Connectivity, security, and China shape India’s outreach to Myanmar
When Myanmar’s President U Min Aung Hlaing landed in Bodh Gaya, Bihar, on May 30, 2026, the symbolism was hard to miss. Before travelling to New Delhi for talks with Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Droupadi Murmu, he visited the Mahabodhi Temple, one of Buddhism’s holiest sites and a UNESCO World Heritage Site. The stopover underscored a broader message: India was welcoming Myanmar’s leader not only through the language of diplomacy but through shared civilisational ties.
This is a major diplomatic engagement, the first visit to India (May 30– June 3, 2026) by Min Aung Hlaing in his capacity as President, reflecting the growing importance of India-Myanmar relations in a shifting geopolitical environment of South and Southeast Asia. For New Delhi, the timing and tone are equally significant.
The world’s democracies have largely turned away from Naypyidaw since the February 2021 coup that ousted Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government. Western nations imposed sanctions and sought to isolate the military regime. But Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri told reporters that India’s policy is “not intended to be a commentary on the internal political arrangements” in Myanmar, and that New Delhi believes engagement is the best way forward.
This is realpolitik disguised as pragmatism. Myanmar is India’s gateway to Southeast Asia and a cornerstone of its Act East and Neighbourhood First policies. Sharing a 1,643-km border with four northeastern States, Myanmar’s instability poses a direct threat to India’s security interests in the region.
Then there is the China factor. Beijing has aggressively cultivated Naypyidaw since the coup, filling the vacuum left by western withdrawal with infrastructure financing, arms supplies, and diplomatic cover. For India to cede Myanmar’s strategic space entirely to China would be a self-inflicted wound in its own backyard.
Few indicators better reflect the depth of India’s strategic investment in Myanmar than the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway — two connectivity corridors that dominated the Modi-Hlaing agenda.
The Kaladan project connects Kolkata to Sittwe by sea, then follows the Kaladan River inland to Paletwa, before linking by road to Zorinpui in Mizoram. The sea and river components are operational, with the first cargo shipment reaching Sittwe in May 2023. But the critical 109-km Paletwa-Zorinpui Road running through mountainous, flood-prone terrain in Chin State remains incomplete. India’s Shipping Minister told Parliament in 2025 that full operationalisation is targeted for 2027.
The Trilateral Highway carries an even grander ambition: linking Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand through Myanmar over roughly 1,360 km, with planned extensions to Cambodia, Lao PDR, and Vietnam. Once completed, it could transform India’s landlocked northeast into a gateway to Southeast Asia. It was supposed to be finished by 2019. It still is not.
At the Myanmar-India Trade and Investment Conclave, Mr. Aung Hlaing described them as vital to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India economic corridor.
Myanmar’s internal conflict lies behind both delays. Armed groups control large stretches of territory along the two corridors, making construction difficult and unpredictable. President Hlaing assured Mr. Modi that Myanmar would do “everything” to complete the projects, while Mr. Misri reiterated that they remain a “major priority” despite security challenges. At the Myanmar-India Trade and Investment Conclave, Mr. Aung Hlaing described them as vital to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)-India economic corridor. The real question is whether these assurances will translate into progress on the ground. Beyond infrastructure, the summit covered significant ground. Bilateral trade stood at $1.95 billion in 2025-26, and both sides agreed to increase it through a rupee-kyat settlement mechanism, with additional discussions on critical minerals and rare-earth cooperation.
On security, Mr. Aung Hlaing reiterated Myanmar’s assurance that its territory would not be used against India’s interests — a significant pledge given the long presence of Indian insurgent groups and cybercrime networks in Myanmar’s border regions. More than 2,400 Indian nationals have been rescued from scam centres through bilateral cooperation over the past 18 months, though many remain trapped. On education, India announced an increase in Mekong-Ganga ICCR scholarships for Myanmar students from 36 to 100 annually from 2026.
By receiving Mr. Aung Hlaing as Myanmar’s President, India has signalled a degree of acceptance of the country’s evolving political reality. This does not necessarily amount to endorsement of the military-backed government. Still, it suggests a recognition that meaningful engagement with Myanmar requires working with those currently in power. For Myanmar, the visit is equally consequential. Mr. Aung Hlaing last visited India in 2019 as Myanmar’s military chief. His return to New Delhi as head of state — and his choice of India for his first major bilateral visit abroad — signals a deliberate engagement with a neighbour that can provide a diplomatic and economic counterweight to overwhelming Chinese dependence. For India, the calculus is rooted in geography, security and the recognition that disengagement rarely produces better outcomes. The message is clear: pragmatic engagement, however uncomfortable, may increasingly shape regional approaches to Myanmar in the years ahead.
This commentary originally appeared in The Hindu.
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Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at ...
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Sreeparna Banerjee is an Associate Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. Her work focuses on the geopolitical and strategic affairs concerning two Southeast Asian countries, namely ...
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