A high-quality, transparent infrastructure strategy will position the Quad as a credible Indo-Pacific development partner and a viable alternative to the BRI
Image Source: Getty Images
On 1 July, the foreign ministers of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) countries—India, Japan, Australia, and the United States (US)—met for the 10th time, since 2017 when it was first established, in Washington, DC. In their joint statement, the ministers condemned China’s belligerence in the South China Sea, Pakistan’s state-sponsored terrorist attack in Pahalgam and expressed deep concerns apropos Beijing’s weaponisation of advanced manufacturing and critical raw minerals supply chains. The statement also resonates with the current White House administration’s foreign policy stance, which frames China as a strategic competitor, emphasises the indivisibility of economic and national security, and reinforces commitments to an open, rules-based, and inclusive Indo-Pacific.
Notably, references to connectivity, energy, and jointly developing trade-enabling infrastructure were absent from the joint statement, infrastructure, signalling a shift in US priorities under the current administration. Yet, such initiatives remain pivotal to the great-power contestation in the Indo-Pacific, which faces a US$ 4.5 trillion development finance deficit between 2015–30. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Beijing has deepened its influence across Indo-Pacific supply chains and development assistance paradigms by exporting industrial overcapacity and fostering trade dependencies, thereby securing both economic gains and strategic leverage.
As a plurilateral grouping of countries that each view China as a strategic competitor and face economic and national security challenges from Beijing, overlooking the geopolitical and economic influence of the BRI is strategically shortsighted. While the Quad foreign ministers' meeting may have been a missed opportunity in this regard, the upcoming 2025 New Delhi Quad Leaders’ Summit can be leveraged to address them. This article analyses the obstacles and opportunities of Quad’s connectivity cooperation and infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific. It also critically assesses the limited cooperation of the Quad in these domains.
Connectivity, cooperation and infrastructure development have emerged as intensely contested domains. Beijing’s BRI has demonstrated how multidimensional connectivity cooperation is instrumental in gaining geopolitical influence. Each Quad country has responded with its connectivity alternative, albeit in its neighbourhood. So far, the Quad’s collective footprint on the ground remains small–– limited to a subsea cable in Palau, and fewer than 10 small-scale, scattered green energy power plants, totalling just around US$ 0.5 billion.
In contrast, the BRI has rapidly expanded its reach. By 2023, Beijing had financed 20,000 projects through its policy state-banks, built by Chinese state and private companies, thereby gaining de facto geoeconomic leverage. For instance, Sri Lanka’s debt defaults resulted in the 99-year lease of Hambantota port to a Chinese state company. In Pakistan, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor has secured its access to the Gwadar deep-sea port. Across Asia and Africa, Chinese-built transport, energy, and digital infrastructure bind local economies to Beijing. The sheer scale of these commitments often means Western alternatives arrive too late to compete.
Yet, this Sino-Quad competition also presents an opportunity for the Quad. A growing number of countries have become wary of the BRI’s debt burdens and opaque terms. The Global South’s economic development hinges on infrastructure development through transparent, sustainable deals. The Quad should capitalise on this need by proposing an alternative development model: one that blends their foreign policy goals with their overseas development assistance (which is largely based on ODA financial flows). The newly launched America First Foreign Assistance, a rebrand of the discontinued USAID agency, may be a pivotal actor in this regard. This new agency focuses on “making strategic investments that strengthen our partners and the US.” The upcoming New Delhi Leaders’ Summit is an opportunity to deepen strategic foreign assistance collaboration in common priority regions for the Quad. For instance, Southeast Asia and the Gulf are priority regions for all four members. Furthermore, the Quad DFCs can collaborate on elements such as the Blue Dot Network, the Quad Ports of the Future (QFPF) partnership, and the Critical Minerals alliance. If the Quad can integrate these pieces as a broader, multifaceted connectivity scheme, it could begin to offer a credible package. Several governments in the Global South have signalled interest in high-quality, transparent projects, suggesting a receptive audience for this alternative.
Trust is essential for the Quad’s future credibility. To reinforce this credibility, it must deliver transparent, milestone-based infrastructure projects.
Collectively, the four countries command significant development capital. Between 2017-2024, they have invested US$ 341.31 billion[1] in regional infrastructure through grants, concessional loans, credit lines, and economic assistance programmes. Deeper cooperation among the development finance corporations (DFCs) of the Quad countries could amplify the impact of their foreign assistance. It could spread risk, reduce costs, tackle larger projects and extend more favourable loan terms. A key step towards realising this vision should be revitalising the 2021 Quad infrastructure fund. The Quad’s combined economic weight can be a force multiplier, enabling projects beyond the scope of any single country.
Trust is essential for the Quad’s future credibility. To reinforce this credibility, it must deliver transparent, milestone-based infrastructure projects. Early, tangible wins, such as improving power, digital connectivity, or transport infrastructure in remote regions, can prove that its model works and restore faith in development partnerships.
Although the Quad has launched collaborative mechanisms such as the Infrastructure Working Group, the Quad Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience (QPCCR) and the QFPF, the results have been intangible and negligible. Financial commitments are not translating into consistent disbursements or on-ground execution. Financial constraints in India and Australia, coupled with evolving foreign policy and strategic priorities, impede continuity.
To overcome these hurdles, the Quad can institutionalise 2+1 trilateral development cooperation that involves two Quad partners and one beneficiary partner nation. This approach enables tailored, country-specific, local interventions that blend the strengths of North-South and South-South collaborations. It will foster co-creation, knowledge sharing, and efficient utilisation of aid, offering an alternative to the delays observed in quadrilateral mechanisms. The India-US-Nepal MCC shows the potential of high-standard alternatives to China’s BRI.
India and Australia, seen as non-colonial, trusted actors, should intensify joint infrastructure work in the Bay of Bengal and the South Pacific. Their complementary capabilities: India’s regional experience and Australia's capabilities in port automation and green shipping can effectively bridge maritime infrastructure gaps. Similarly, Japan and the US should deepen connectivity cooperation in Southeast Asia, where their developmental goals align with strategic imperatives. These trilateral arrangements can later be scaled into broader cooperation with entities like the PGII, Global Gateway, or the Italian Mattei Plan–– but only after internal Quad mechanisms prove effective.
Still, challenges persist: coordination complexity, asymmetrical decision-making power within the grouping, differing legal systems, and (possibly) limited institutional capacity in recipient nations. Political tumult in involved countries further hinders trilateral success. Yet, the Quad countries’ robust political trust and a latticework of engagement across domains offer a unique foundation to operationalise this model more effectively than past attempts.
In parallel, the Quad must prioritise financing transport and trade corridors to rival the BRI’s connectivity infrastructure. Corridors (land, sea, or multimodal) are central to China’s influence strategy and must be matched by equally strategic investments. The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) should be revived to expand Asia-Africa connectivity paradigms, especially given the renewed interest among Quad partners in Africa’s strategic and economic value. Linking the AAGC with the Lobito Corridor or the EU’s Global Gateway could foster economic synergy and geopolitical coherence.
Moreover, partnerships with the I2U2 grouping (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the US) may offer promising pathways in the medium and long-term scenario. Abu Dhabi, now Africa’s top bilateral development partner, brings substantial capital and credibility. Medium-term coordination between Quad and I2U2 development efforts in infrastructure and energy could deepen impact and improve project bankability.
Ultimately, a cohesive, transparent, and resilient infrastructure strategy will place Quad as a credible development partner in the Indo-Pacific, offering a viable alternative to the BRI.
To position itself as a credible alternative to the BRI, the Quad must bridge the implementation gap, adopt flexible trilateral models, and focus on financing strategically significant transport corridors that enhance connectivity and regional trust.
To meaningfully advance connectivity and infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad must deepen its cooperation. This entails expanding investment in areas such as green energy, digital infrastructure, and maritime connectivity, while adhering to transparency, sustainability, and high-quality standards. India should consider joining the BDN to strengthen collective credibility, harmonise infrastructure standards, and attract private sector investment. Revitalising the AAGC could also offer strategic leverage against China’s BRI, enhancing economic linkages between the Indo-Pacific and Africa. Quad DFCs and policy banks must work together to streamline funding mechanisms, reduce investment risks, and foster public-private partnerships. The Quad must also collaborate with regional institutions such as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands Forum, which includes the South Pacific countries, such as Palau, Papua New Guinea, Fiji, etc., to tailor infrastructure projects to local needs, while ensuring inclusivity and regional buy-in. Ultimately, a cohesive, transparent, and resilient infrastructure strategy will place Quad as a credible development partner in the Indo-Pacific, offering a viable alternative to the BRI.
Prithvi Gupta is a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme.
[1] Author’s own calculations.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Prithvi Gupta was a Junior Fellow with the Observer Research Foundation’s Strategic Studies Programme. He worked out of ORF’s Mumbai centre, and his research focused ...
Read More +
PREV
