Shifting Russia-West relations and Northeast Asia’s regional dynamics have given the Russia-North Korea partnership a clearer strategic dimension. These realities signal that the partnership is here to stay.
The Russia-North Korea partnership has deepened significantly in recent years amid a growing contestation with the West. The Ukraine war, in particular, has served as a catalyst for strengthening the partnership, culminating in the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty in 2024. While there is agreement on the operational and tactical drivers of the partnership, the strategic rationale binding this alliance has remained ambiguous. However, shifting Russia-West relations and Northeast Asia’s regional dynamics have given this partnership a clearer strategic dimension.
Since 2024, the bilateral relationship has grown by leaps and bounds. Military ties have become the most vital aspect of this relationship, particularly in the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war. North Korea’s supply of munitions and matériel to Russia has strengthened the latter’s military posture against Ukraine. Experts estimate that North Korea received around US$13 billion in return.
The economic partnership, which had been virtually absent since the end of the Cold War, began to see an uptick, increasing sevenfold in 2024 to US$34 million.
Furthermore, Pyongyang's participation in the recapture of the Kursk region cemented its relationship with Russia. Its participation in the conflict was less about a shortage of forces and more about signalling to the West of its deepening bond with Russia and emphasising the failure of the West’s sanctions regime against Pyongyang. With the broader aim of deterring further overt support for the Ukrainian military. North Korea’s closer relationship has generated a positive image of it in Russia. Kim Jong Un has also used this opportunity to position the country as Russia’s true friend. He stated that the North Korea-Russia friendship was “written in blood”, underscoring the symbolic depth of the relationship.
Beyond the military relationship, Moscow and Pyongyang have expanded their partnership across diverse domains such as health, education, connectivity, labour mobility, law enforcement and tourism. The economic partnership, which had been virtually absent since the end of the Cold War, began to see an uptick, increasing sevenfold in 2024 to US$34 million. North Korea's imports are likely to increase with the opening of a land bridge between the two countries (in addition to the existing rail line); bilateral trade is expected to rise further.
Table 1: Expanding Russia-North Strategic Partnership Since 2024
| Contents of Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, 2024 | Russia-North Korea Bilateral Cooperation: Projects, Initiatives and Agreement (Since 2024) | Developments/Focus Area |
| Military assistance per Article 51 of the UN Charter and respective countries’ laws (Article 4) | North Korea soldiers' participation (approx 14,000-15,000) in the Russia-Ukraine war. |
The deployment of North Korea's soldiers has established a precedent, enabling reciprocity in case conflict breaks out in the Korean peninsula or the Northeast Asian region. Putin has expressed his gratitude for North Korean soldiers' participation in the Kursk fighting and has reportedly awarded the North Korean commander responsible for commanding the North Korean troops last year. North Korea has inaugurated the Memorial Museum of Combat Feats at the Overseas Military Operations in honour of North Korean martyr soldiers. |
| Shall promote the expansion and development of cooperation in trade and economic, investment, scientific and technological fields (Article 10) | Signed a protocol to expand cooperation in the area of economic, science and technology ties. | A new bridge connecting North Korea and Russia has been built to further increase trade over the Tumen River. The bridge is estimated to handle 300 vehicles and 2,850 people. |
| Shall mutually cooperate to ensure solid regional and international peace and security (Article 3) | Since 2024, North Korea and Russia have closely consulted with each other on regional and international peace and security developments, including supporting each other on security issues. | Russia has supported North Korea's position on nuclearisation and military modernisation. It has also condemned South Korea and Japan's activities in the region. |
| Each party has an obligation not to conclude agreements with third countries that infringe on the sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of the other party (Article 5) | On March 26, 2026, North Korea and Belarus signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. |
Signal Russia’s support for the treaty and the entry of North Korea as part of the Eurasian security architecture. Prospects of trilateral cooperation between Russia-Belarus-North Korea are growing |
| No mention of the reunification of Korea |
Systematically removed all symbols and references to unification in the public and North Korean education curriculum. Kim Jong Un has amended the Constitution, removing all references to unification. |
This shows that reunification is no longer part of the bilateral agenda between the two countries. This will likely influence Russia’s position on Korean reunification. |
| Increased emphasis on cooperation in the fields of health, standards, education, and labour mobility (Article 12 and 14) |
April 15, 2026: Labour: Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and General Federation of Trade Unions of Russia signed an MoU on friendship and cooperation. April 23, 2026: Health: laid the foundation of the North Korea-Russia Friendship Hospital in Wonsan-Kalma Marine Tourist District. June 12, 2025: Education: Russian and North Korean Ministers of Education signed an agreement to cooperate in the field of education. |
North Korea has made Russian mandatory above fourth grade in 2024. Teachers are trained in the Russian language from Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University. Russia has issued 36,413 visas in 2025 as compared to 9,239 in 2024. Among these, 35,839 were for education. The North Korean Delegation for Education participated in the Third International Forum for Ministers of Education. Direct flights from Moscow to Pyongyang have started again. |
| Cooperation in the fields of international information security and countering disinformation. (Article 18 and 20) |
The Russian Ministry of Digital Development, Communication and Mass Media and North Korea’s Committee on Public Information (the State’s Publicity and Media oversight organ) signed a pact on cooperation in public relations March 29, 2026: Russian News Agency TASS and North Korean State News Agency KCNA have signed an agreement to counter “fake news” and “disinformation.” KCNA and Rossiya Segodnya signed a cooperation agreement(A delegation from Rossiya Segodnya visited Pyongyang in Nov 2025) |
Enables cooperation in the field of mass media and information exchange between state and private information services. Allows joint projects to be undertaken. All aimed at strengthening information and media ties. |
| Cooperation on international terrorism and extremism, human trafficking, illicit circulation of goods and funds (Article 17) Cooperation between legislative, executive, and law enforcement agencies of the countries (Article 15) |
Sep 6, 2025: Russia’s Interior Ministry and North Korea’s Public Security Ministry signed an agreement to strengthen cooperation on public safety affairs and law enforcement 22 April, 2026: Russian Interior Minister, on his visit to North Korea, met North Korea’s Minister of Social Safety and signed the 2026-2027 Exchange Plan) |
Cooperation in areas such as transnational organised crime, terrorist threats, arrests of wanted criminals, and drug and human trafficking. |
Source: Compiled by Authors
The pace and the depth of the ties achieved in such a short period have surprised many. The agreements and MoUs signed over the last two years have led to significant developments, as illustrated in Table 1. The scope and agenda underline the ambition to develop this partnership across levels.
Since 2024, Russia and North Korea's ties have gradually moved towards greater institutionalisation with growing and diversified sectoral cooperation. The frequent high-level visits between the Russian and North Korean leaders reflect the strengthening of political relations. Three key global trends are driving the special focus on security and defence cooperation between Russia and North Korea: the securitisation of Northeast Asia, close trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, and the remilitarisation of Japan.
Three key global trends are driving the special focus on security and defence cooperation between Russia and North Korea: the securitisation of Northeast Asia, close trilateral cooperation among the US, Japan, and South Korea, and the remilitarisation of Japan.
North Korea's pursuit of defence modernisation and updation, bolstering its conventional military capabilities, including in new areas such as space, cyber, and Artificial Intelligence (AI), presents new opportunities for bilateral cooperation to expand. Additionally, increasing the number of North Korean STEM students in Russia creates another talent pipeline that could further add to the scientific and technological ecosystem back home.
Moscow and Pyongyang also share perceptions of common security and threat, which have led to greater strategic convergence on regional security architecture and a growing realisation of closer defence and security cooperation. Russia’s support for North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy positions demonstrates a stark shift from its previous stance. North Korea’s denuclearisation and, most likely, reunification are two specific areas where the Russian position has shifted and is expected to align more closely with Pyongyang's, moving away from its original stance.
This strategic convergence was reflected in remarks by Russia’s Acting Ambassador to North Korea, Vladimir Topekha, who expressed support for North Korea’s economic development agenda and its “autonomous” foreign policy posture. This signals Russia’s interest in actively supporting North Korea’s vision for domestic development and its foreign policy posture.
Russia’s support for North Korea’s domestic and foreign policy positions demonstrates a stark shift from its previous stance.
Moscow is likely to pursue a nuanced, hyphenated approach, seeking reintegration into the US-led geoeconomic order on one hand, while sustaining its cooperation with North Korea on the other. On the surface, a temporary freeze on the conflict in the European theatre may not necessarily alleviate the structural insecurities in East Asia. Thus, North Korea will remain salient for Russia in this context. With the broader interest in maintaining strategic balance in Northeast Asia, including China. Furthermore, the lack of strategic convergence in the US-Russia relationship reflects its structural weakness. Russia, thus, may not consider North Korea a mere wartime ally, but will play a critical role in strengthening the latter’s latent capacity and subsequently assisting in the modernisation of its military. In other words, these realities signal that the partnership is here to stay and grow.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Junior Fellow with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia’s foreign policy and economy, and India-Russia relations. Siddharth is a ...
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Abhishek Sharma is a Junior Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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