The partnership remains strategically indispensable, yet increasingly vulnerable to friction arising from divergent priorities
The deaths of three Indian seafarers in a US military strike near the Strait of Hormuz represent more than a tragic maritime incident. They have exposed a deeper reality about contemporary US-India relations: strategic convergence, however significant, does not eliminate divergent interests. At a moment when New Delhi and Washington are often described as indispensable partners in shaping the Indo-Pacific balance of power, the crisis in the Gulf has highlighted the limits of alignment between the world’s two largest democracies.
For much of the past decade, the dominant narrative surrounding US-India relations has been one of growing strategic cooperation. Shared concerns about China’s rise, expanding defence ties, technological collaboration, and the institutionalisation of platforms such as the Quad have created an impression of an increasingly seamless partnership. Yet, the Strait of Hormuz crisis demonstrates that geopolitical alignment in one theatre does not necessarily translate into policy convergence across all regions.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis demonstrates that geopolitical alignment in one theatre does not necessarily translate into policy convergence across all regions.
As the second Trump administration pursues a more assertive and unilateral approach to international affairs, New Delhi is being reminded that its strategic priorities do not always coincide with Washington’s.
The immediate trigger for the diplomatic confrontation has been a series of US military operations conducted between June 8 and June 11 against commercial vessels operating near the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. The most serious incident involved the MT Settebello, a Palau-flagged tanker carrying an all-Indian crew of 24. A US strike intended to disable the vessel hit its engineering compartment, resulting in extensive fire and flooding. While a coordinated rescue operation involving Omani authorities managed to save 21 sailors, three Indian crew members lost their lives.
Washington has justified the operation as part of its broader effort to enforce the naval blockade against Iran imposed in April following the escalation of conflict in West Asia. According to US Central Command, vessels such as the MT Settebello formed part of a wider “shadow fleet” allegedly facilitating Iranian oil exports in defiance of sanctions. American officials have maintained that repeated warnings were issued before force was employed and that the objective was to disable the vessel rather than sink it.
Yet from India’s perspective, such distinctions are largely beside the point. The central issue is not whether the vessel was carrying sanctioned cargo or whether established procedures were followed. The issue is that Indian citizens became casualties of an American military operation. Once civilian deaths occur, legal arguments about sanctions enforcement quickly give way to political questions about accountability, proportionality, and the obligations that strategic partners owe one another.
New Delhi’s reaction has therefore been unusually sharp. The Ministry of External Affairs summoned the US Charge d’Affaires and issued a formal diplomatic protest demanding an explanation, accountability, and assurances that similar incidents would not be repeated. Indian officials reiterated their long-standing commitment to freedom of navigation and safe passage through the Strait of Hormuz, a waterway critical not only to global commerce but also to India's economic and energy security. Simultaneously, Indian authorities coordinated efforts to repatriate the surviving crew members and the remains of those killed.
Domestic political pressures have further amplified the significance of the crisis. Maritime organisations have questioned the rules of engagement employed by US forces in crowded commercial shipping lanes, while opposition parties have seized upon the incident to criticise the government’s handling of the relationship with Washington. Such reactions are hardly surprising. The deaths of Indian citizens at the hands of a strategic partner inevitably create political pressures that no government can ignore, regardless of the broader importance of the bilateral relationship.
However, the significance of the episode extends well beyond the immediate diplomatic fallout. The Hormuz crisis must be situated within a broader pattern of friction that has increasingly characterised US-India relations during the Trump 2.0 era. While the structural foundations of the partnership remain strong, the return of a more transactional and unilateral American foreign policy has exposed underlying differences that were often obscured during periods of strategic optimism.
While the structural foundations of the partnership remain strong, the return of a more transactional and unilateral American foreign policy has exposed underlying differences that were often obscured during periods of strategic optimism.
President Donald Trump’s second administration has revived a foreign policy approach centred on immediate American interests, burden-sharing by partners, and a willingness to employ coercive instruments in pursuit of strategic objectives. Such an approach has generated unease in New Delhi, which continues to view strategic autonomy as a central pillar of its foreign policy. The tension between these two worldviews is becoming increasingly visible across multiple domains, from trade and technology to energy security and regional diplomacy.
Trade remains one of the most visible areas of disagreement. American demands for greater market access, concerns regarding digital regulation, and disputes over tariffs have periodically complicated the relationship. Although these disagreements have not fundamentally altered the strategic trajectory of bilateral ties, they have reinforced the perception that Washington increasingly views partnerships through a transactional lens. For India, which seeks to balance economic openness with the protection of critical domestic industries, such pressures are often viewed as inconsistent with the rhetoric of strategic partnership.
The more consequential divergence, however, concerns West Asia. For Washington, the blockade of Iran is part of a broader strategy aimed at reshaping the regional balance of power and constraining Tehran’s influence. For India, the primary concern is maintaining regional stability. The Gulf is not merely another geopolitical theatre; it is central to India’s energy security, commercial interests, and diaspora welfare. Millions of Indians live and work across the region, while a substantial proportion of India's energy imports and maritime trade pass through Gulf waters. Consequently, instability in the region has direct implications for India’s domestic economy and national security.
This difference in priorities helps explain why the Hormuz incident resonates so deeply in New Delhi. The crisis has transformed what was previously a difficult strategic balancing act into a politically charged issue. India has traditionally sought to maintain constructive relations with Iran while simultaneously deepening its partnership with the United States. This balancing strategy has allowed New Delhi to preserve strategic flexibility in a volatile region. However, when the enforcement of American policy results in Indian casualties, the political space for quiet accommodation narrows considerably.
The economic implications further complicate the situation. Disruptions to shipping through the Strait of Hormuz have raised concerns about energy supplies, freight costs, and maritime security. Reports of Indian-linked vessels stranded in the region underscore the vulnerability of India's economic interests to geopolitical instability. As a result, New Delhi is likely to seek assurances, exemptions, or alternative arrangements that protect commercial shipping and reduce risks to civilian crews. Washington’s willingness-or unwillingness-to accommodate such concerns will provide an important indication of how effectively the two countries can manage strategic differences.
None of this suggests that the US-India partnership is facing a fundamental rupture. The broader logic underpinning bilateral ties remains compelling. Cooperation in defence, emerging technologies, intelligence sharing, and Indo-Pacific security continues to serve the interests of both countries. China remains the single most important factor driving strategic convergence between New Delhi and Washington. Neither side has any interest in allowing a regional crisis to derail a partnership that has taken decades to build.
In many ways, the Strait of Hormuz crisis may come to symbolise a defining feature of the Trump 2.0 era in US-India relations: a partnership that remains strategically indispensable, yet increasingly vulnerable to friction arising from divergent regional priorities, competing conceptions of order, and differing approaches to the use of power.
Nevertheless, the Hormuz episode serves as an important reminder that strategic partnerships are ultimately tested not by areas of agreement but by moments of disagreement. The challenge for both capitals will be to prevent a tragic maritime incident from becoming a broader crisis of confidence. How Washington responds to India’s demands for accountability and how New Delhi balances its regional interests against its larger strategic calculations will shape not only the immediate diplomatic fallout but also the future character of the relationship.
In many ways, the Strait of Hormuz crisis may come to symbolise a defining feature of the Trump 2.0 era in US-India relations: a partnership that remains strategically indispensable, yet increasingly vulnerable to friction arising from divergent regional priorities, competing conceptions of order, and differing approaches to the use of power.
The task before both governments is not to eliminate these differences-which is neither possible nor desirable-but to manage them in a manner that preserves the larger strategic logic binding the two nations together.
This commentary originally appeared in Moneycontrol.
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Professor Harsh V. Pant is Vice President at Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a Professor of International Relations with King's India Institute at ...
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