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India In The West Pacific Interests And Rationale For Engagements

India in the West Pacific: Interests and Rationale for Engagements

Ippeita Nishida and Pratnashree Basu, Eds., India in the West Pacific: Interests and Rationale for Engagements, Observer Research Foundation, May 2026.

Editors’ Note

Over the past decade, the Indo-Pacific has emerged as a principal theatre of geopolitical contestation, economic reconfiguration, and strategic realignment. Within this expansive construct, however, the “West Pacific” sub-region remains relatively under-examined in Indian strategic thinking. While India’s engagement with the Indian Ocean and, increasingly, Southeast Asia has attracted sustained analytical attention, its interests, presence, and potential role in the West Pacific, particularly in relation to East Asia and the Taiwan Strait, are only beginning to be systematically explored. This volume, jointly produced by the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), seeks to address this gap.

The chapters in this volume build on insights shared by participants in a closed-door workshop held in Tokyo in December 2025, which brought together scholars and practitioners from India, Southeast Asia, Taiwan, and Japan. The discussions were framed around a central question: What are the drivers, limits, and implications of India’s expanding engagement in the West Pacific? In addressing this question, the contributors move beyond declaratory frameworks such as the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” to examine the material, strategic, and geopolitical underpinnings of India’s role in a region historically seen as being outside its core theatre of engagement.

A key theme that runs through the volume is the growing salience of economic security as a driver of India’s relations with East Asia. Although New Delhi’s earlier iteration of the Act East Policy (AEP), the Look East Policy (LEP), focused on expanding the country’s economic ties with ASEAN countries, the measured and tangible developments in this regard were felt under the AEP. In parallel, AEP expanded India’s strategic engagements with the region.

The first set of articles examines the intersection of supply chains, technological dependencies, and geopolitical risk, particularly in the context of potential contingencies in the Taiwan Strait. India's quest for self-reliance must be interpreted as an effort to rebalance its integration into globalisation rather than as a retreat from it, given the growing strain that geopolitical fragmentation is placing on global production networks.

The analysis by Kalpit Mankikar and Eri Ikeda examines how India’s approach to economic security is being reshaped by geopolitical disruptions, particularly supply chain vulnerabilities and the risks of overdependence on China. It argues that India is pursuing a dual strategy of domestic capacity-building (self-reliance) alongside diversification through trusted partnerships, including deeper cooperation with Japan. This tension is further explored in the chapter by Tsaiying Lu and Shotaro Kumagai, which discusses how a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, particularly involving scenarios like a maritime quarantine, could disrupt global shipping and semiconductor supply chains, with cascading effects on India’s economy. It argues that such risks simultaneously create an opportunity for India to position itself as an alternative manufacturing hub, contingent on its ability to build credible domestic semiconductor capacity and attract investment from partners like Japan and Taiwan. Together, these articles underscore that economic security is no longer a peripheral concern but central to strategic positioning in the Indo-Pacific.

The second thematic cluster turns to the question of security contingencies, with a particular focus on the Taiwan Strait. Here, the volume engages with a critical but often underexplored issue: How does India perceive, and how will it potentially respond to, crises in East Asia? The chapter by Harsh V Pant and Suyash Desai assesses India’s strategic stakes in a potential crisis in the Taiwan Strait, focusing on implications for trade, supply chains, and regional stability. It argues that while India has substantial indirect interests, its response is likely to remain cautious and calibrated due to capacity constraints and its commitment to strategic autonomy. This is not merely a question of capability, but of strategic choice, shaped by India’s broader commitment to autonomy and its prioritisation of more immediate security concerns.

Complementing this perspective, Tsuneo Watanabe and Dee Wu offer insights into how Japan and Taiwan perceive India’s evolving geopolitical role. Their analysis reveals a degree of expectation asymmetry: while regional actors increasingly view India as a potential stabilising force, India’s own strategic calculus remains cautious and calibrated. This gap between external expectations and internal prioritisation is a recurring theme in the volume and points to the broader structural constraints that shape India’s engagement with the West Pacific.

The final set of chapters shifts the focus to maritime Southeast Asia, a region that serves as both a bridge and a buffer between the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. The essay by Pratnashree Basu and Sayantan Haldar examines the evolving maritime balance in this sub-region, giving particular attention to the role of India and Japan. Their analysis highlights the importance of capacity-building and strategic partnerships in shaping and sustaining a stable regional order. At the same time, it underscores the limits of external influence in a region characterised by strong preferences for autonomy and inclusivity. The final chapter by Sugit Arjon and Saya Kiba further enriches the discussion by examining India’s engagement with maritime Southeast Asia. It analyses the intersection of traditional and non-traditional security and contends that India’s strategic relevance in the region will depend on shifting toward non-traditional security cooperation—particularly HADR, maritime governance, and legal norm-building—to better match ASEAN priorities and build long-term trust.

Together, the chapters in this volume highlight a fundamental paradox: whereas India’s stakes in the West Pacific are growing, its capacity to convert these interests into a long-term strategic presence is still limited. Geography continues to impose limits on operational reach, tethering India to its primary theatre in the Indian Ocean. Strategic culture and policy orientation also influence how involved New Delhi could be, with India’s emphasis on strategic autonomy standing in sharp contrast to the alliance-driven frameworks that dominate East Asian security. The extent of integration is also limited by institutional constraints, both with regard to bilateral procedures and larger regional systems.

However, these limitations should not be interpreted as signs of disengagement or inertia. Instead, they show how India is negotiating its place in a shifting regional order. The Indo-Pacific is a dynamic strategic region with ever-evolving roles, responsibilities, and expectations. Therefore, it is necessary to view India's involvement with the West Pacific as a component of a larger process of adaptation that is influenced by both opportunity and constraint.

A particularly important dimension of this adaptation is the role of partnerships. The India–Japan relationship features prominently across the volume, not only as a bilateral partnership, but as a key component of the wider Indo-Pacific strategic architecture. Japan’s proactive security posture and its emphasis on economic security and technological resilience align closely with India’s own evolving priorities. At the same time, the partnership is shaped by asymmetries—in capabilities, institutional frameworks, and strategic outlooks—that limit its operational depth. The challenge, as several of our authors note, lies in moving from political and diplomatic convergence to coordination at the level of practice.

Additionally, the volume emphasises how crucial multilateral and minilateral frameworks are in closing these disparities. ASEAN-led institutions and platforms like the Quad offer ways to coordinate without the formal commitments of alliances. But they also impose their own limitations, especially when it comes to inclusivity and reaching consensus.

Looking ahead, the question is not whether India will engage more deeply in the West Pacific, but how. The course of the great-power competition, the development of regional institutions, and India’s own domestic capabilities and policy decisions are just a few of the variables that will determine the response. Additionally, it will rely on how well India can use partnerships, especially with Japan, to increase its strategic reach without using too many resources.

This volume aims to open up space for more nuanced and grounded analyses of India’s role in the West Pacific. It highlights both the opportunities and the limits of this engagement through the examination of diverse perspectives from across the region. In doing so, it contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the Indo-Pacific as a connected, but differentiated, strategic space.

The editors would like to acknowledge the contributions of all the participants in the December 2025 workshop, whose insights and exchanges have shaped this volume. ORF is grateful to the Sasakawa Peace Foundation for their partnership in convening the workshop and supporting this publication. The chapters that follow reflect the collaborative spirit that guided the workshop, and it is our hope that this volume can serve as a starting point for further analyses and discussions on this vital topic.

As the Indo-Pacific continues to evolve, the West Pacific will remain a critical arena for both competition and cooperation. Understanding India’s role in this space is therefore not just an academic exercise, but a strategic imperative.


All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.


Ippeita Nishida is Senior Fellow, Strategy and Deterrence Group, Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), Japan.

Pratnashree Basu is Associate Fellow, Indo-Pacific, Strategic Studies Programme, Observer Research Foundation, India.

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Editors

Ippeita Nishida

Ippeita Nishida

Ippeita Nishida is Senior Fellow, Strategy and Deterrence Group, Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF), Japan. ...

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Pratnashree Basu

Pratnashree Basu

Pratnashree Basu is an Associate Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. She covers the Indo-Pacific region, with a focus on Japan’s role in the region. ...

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