New Delhi’s multifaceted Indian Ocean strategy
Once considered a neglected expanse, the Indian Ocean region is fast emerging as a critical hotbed of geo-economic opportunities and geopolitical contention.
Although there are many stakeholders from within and beyond the region, the contest appears to be playing out between China and India.
While the region is integral to the Indo-Pacific strategic theater, it also possesses advantages and security compulsions uniquely embedded in geography. As a resident Indian Ocean power, India is a key player in the region, especially in shaping its maritime security architecture by emerging as a preferred security partner or first responder.
The cross-cutting strategies and ambitions of China and India have spurred a geopolitical duel that is shaping the security landscape.
Meanwhile, China has sought to enhance its presence, seemingly as part of its strategy to attain global status and regional dominance. The cross-cutting strategies and ambitions of China and India have spurred a geopolitical duel that is shaping the security landscape.
This contest is underscored by evolving strategies pursued by New Delhi and Beijing. For India, China’s growing presence has emerged as a critical challenge to securing its maritime interests, with Beijing’s advances posing a security dilemma. In response, New Delhi is taking calibrated and systematic political, naval and strategic steps to enhance maritime security preparedness.
China’s actions in the Indo-Pacific present distinct and diverse maritime security challenges.
In the Pacific region, which encompasses vital trade routes in the East China and South China seas and the Taiwan Strait, China’s confrontational actions spark skirmishes mainly between China’s coast guards and other countries’ coast guards. China’s continuing provocation of Philippine vessels operating lawfully in the South China Sea is a notable example.
In contrast, Beijing’s forays in the Indian Ocean appear more nuanced and calibrated, revealing what seems to be a long game. Importantly, China is not an Indian Ocean power. The maritime geography is not a natural strategic backyard for Beijing. To overcome this reality, Beijing has deployed a multipronged strategy to expand its political influence among Indian Ocean countries by fostering developmental partnerships, while deploying dual-use survey vessels to gather military intelligence.
China’s naval forays into the Indian Ocean began in the early 2000s, purportedly in response to the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia in East Africa. However, Beijing has sought to consolidate its presence since Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping unveiled his One Belt, One Road (OBOR) infrastructure scheme in 2013.
China’s naval forays into the Indian Ocean began in the early 2000s, purportedly in response to the surge in piracy off the coast of Somalia in East Africa.
Under OBOR, China has enhanced its partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states by investing in infrastructure, offering financial assistance — often involving predatory lending — and promising security cooperation.
China also seeks to project its power as a lead through the China-Indian Ocean Forum, an annual convening of nations it launched in 2022, by ostensibly fostering maritime regionalism.
Additionally, China has deployed survey vessels that often dock at countries near India, such as the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Although China claims the vessels are conducting hydrographic surveys, analysts say the ships may be spying for the CCP’s military.
Amid China’s expanding presence, India has bolstered its strategic engagements and continues to emphasize its centrality as a maritime security actor. Among other initiatives, New Delhi is fostering multifaceted partnerships, modernizing the Indian Navy and building capacity.
To better counter China’s model of quid pro quo, India has increasingly sought to call itself a preferred security partner or first responder. While Beijing seeks partial or total control over the infrastructure it has built, along with other conditions such as the use of Chinese workers in building the projects, India has been careful not to reproduce such a dynamic in its initiatives and negotiations. By emerging as a partner rather than a provider, India has distinguished its approach from that of China to expand influence in the Indian Ocean region.
By enhancing engagement with regional countries through the Indian Ocean Rim Association, India is injecting momentum in developing a regional awareness. This also serves as a vital strategy to reinforce that China is not an Indian Ocean power, and that it does not have natural stakes in the region.
Simultaneously, India has shifted gears on defense production and capacity building, focusing on domestic development, including a growing naval fleet. India continues to enhance its deterrence capabilities with nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and stealth frigates. In addition, it increasingly embraces new dimensions of security cooperation, including maritime domain awareness through the Indian Navy-hosted multinational Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region.
India continues to lead efforts to check China’s advances in the region, seeking to secure its interests and shape a favorable maritime security architecture. The challenges presented by China’s presence are complex. India’s multifaceted strategy to respond to Beijing’s inroads in its strategic backyard is characterized by three key approaches: distinctly define the nature of New Delhi’s partnership with Indian Ocean littoral countries; foster regional cooperation; and advance naval capabilities.
This commentary originally appeared in Indo-Pacific Defense FORUM.
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Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at ...
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Sayantan Haldar is an Associate Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s work is focused on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions on ...
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