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Kartik Bommakanti and Rahul Rawat, “Mapping the Recent Trends in China’s Military Modernisation - 2025,” Special Report No. 279, Observer Research Foundation, September 2025.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China has witnessed significant changes since its first push for modernisation in the 1980s under Deng Xiaoping. This has included regular updates in its doctrine, organisational structure, equipment, and weapons systems to reflect the changing needs of modern warfare. The PLA’s doctrines have shifted from dominating in “local wars” on China’s periphery under Deng Xiaoping[1] to becoming a “world-class” military under Xi Jinping[2] for safeguarding China’s national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security as well as its maritime rights and overseas interests. Xi has initiated two major reforms: organisational and command and control reforms in 2015 and service-level force standardisation and doctrinal revisions in 2017.[3] In terms of prioritising military readiness, President Xi Jinping called for the establishment of a “…strong, modernized information support force, and to leapfrog development of the Chinese military’s network information system.”[4] In this context, his recent plans for an accelerated modernisation of the PLA, combined with aggressive actions to achieve its foreign policy goals, have caused concern worldwide, especially in the United States (US), the littoral states in the East and South China Sea, and India.
This report examines the relevance of these developments from India’s perspective and discusses the recent upgrades in China’s military doctrine, organisational structure, and equipment and weapons systems in its five services—the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—and the newly established Information Support Force (ISF). It will then evaluate these developments in the context of the PLA’s growing joint operational capabilities and combat preparedness as well as infrastructural, logistical, and technological support systems.
During the 1980s and 1990s, drawing lessons from the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the PLA restructured its forces and sought to equip them with technologically advanced weapons systems.[5] Under Xi Jinping, the circumstances are different. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi stated that China is confronted with “frequent outbreaks of regional conflicts and disturbances, and intensifying global issues”[6] and that it needs to “adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution” and modernise its forces accordingly.[7] Xi further stated that “historic breakthroughs” have already been made in China’s military modernisation.[a],[8] At the 20th Party Congress in 2022, he contextualised this within unprecedented global changes,[9] including shifts in the international balance of power, mounting unilateralism, external interference in Taiwan affairs, and “attempts to blackmail, contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure on China”.[10] He also urged China’s armed forces to be prepared to confront the worst-case scenarios.[11] The PLA’s commitment to preparedness along the lines of civil-military integration and embracing revolution in military affairs was reaffirmed in March 2025 at the 15th National People’s Congress. If anything, this was Premier Li Qiang reiterating Xi Jinping‘s talking points from his March 2024 NPC address. Yet two statements by the Premier stood out. First, “…establish a framework of modern military theories with Chinese characteristics.”[12] This phrase exhorts Chinese military leaders to make original contributions to military doctrine that are not totally compatible with Western approaches. The second was Li Qiang’s emphasis on “network information systems”,[13] which relates to the importance of ‘intelligentisation’ that mandates the comprehensive integration of information technology, cyber, space, and autonomous platforms into “PLA operations”.[14] The measures are meant to shape a favourable (multi-domain) battlespace to facilitate a swift and decisive victory. To this end, by 2030, the PLA has ambitions to integrate a range of “algorithmic warfare” and “network-centric warfare” capabilities operating at different levels of human-machine integration.[15]
To adapt to the challenges in the “new era”,[16] Xi has established time-specific modernisation goals for the PLA:
China has made progress towards its goals, especially in terms of building joint operational capabilities, combat readiness, and integration of technology with the armed forces.[20] Since 2020, the PLA has also “adopted more coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region” as well as on border disputes with India.[21]
Underlying China’s enhancement of its military capabilities is the massive growth of its economy in the 21st century. China’s military expenditure in the last decade has stayed at around 1.7 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP), while there has been a gradual decrease in its share of government expenditure, from 6.2 percent in 2010 to 5 percent in 2022 (see Table 1). These figures indicate that the growth in China’s military capabilities has remained in healthy proportion to its GDP (see Table 2). However, there is a lack of transparency in China’s defence budgets and expenditure; in absolute terms, China’s defence expenditure has seen a meteoric rise in the last decade, with the decline in 2023 attributed to exchange rate effects (see Table 2). For the years 2024 and 2025, both Chinese government and external data show steady increases in military expenditure (see Table 2).
Table 1: Defence Budget Share of China’s GDP and Government Expenditure in Percent
| Year | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | |||||||
| Share of GDP | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.8 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 1.7 | |||||||
| Share of Government Expenditure | 6 | 5.6 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.0 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 4.9 | 5.0 | 5.1 | Not Available | |||||||
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)[22]
Table 2: China’s Defence Budget (2012–2024)
| Year | China’s Official Announcements (Nominal US$ billion) | IISS Estimates (Current US$ billion) | SIPRI Estimates (Current US$ billion) | Growth in China’s GDP |
| 2012 | 103.06 | 146.2 | 145.1 | 7.8 percent |
| 2013 | 116.28 | 162.2 | 164.1 | 7.8 percent |
| 2014 | 131.12 | 180.1 | 182.1 | 7.4 percent |
| 2015 | 142.39 | 193 | 196.6 | 7 percent |
| 2016 | 143.68 | 197 | 198.5 | 6.9 percent |
| 2017 | 151.49 | 209.3 | 210.4 | 6.9 percent |
| 2018 | 167.37 | 225 | 233.1 | 6.8 percent |
| 2019 | 177.52 | 234 | 240.3 | 6 percent |
| 2020 | 178.61 | 256 | 252 | 2.2 percent |
| 2021 | 209.16 | 285 | 293 | 8.4 percent |
| 2022 | 230 | 319 | 292 | 3 percent |
| 2023 | 224.79 | 319 | 296 | 5.2 percent |
| 2024 | 234.5 | 439 | 313 | 4.6 percent |
| 2025 | 249 | Not Available | 314[23] | 4 percent |
Sources: ChinaPower;[24] IISS;[25],[26],[27],[28]; SIPRI;[29],[30],[31],[32] IMF;[33] Global Times;[34] PRC’s State Council Information Office;[35] Xinhua,[36] Xinhua[37]
To further its information network capabilities, the PLA underwent yet another reorganisation at the services level in April 2024. On 29 April 2024, Xi Jinping disbanded the PLA’s Strategic Support Force (SSF), which focused on space and information warfare capabilities, and created the new Information Support Force (ISF) unit aimed at advancing the PLA’s competitiveness in information network warfare.[c],[38] The ISF was not established as a replacement for the SSF but is instead meant to be an upgraded version of the SSF’s former corps-grade organisation, the Information Communication Base (ICB).[39] While the SSF was a theatre-grade organisation on par with the other military services, the ISF is a deputy theatre-grade organisation.[40] Additionally, the SSF’s Aerospace Systems Department and the Network Systems Department were retained and have been redesignated as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and the Cyberspace Force (CSF), respectively. Together with the ISF, they now report directly to the PLA’s Central Military Commission (CMC).[41] From an operational viewpoint, the ISF’s revamped role in organisational reform will be to enhance networked information systems to promote and support joint operations capabilities and all-domain operations capabilities based on network information systems.[42]
With this reform, the PLA has been restructured into four services or branches (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and four arms or auxiliary units (ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint Logistics Support Force).[43] The four arms will be positioned below the four services and the five theatre commands in the PLA hierarchy, although how they will interact with each other remains unclear.[44] Nevertheless, the theatre commands may now be able to gain smooth and efficient services from each of the arms.[45]
Figure 1: The New PLA Structure Post the Creation of ISF
Source: The Jamestown Foundation[46]
After Deng Xiaoping’s military reforms of the late 1980s, critical structural and operational reforms of the PLA were undertaken under President Xi Jinping starting in 2015, towards a comprehensive modernisation of the armed forces and their combat effectiveness,[47] including reorganising the seven military regions into five theatre army commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the Tibet Military District.[48] The PLAA’s 13 group armies comprise several combined-arms brigades of 4,500–5,000 personnel.[49] These brigades, which serve as the primary manoeuvre force, have artillery, armoured vehicles, air defence, and air assault capabilities, and also include special operations forces and sustainment brigades.[50] The PLAA also has non-standard divisions and brigades that are typically located in areas that the CCP considers sensitive, including Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing.[51] The PLAA has three types of Combined Arms Brigades (CABs) – light, medium and heavy variants. The light CABs consist of motorised, air assault, mountain and high-mobility elements.[52] The medium CABs comprise wheeled vehicles, and the heavy CABs have tracked vehicles or tanks.[53] Organically the heavy CABs of the PLAA are the best equipped for manoeuvre warfare.[54] The latter consist of four Armoured/Mechanised Battalions, Reconnaissance Battalion, Artillery Battalion (Tube, Rocket, and Long-Range Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMS), a Service Support Battalion (Logistics), Operational Support Battalion (with engineer element) and an Air Defence Battalion.[55] In a heavy CAB, PLAA manoeuvre battalions are equipped with two tank companies and two mechanised infantry companies with other supporting unit, reflecting the importance PLAA places on manoeuvre.[56] These heavy CABs have greater direct and indirect fire capabilities than their American counterparts.[57] Operationally, a military personnel rebalancing has been initiated, the teeth-to-tail ratio has been improved to boost support and logistical capabilities, and the PRC continues to push towards the indigenisation of the defence industry.[58],[59]
Since 2020, the PLAA has continued to modernise its equipment (from service pistols to tanks) and focus on combined arms training to achieve President Xi’s goal of becoming a world-class military.[60] Reports suggest that the next-generation QBZ-191 series of rifles is being developed, serving as an improvement over the currently operational QBZ-95-1 and 95B-1 rifles.[61] Branded under the Type 20 series, which also includes submachine guns and marksman rifles, these new indigenously manufactured rifles are similar to the US Marine Corps’ Heckler & Koch 416 rifle.[62]
Since the deployment of the most advanced Type 15 tank in Tibet during the 2020 Sino-Indian border standoff, multiple batches have been delivered to the Tibet and Xinjiang Military Commands in 2021 to safeguard China’s western borders.[63] Due to its lightweight and powerful engine, the Type 15 tank can be rapidly deployed in high-altitude mountainous and plateau terrains with low oxygen levels, unlike the Type 96 and Type 99 tanks.[64] Type 15 tanks are also reported to possess stealth technologies and have battlefield situational awareness capabilities that enable them to identify friends and enemies.[65] These Type 15 tanks would complement China’s “most-powerful” third-generation Type 99A tanks deployed near the Ladakh border in the Karakoram mountains.[66] China has upgraded its ZTZ-99A MBTs with GL-5 hard-kill active protection system against UAVs or anti-tank missiles. This technology was previously seen on export VT-4 and VT-5 tank designs.[67]
In 2021, the PLAA Xinjiang Military Command received four new advanced weapons systems.[68] These included Type 08 armoured assault vehicles, a new-type 122mm-calibre self-propelled howitzer, the PHL-03 self-propelled long-range multiple rocket launcher system with jamming-resistant capabilities, and a new self-propelled rapid-fire mortar.[69] The Xinjiang Military Command is now considered to possess a complete modern ground combat system crucial for plateau combat.[70]
In 2020, the Tibet Military Command received the third-generation Dongfeng Mengshi (DM) assault vehicles for use in border defence missions in the northern Himalayas.[71] These assault vehicles are indigenously manufactured, lightweight, and multifunctional: they can abandon their transport function and become a command vehicle, a self-propelled howitzer, or a long-range rocket launcher system.[72] In 2021, these DM vehicles were mass-produced and were ready to be incorporated into the PLAA’s integrated joint combat system.[73] In 2020, a new Type 625 wheeled self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was used in a military exercise with the 77th Group Army of the Western Theatre Command.[74] Type 625 combines a 25mm anti-aircraft Gatling gun with surface-to-air missile launchers.[75] These short-range defence (SHORAD) systems can be rapidly deployed in various combat scenarios and are also capable of engaging cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).[76] In 2022, it was revealed that an upgraded Type 625E AA Gun Missile Integrated Weapon System has been developed, which is comparable to the US’s Manoeuvre Short-Range Air Defence system and Russia’s Pantsir system.[77]
The PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units are reported to be undergoing training to support amphibious operations and develop multidimensional assaults, including air support tactics and manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T).[78] They are envisioned as the primary combat force in a greater joint operation and will conduct extraterritorial non-war military operations.[79] There is greater focus on group armies in the Eastern and Western Theatre Commands and the military districts of Tibet and Xinjiang.[80] The PLAA’s air defence forces have also deployed new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that will support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial (A2AD) mission.[81]
An important feature of the PLA is its emphasis on deploying the latest technologies. China’s recent military modernisation efforts have included developing and incorporating artificial intelligence (AI) and other emerging disruptive technologies (EDTs) in its military equipment, as well as using civilian instruments for military purposes through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) development strategy and espionage activities.[82] In 2022, China developed an unmanned model of the Type 15 tank called the VT-5, and in May 2024, photographs surfaced of advanced comprehensive electronic warfare (EW) systems on Dongfeng Mengshi CTL18A armoured vehicles.[83] Reports suggest that these systems utilise ultra-shortwave interference to disrupt enemy communications and intelligence devices.[84] In February 2024, researchers in China developed a vehicle-launched high-power microwave (HPM) weapon that creates high-frequency electromagnetic waves to suppress drones, military aircraft, and satellites.[85]
The PLAA has also made investments in aerial and land unmanned vehicles. In 2020, the PLA’s Eastern Theatre Command began using the Sharp Claw I UGV unmanned ground vehicle,[86] armed with a 7.62 mm machine gun. Since 2022, the PLA Ground Force has also been using an unmanned reconnaissance and strike aircraft, KVD002,[87] during patrols and exercises near Taiwan. In the Western Theatre Command, a significant number of UAVs, likely the armed CH-4, have been deployed at the Ngari Gunsa airbase since 2021.[88] An AI-enabled WZ-7 Soaring Dragon UAV was also spotted at the Shigatse base in December 2022.[89]
Drawing on the heavy use of UAVs by Russia and Ukraine, China has prioritised the development of low-altitude dominance capabilities for the PLAA’s UAVs.[90] In 2022, PLAA air defence units focused on improving tactical air defence against low and slow threats such as Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and loitering munitions through hybrid self-propelled air defence artillery systems (SPADA), small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).[91] In August 2023, PLA-affiliated academies developed two unmanned intelligent technologies, including a drone swarm system capable of “self-repair” and an augmented reality (AR) interaction system that allows individual infantry soldiers to control multiple unmanned aircraft and vehicles.[92] These systems enable drone reconnaissance and attacks, enhancing troops’ situational awareness on the battlefield.[93] In February 2024, it was reported that the PLAA’s 78092 unit was working with scientists to develop UAVs that would replace humans in complex overseas missions within a few years.[d],[94]
In 2025, Chinese scientists, learning from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, are designing or reconfiguring drones that can perform high-G manoeuvres for “terminal evasion”, preventing missile interception.[95] Apart from evasive capabilities, this will enable higher survivability for drones.[96] Despite lacking combat experience, the PLAA has closely studied and analysed the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war by focusing heavy investment in UAVs, ATGMs and long- and short-range precision fires. UAVs in the PLAA CABs, from light to heavy, have been integrated at all levels or echelons stretching from the squad to brigade level.[97] The PRC is the world’s biggest manufacturer of Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) dedicated to air, naval and ground operations, and these capabilities range from small quadcopters to Medium Altitude Long Endurance Systems (MALE) with advanced sensor and targeting capabilities which can be subject to quick and responsive modification geared to specific mission sets as the Russians and the Ukrainians have displayed with ISR, strikes and electronic warfare.[98] Fundamentally, the PLAA, as well as the other service arms of the China have demonstrated a strong commitment to mass evident from their growing integration of quantitatively large UV forces into their Order of Battle (ORBAT).
China’s satellite constellations, which enable surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and communication systems, play a critical role in the development of the PLA’s capabilities. China has over 600 satellites in orbit, of which more than 360 are intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance (ISR) satellites, which, together with AI, would help track vehicles and vessels.[99] In 2021, Chinese scientists developed a new quantum radar technology that could detect stealth aircraft by generating a small electromagnetic storm to strengthen its intelligentised warfare capabilities.[100] In the same year, Beijing funded a research project called the China Brain Plan, which aimed to use brain science to develop new AI and biotechnology applications.[101] In July 2023, the PLA was reported to be developing “neurostrike weapons” designed to disrupt the brain functions of military personnel and civilians and influence government leaders or entire populations by using non-kinetic technology.[102] The weapons, which can use microwaves or electromagnetic beams, represent a significant development in China’s brain warfare capabilities.[103] Chinese scientists have developed an electronic warfare capability to monitor in real-time and analyse the electromagnetic spectrum, creating a ‘nowhere to hide’ battlespace for the adversary. The technology will enable the “detection and locking onto enemy signals at unprecedented speeds, decode the physical parameters of these signals almost instantly, and effectively suppress them, all while ensuring the smooth flow of their own communications.”[104]
The PLAA has steadily reduced its number of personnel in the last three decades to create a leaner, more mobile force (see Table 3).[105] Under President Xi Jinping, the focus has been on modernising the PLA into a more efficient force.[106] Consequently, in 2015, while the number of PLAA troops was reduced by 300,000, in 2017, the total number was brought under one million.[107] However, the number of personnel in the PLA Navy and PLA Rocket Force has increased from 2015 to 2023.[e],[108] In 2023, the PLAA transferred three brigades (BDEs) to the PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) to supplement the previous additions of aviation and special forces BDEs.[109] This move resulted in a total of eleven BDEs in PLANMC to help improve its expeditionary force capabilities.
Table 3: PLA Personnel, 1980–2020 (in millions)
| Year | 1980 | 1985 | 1990 | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 | 2015 | 2020 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 |
| PLA Army | 3.6 | 3.16 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 1.6 | 0.975 | 0.965 | 0.965 | 0.960 |
| PLA Navy | 0.63 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.255 | 0.255 | 0.235 | 0.250 | 0.260 | 0.252 | 0.252 |
| PLA Air Force | 0.4 | 0.49 | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.4 | 0.33 | 0.398 | 0.395 | 0.395 | 0.403 | 0.403 |
| Strategic Forces/ Coast Guard | 0 | 0 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.145 | 0.145 | 0.145 | |
| Strategic missile forces | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.120 | 0.120 | 0.120 | 0.125 |
| Reserves | 0 | 5 | 4 | 1.2 | 0.55 | 0.8 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0.51 |
| Paramilitary | 7 | 4.3 | 12 | 1.2 | 1.1 | 1.5 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.50 |
| Others | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.15 | 0.295 |
| Total number of PLA personnel | 11.6 | 13.3 | 16.32 | 5.42 | 4.49 | 4.665 | 3.455 | 3.503 | 3.205 | 3.045 | 3.045 | 3.045 |
Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,[110] International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)[111],[112],[113],[114], [115]
The change in focus from the PLAA to its allied forces—PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF), PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLA Strategic Support Force (PLASSF) (and now ISF)—is due to the PLA’s changing strategic goals and security requirements. While the PLA previously focused on ground operations and homeland defence, China now prioritises overseas interests[116] such as safeguarding sea lanes, enforcing maritime claims, and securing information infrastructures.[117] Moreover, by reducing non-combat and non-essential personnel, China can redirect resources towards the scientific training of personnel, research and development, and improved joint operations.[118] The PLA has also focused on recruiting more university and college graduates with science and engineering degrees to build an informatised and intelligentised force.[119] As of 2023, about 57 percent of active PLA personnel had one or more college degrees.[120] In 2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its single annual military conscription cycle to a two-phase system to account for the academic school year and allow for more efficient enlistment.[121] Amidst modernisation efforts, the PLA announced a new training programme in 2021 to develop officers capable of operating in a joint environment. It is meant to avoid the “Five Incapables” among the officer corps: poor judgment of situations, inability to understand higher authorities’ intentions, inability to make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected situations.[122]
The US military successes during the 1991 Gulf War and the deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis reinforced the need for China to expand and modernise its naval capabilities.[123] China’s navy has since become a formidable military force, particularly in the near-seas region.[124] As of June 2024, the PLAN is the largest navy in the world, with over 234 warships compared to the US Navy’s 219,[125] and is expected to grow to 435 by 2030.[126] Much of this growth will be in surface combatants.[127] The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper outlines that “the PLAN is speeding up the transition of its tasks from defense on the near seas (offshore defense) to protection missions on the far seas (open seas protection), and improving its capabilities for strategic deterrence and counterattack,”[128] specifically aimed at developing A2AD force capabilities against the US.[129]
The PLAN has modernised both the surface and subsurface segments of its fleet. In June 2022, China launched its third aircraft carrier, Fujian, which began its first round of sea trials in May 2024.[130] Fujian’s CATOBAR (catapult-assisted take-off but arrested recovery) launch system is a significant development over the STOBAR (short take-off, barrier-arrested recovery) systems of the first two aircraft carriers and enables it to launch heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft.[131] Fujian’s catapults are powered by an electromagnetic system.[132] According to experts, Fujian will possess improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, the next-generation J-35 stealth jet, the early warning aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer jet.[133] The J-15T, which is the most advanced jet of the Flanker series based on Soviet designs, is in the initial stages of catapult launch testing from the newly built Fujian aircraft carrier.[134] In May 2025, the J-15D, an electronic warfare variant of the J-15 series, which is comparable to the F/A-18G, was tested and will be operationalised from the Fujian.[135] The Fujian is being prepared for launch from Shanghai.
In April 2024, China announced that it is building its fourth aircraft carrier, likely a nuclear-powered supercarrier.[136] In May 2024, the PLAN commissioned its tenth Type-055 Renhai-class cruiser, of which at least four are assigned to the Southern Theatre Command, which is responsible for operations in the South China Sea (SCS).[137] The first of these advanced ships entered service in 2020. Equipped with an integrated electric propulsion (IEP) system, the Type 055 is considered to be one of the world’s most powerful warships,[138] with a 130 mm main gun, an HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM), the YJ-18 Anti-Ship Missile (AShM), and the YJ-21 hypersonic AShM,[139] and advanced radar systems, sensors, and jamming antennas.[140]
In May 2024, the PLAN tested an electromagnetic rail gun that fired a smart bomb 15 km-high into the stratosphere at a speed exceeding Mach 5.[141] Although the test was declared unsuccessful, the testing of technology that can launch heavy projectiles at hypervelocity is indicative of the PLAN’s intent to develop cutting-edge technology.[142] China’s most recent destroyers are the 25 Luyang III (Type 052D) guided-missile destroyers (DDGs)—which include 12 lengthened Luyang III MOD DDGs—capable of launching cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship ballistic missiles, and anti-submarine missiles.[143] China is now commissioning an upgraded version of the Type 052D that incorporates an extended-length helicopter flight deck and a new radar.[144]
PLAN’s Type 054A Jiangkai II-class frigates have increased from 30[145] in 2019 to 39[146] in 2024. A new Type 054B (Jiangkai III) frigate was launched in August 2023.[147] This next-generation frigate, which has an IEP system,[148] has been called a “mini destroyer”;[149] it is equipped with a 100mm main gun, a 32-cell missile vertical launch system, a 1130 close-in weapon system, an HQ-10 short-range air defence missile system, anti-submarine weapons, and advanced radar detection and stealth capabilities.[150] The PLAN commissioned its first Type 054B frigate, the Luohe, in January 2025.[151] China also built the Jiangdao-class corvettes (FFLs) in large numbers over a relatively short period;[152] from 2013 to 2021, it commissioned 72 corvettes,[153] including 22 Type 056 and 50 Type 056A with greater anti-submarine warfare capabilities and YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.[154]
In December 2023, the country launched its fourth Yushen-class Type 075 LHA amphibious assault ship.[155] First launched in 2019, the Type 075 can carry helicopters, air-cushioned landing craft, and amphibious armoured vehicles.[156] Type 075s are designed to enhance the vertical amphibious landing capabilities of the PLA and can carry out missions in regions like the Taiwan Straits and the SCS, as well as non-military operations such as international humanitarian aid.[157] Together with the eight Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious transport docks (LPD), they are modern platforms that are capable of regional and global expeditionary missions in support of both wartime and non-war contingency operations.[158]
In terms of aviation capabilities, the PLAN is developing variants of the J-15 fighter aircraft that currently operate from its carriers.[159] These include a catapult-capable variant, the J-15S tandem-seat variant, and the J-15D electronic warfare variant, as well as a variant of the Y-9 aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and maritime patrol.[160] China is also developing the carrier-capable variant of the fifth-generation J-31 fighter, known as the J-35, which was revealed at the Zhuhai airshow in 2024[161] and is improving the design of a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, KJ-600.[162] The PLAN is also developing the Z-20F helicopter, with improved ASW capabilities for the Renhai cruisers and Luyang III MOD destroyers and the Yushen LHAs.[163] Additionally, the PLAN is replacing older variants of the H-6 bombers with the larger advanced maritime strike bomber H-6J, which can carry up to six YJ-12 supersonic missiles and can reach the Second Island Chain.[164] However, in pursuit of increasing jointness in maritime strike operations, the PLAN’s H-6J-equipped regiments were transferred to the Air Force divisions in 2023.[165]
For its subsurface operations, the PLAN currently has 59 submarines: six Type-094/094A Jin nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), six Type 093 Shang I-class and Type 093A Shang II-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs), and 47 diesel-powered/air-independent powered attack submarines (SS).[166],[167] Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an expansion of submarine construction capacity.[168] The Jin SSBNs can carry 12 sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), JL-2 (range of 7,000km), and JL-3 (range of over 10,000km) and are capable of targeting the continental US from Chinese littoral waters, representing China’s first viable sea-based nuclear deterrent.[169] In the late 2020s or early 2030s, the PLAN is expected to launch its next-generation Type 096 SSBN, which will be armed with a longer-range SLBM.[170] Aided in part by Russian technology, the Type 096 will also overcome the noise problem currently faced by the Type 094 and will be difficult to detect.[171]
Amidst increasing risks of high-seas confrontation with the US, the PLA’s focus is on developing more nuclear-powered submarines that can remain submerged for prolonged periods and support long-distance operations with multipurpose weapons, overcoming the shortcomings of conventional submarines.[172] The PLAN has developed Shang III (Type 093B)-class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines with anti-surface warfare capabilities, which are now operational, phasing out older SSNs. The PLAN is expected to expand their numbers significantly until they are replaced with the more advanced or next-generation Type 095 (V) SSNs.[173] In addition, the PLAN’s inventory of conventional submarines is increasing.[174] In June 2024, the PLAN revealed a new submarine, unofficially named the Type 039C,[175] which is speculated to be China’s latest air-independent powered attack submarine with improved stealth capabilities.[176] The Type 039C’s less advanced variant – the Type-039A is now cleared for export.[177]
In October 2019, China revealed its first large displacement autonomous underwater vehicle, the HSU-001, which has long-range patrol capability and a sonar for detecting underwater targets.[178] In 2020, China’s unmanned surface vessel JARI underwent its first sea trial.[f],[179] In 2022, satellite images of China’s Sanya naval base revealed two extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles (XLUUVs) capable of performing ISR missions and enduring at sea on longer missions.[180] The PLAN has also conducted sea trials on multiple UAVs with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL).[181] These include the SD-40, S-100 CAMCOPTER, AV-500, and CSC-005, which specialise in ISR missions.[182] Satellite images of the Changxing Island in Shanghai from June 2024 also revealed mock trials of the stealth-capable GJ-11 Sharp Sword unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).[183]
China has developed expertise in building medium-to-large UUVs which are used for seabed mapping and exploration.[184] These include the underwater glider Haiyan, which set an endurance record of 141 days and sailed 3,619.6km in the SCS in 2019,[185] and the Haidou-1 unmanned submersible,[186] which dove below 10,000m in 2021. These UUVs, although used for marine scientific research, can also be employed for military purposes like ISR missions and grey-zone operations.[187] In 2023, China also commissioned the world’s first autonomous seaborne drone carrier, the Zhu Hai Yun.[188] Although the unmanned carrier will undertake marine scientific research, some experts believe that it could be a forerunner to the Type 076 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD), which is currently in the development phase and will play the role of a drone mothership in the PLAN.[189] PLAN’s first Type 076 named ‘Sichuan’, fitted with an electromagnetic catapult, was inducted on 29 December 2024, and is capable of launching fixed-wing aircraft and UAVs.[190] It enables seamless multi-platform integration and intelligent combat operations, leading to better decision-making.[191] The Sichuan is also designed to switch roles from amphibious assaults and UAV operations to humanitarian missions and disaster relief.[192] In November 2024, the Chinese also displayed their 500-tonne high-speed unmanned combat vessel dubbed the ‘Orca’, which is integrated with stealth features and is capable of fulfilling a range of mission functions such as Beyond Visual Range (BVR) strikes, Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) involving search and attack and missile and air defence.[193] The Orca has an operating range of 4,000 nautical miles, powered by a diesel-electric propulsion system with a maximum surface speed of 40 nautical miles per hour.[194]
The PLAN’s expansion and modernisation of its ships and weapons capabilities have allowed it to extend its operational reach beyond the near seas region into the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters around Europe.[195] The PLAN also has numerous logistical replenishment ships, auxiliary ships, and Fuyu-class fast combat support ships, which can support long-distance and long-duration deployments.[196] Supported by its crucial naval bases, such as in Djibouti, PLAN modernisation is also a means to assert its status as the leading regional power and a major global power, as its capabilities enable it to conduct distant anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.[197]
In the 75 years since its inception, the PLAAF has evolved from a homeland-focused limited force to a “strategic air force” with advanced long-range aircraft, bombers, and drone systems.[198] Today, the PLAAF, together with PLAN aviation, is “the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and the third largest in the world,” with more than 3,150 total aircraft,[199] of which approximately 2,919[200] are combat-capable.[g]
The PLAAF has continued to modernise and indigenise its aircraft, bombers, and drone systems. Its WS-series jet engines are now able to match the capabilities of those of NATO nations.[201] Since 2016, the PLAAF has also reorganised its theatre commands, bases, and regiments.[202] In mid-2023, a majority of PLAN aviation units, including fighter, bomber, radar, and air defence systems, were transferred to the PLAAF[203] to streamline bureaucratic duplication,[204] improve the standardisation of identical units, and unify all defensive air operations under theatre command air forces. With this transfer, the PLAAF also gained the responsibility for land-based maritime strike tasks in coordination with the PLAN.[205]
Modern and advanced fighters have increased from constituting 4 percent of China’s air force in 2004-05 to 58 percent in 2024.[206] These fighters include the Chengdu J-10C, the Shenyang J-16, and the Chengdu J-20A, which is the PLAAF’s most advanced tactical-combat aircraft with low-observable and stealth capabilities. All three of these types are fitted with an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, which is less vulnerable to jamming countermeasures.[207]
J-20 fighters are also continuously upgraded and increasing in number. In 2023, a design upgrade and the capability of an increased number of air-to-air missiles (AAM) were tested.[208] The J-20 also underwent small-scale flight tests after being fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 turbofan engine,[209] which were aimed at adding supersonic capability and a longer range[210] to the J-20s, thus placing US bases in South Korea, Japan, and Guam within its range.[211] In the same year, the PLAAF received more than 200 J-10C, J-16 Flanker N, and J-20 tactical combat aircraft from the PLAN, which together amount to over 700.[212] The J-16 Flankers possess a long-range surface-attack capability and are likely to be equipped with the PL-17 very long-range air-to-air missile that is currently in development.[213] The PLAAF currently has at least six operational brigades of J-20.[214] In July 2024, it was reported that the J-20s were deployed in the Tibet area, in addition to the usual J-7, J-8, J-10, J-11, and J-16 fighters and the KJ-500 airborne early-warning and control system.[215]
In December 2023, images of the WS-20 fitted Y-20 Kunpeng aircraft, re-designated as the YY-20B, were released on Chinese social media.[216] While it is unclear whether the re-engined Y-20 has entered PLAAF service, the new engines will give the transport aircraft short take-off and air-refuelling capabilities along with greater endurance, thereby increasing its range beyond the first island chain.[217] The Y-20 could also be modified as a refuelling tanker for combat aircraft, thereby doubling the range of fighter jets such as the J-20 and J-31.[218] It can also be transformed into a strategic command centre for fighter jets and drones during combat.[h],[219]
The PLAAF’s bombers are also undergoing modernisation to improve their operational effectiveness.[220] The PLA’s bomber force currently comprises H-6 bomber variants, introduced to China in the 1950s and produced domestically based on the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) bomber designs.[221] Since 2020, of the estimated 209 H-6 variants,[222] the PLAAF has increasingly deployed H-6K bombers.[223] The H-6K is capable of carrying six land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)[224] that can range targets in the Second Island Chain, the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile, and the YJ-21 hypersonic missile.[225] In June 2023, a PLAAF unit used the H-6K bomber for the first time to conduct night-time encirclement flight exercises around Taiwan, demonstrating its all-weather, round-the-clock capabilities.[226] While the H-6 made China part of the three-member club of countries with strategic bomber operators (the other two being the US and Russia), its legacy status necessitated a shift in focus to developing the H-20 stealth strategic bomber.[227]
In March 2024, the Deputy Commander of the PLAAF, Wang Wei, declared that the H-20 would soon be publicly revealed.[228] However, in April 2024, it was reported that the H-20 development is facing engineering design challenges; its current timeline remains uncertain.[229] The bomber was reported to have been in development since 2016 and is said to be China’s first indigenously developed large-scale stealth bomber with nuclear capabilities.[230] It is estimated to have a range of at least 8,500km[231] and can target the US military bases in Guam and Hawaii and cross the Himalayas to attack targets in India.[232] Through the H-20, Beijing hopes to compete with the US B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider bombers and complete its nuclear triad.[233]
In 2019, the PLAAF revealed the nuclear-capable H-6N bomber, a derivative of H-6K, which can carry air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM).[234] Operationally fielded the next year, the H-6N has air-to-air refuelling capabilities, thus providing it with a greater range over other non-air refuellable H-6 variants.[235] However, the H-6N is subsonic and capable of only a 15-tonne payload and is easily detectable.[236] Hence, in addition to the H-20, the PLAAF is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers capable of striking regional and global targets.[237] The H6-K bombers are capable of carrying two KD-21 high-speed missiles geared most likely for land-attack missions.[238]
The PLA Air Force has developed a major operational capability in the form of PL-15, an advanced beyond-visual-range air-to-air missile (BVRAAM) for aerial warfare. The PL-15 was first test-fired in 2011 and later entered service in 2015.[239] It features a technologically superior dual-pulse solid-propellant rocket motor than other existing Chinese air-to-air missiles. The system is integrated with PLAAF’s J-10C, J-16 and J-20 series of fighter jets. During Operation Sindoor, the export variant of PL-15 (PL-15E) was seen integrated with Chinese-origin fighter jets, especially J-10CE, JF-17 Block III operated by the Pakistani Air Force (PAF).[240] For guidance and countermeasures resistance, the PL-15 uses a sophisticated guidance system, combining inertial navigation, Beidou satellite network, a two-way datalink for mid-course corrections, and a terminal active radar seeker using advanced AESA (Active Electronically Scanned Array) technology.[241] This multi-mode navigation for targeting guidance provides PL-15 with a qualitative edge in the battlespace over adversaries’ systems and forces. Simultaneously, the PL-15 has advanced Electronic Counter-Counter-measures (ECCM) for being jamming-proof, facilitated through the ability to switch frequencies as per the radar frequencies of the adversary across the battlefield.[242]
Table 4: Characteristics of PL-15 AAM
| Characteristics | PLAAF PL-15 | Export model PL-15E (Pakistan Air Force) |
| Range | 200 kms | 150 kms |
| Speed | Greater than Mach 5 | Greater than Mach 5 |
| Weight | 200 kg (approx.) | 200 kg (approx.) |
| Guidance | Inertial Navigation System (INS), Beidou Satellite Navigation, Two-way Datalink from AWACS aircraft in real-time, Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) | INS, Beidou, Two-way Datalink, AESA |
| Propulsion | Dual-pulse rocket motor | Dual-pulse rocket motor |
| Resistance | Electronic Counter Counter-measures (ECCM) | Electronic Counter Counter-measures (ECCM) |
| Platforms | J-10C, JF-17, J-20 | J-10CE, JF-17 Block III |
Source: India Today,[243] Hindustan Times[244] Defence Security Asia[245]
The PLAAF is also upgrading its special-mission aircraft, which are “force multipliers”[246] in terms of enhancing the endurance and operational capabilities of its fleet.[247] Among its airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, the KJ-2000, KJ-200B, and KJ-200AG entered into service in 2020 and 2022, respectively.[248] The KJ-500A was deployed in 2020, and increasing numbers of KJ-500 are being fielded, including at least one with aerial-refuelling capability.[249]
Amid rising tensions with the US, Taiwan, and other Indo-Pacific countries, there have been sightings of a new next-generation KJ-700 with multiple capabilities such as aerial reconnaissance, electronic countermeasures deployment, air and maritime surveillance, and combat aircraft guidance.[250] Another system, that KJ-3000, with an advanced radar system and electronics, is also reported to be under development.[251] China’s aviation industry is rapidly developing greater numbers of its Y-20 large transport aircraft and its tanker variants, and the world’s largest seaplane, the AG600.[252] These large transport aircraft are meant to support a range of PLAAF’s operations, such as airborne combat and control, paradrop, logistics, refuelling, reconnaissance, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief missions.[253] In 2019, the PLAAF also fielded a new Y-9 communications-jamming aircraft known as the GX-11.[254]
Several PLAAF units operate different high- and medium-altitude unmanned aircraft systems and vehicles.[255] The PLAAF is focusing not only on modernising its drones but also on conducting integrated operations with fighter jets, early warning aircraft, helicopters, and other drones to reach the maximum capabilities of the drone.[256] In this integrated MUM-T format, drones conduct ISR without revealing the position of the pilots and undertake beyond visual range (BVR) air-to-air missile targeting.[257] After former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, many drones, such as TB-001, BZK-005, and KV-001 conducted regional combat training missions with J-10s and J-16s.[258] In September 2022, the PLAAF for the first time unveiled an armed reconnaissance drone unit based in Northwest China and conducted an integrated exercise of its armed UAV aimed at border patrol and counterterrorism.[259] The drone practised long-endurance reconnaissance and attack manoeuvres in Northwest China, which includes the Xinjiang region and the Indian border.[260] In April 2024, a new WZ-8 drone was sighted beneath the fuselage of a PLAAF Xian H-6 bomber intended for reconnaissance missions across Southeast Asia, including areas such as Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Northeast India, and Ladakh.[261] This drone possesses a speed of Mach 3+ and can fly at an altitude of up to 100,000 feet. However, unlike conventional drones, it needs an air-launched “mothership” to take off.[262] In May 2024, the PLAAF’s new, indigenously developed WL-10 UAV with high-altitude, long-endurance, and stealth and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities conducted flight operations in the Japanese airspace in the East China Sea.[263]
Overall, the emerging modernisation trend in the PLAAF highlights the production of swarming capability for operational applications and the development of a future multi-domain kill-web designed to target penetrating counterair operations by coordinating across aircraft, sensors, and missiles.[264]
China reciprocates the US’ prioritisation of its homeland defence in its 2022 National Defense Strategy.[265] In its 2019 Defense White Paper, China highlights that the core mission of armed forces is to “safeguard national territorial sovereignty (领土主权) and maritime rights and interests (海洋权益).”[266] Later in 2020, China’s National Defense Law included space, electromagnetic and cyberspace as other major domains of security.[267]
In 1964, Mao Zedong ordered the commencement of Project 640, an effort to develop the technology necessary for a BMD system, including research into kinetic kill vehicles, high-powered lasers, as well as early warning and tracking radars.[268] Since the early days, the Chinese military planners have been concerned about the survivability of their forces and the credibility of their retaliatory capabilities, a trend that continues and is more relevant in the 21st century.[269]
In response to the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of US President Ronald Reagan, Chinese Premier Deng Xiaoping launched Project 863,[270] leading to research in missile defence and later the maturation of counterspace capabilities.
In the mid-1990s, the Central Military Commission initiated the development of an indigenous missile defence capability, including interceptors and early warning satellites.[271] For China, Iraq’s vulnerability to the US air strikes during the Gulf War became one of the major lessons for developing missile defence at home.[272]
China procured the Russian-origin S-300 PMU in 1991 and the S-300F naval variant in 2002 to emulate the capability and technology for domestic production.[273] Subsequently, the HQ-9 Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) were introduced in 2001 with some limited capability against SRBMs and MRBMs.[274]
In 2007, China conducted a demonstration of ASAT capability through a direct-ascent test labelled ‘the SC-19’ by the US military, and is believed to be a modified version of the DF-21 two-stage, road-mobile, solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), also known as the CSS-5.[275] Notably, ASAT capabilities overlap with those of the strategic ballistic missile defence, as it can intercept moving high-speed objects at various altitudes outside the Earth’s atmosphere.[276]
In 2010, China tested a mid-course BMD interceptor. Subsequent tests were conducted in 2013 and 2014, though dubbed as part of ASAT capabilities, China has fielded the mid-course interceptor Dong Neng-3 (DN-3). DN-3, a hit-to-kill interceptor, has undergone multiple tests, including those in 2018, 2021 and 2023.[277] The US Department of Defense assessed that the DN-3 will “form the upper-layer of a multi-tiered missile defense.”[278]
China did attempt to reduce its dependency on Russia by developing domestic capabilities. However, in 2014, China ordered the procurement of S-400 from Russia, and the deliveries began later in 2018.[279] These technological developments are for better interception and defence against adversarial threats. The elements of power and prestige, reinforcement of the survivability of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities, countering India’s ICBM capabilities, and keeping up with the related developments are some of the drivers of China’s missile defence.[280] Additionally, the technological aspect is critical. China tests missile defence, which, according to a PLA officer, the hit-to-kill aspect “is useful for both missile defense and space applications, but space is more important.”[281]
To complement the capabilities of HQ-19, China planned to purchase S-500 systems from Russia,[282] however, there has been no further update on the materialisation of the defence deal. China is also planning to develop HQ-26, a mid-course interceptor against Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs), meant to be installed on its Type 055 destroyers.[283] It has deployed the HQ-9 to contested islands in the South China Sea and has also developed a naval variant, which is integrated into a number of PLAN surface ships.[284] China has also fielded Russian-origin SAMs, including the S-300 PMU-2 and the S-400, against the threat from Short-Range Ballistic Missiles (SRBMs).[285]
For interception purposes, Russia is helping China develop early warning sensors as part of a ballistic missile launch detection. Simultaneously, China is developing ground-based large phased-array radars to cover a wide geographical space, including Japan, Russia and the Korean peninsula.[286] In 2025, China deployed a new Large Phased Array Radar (LPAR) in Yunnan Province, near Myanmar with a reported range of over 5,000 km, which can monitor deep into Indian territory and track missile tests conducted from Dr. Abdul Kalam Island off India's eastern coast.[287]
The Chinese missile defence capability, evident in the training of personnel skills, ASAT capabilities, hit-to-kill technology and Russian-aided development of interceptors, and sensors architecture, will help shape a robust missile defence network.
Table 5: Short-, Medium-, and Long-Range Air-Defence Systems
| System | Design & Features | Radar | Radar Detection Range | Guidance | Launch Vehicle/Platform | Status |
| HQ-9 (FD-2000 export variant) | Long-range air defence system with limited capability against SRBMs. HQ-9 and HQ-22 are domestically produced, while China purchased the S-300 PMU2 variant from Russia | LD-JPG600 3D S-band long-range early warning Radar (for HQ-9BE variant) | 120-200 km | Inertial guidance in the initial stages with radio command mid-course correction and Track-via-Missile (TVM) for end game.[i] | Transporter Erector Launcher (TEL)[j] | PLAAF operated; Deployed around Beijing and military facilities including ICBM bases. HQ-9 was previously deployed to the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea. |
| HQ-12 | Medium-range SAM air defense system | SJ-202 ‘Gin Sling’ phased array radar or its upgraded variant, the SJ-212 | 115-120 km plus | semi-active radar seeker[k] | TEL | PLAAF operated |
| HQ-16 (LY-80 export variant) | Medium-range air defence system effective against tactical ballistic missiles | 3D phased array radar | 150 kms | Inertial guidance and intermittent illumination[l] | Road mobile, TEL[m] | Deployed with the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force and Navy |
| HQ-17 | short-range air defense system | planar phased array radar | 30 kms plus | Radio command[n] | TEL | PLAA |
| S-400 | Long-range air defence system purchased from Russia. Provides terminal defence against MRBMs as well as cruise missiles and aircraft | Command and active radar[o] | TEL | Reportedly deployed to China’s border with India in 2021 at the Hotan air base in Xinjiang and the Nyingchi air base in Tibet, just across Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh, respectively[288] | ||
| HQ-19 | Terminal defence against medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, with possible capability against ICBMs and low-altitude satellites | Type 610A active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar[p] | Up to 4000 km | combination of radar and infrared sensors[q] | Active radar homing + side-mounted InfrRed seeker | Possible initial operating capability. Not yet publicly deployed |
| HQ-22 | long-range SAM; an upgraded version of HQ-12 | H-200 passive electronically scanned array target engagement radar and a JSG-100 target acquisition radar | H-200: >120 km JSG-100: 160-170 km | Radio command guidance and semi-active radar homing[r] | TEL | PLAAF, PLAN operated |
| HQ-26 | A naval-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) interceptor currently under development | In development. Expected eventual deployment on Type 055 destroyers | ||||
| Dong Neng-3 (DN-3) | ASAT weapon and midcourse ballistic missile defence interceptor capable against ICBMs | Ground-based tracking, satellite data links, and onboard sensors for midcourse correction and terminal phase targeting[s] | Mobile TEL | In development. Tested from Korla missile complex. ASAT capability possibly operational | ||
| DN-2 | ASAT | Multiple midcourse correction options and advanced terminal homing[t] | Mobile TEL | |||
| DN-1 | ASAT | A combination of inertial navigation, mid-course correction via satellite data link, and terminal phase homing using onboard sensors, including infrared and optical seekers[u] | Mobile TEL | |||
| SC-19 | ASAT | A combination of midcourse guidance and terminal homing systems[v] | Mobile platforms similar to those used for China’s DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile (TEL)[w] |
Source: Atlantic Council,[289], CASI[290] (originally compiled information using various sources)
Table 6: Land-based Anti-Aircraft Systems
| System | Radar | Radar Detection Range | Launch Vehicle | Service |
| 9K331 Tor-M1 SHORAD (Russian origin) | Scrum-Half Radar | 25+ km | PLAA | |
| FB-6 SHORAD System | Type 820 FB-6A fire control radar | 65 km (Type 820) / 30 km for aircraft and 18 km for cruise missiles (FB-6A fire control radar) | PLAA | |
| FB-10A Combination SPAAG and SAM System | It combines optoelectronic sensors with radar guidance (no credible information about the radar system) | Unknown; short-range platform | PLAA | |
| HQ-6 SAM (LY-60 export variant) | A full HQ-64 system is equipped with one long-range search radar and three tracking/fire control radars, in addition to a number of support vehicles (no specific information available about the radar) | 18 km | HQ-64 missile launcher | PLAAF |
| HQ-7 SAM (FM-80 export variant) | Transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles paired with an acquisition radar vehicle | 12-15 km | PLAA, PLAAF | |
| Smarthunter MANPADS Command and Control System (FN-6 and FN-16) | They serve as both a short-range radar detection platform to guide MANPADS such as the FN-6 and possibly the QW-1/2, in addition to serving as a network backbone for distributed MANPADS operations. It can also guide anti-aircraft artillery such as the PGZ-09. | 50-100 km | PLAA, PLAN | |
| Yitian short-range air defense system (TY-90 export variant) | Radar and photoelectronic detectors with both infrared and radar missile guidance | 12-18 km | PLAA |
Source: CASI[291] (a compilation from various sources)
The PLAAF, PLARF, and the ISF each have crucial roles in the air defence mechanism. The PLAAF has fielded advanced long-range SAMs and networking systems to defend the skies, the PLARF contributes both offensive long-range firepower and missile interception roles, and the ISF provides the space-based and electronic backbone to detect and manage threats.
In 2011, the PLAAF abolished at least four air-division headquarters and created four bases, namely the Dalian, Nanning, Shanghai, and Urumqi bases, which later became Air Defense Bases in 2017.[292] The PLAAF maintains a SAM Branch that operates SAM brigades throughout the PRC. SAM brigades maintain subordinate battalions with radar and technical support units.[293]
The PLA divested the PLAN of any regional air defence responsibility in 2023 when it transferred PLAN ground-based radar and air defence units to the PLAAF.[294] However, PLAN’s surface combatants play an integral part in the integrated air defence network. A naval variant of HQ-9 SAM, known as the HHQ-9, is deployed by the PLAN surface combatants. The Luyang destroyers and Renhai cruisers can launch SAM missiles.[295] In addition, the PLAN operates electronic countermeasures brigades which are capable of tracking and jamming simulated ‘enemy’ aircraft and counter missiles.[296]
Four new brigades of PLARF were raised between 1980 and 2000, and the expansion accelerated later in the 2000s.[297] Between 2000 and 2010, the then Second Artillery Force had eleven new brigades equipped with weapons like ground-launched cruise missiles, the CJ-10, and its first self-contained road-mobile ICBM, the DF-31, as well as the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile. The pace of growth intensified between 2010 and 2020, as the Second Artillery Force (and, following its name change in 2016, the Rocket Force) added 13 new brigades, as well as the longer-range and more capable DF-41 road-mobile ICBM, the dual nuclear-conventional DF-26 IRBM, and the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle.[298] Between 2017 and late 2019, the PLARF added at least ten new missile brigades, resulting in 29 to 39 brigades, highlighting a 33 percent increase in size in only three years.[299] The PLARF conventional missiles forces will perform a vital role in neutralising static installations like air bases in the early stages of a war, especially their taxiways and runways, preventing fighter aircraft from becoming airborne. China fields a wide array of intermediate-range and short-range ballistic missiles, which it can launch in combination with cruise missiles to saturate missile defences and perform penetrative strikes against stationary targets.[300] As a consequence, it would help defeat the adversary at low cost,[301] because the PLAAF’s fighter planes would not need to engage the adversary’s air combat fleet in a direct engagement, which would otherwise be costly.[302]
Since the 2015-16 organisational reforms, President Xi Jinping has accelerated China’s military modernisation. The PLA has witnessed significant changes in its military doctrine, equipment, and weapons systems as well as an organisational restructuring through the creation of the ISF. The PLAA has continued to modernise its equipment, including tanks, artillery, UAVs, air defence and electronic warfare systems, and focused on combined arms training to achieve the goal of becoming a world-class military. It has also become a leaner and more efficient force, and more personnel have been transferred to the PLAN and PLARF to adapt to changing regional geopolitical changes. The PLARF has undergone considerable expansion, fielding a wide variety of missiles, and this has significant implications for India as its rocket forces need substantial investment and augmentation.
The PLAN, now the largest navy in the world, has become a formidable military force in the near-seas region and is on the path to developing strategic deterrence and counterattack capabilities on the far seas, especially aimed against the US in the Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. Together with PLAN aviation, the PLAAF is the largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and is developing capabilities for both offensive and defensive operations.
An evaluation of these developments in terms of joint operations capability and warfare support systems suggests that the PLA has developed its capabilities in combat preparation, situation shaping, information-led task implementation, and improved joint combat and command systems, as reflected through the numerous joint operations exercises and drills that are conducted to improve combat preparedness. Moreover, China’s capabilities in infrastructure, logistical, and technological support have been the backbone of PLA missions to “fight and win wars”.[303] These capabilities, although primarily supporting China’s operations against Taiwan and in the South China Sea, have important implications for India since the armies of both countries are in a stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the LAC. An assessment from a senior PLA official, Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in August 2024, highlights that despite reforms and modernisation, the PLA faces obstacles in becoming a world-class military force. It faces “systemic obstructions across organizational and materiel systems, a rudderless focus on jointness, slow progress improving training and readiness, ineffective military governance, inefficient resource management, slow onboarding of new weapons, and corruption.”[304] Furthermore, he highlights that the PLA lacks in cultivating talent and, at present, the “supply of talents is not fully matched with the demand for fighting.”[305]
The modernisation drives underscore a vital point in the machinery of the CPC since Xi became general secretary. Xi shares the same aspirations and fears as his predecessors. His vision of a modern and battle-ready PLA is driven by his ambitions of a China that is at the centre of the global economy. China has progressively created a favourable asymmetry in military strength to pose serious capability-related, operational, and logistical challenges for its immediate neighbours, including India. Nevertheless, these capabilities also reflect some shortcomings as visibly demonstrated during India’s Operation Sindoor, resulting in China’s air defence systems operated by the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) suffering heavy damage, rendering them ineffective. The poor performance of Chinese-origin air defence systems will compel the Chinese to vigorously improve their air defence capabilities. This modernisation could also be viewed as a way to establish that China is a force to reckon with in the post-COVID-19 world, that it has learnt from past failures, and is stronger today than it has been in several years.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] According to the 2019 National Defence Policy, China’s armed forces need to “strengthen the awareness of potential dangers, crises and wars, and actively adapt to the new landscape of strategic competition…and new developments in modern warfare, so as to effectively fulfil their tasks and missions in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html#:~:text=China%20advocates%20the%20ultimate%20complete,level%20required%20for%20national%20security
[b] While China has not defined what it means by a “world-class” military, it is likely to include developing a military that is on par or superior to the US military and any other power that Beijing may view as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development interests, such as India. See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[c] According to PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian, the establishment of the ISF is of “profound and far-reaching significance to the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces and effective fulfilment of the missions and tasks of the People's military in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16302635.html
[d] Newspaper reports alluded that this overseas mission, which was planned for the year 2035, may be against India, where the PLA would need UAVs purpose-built for flying at extremely low altitudes, capable of operating both alone and in swarms, and able to strike swiftly on critical command and supply installations deep behind enemy lines. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3249831/drone-007-chinese-military-plans-replace-human-agents-machines-special-operations-overseas
[e] The reasons for personnel optimisation were outlined in a 2016 opinion paper by the Central Military Commission. According to the paper, China’s military needed to respond to the “unprecedented great changes in the world”, “adapt to the evolution of war forms”, and “liberate and enhance [its] vitality”. It aimed to “optimise the proportion of military services” and transform the military from a “quantitative and large-scale model to a quality and efficiency model”. It also aimed to strengthen the “military through science and technology”, build “elite troops with Chinese characteristics”, and “firmly establish combat effectiveness as the only fundamental standard”. See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm
[f] JARI is reported to be the world’s first unmanned surface vehicle (USV) with multiple roles, i.e., anti-submarine, air defence, and surface combat, and the capability to track underwater targets up to 7 kms. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3046601/chinas-new-killer-robot-ship-goes-through-its-first-sea-trial
[g] The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper stated that the PLAAF’s missions and tasks are transforming “from territorial air defence to offensive and defensive operations.” See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF
[h] The Y-20 with PLAAF 27 aircrafts were reported to have intruded Taiwan’s air defence identification zone in July 2021. See: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/an-aircraft-us-fears-chinas-y-20-chubby-girl-gets-new/amp/
[i] TRADOC, “HQ-9 (SA-9) Chinese 8x8 Long-Range Air Defense Missile System,” ODIN TRADOC, https://odin.tradoc.army.mil/WEG/Asset/HQ-9
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[m] J. Michael Dahm, “Offensive and Defensive Strikes,” John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory, 2021, https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/OffensiveDefensiveStrike.pdf
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[305] Youxia, “持续深化国防和军队改革 (学习贯彻党的二十届三中全会精神) [Continue to Deepen National Defense and Military Reforms (Study and Implement the Spirit of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the Party)”
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Kartik is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. He is currently working on issues related to land warfare and armies, especially the India ...
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Rahul Rawat is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme (SSP). He also coordinates the SSP activities. His work focuses on strategic issues in the ...
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