in recent years, on a par with India.[37] However, connectivity between the two regions remains limited; for instance, there are no direct flights between Tanzania or Mozambique and India, hampering deeper engagement.
India is also strengthening its defence cooperation with the SWIO countries. During the 2025 Aikeyme Exercise off the coast of Tanzania, the Indian Navy trained alongside a dozen East African militaries.[38] In addition, the 2025 INS Sagar training mission in the SWIO paved the way for a more enduring Indian Navy deployment in the region via new and potentially recurring pathways of cooperation such as on-ship cadet training (see Figure 6). Additionally, since 2024, India has posted defence attachés in Mozambique and Tanzania.[39]
Figure 6: Indian Navy’s Mission-Based Deployments in the Indian Ocean
Source: Dutta[40]
India remains committed to traditional defence partners such as Mauritius (for instance, by building the Agalega airstrip[41]), but is now diversifying its regional partnerships and engaging more widely. For instance, India provided HADR assistance to Madagascar, through ‘Operation Vanilla’, following severe flooding from Cyclone Diane in 2020, and has since carried out joint EEZ patrols, participated in joint training, and made port calls on the island.[42] India has also maintained sustained engagement with Mozambique through regular navy visits (following a maritime security agreement in 2011) and the donation of patrol boats in 2022.[43]
Consequently, India is increasingly recognised as a major regional stakeholder, epitomised by its new ‘MAHASAGAR’ vision, launched in Mauritius in 2025,[e] and the navy’s deployments in the region.
France’s and India’s strategic priorities in the SWIO often align, particularly in the maritime domain. It is prudent for the two sides to find new avenues for bilateral cooperation to benefit the countries of the region.
The two countries could consider establishing a cooperation mechanism with Mauritius on maritime safety and security. The upsurge in maritime traffic through the Mozambique Channel increases the risk of accidents, including oil spills and collisions, but the region is ill-equipped to address these safety hazards. In 2020, Mauritius attempted to salvage the bulk carrier MV Wakashio off its coast with a tugboat, which subsequently sank, while the ship released more than 1,000 metric tons of oil into Mauritius’ fragile coral ecosystem. France and India were the primary responders during the incident, sending support teams and equipment to help contain the oil spill. Later, during their 2025 visits to Mauritius, Macron and Modi stressed the need to strengthen maritime security and signed various agreements on the issue.[44] As such, Paris and New Delhi could assist Port Louis in developing its own capacities to avoid similar disasters by investing in larger tugboats better suited to the demands of the growing maritime traffic. Japan has already announced a similar partnership with Mauritius.[45]
Another area of convergence is in the underwater domain, particularly submarine cables, several of which pass through the Mozambique Channel and the adjacent waters and are strategic for India and France. Together with Australia, a key player in the domain, India and France can establish a regional submarine cable repair centre in Mauritius to enhance cable security and reduce vulnerability. Sharing knowledge about cable disruptions is vital; India already discusses this with Australia and the other Quad partners (the US and Japan),[46] and France can share the expertise of private firm Alcatel Submarine Networks (among the top companies worldwide for the manufacture and installation of submarine cables) and the French military (through its exercises on potential cable breakdown and backup strategies through military satellites) with India and Australia.[47]
France, India, and Australia could also leverage their locations in the Indian Ocean to systematise joint air and naval patrols, which are essential for monitoring the region, especially given concerns about China's presence. The patrols could operate from Diego Garcia, Réunion, the Cocos Islands, Agalega, or the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The three countries have already undertaken some initiatives on this front: joint Indo-French patrols off Réunion were established in 2020 and 2022,[48] Australia sent a Boeing P-8 maritime patrol aircraft to Réunion in 2024,[49] and an Indian Navy ship made a port call in 2025.[50] Although Australia’s Cocos Islands and India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands are politically and ecologically sensitive[f] and infrastructure-constrained, there have been instances of foreign naval and air deployments, such as a US Navy’s P8 stopover in Port-Blair in 2020[51] and an Indian Navy C-130 call to the Cocos airfield in 2023.[52] Additionally, with the United Kingdom (UK) and Mauritius having finalised the legal status of the Chagos Islands, Diego Garcia may begin to be used more widely by other navies and air forces.
These joint maritime security efforts could prove instrumental in addressing threats such as piracy, illegal trafficking, and smuggling, as well as in monitoring the activities of Chinese fishing fleets, research vessels, and submarines, which frequently cross the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean. Importantly, these efforts could include additional like-minded partners, such as Seychelles, which is already active in the US-led Combined Maritime Forces, of which France, India, and Australia are also members.
The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) is another venue where India, France, and Australia can raise awareness of the threats facing the region through table-top exercises and high-level discussions. India is the current IONS president and held the 9th Conclave of Chiefs alongside the Milan Exercise in February 2026.[53] India can leverage its presidency to transform the organisation into an ‘Indian Ocean Quad,’ with only like-minded partners participating in joint naval exercises.
France and India also have a strong incentive to stabilise Mozambique, one of the region’s most volatile states. While Maputo is keen to expand and diversify its partnerships with global actors, domestic political instability and security risks have long hampered lasting cooperation. However, Mozambique’s LNG sector offers promise for further cooperation (see Figure 7).
Figure 7: Gas Exploitation in Mozambique
Source: Alessandro Picoli et al., S&P Global[54]
Although the country’s large offshore gas reserves remain largely untapped due to the ongoing insurgency in Cabo Delgado, the current deployment of the European Union (EU) Military Assistance Mission (which aims to train and advise Mozambican armed forces to restore security in the region) could help secure the oil installations needed to operate the large-scale LNG project in that area. The US$20-billion project has been stalled for years, but the French major TotalEnergies has now restarted construction. If completed by the 2029 deadline, it will both boost Mozambique’s coffers and help satisfy India and France’s growing appetite for LNG (Indian companies hold 30 percent of the project).[55] As such, Paris and New Delhi have a strong interest in maintaining stability in the Cabo Delgado region by reigning in the ongoing insurgency. While France can support extending the EU mission in Mozambique beyond the current deadline of June 2026, India can take on a more active role by providing financial assistance to local military efforts in Cabo Delgado.
This could ensure a steady implementation of Mozambique’s main energy project, which could prove instrumental in Maputo’s fiscal and macroeconomic consolidation and its overall political stability. This, in turn, would benefit the entire sub-region.
The diverse, if incremental steps, discussed in this brief could help cement a stronger India-France security nexus in the SWIO. However, any vacuum or lapse due to inaction will likely be filled by competitors. Indeed, regional states are not waiting for other countries to express interest in establishing development projects and security initiatives.
Rather, they are actively engaging in multialigned partnerships to secure their interests. For instance, Somalia is working to deepen its military cooperation with Türkiye[56] and Tanzania is aiming to strengthen its energy ties with Russia. In this competitive environment, France and India share the advantage of being resident powers with long histories of regional engagement and cooperation.
Guillaume Gandelin is Visiting Fellow, Strategic Studies Programme, ORF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the author, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] A Chinese policy encouraging businesses, both state-owned and private, to invest in foreign countries.
[b] The exercises saw participation from the Chinese army, air force (Y-20 transport aircraft) and navy (Type 071 amphibious landing dock vessels).
[c] IORIS’s idea is to aggregate and map through a digital tool the maritime activities in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific to have a common operating picture of the zone. It is funded by the EU Crimario’s programme.
[d] The French Armed Forces in the south-western Indian Ocean.
[e] PM Modi launched SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in 2015, focusing on maritime security in the Indian Ocean. With the upgrade to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), it widens the scope to encompass economic and geopolitical challenges across the IOR and beyond.
[f] Cf. the heated debate on the controversial Great Nicobar Project.
[1] D. Jacquard, Service Information et Relations Publiques de l’Armée, Marine Nationale, https://www.colsbleus.defense.gouv.fr/fr/le-canal-du-mozambique-sous-etroite-surveillance.
[2] C. Bouchard, “Indian Ocean Region,” 2007, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/indian-ocean-region.
[3] Darshana Baruah, “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), June 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/mapping-the-indian-ocean-region?lang=en.
[4] ScienceDirect, “Indian Ocean Region,» https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/indian-ocean-region.
[5] Gabriel Lane, “Navigating the Malacca Dilemma in 2025,” Atlas Institute for International Affairs, March 4, 2025, https://atlasinstitute.org/navigating-the-malacca-dilemma-in-2025/.
[6] C. Bouchard, “Sea Lanes of Communications and Chokepoints in the Indian Ocean Region,” 2008, https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/social-sciences/indian-ocean-region.
[7] Rajeev Srinivasan, “Shadow Warriors: The Need for Paxx Indica: Malacca was Blocked 1001 Years Ago, Hormuz is Choked Now,” Firstpost, April 29, 2026, https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-the-need-for-pax-indica-malacca-was-blocked-1001-years-ago-hormuz-is-choked-now-14005673.html.
[8] Cedric Perrin et al., “La stratégie française pour l’Indo-Pacifique : des ambitions
à la réalité,” Rapport d’information, n° 285, Sénat, January 25, 2023, https://www.senat.fr/rap/r22-285/r22-285.html.
[9] United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), “Understanding and Valuing the Marine Ecosystem Services of the Northern Mozambique Channe,” https://wedocs.unep.org/items/7b12fc1d-eaa4-4ffd-9b3d-518b8df128e7.
[10] Mike Schuler, “Uncertainty Returns to Red Sea as CMA CGM Reverses Course, Threatening Supply Chain Stability,” GCaptain, January 20, 2026, https://gcaptain.com/uncertainty-returns-to-red-sea-as-cma-cgm-reverses-course-threatening-supply-chain-stability/.
[11] Alessandro Picoli et al., “Is Floating LNG the Key to Unlocking the Rovuma Basin Potential?,” S&P Global, November 21, 2022, https://www.spglobal.com/energy/en/research-analytics/is-floating-lng-the-key-to-unlocking-the-rovuma-basin-potential.
[12] Bahati Mwatesa, “$42 billion LNG Project in Lindi Promises Thousands of Jobs and Economic Growth,” The Citizen, January 11, 2025, https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/national/-42-billion-lng-project-in-lindi-promises-thousands-of-jobs-and-economic-growth-4885510.
[13] Mbungu Harrison, “KPA, China Firm Deepen Strategic Ties as Mombasa Port Expansion Gains Pace,” The Coast, March 21, 2026, https://www.thecoast.co.ke/2026/03/21/kpa-china-firm-deepen-strategic-ties-as-mombasa-port-expansion-gains-pace/52/28/business-news/thecoast/14847/07/.
[14] “Tanzania to Begin Construction of Long-Delayed $10bn Bagamoyo Port,” Live Africa News, November 25, 2025, https://liveafricanews.com/2025/11/25/tanzania-to-begin-construction-of-long-delayed-10bn-bagamoyo-port/.
[15] Javier M. Pedra, “On a China-built Train from Mombasa to Nairobi,” Asia Times, August 22, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/08/on-a-china-built-train-from-mombasa-to-nairobi/.
[16] “TAZARA Revitalization,” CGTN, November 28, 2025, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2025-11-28/TAZARA-revitalization-1IFyuZBkRvq/p.html.
[17] Jevans Nyabiage, “China-backed Nairobi Expressway Opens in Kenya, Paving the Way for More Cautious Financing Model,” South China Morning Post, August 2, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3187354/china-backed-nairobi-expressway-opens-kenya-paving-way-more.
[18] Jevans Nyabiage, “How China Leapfrogs Other Nations to Build Close African Trade and Military Ties,” South China Morning Post, July 19, 2025, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3318574/how-china-leapfrogs-other-nations-build-close-african-trade-and-military-ties.
[19] Alessandro Arduino, “China’s Expanding Security Footprint in Africa: From Arms Transfers to Military Cooperation,” Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), September 20, 2024, https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/chinas-expanding-security-footprint-in-africa-from-arms-transfers-to-military-cooperation-184841.
[20] Jake Vartanian, “Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania,” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, October 9, 2024, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/SSI-Media/Recent-Publications/Display/Article/3930357/peace-and-unity-chinas-growing-military-footprint-in-tanzania/.
[21] Vartanian, “Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania.”
[22] Vartanian, “Peace and Unity: China’s Growing Military Footprint in Tanzania.”
[23] “Mozambique Violence Fuelled by Historical Grievances and Civil War Politics,” Radio France Internationale (RFI), December 10, 2024, https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20241210-mozambique-violence-fuelled-by-historical-grievances-and-civil-war-politics.
[24] Isaac Mugabi, “Tanzania’s Opposition Criticizes ‘Whitewashing’ of Violence,” Deutsche Welle, April 4, 2024, https://www.dw.com/en/tanzanias-opposition-criticizes-whitewashing-of-post-election-violence/a-76919885.
[25] “Police Fire Tear Gas as Violence Erupts in Madagascar Protests,” Al Jazeera, October 10, 2025, https://www.aljazeera.com/gallery/2025/10/10/police-fire-tear-gas-as-violence-erupts-in-madagascar-protests.
[26] For La Réunion, see National Institute of Statistic and Economic Studies (INSEE), https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/8605042?sommaire=8596364#tableau-figure1. For other territories, see International Monetary Fund (IMF), https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDPD@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/MUS/MDG/COM/MOZ.
[27] Paco Milhiet, “France in the Indian Ocean: Navigating National Imperatives and Regional Ambitions,” The Diplomat, May 1, 2025, https://thediplomat.com/2025/05/france-in-the-indian-ocean-navigating-national-imperatives-and-regional-ambitions/.
[28] Christian Bouchard et al., “Two Faces of France: ‘France of the Indian Ocean’/’France in the Indian Ocean’,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 7, (2011), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/19480881.2011.637423.
[29] Milhiet, “France in the Indian Ocean: Navigating National Imperatives and Regional Ambitions.”
[30] Préfecture de La Réunion, “Académie de l’Océan Indien,” https://www.reunion.gouv.fr/Actions-de-l-Etat/Cooperation-ocean-Indien/Academie-de-l-ocean-Indien.
[31] Ministère des Armées (France), “Forces armées dans la zone sud de l’océan Indien (FAZSOI),” https://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/indopacifique/forces-souverainete-indopacifique/forces-armees-zone-sud-locean-indien-fazsoi.
[32] “Cyclone Fytia à Madagascar: Les FAZSOI déployées en soutien pour acheminer une aide d’urgence,” Freedom, February 9, 2026, https://freedom.fr/cyclone-fytia-a-madagascar-les-fazsoi-deployees-en-soutien-pour-acheminer-une-aide-durgence/.
[33] Antoine Bondaz, “Fact sheet No.4: Military Presence and Defense Diplomacy Defending Sovereignty and Promoting Stability in the Indo-Pacific Region,” Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, December 18, 2023, https://frstrategie.org/en/publications/fiches-indo-pacifique/n4-military-presence-defence-diplomacy.
[34] Eline Ulysse, , “Opération Tulipe 25: 1500 militaires issus des 5 pays de la force multinationale de l’océan Indien présents à Madagascar,” Outremers360, April 20, 2025, https://outremers360.com/bassin-indien-appli/operation-tulipe-25-1500-militaires-issus-des-5-pays-de-la-force-multinationale-de-locean-indien-presents-a-madagascar.
[35] Guilhem Fabry, “Îles Éparses: le président malgache veut trouver avec la France une issue durable sur leur rétrocession,” Radio France Internationale (RFI), May 5, 2025, https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20250505-%C3%AEles-%C3%A9parses-le-pr%C3%A9sident-malgache-veut-trouver-avec-la-france-une-issue-durable-sur-leur-r%C3%A9trocession.
[36] “India – Africa Momentum: A Purpose-driven Partnership,” Confederation of Indian Industries, August 2025, https://www.cii.in/International_ResearchPDF/India%20Africa%20Report%202025.pdf.
[37] International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook DataMapper, Real GDP Growth (NGDP_RPCH), https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/IND/ETH/UGA/TZA/RWA.
[38] Press Information Bureau (Government of India), Press Release PRID=2121521, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2121521®=3&lang=2.
[39] Raja Pandit, “India Posts Defense Attaches to Several New Nations for First Time,” Times of India, April 11, 2024, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-posts-defence-attaches-to-several-new-nations-for-1st-time/articleshow/109205408.cms.
[40] Dutta, “Indian Naval Seven Deployments in Indian Ocean,” 2018, https://www.academia.edu/52700695/The_Implementation_of_India_s_Maritime_Doctrine_to_Respond_China_Naval_Presence_in_Indian_Ocean_Region.
[41] N.C. Bipindra, “India to Finish Massive Mauritius Agalega Air Base and Naval Jetty by 2026 Without the Debt Trap Strings China Pulls,” Defence Capital, November 9, 2025, https://defencecapital.in/2025/11/09/india-to-finish-massive-mauritius-agalega-air-base-and-naval-jetty-by-2026-without-the-debt-trap-strings-china-pulls/.
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[56] Raphael Parens, “Turkey’s Return to Africa,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 10, 2025, https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/turkeys-return-to-africa/.
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Guillaume Gandelin is a Visiting Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation. His research focuses on the India-EU and India-France security and defence ...
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