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Jaibal Naduvath, “Capitol Consensus: Where War is Business,” ORF Special Report No. 273, Observer Research Foundation, September 2025.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, in his farewell address as United States (US) president on 17 January 1961, ominously remarked, “American makers of plowshares could, with time and as required, make swords as well. … This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. … [Yet] we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. … We must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”[1]
Indeed, the nexus between the military, policymakers, and defence contractors—termed the ‘military-industrial complex’ by Eisenhower—remains one of the most influential blocs in America today. Its reach extends deep into the political process and executive decision-making, reinforced through the so-called ‘iron triangle’ linking the political class, bureaucracy, and defence industry.[2]
Transparency International reports that the military-industrial complex exerts vast influence on policymaking through a combination of lobbying, campaign finance, the “revolving door” between government and industry, and defence offsets, which together help ensure an export-friendly regulatory environment and continued government support.[3] This networked web of interactions enables defence contractors to shape legislation and policy decisions and, given the vast financial stakes at play, fosters incentives for conflict. Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute in the United States, recalls an incident at the end of the Cold War when, as uncertainty loomed over the military–industrial complex, an emcee at a defence contractors’ convention thanked Saddam Hussein for his Kuwait misadventure, presumably as it promised imminent war and potentially billions—if not trillions—in contracts for the industry.[4]
The US’s share of global arms exports grew from 35 percent in 2014-19 to 43 percent in 2020-24, a rise of 21 percent, with arms exported to more than 100 countries.[5] In 2024, the total value of transferred defence articles, services, and security cooperation activities under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) system was US$117.9 billion, a 45.7-percent increase from US$80.9 billion in 2023. Direct commercial sales in the same period rose to US$200.8 billion from US$157.5 billion, marking a 27.6-percent increase.[6] Within the US defence industrial base of more than 100,000 companies,[7] five prime contractors—Lockheed Martin, RTX, General Dynamics, Northrop Grumman, and Boeing—secured over one-third of all Pentagon contracts.[8] These companies are also among the largest manufacturers of military equipment globally.[9]
Between one-third and half of the Pentagon’s discretionary spending has consistently gone to defence contractors.[10] Continuous conflicts in different parts of the world—from Iraq and Afghanistan to Ukraine—along with the growing Chinese threat, have generated steady windfalls. William D. Hartung and Stephen N. Semler, in their paper, 'Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020–2024', note that private defence contractors secured nearly US$2.4 trillion in Pentagon contracts during this period—over half of its US$4.4-trillion discretionary budget. Of this, approximately US$771 billion—roughly one-third—went to five prime contractors: Lockheed Martin (US$313bn), RTX (US$145bn), General Dynamics (US$116bn), Northrop Grumman (US$81bn), and Boeing (US$115bn).
Notably, the total US expenditure on diplomacy, international development, and humanitarian aid (excluding military aid) during the same period was US$356 billion—only slightly more than what went to a single contractor.[11] However, these figures only account for part of their earnings, which are further boosted by the expanding global market for American arms.
Table 1: Pentagon Contracts to Top Five Contractors (2020–2024)
Source: William D. Hartung and Stephen N. Semler[12]
In 2024, overseas equipment sales by these contractors reached US$318.7 billion, including nearly US$118 billion through Foreign Military Sales. This marked an increase of over 30 percent compared to the previous year, when total sales reached US$238.4 billion, with FMS alone accounting for US$80.9 billion.[13]
Wars have traditionally boosted defence contractors, but the Ukraine war has broken new ground. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, global defence spending increased by 9.4 percent to US$2.72 trillion in 2024, marking the steepest annual rise since the end of the Cold War,[14] driven largely by the Ukraine conflict. The war has expanded order books, improved valuations, and strengthened the ecosystem, marking a potential turning point for the US defence manufacturing sector. In the Ukraine conflict, the US has sought to leverage its defence-industrial base (DIB) to support the war effort by providing Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) with domestically produced weapons, munitions, and other military hardware, while replenishing US and allied stockpiles.[15]
Since February 2022, the US has provided Ukraine with approximately US$66.9 billion in military assistance, with total support—including humanitarian and financial assistance—approaching US$125 billion at the time of writing.[16] Between 2020 and 2024, 45 percent of Ukraine’s arms came from the US (constituting 9.3 percent of America’s total arms exports during this period), peaking after the conflict began in 2022.[17]
Table 2: US Military Sales to Ukraine (2019-2024, in US$)
Source: DSCA Historical Sales Yearbook, 1950-2024[18]
The war in Ukraine has catalysed higher production rates and expanded capacity within the US defence-industrial base. Table 3 shows the increase in monthly output for selected weapons and munitions since the war began.
Table 3: Production Output for Selected Weapons and Munitions (2022-2024)
Source: US Congressional Research Service[19]
Between 2020 and 2024, Ukraine became the world’s largest arms importer, accounting for 8.8 percent of global imports, up from just 0.1 percent in 2015-19—or a 9,627-percent surge. In 2023 and 2024, it ranked as the top global importer.[20] From 2024 onward, and increasingly in 2025, the US began shifting supplies from direct aid to sales. In August 2025, for instance, the US approved a US$825-million sale of 3,350 Extended Range Attack Munitions (ERAM) missiles with associated equipment to Ukraine. Funding for these sales comes from NATO allies (Denmark, Norway, Netherlands) and US Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programmes, which are loan/grant mechanisms that may involve repayment but are sales.[21]
A series of further developments assures a robust order book and cash flows for the foreseeable future for US defence contractors.
In a notable display of strategic leverage, the US administration persuaded European NATO states and Canada to purchase over US$10 billion in American arms, either to replenish stockpiles for Ukraine or for direct transfers under the NATO Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) initiative. The agreement, closed at the 14 July 2025 meeting between NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and US President Donald Trump, requires participating states to fund tranches, or “packages”, of about US$500 million each.[22] At the time of writing, nearly US$2 billion has been committed via this route. On 4 August, the first package of artillery and ammunition, valued at more than US$500 million—was announced, funded by the Netherlands. On 5 August, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden jointly pledged US$500 million for equipment and munitions.[23] On 13 August, Germany announced it would fund a US$500-million PURL package;[24] and on 24 August, Canada announced funding for a US$500-million PURL package for Ukraine.[25]
Further, at the 2025 NATO Summit at The Hague, member states committed to raising annual defence and security spending to 5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2035.[26] This represents a 150-percent jump from the 2-percent target first agreed by NATO Defence Ministers in 2006 and reaffirmed by Heads of State and Government in 2014 after the Crimea crisis. By 2025, all allies are expected to meet or exceed the 2-percent threshold.[27] Notably, the US accounted for 64 percent of NATO allies’ arms imports in 2020-24, up from 52 percent in 2015-19, largely driven by the Ukraine crisis.[28]
Ukraine’s defence and def-tech marketplace has opened to overseas investment as the country seeks to fast-track its defence manufacturing and service capabilities—both to sustain the current war effort and to position itself as a major def-tech marketplace. With warfare increasingly shaped by frontier technologies such as robotics and Artificial Intelligence, early investors have been able to enter at modest valuations and gain from Ukraine’s tech push to further their own valuations and return on investment. Ukrainian def-tech startups have received US$40 million between 2023 and 2024 from Western investors. Much of this came towards the end of 2024. For reference, in 2023, it was US$5 million. It is estimated that by the end of 2025, it will reach US$100 million. All investments are being routed through BRAVE1, the government’s defence-tech initiative connecting investors and Ukrainian companies.[29]
Notable examples include Dare to Defend Democracy (D3), a US$19-million fund launched in July 2023 that has invested in over 14 Ukrainian startups.[30] In August 2024, Kara Dag, an electronic warfare developer secured backing from Los Angeles-based Green Flag Ventures (GFV). The investment size is undisclosed, but GFV typically invests anywhere up to US$1.2 million in startups.[31] In September 2024, Ukrainian AI drone solutions startup Swarmer raised US$2.7 million in a seed round led by US defence technology company R-G.AI. Others included GFV and D3. Swarmer started operations a month prior, in August 2024, with a modest US$48,000 grant from BRAVE1.[32] At around the same time, Ukrainian AI-based disinformation-fighting solutions startup Osavul secured US$3 million in seed funding from three European venture funds—viz. 42CAP, u.ventures, and SMRK.[33] In July 2025, US-Ukrainian investment group MITS Capital invested US$3.74 million in Tencore, a leading manufacturer of unmanned robotic platforms used by the Ukrainian military.[34] In October 2024, Arlington-based AeroVironment announced plans to make the Switchblade 600 loitering munitions locally.[35] AeroVironment has been supplying drones to Ukraine since the start of the conflict.[36]
Notably, the European Commission and Ukraine announced a def-tech partnership at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Rome called BraveTech EU on 11 July 2025. Under this, €50 million in EU funding is proposed, matched by €50 million from the Ukrainian government. It brings together the European Defence Fund (EDF), the EU Defence Innovation Scheme (EUDIS), and BRAVE1.[37]
Market optimism reflects this trend, with investors—typically cautious about their bets—leaning heavily into defence. Since the beginning of the war on 24 February 2022 to the time of writing, the S&P Aerospace & Defense index has surged almost 90 percent, far outpacing its 22-percent gain over a comparable pre-war period[38] (see Figure 1). Over the same two windows the S&P 500 Index[a] rose around 50 percent, implying a similar pace of growth for the wider market pre-war and after the start of the conflict.[39] This pattern indicates that the conflict catalysed a rearmament cycle, driving order backlogs, revenue visibility, and valuation support for defence contractors. In effect, the defence sector’s gains line up with the war’s timing, while the markets’ do not.
Figure 1: Growth Comparison| S&P Aerospace and Defense Index v/s S&P 500 Index
The valuations of the top five defence contractors have risen, though below the sectoral index (see Table 4), reflecting the surge of emerging players gaining market share. Several companies recorded windfall gains during the war. Anduril Industries, an AI-enabled autonomous systems developer active in Ukraine since the conflict began and claiming credit for destroying Russian military assets worth “hundreds of millions”, saw its valuation soar from US$14 billion in 2024 to US$30.5 billion in 2025. Anduril recently raised US$2.5 billion, with San Fransisco-based venture capital firm Founders Fund leading the round with a US$1-billion commitment.[42]
Similarly, Denver-based Palantir has partnered with Ukraine’s Digital Transformation Ministry, embedding its software within the Ukrainian military’s operations to sift through intelligence data in real-time.[43] Palantir’s market capitalisation grew from a little over US$13 billion at the end of 2022 to reach a peak of over US$443 billion in early August 2025, a jump of around 3,200 percent. Likewise, San Diego-based Shield AI, a developer of autonomous aircraft and drone software which counts Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces among its partners,[44] was valued at over US$5.3 billion, up from a little over a billion dollars in late 2021.[45]
Meanwhile, AeroVironment, which manufactures Switchblade drones that have seen action in Ukraine since the start of the war, saw its market capitalisation rise from close to US$2 billion at the start of the war to peak at over US$13 billion in July 2025.[46],[47] San Luis Obispo, California-based Zone 5 Technologies, a developer of unmanned aircraft systems, doubled its revenue in 2024.[48] The company was recently awarded contracts worth US$825 million to supply thousands of Extended Range Attack Munitions to Ukraine along with Virginia-based CoAspire.[49] Notably, the company founded in 2011,[50] had just about 65 employees in late 2024, up from about 22 employees in 2022.[51]
Table 4: End-of-Year Market Cap of Prime Contractors v/s Sectoral Index
Sources: www.companiesmarketcap.com,[52] FRED/S&P[53]
Investor interest has surged since the start of the war. The number of US publicly traded defence funds rose sevenfold—from four in 2022 to 27 in 2025—while Assets Under Management grew ninefold, exceeding US$35 billion.[54] Although rising sales and share prices have benefited investors, the issue of whether companies are investing in new capacity or merely increasing buybacks and dividends has sparked debate. Bloomberg, for instance, reported that in 2023, Lockheed Martin and RTX spent US$18.9 billion on share buybacks, compared to US$4.1 billion on capital expenditures[55] (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Capital Use by Major Defence Contractors in 2023 (%)
Source: Bloomberg[56]
It has been argued that historic levels of share buybacks reflect an overemphasis on profit-seeking vis-a-vis long-term reinvestment and capacity building, despite the increased contractual opportunities. Former US Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel has argued that excessive focus on buybacks and dividends makes “the US defense industry [is] a bigger risk to America’s security and the credibility of [our] deterrence than China [is].”[57] Echoing this, former US Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro said, “You cannot be asking for the American taxpayer to make greater public investments while you continue to goose your stock prices through stock buybacks, deferring promised capital investments, and other accounting manoeuvres.”[58]
In his 1993 essay, The Prosperous Few and the Restless Many, Noam Chomsky argues that “the general population doesn’t know what’s happening, and it doesn’t even know that it doesn’t know.”[59] Public ignorance offers a shield from scrutiny, allowing problematic agendas to advance without challenge. There is no greater occasion for this than war, where the miasma of national security provides the perfect smokescreen.
It is estimated that US taxpayers have bankrolled US$8 trillion for post-9/11 wars, with the war in Afghanistan alone costing over US$2.5 trillion.[60] Roughly two-thirds of war casualties, if not more, come from poor or working-class families.[61] The images of hundreds of thousands of pieces of military equipment left behind in the chaotic US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 hide within them a larger and perhaps lesser-told story. Over half a million of these weapons seized by the Taliban have since filtered into terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates.[62] In effect, US-manufactured arms now equip both sides of conflicts, creating a perverse cycle of demand and profits for manufacturers. Against this backdrop, the US government’s acquisition of a 10-percent stake in semiconductor manufacturer Intel at US$9 billion,[b] and US Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick’s remark that Lockheed Martin is “basically an arm of the US government,”[63] in justifying the possible purchase of a stake in the company by virtue of the huge volume of US government contracts it gets—arguably conceal more than they reveal.
The role and motives of powerful vested groups in inciting and prolonging conflicts for gain have long been debated. Whereas the security narrative offered by the weapons of mass destruction argument was used to justify a large-scale military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which some commentators argued was more about control over oil resources,[64],[65] the Libya intervention in 2011 was similarly argued by some to have been a combination of oil, corporate interests, and efforts to reshape the political influence map in the region.[66] Against this backdrop, the subtext behind the recent creation of the US–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund merits closer reading. The fund, a 50-50 partnership between the US and Ukraine, ostensibly targets development, post-war reconstruction, and the enhancement of Ukraine’s energy and mineral sectors, including oil and gas. It is noteworthy that Ukraine has vast reserves of critical mineral resources,[67] which are essential for defence technologies, renewable energy, and advanced manufacturing.
The situation is also exacerbated by the consolidation within the defence industrial base from about 51 prime contractors at the end of the Cold War to just five today.[68] This has impeded competition while increasing the leverage of a few players with the Department of Defense (DoD). This arguably has a perverse impact on the DoD’s agency and consequently the prisms through which conflicts get viewed and engaged with, as private corporations gravitate towards situations that generate more profits. What is further significant, however, is the structure of these large corporations. They remain steeply hierarchical with power concentrated at the top.[69] This narrows the real circle of power and affords leverage to a handful of individuals, creating a closed oligarchy of influence.
The Ukraine war has revitalised the US defence-industrial base to levels unseen since the early years of the Cold War, when US defence spending reached 5.7 percent of GDP.[70] In 2024, the US constituted 40 percent of global military expenditure—equal to the next nine countries combined.[71] Valuations of defence contractors have surged, alongside momentum for long-term structural change. The National Defense Industrial Strategy (NDIS) of 2024 emanates directly from this felt need, seeking to provide a framework that can institutionalise resilience in the Defence Industrial Base over the coming decade.[72] European commitment to steeply increase defence spending,[73] combined with progressively increasing European sourcing of arms from US defence contractors,[74] and commitments to funnel over US$10 billion into US-made arms for Ukraine or stockpile replenishment on account of supplies to Ukraine, will result in deeply consequential changes. It will lead to a diminishing of Europe’s so-called ‘peace dividend’ from which it has benefited after the Cold War and result in an increased ‘economic dividend’ to US defence contractors. US defence contractors will become indispensable in the European security schema, locking European defence futures into US political cycles, making them vulnerable to Washington’s choices. In this backdrop, whether NATO Secretary General Rutte’s agreement to buy US arms for Ukraine under PURL was a capitulation in the face of a Hobson's choice, or a stroke of strategic genius to buy time from an impatient key partner to reimagine his options[75]—only time will tell.
What is clear is that the Ukraine conflict has set cash registers ringing for US defence contractors. Yet a major realignment is underway. Challenger firms—leveraging agility and innovation—have entered the field. For players like AeroVironment, Anduril Industries, Shield AI, and Palantir, Ukraine offers both a proving ground for their technologies and an opportunity to build war chests as they seek influence in an arena long dominated by five players.
Even more significantly, the reenergised defence-industrial base will reshape the political economy of conflict. With larger sums at stake and an expanded ecosystem of firms dependent on sustained demand, the proclivity towards militarised solutions will intensify, incentivising the creation of new conflict zones. As profit motives become increasingly embedded in the calculus of war and peace, production networks, financial instruments, and transnational partnerships will consolidate around defence. The ramifications of the current war will stretch far beyond Ukraine’s borders, reshaping Western security architecture and the way in which future conflicts are imagined. The war in Ukraine once again lays bare how inseparable the fortunes of industry and strategy are and how enduring the consequences of this convergence will be. Eisenhower’s caution against the military-industrial complex is today more potent than ever.
Jaibal Naduvath is Vice President and Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation.
The author acknowledges the research assistance provided by Rahul Rawat, Research Assistant and Arya Roy Bardhan, Junior Fellow at ORF, and Anushree Kaushal, Associate Fellow at RPIF.
All views expressed in this publication are solely those of the authors, and do not represent the Observer Research Foundation, either in its entirety or its officials and personnel.
[a] The index tracks the performance of 500 of the largest publicly traded companies in the US.
[b] Semiconductors are critical to the manufacture of much of modern military equipment.
[1] National Archives, “President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Farewell Address (1961),” National Archives, nd., https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/president-dwight-d-eisenhowers-farewell-address
[2] Emma Catherine Grosvenor Salisbury, “Beyond the Iron Triangle: The military-industrial complex as assemblage” (PhD thesis, University of London, 2024), https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/53871/
[3] Jodi Vittori, “A Mutual Extortion Racket: The Military Industrial Complex and US Foreign Policy – The Cases of Saudi Arabia and UAE,” Transparency International Defence & Security, November 2019, https://ti-defence.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/US_Defense_Industry_Influence_Paper_v4_digital_singlePage.pdf
[4] Doug Bandow, “War Is Big Business,” CATO Institute, September 30, 2021, https://www.cato.org/commentary/war-big-business
[5] Mathew George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, SIPRI, March 2025, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/fs_2503_at_2024_0.pdf
[6] “US Arms Exports Hit Record in 2024 on Ukraine-Related Demand,” U.S. News, January 24, 2025,
[7] CISA, “Defense Industrial Base Sector,” Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency, nd., https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors/defense-industrial-base-sector
[8] William D. Hartung and Stephen N. Semler, “Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020 – 2024,” Costs of War Project, Brown University, July 8, 2025, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2025/Profits%20of%20War_Hartung%20and%20Semler_Costs%20of%20War%3AQuincy%20FINAL.pdf
[9] “Top 100 for 2025,” Defense News, 2025, https://people.defensenews.com/top-100/
[10] William D. Hartung, “Profits of War: Corporate Beneficiaries of the Post‑9/11 Pentagon Spending Surge,” Costs of War, Watson Institute, Brown University, September 13, 2021, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/files/cow/imce/papers/2021/Profits%20of%20War_Hartung_Costs%20of%20War_Sept%2013%2C%202021.pdf
[11] Hartung and Semler, “Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020 – 2024”
[12] Hartung and Semler, “Profits of War: Top Beneficiaries of Pentagon Spending, 2020 – 2024”
[13] John A. Tirpak, “Foreign Military Sales Sets New Record, Up 55.9 Percent in 2023,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, January 29, 2024, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/foreign-military-sales-new-record-2023/
[14] Benzinga News, “Anduril CEO Palmer Luckey Says Weapons Destroyed ‘Hundreds of Millions’ in Russian Assets, Urges US Military Aid to Ukraine,” Sahm Capital, July 3, 2025, https://www.sahmcapital.com/news/content/anduril-ceo-palmer-luckey-says-weapons-destroyed-hundreds-of-millions-in-russian-assets-urges-us-military-aid-to-ukraine-2025-07-03
[15] “Luke A. Nicastro, “Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service R48182, September 16, 2024, https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2024-09-16_R48182_efc76a6f433ff6ce906b442a0bf41d9f81667852.pdf
[16] “US Security Cooperation with Ukraine,” Department of Defense, United States of America, March 12, 2025, https://www.state.gov/bureau-of-political-military-affairs/releases/2025/01/u-s-security-cooperation-with-ukraine.
[17] George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024”
[18] “Historical Sales Book: Fiscal Years 1950-2024,” Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense, United States of America, 2024, https://media.defense.gov/2025/Jul/01/2003746467/-1/-1/1/FY_2024_HISTORICAL_SALES_BOOK_COMPLETE.PDF
[19] Nicastro, “Defense Production for Ukraine: Background and Issues for Congress”
[20] George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024”
[21] Mike Stone and Ryan Patrick Jones, “US State Department approves potential sale of air-launched cruise missiles to Ukraine,” Reuters, August 29, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-state-department-approves-potential-sale-air-launched-cruise-missiles-ukraine-2025-08-28/
[22] Gram Slattery, Mike Stone, and Phil Stewart, “US, NATO Developing Novel Funding Mechanism for Ukraine Weapons Transfers,” Reuters, August 1, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/us-nato-developing-novel-funding-mechanism-ukraine-weapons-transfers-2025-08-01/
[23] “NATO Allies Denmark, Norway and Sweden announce $500m package of support for Ukraine,” NATO, August 5, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_237131.htm
[24] “Germany to Fund $500m PURL Package for Ukraine,” NATO, August 13, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_237162.htm#:~:text=Relations%20with%20Ukraine-,News,2025
[25] “Canada to Fund $500m PURL Package for Ukraine,” NATO, August 24, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_237168.htm?selectedLocale=en
[26] “Funding NATO”, NATO, September 3, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm
[27] “Defence Expenditures and NATO’s 5% Commitment,” NATO, August 27, 2025, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm
[28] George et al., “Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2024”
[29] Kollen Post, “Ukraine’s Long-Awaited Weapons Tech Investment Boom is Finally Kicking Off,” Kyiv Independent, February 17, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/ukraines-long-awaited-weapons-tech-investment-boom-is-finally-kicking-off/
[30] Olena Bilousova, Emir Omelchenko, Maksym Makarchuk, and Tymofiy Mylovanov, “Ukraine’s Drones Industry: Investments and Product Innovation,” KSE Institute, October 4, 2024, https://kse.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/241004-Brave1-report-v.1.pdf
[31] “The American fund Green Flag Ventures has invested in the Ukrainian developer of drone countermeasure systems, Kara Dag,” The Odessa Journal, August 21, 2024, https://odessa-journal.com/the-american-fund-green-flag-ventures-has-invested-in-the-ukrainian-developer-of-drone-countermeasure-systems-kara-dag
[32]“Ukrainian drone startup Swarmer raises $2.7 million in seed round,” Ukraine Rebuild Newswire, September 17, 2024, https://www.ukrainerebuildnews.com/ukrainian-drone-startup-swarmer-raises-2-7-million-in-seed-round/
[33] Bilousova, Omelchenko, Makarchuk, and Mylovanov, “Ukraine’s Drones Industry: Investments and Product Innovation,”
[34] Yana Prots, “Ground drone maker Tencore raises $3.7 million in one of the largest known investments in Ukraine defense tech,” The Kyiv Independent, July 11, 2025, https://kyivindependent.com/ukrainian-robotics-company-tencore-raises-3-7-million-in-investment-06-2025/
[35] “AeroVironment plans to start producing Switchblade kamikaze drones in Ukraine,” The Kyiv Independent, October 2, 2024, https://kyivindependent.com/us-company-aerovironment-plans-to-start-producing-switchblade-loitering-munitions-in-ukraine/
[36] Marcin Frąckiewicz, “Drones in Ukraine (2022-2025): A Comprehensive Report,” TS2, May 29, 2025, https://ts2.tech/en/drones-in-ukraine-2022-2025-a-comprehensive-report/
[37] “BraveTech EU”, Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space, EU, https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/bravetech-eu_en
[38] “S&P Aerospace & Defense Select Industry Index,” S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-aerospace-defense-select-industry-index/#overview
[39] “S&P 500,” S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-500/#overview
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[41] “S&P 500,” S&P Global, https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/equity/sp-500/#overview
[42] Bezinga News, “Anduril CEO Palmer Luckey Says Weapons Destroyed 'Hundreds of Millions' in Russian Assets, Urges US Military Aid to Ukraine”, Sahm, n.d., https://www.sahmcapital.com/news/content/anduril-ceo-palmer-luckey-says-weapons-destroyed-hundreds-of-millions-in-russian-assets-urges-us-military-aid-to-ukraine-2025-07-03
[43] Daniel Kosoy, “Palantir, the Secretive Tech Giant Shaping Ukraine’s War Effort,” United 24 Media, January 31, 2024, https://united24media.com/war-in-ukraine/palantir-the-secretive-tech-giant-shaping-ukraines-war-effort-5519
[44] Shield AI, “Shield AI Surpasses 130 V‑BAT Sorties in Ukraine in Partnership with Ukrainian Forces,” April 17, 2025, https://shield.ai/shield-ai-surpasses-130-v-bat-sorties-in-ukraine-in-partnership-with-ukrainian-forces/
[45] Shield AI, “Shield AI Raises $210 Million Series D Round,” August 24, 2021, https://shield.ai/shield-ai-raises-210-million-series-d-round/
[46] CompaniesMarketCap, “AeroVironment (AVAV) – Market Capitalization,” CompaniesMarketCap.com, accessed September 5, 2025 https://www.companiesmarketcap.com/aerovironment/marketcap/
[47] MacroTrends, “AeroVironment Market Cap 2010-2025”, MacroTrends, nd., https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AVAV/aerovironment/market-cap
[48] “Fast-Rising Drone Developer Zone 5 Technologies Upgrades to Unanet,” Unanet News, March 10, 2025, https://unanet.com/news/fast-rising-drone-developer-zone-5-technologies-upgrades-to-unanet-erp-govcon?
[49] Cal Biesecker, “CoAspire, Zone 5 Tapped To Provide Long-Range Missiles For Ukraine,” Defense Daily, August 29, 2025, https://www.defensedaily.com/coaspire-zone-5-tapped-to-provide-long-long-range-missiles-for-ukraine/international/
[50] “Fast-Rising Drone Developer Zone 5 Technologies Upgrades to Unanet”
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Jaibal is Vice President - ORF Mumbai and Communications of the Observer Research Foundation (ORF), India’s premier think tank. His research focuses on issues of ...
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