

India as a Partner in Triangular Development Cooperation: Prospects for the India-UK Partnership for Global Development

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ABSTRACT Triangular cooperation is a growing trend in India's global engagement. The term refers to development cooperation in which traditional aid donors work together with Southern partners to address challenges in developing countries. Largely absent from this type of cooperation in the past, India has gradually become a more visible partner. The current government's endorsement of triangular cooperation in joint statements with key partners, as well as high-profile initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor underline India's motivation to play a more active role. This paper analyses India's approach to triangular cooperation. It focuses on the India-United Kingdom partnership for global development, which has been shaping an innovative model for India's participation in triangular cooperation in the past years. India's growing interest in this modality provides momentum to move this relationship forward. India-UK cooperation could open up new opportunities in the context of India's thriving partnership with the African continent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Triangular cooperation has been gaining relevance against the background of major shifts in the global development landscape. The changing role of rising powers and other middle-income countries (MICs) as development

partners has contributed to a growing diversity of development cooperation approaches. In this context, triangular cooperation has gained momentum as a modality that promises to build bridges and create synergies between North-

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South and South-South cooperation. Although understandings of the term “triangular cooperation” vary, it generally refers to projects and other initiatives that combine the comparative advantages of traditional donors and South-South cooperation to share knowledge and address challenges among developing countries.¹

Current analysis of the growing global practice of triangular cooperation has given little attention to India’s role as a partner. India’s preference for bilateral action within the framework of South-South cooperation has long prevented a stronger engagement. However, India’s reluctance to participate in triangular cooperation has given way to more openness for alternative partnerships. India has shown leadership in shaping United Nations (UN)-managed triangular funds to support South-South cooperation, such as the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) Fund. Moreover, various types of Indian partners have increasingly cooperated with traditional bilateral donors from the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD/DAC), such as the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), to implement projects in developing countries. The Indo-Japanese plan for an Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) signals growing levels of ambition to work in triangular partnerships.

The UK has been a key partner for India’s growing engagement in triangular cooperation, having brokered partnerships with a broad range of actors from India and other developing countries. Examples of India-UK cooperation in third countries include the “Global Research Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security, Health and Women” and the South-South aid-for-trade programme “Supporting Indian Trade

and Investment for Africa” (SITA). In November 2015, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) signed the “Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries”. The statement reaffirms the two countries’ commitment to deepen their cooperation in developing countries.

Against the background of India’s growing role as a partner in triangular cooperation, this paper aims to contribute to the understanding of India’s approach to this modality. The focus is especially on the India-UK partnership for global development as a relationship that has been instrumental in shaping India’s involvement in triangular cooperation in the past years. The paper analyses the current practice of India-UK cooperation in third countries and discusses the prospects for moving this partnership forward. To this end, the paper puts triangular cooperation in the context of India’s thriving relations with African countries.

The paper opens with an overview of the concept of triangular cooperation. The subsequent section presents the contours of India’s approach to triangular cooperation and discusses India’s motivations for engaging in this modality. The fourth section takes stock of the experiences with India-UK cooperation in third countries and identifies key features that have emerged from this relationship. Finally, the paper discusses to what extent triangular cooperation fits into the context of the India-Africa partnership. The conclusion highlights recommendations for the future of India-UK cooperation. The paper draws on the academic and policy literature on triangular cooperation, other documents, and interviews.²

II. TRIANGULAR COOPERATION: AN OVERVIEW

What is triangular cooperation?

As a modality to support technical cooperation among developing countries, triangular cooperation has existed for several decades. Despite this long history, however, interest in this modality has surged only recently against the background of the increasing importance of providers of development cooperation outside the group of rich, industrialised countries organised in the OECD/DAC (hereafter referred to as “traditional donors”).³ Given differences in norms, principles and approaches, the current development landscape often tends to be seen as being split between “North-South” and “South-South” cooperation. Triangular cooperation is the most visible sign that this more complex, fragmented and multipolar development landscape also consists of cooperation across traditional divides. In this context, triangular cooperation serves as a “modality that transcends divides between north-south and south-south cooperation and combines the comparative advantages of different partners by making use of complementary strengths to create synergies.”⁴

Beyond this understanding, a commonly shared definition of triangular cooperation does not exist. The search for a definition is further complicated by the use of different terminologies, with “triangular” and “trilateral” cooperation being the most common labels. This paper uses the term “triangular”, as in the definitions of the UN and the OECD, without claiming a difference in meaning compared to other terms in use.

Some definitions stress the number of countries as the key feature, which would include cooperation among three developing or

emerging countries. This paper, in contrast, draws on definitions that highlight the interaction of three different types of actors. The OECD defines triangular cooperation as involving at least one bilateral provider of development cooperation from the OECD/DAC (or an international organisation) and one or more providers of South-South cooperation “to promote a sharing of knowledge and experience or implement development cooperation projects in one or more beneficiary countries”.⁵ The UN defines triangular cooperation as “Southern-driven partnerships between two or more developing countries, supported by a developed country (or countries) or multilateral organization(s) to implement development cooperation programs or projects.”⁶

These definitions emphasise the combination of three different types of actors that assume roles based on their comparative advantages.⁷ First, rising powers or other MICs act as “pivotal countries” that provide cost-effective expertise, services or technology from their own development experience. Second, traditional bilateral and multilateral donors act as “facilitators” that help connect countries and partners to form a triangular partnership. In this role, they contribute funding as well as their experience and know-how of managing development cooperation. Moreover, they support triangular cooperation through their extensive networks of embassies and development agencies across the developing world. Finally, third (partner) countries, where the results of triangular cooperation are to be achieved, take ownership and ensure that results are sustainable. The three roles should not be seen as strictly separate as the sharing of knowledge and experience can benefit, in principle, all partners. Overall, it is useful not to consider triangular cooperation as a fixed template since it covers a broad space of

different cooperation formats between bilateral cooperation, on the one hand, and multilateral cooperation, on the other.

Opportunities and challenges of triangular cooperation

According to an OECD survey, the use of triangular cooperation has substantially expanded across all world regions and sectors (with the majority of projects still concentrated in Latin America and the Caribbean).⁸ By now, all major international platforms with a mandate to shape international development cooperation – the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (GPEDC), the United Nations Development Cooperation Forum (UN-DCF) and the OECD/DAC – endorse and support triangular cooperation as a complementary modality. The relevance of triangular cooperation has further increased as part of the “means of implementation” for the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG 17 stresses the role of triangular cooperation for the sharing of knowledge and technology as well as capacity building.⁹ The Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development highlights triangular cooperation “as a means of bringing relevant experience and expertise to bear in development cooperation.”¹⁰

Triangular cooperation is associated with both opportunities and risks for the effectiveness of development cooperation. The case for increased effectiveness is based on the expected benefits of combining the comparative advantages of different types of actors. The main argument is that the modality combines access to affordable and relevant development solutions from Southern partners with the strengths of traditional donors, including

funding, management capacity and country presence. Shared linguistic, cultural and historical ties between Southern partners might also contribute to a conducive environment for cooperation. At the same time, triangular cooperation comes with challenges that could undermine effectiveness. The literature typically highlights three main types of challenges: transaction costs, limited ownership and fragmentation.

First, triangular cooperation is more complex in terms of coordination than bilateral and multilateral cooperation, which work on the basis of established structures. Triangular cooperation requires coordination among three or more countries, possibly including several partner organisations within each country. The modality is therefore more demanding in setting up and aligning the required institutional, legal and financial processes and structures as well as the availability of capacity and staff. Moreover, participating countries need to ensure the compatibility of technical and operational aspects, for instance the organisation of work at field level and evaluation techniques. As a result, effective implementation requires clarity about objectives and a clear division of roles.¹¹

Second, the effectiveness of triangular cooperation might suffer from a lack of ownership in third countries. One of the expected benefits of triangular cooperation is to transform existing patterns of development cooperation into more horizontal partnerships by bringing pivotal countries into the equation. However, triangular cooperation runs the risk of falling short of creating genuinely horizontal partnerships. The relationship between traditional donor and pivotal country often dominates the partnership.¹² Lack of ownership and insufficient use of country systems risk

undermining effectiveness. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of triangular cooperation projects has been implemented in MICs as third countries, which have the necessary capacity to assume ownership of complex partnerships.

Finally, triangular cooperation has always struggled with the reputation of consisting mainly of relatively small and scattered projects in the form of training, dispatching experts, exchange visits, capacity building and human resource development.¹³ High numbers of small projects contribute to the fragmentation of development cooperation. The aforementioned OECD survey notes a trend towards increases in the average size and duration of projects. According to the survey, triangular cooperation could be moving from an “international testing phase”, characterised by small and scattered activities, into a more mature phase of expansion and consolidation.¹⁴ However, the image of triangular cooperation as being rather small-scale has not become entirely obsolete and fragmentation remains a challenge. For instance, the survey indicates that the budget of 74 percent of reported projects was less than US\$1 million.

Why do countries engage in triangular cooperation?

Triangular cooperation requires that all actors have a clear motivation for setting up new approaches to cooperation. Otherwise, they could use existing structures for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Apart from the shared objective to promote development, actors follow different motivations. Sceptics argue that the incentives are skewed towards traditional donors and less clear for Southern partners.

Triangular cooperation is sometimes seen critically as a way to safeguard Northern

influence over South-South cooperation.¹⁵ The modality is indeed a component of traditional donors’ strategies to transform their relationships with rising powers and other MICs. As bilateral country programmes with more advanced developing countries are being phased out, traditional donors search for new ways to stay engaged with these key partners. In this context, they position themselves in new roles, moving from being mainly providers of aid to being brokers of partnerships that address global issues of mutual interest.¹⁶ Traditional donors also see triangular cooperation as a means to bring about a convergence of norms and practices and integrate Southern partners into the established international architecture of development cooperation.

Given concerns over Northern domination of triangular cooperation, some Southern partners, wary of being co-opted or “socialised” into existing patterns of development cooperation and limited to the role of cheap contractors, have remained reluctant partners. According to some observers, such concerns about equal partnership might explain the long absence of major Southern players, especially China and India, from triangular cooperation.¹⁷ A key question for the effectiveness is thus not only who participates, but who leads the triangular partnership. Effective triangular cooperation therefore requires careful design as a Southern-led partnership.

Apart from these concerns, Southern partners have their own motivations for joining triangular cooperation.¹⁸ Partner countries value access to experience and solutions from pivotal countries with similar development contexts. For pivotal countries, triangular cooperation can be an option to address rapidly growing demand from other developing countries for knowledge sharing and expertise. Working together with

other international actors can add capacity to their development cooperation. Southern partners also draw on triangular cooperation to advance their own evolving development cooperation architectures. In this regard, they might consider triangular cooperation as a way to acquire more international recognition as development partners. Ultimately, however, motivations to engage in triangular cooperation relate to broader foreign policy considerations that vary across countries.

III. INDIA'S APPROACH TO TRIANGULAR COOPERATION

India's evolving position on triangular cooperation: from reluctance to openness

India has long kept its distance from triangular cooperation, although the modality was part of the early history of India's development cooperation. Examples of cooperation with industrialised nations in other developing countries date back to the 1950s when India cooperated with the US in road and telecommunication projects in Nepal.¹⁹ In general, however, India has been reluctant to engage with traditional donors in other developing countries due to its long-standing foreign-policy orientations from the post-independence and Cold War period.

India's framing of development cooperation in terms of Southern solidarity, non-alignment and anti-colonialism has prevented engagement in triangular cooperation. India has shaped its identity as a development partner within the framework of South-South cooperation and in opposition to the "OECD/DAC model".²⁰ India's self-image as a demand-oriented development partner mirrors its criticism of traditional donors, seen as failing to respond to the needs of developing countries, applying conditionality and reinforcing asymmetric relationships. Thus,

triangular cooperation has constituted a certain reputational risk for India's standing as a leader and benign influence in the global South. This position continues to influence the rhetoric through which India aims to distinguish itself from the "top-down" approaches of traditional donors.

Since the end of the Cold War and India's economic reforms of the early 1990s, the scope for alternative development policy choices has widened. India has gone through a gradual foreign policy shift from the political imperatives of non-alignment towards strategically using foreign policy to support its economic emergence on the global stage.²¹ As part of this shift, India has substantially expanded resources and capacity to forge development partnerships and conduct economic diplomacy. In 2003, the landmark decision to limit development assistance from foreign donors and to strengthen the outward orientation of India's development policy has contributed to transforming the country's position as a development partner.

The more immediate outcome of these shifts has been the expansion of India's bilateral engagement to strengthen its own role in global affairs. The financial volume of India's development cooperation saw a five-fold increase during the two decades following the end of the Cold War.²² Geographically, India's bilateral development partnerships now cover the global South more comprehensively, going well beyond the traditional focus on South Asia. India's development cooperation wields a broad range of instruments and modalities, including training, scholarships, capacity-building and skills development, concessional finance (grants and government-backed lines of credit/LOCs), preferential trade, and investment. The institutional architecture of India's development partnerships has evolved

culminating in the creation of the Development Partnership Administration (DPA) within the MEA in 2012.²³ Based on this increasing capacity to act, India's preferred mode of engagement remains bilateral cooperation under the framework of South-South cooperation.

At the same time, the scope for alternative ways of engagement has broadened. Since the 2000s, India has been actively shaping new groupings such as IBSA and BRICS, and forged relationships with regional and continental frameworks. Triangular cooperation can be seen as part of this trend towards a diversification of India's engagement to complement bilateral ties. India's openness for triangular cooperation has been facilitated by the softening of the reasons that led to India's initial reluctance. In a more heterogeneous global South, the foundation of the traditional North-South divide has weakened. Becoming a net provider of development cooperation has also put India on a more equal footing with traditional donors. Overall, India's stance on triangular cooperation has changed from reluctance to a discreet form of openness: "India should collaborate with and learn from other donor countries; at the same time, the Indian core mission remains unchanged – empowering developing countries under the SSC [South-South cooperation] umbrella, continuing to play the role of a 'partner' as opposed to a 'donor' in development assistance initiatives."²⁴

What are India's motivations for engaging in triangular cooperation?

Triangular cooperation is still a less obvious choice and a sideshow of India's global engagement. Part of the reason why India has been hesitant to engage with traditional donors for so long is a lack of clear incentives. Interestingly, India and China, which have

shared a lack of interest in triangular cooperation until recently, are now becoming more active in this modality at the same time, albeit for different reasons. China uses partnerships with traditional donors to counter critical perceptions of its massive external footprint and to demonstrate that it is a reliable international actor willing to learn from other partners.²⁵ Although mutual learning is generally relevant for India as well, India has come to see triangular cooperation as an additional means to navigate a challenging geopolitical context in which it seeks to overcome capacity constraints and shape normative frameworks.

Under the current Indian government, triangular cooperation has gained momentum as part of India's broader foreign policy response to balance China's growing influence in strategically important regions, such as South Asia, the Indian Ocean region, and Africa. India's concerns about current geopolitical shifts have become most visible in the strong criticism against China's "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI), which India rejects for its hegemonic tendencies.²⁶ India's negative perception of China's global engagement is gradually taking the place of past criticism against traditional donors and Western powers. In turn, some traditional donor countries have strongly improved their relations with India and have become potential like-minded partners to balance China and work on alternative initiatives.

Against this background, India's increasing interest in triangular cooperation is partly related to long-term strategic convergence on important global and regional issues with the United States and Japan.²⁷ The announcement of the AAGC and the reinvigoration of the idea of a "Quad" (Australia, India, Japan, US) as

platforms to deal with China's rise in the political, security and economic domains are results of this foreign policy convergence. As an appendix to these broader geopolitical partnerships, India has endorsed triangular cooperation at the highest political level. The India-US Joint Statement of 7 June 2016, signed during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to the US, welcomes triangular cooperation with African partners and stresses opportunities for India-US global development cooperation.²⁸ Similarly, plans for the AAGC were announced during the state visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to Japan on 11 November 2016.²⁹

In the context of these wider geopolitical partnerships, India engages with traditional donor countries to shape normative frameworks and differentiate its global approach from China's. For instance, India's criticism of China infringing on the sovereignty of other countries and undercutting international standards is directly mirrored by the AAGC's emphasis on "quality infrastructure" and "people-centred" connectivity. India's triangular cooperation with Japan, the US and other countries is also a way to contrast China's "hegemonic" expansion with a "rules-based", "free and open", "democratic" and "liberal" alternative for the Indo-Pacific region.³⁰

European countries, especially the UK, Germany, France and the European Union (EU), are also on India's radar as partners to shape new forms of cooperation. The Indo-French leadership to create the International Solar Alliance (ISA) is a prominent example. The Joint Statement during the 14th India-EU summit, held in New Delhi in October 2017, notes that the "EU and India expressed their commitment to enhancing their consultations and cooperation regarding Africa, with a view to optimising possible synergies between their respective initiatives."³¹ The UK has been one of the most

active countries working with Indian partners in triangular cooperation. The joint statement during the visit of UK Prime Minister Theresa May to India on 7 November 2016 endorses the "Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries".³² At the same time, it remains to be seen how far triangular cooperation can be taken in the absence of a shared strategic narrative. For instance, Indian observers felt irritated by the UK's ambiguous position towards China's BRI and the lack of interest in India-led initiatives such as the AAGC. Overall, the geopolitical dimension of India's engagement underlines the importance of embedding triangular cooperation within India's broader foreign policy.

Finally, triangular cooperation is generally a way for India to address capacity constraints. Observers of India's development cooperation expect "enormous potential gains to be made through improved trilateral donor cooperation".³³ Cooperation with international partners can help bridge gaps in India's capacity to deliver development partnerships, such as its relatively understaffed foreign service.³⁴ For India, triangular cooperation is therefore an option to satisfy growing demand for cooperation and assume global responsibility without straining the limited capacity of its own official development partnerships.

How does India engage in triangular cooperation?

Given the absence of a policy framework for India's development cooperation in general, India's approach towards triangular cooperation is not formalised. The principles of South-South cooperation provide the general framework for India's development partnerships, including triangular cooperation. In line with these principles, triangular cooperation should be demand-driven, triggered by specific requests,

and decided on a case-by-case basis for sector-specific projects that yield tangible results for partner countries. On this basis, India's involvement in triangular cooperation can be divided into two main types of engagement. First, India has been actively shaping funds to support South-South cooperation under the auspices of the UN. Second, India has engaged in triangular cooperation with traditional donors through a broad range of non-state and parastatal actors. The plan for the AAGC might lead towards new models for India's engagement in triangular cooperation.

India and triangular cooperation with the UN system

India has shown a preference for triangular cooperation with the UN, which is perceived as more neutral and respectful of Southern-led cooperation. UN organisations have increasingly integrated "South-South and Triangular Cooperation" into their mandates. In 1974, the UN General Assembly endorsed the creation of a Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU-SSC) within the UNDP, now renamed the United Nations Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC). Working with these structures, India has shown leadership in the multilateral sphere by shaping funds for triangular cooperation.

One example is the IBSA Facility for Poverty and Hunger Alleviation (IBSA Fund), which was established in 2004 and became operational in 2006.³⁵ The fund has the objective to share experiences from IBSA countries with Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and post-conflict countries. It emphasises the importance of capacity building, local procurement and the use of Southern expertise. India, Brazil and South Africa each contribute \$1 million per year. Interested governments initiate discussions on

projects and can request support with IBSA representatives around the world. Proposals that receive a favourable opinion from one or more of the IBSA Focal Points in the three capitals are forwarded to the IBSA Fund Board of Directors, which meets quarterly to approve projects, monitor implementation and provide strategic direction. The UNOSSC acts as the fund manager and the secretariat for the Board of Directors. It initiates contact with potential executing agencies and supports implementation.

Another example is the India-UN Development Partnership Fund (DPF), launched on 8 June 2017. The DPF supports the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, prioritising poverty reduction and hunger, health, education, and access to clean water and energy. The DPF's objective is to "support Southern-owned and -led, demand-driven, and transformational sustainable development projects across the developing world."³⁶ It focuses on LDCs and Small Island Developing States. The DPF's first project deals with improving resilience to natural disasters in seven Pacific small-island states; several more projects have since been initiated. The UNOSSC acts as the fund's manager and serves as a secretariat for its Board of Directors. The UNOSSC coordinates the implementation of projects through UN agencies, governments and other stakeholders in coordination with partner countries. At the launch, India made an initial contribution of \$5 million, which has since been increased by an additional pledge for a multiyear contribution of \$100 million.³⁷

Traditional donors as brokers of triangular partnerships

Traditional donors have shown interest in working more strongly together with India in developing countries. India's engagement with

industrialised countries on global development challenges has drawn especially on its rich landscape of non-state and parastatal actors. Early examples include the involvement of the Indian NGO CUTS International in projects supported by DFID and other international partners.³⁸ In the World Bank-managed “South Asia Water Initiative” (a multi-donor trust fund supported by the UK, Norway and Australia), traditional donors work with non-state actors (including Observer Research Foundation) to promote regional cooperation on cross-border water management.³⁹ Another example is the agreement signed between the Indian Council of Medical Research and the German Helmholtz Association in 2006 to create the Indo-German Science Centre for Infectious Diseases, a platform for collaborative research to combat infectious diseases worldwide.⁴⁰

In recent years, the number of triangular projects and programmes involving Indian partners with traditional donors has markedly increased. The UK (see section IV) and the US have so far undertaken the most visible and systematic effort to work with Indian partners. India and the US, for instance, have intensified their joint cooperation in Asia and Africa in the areas of food security and nutrition, health, sanitation, women’s empowerment and energy. Triangular projects have been implemented, for example, under the US presidential initiative “Feed the Future”, in which the US cooperates with India as a strategic partner. In one example, the Feed the Future India Triangular Training Program, USAID cooperates with the National Institute of Agricultural Extension Management (MANAGE), a research institute affiliated with the Indian Ministry of Agriculture. The project trains agricultural practitioners from 17 countries across Africa and Asia on specialised farming practices to improve productivity and incomes.⁴¹

India’s global partnerships with the US and the UK have been instrumental in shaping a model for Indian engagement in triangular cooperation. This model focuses on leveraging the strengths of India’s diverse landscape of non-state and parastatal actors (private sector, civil society organisations (CSOs), research institutes, India Exim Bank, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), etc.) to address development challenges in India and other developing countries. This type of triangular cooperation has a relatively weak government-to-government dimension. DFID and USAID take on a central role as hubs for expertise, knowledge and partnership building.⁴² This function is also reflected in organisational innovations within these agencies, such as DFID/India’s “Global Partnerships Team” and USAID/India’s “Centre for Innovations and Partnerships” (CIP).

The current Indian government has assumed a stronger role by endorsing triangular cooperation in joint high-level statements with the UK and the US. India has agreed with these two partners on guiding documents, such as the India-UK “Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries”. In the case of the US, the MEA and USAID have signed a “Statement of Guiding Principles on Triangular Cooperation for Global Development”.⁴³ Moreover, the US Millennium Challenge Cooperation and the DPA have signed a “Joint Statement on Cooperation” on 13 January 2017. In this statement, they express the intention to strengthen regional integration and connectivity, especially in the areas of energy, trade, and investment.⁴⁴ To this end, the MCC and the DPA agree to share information, knowledge, and technical expertise, and provide partner countries with support in the form of advisory assistance and capacity building.

New models for triangular cooperation in the making

In comparison to the approaches of triangular cooperation with the UK and the US, the AAGC might set the precedent for a different model. With the AAGC, India and Japan aim to link economies from Asia and Africa through physical infrastructure as well as institutional, regulatory and digital connectivity. The plan for the AAGC consists of four main components: development cooperation projects; quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity; capacity and skill enhancement; and people-to-people partnerships. So far, the AAGC is a statement of intent outlined in a “vision document”, with the next phase of the planning process taking place in 2018.⁴⁵ Based on the current shape of the plan, the AAGC shares common characteristics with the UK and US examples, but also points towards a new model for India’s involvement in triangular cooperation.

The underlying idea of the AAGC clearly follows the logic of triangular cooperation, emphasising the combination of India’s and Japan’s respective comparative advantages. Similar to India’s other engagements in triangular partnerships, non-state or parastatal actors play a crucial role. For instance, research institutions from India, Japan and Indonesia have been drafting the AAGC plans in consultation with governments and other partners. At the same time, the AAGC looks like an unusual case compared to the prevailing image of triangular cooperation, especially due to its strategic ambition and potentially large size.

Overall, it seems more appropriate to think of the AAGC as an overarching framework, a platform or a narrative under which different

projects and activities will take place, including triangular cooperation. The AAGC covers a broad range of sectors and would also add a new dimension to triangular cooperation in terms of funding. The AAGC is also flexible with regard to including new participants as India and Japan are in talks with the other Quad countries, the US and Australia, to broaden participation. More generally, the AAGC can be seen in the context of India’s growing role in shaping new platforms, with the ISA being another example, in which the presence of rising powers, developing and industrialised countries as well as international agencies opens up new space for triangular cooperation in the future.

IV. TRIANGULAR COOPERATION IN THE INDIA-UK PARTNERSHIP FOR GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT

The evolving India-UK partnership for global development

The development partnership between India and the UK has been undergoing a profound transition. Both countries have been redefining their relationship against the background of India’s growing role as a global actor and the changing global development landscape. The UK was one of the few donor countries retaining a full-fledged aid programme in India after 2003. Since then, the India-UK partnership has been gradually moving from an aid-based donor-recipient relationship to a partnership for global development.

The UK’s changed approach to development cooperation with India has been part of a broader strategy towards relations with emerging powers. In 2011, the then UK Secretary of State for International Development, Andrew Mitchell, set out a strategy for new types of flexible partnerships with emerging powers to address global development challenges, focusing

especially on Brazil, China, India and South Africa.⁴⁶ The UK's bilateral aid programmes with these global partners had either already ended by that time (Brazil, China) or was being phased out (India, South Africa). The emphasis of cooperation with emerging powers has shifted from financial cooperation towards knowledge sharing with developing countries and cooperation on global issues of mutual interest, such as global public goods and the reform of international institutions.

The UK's emerging powers strategy singles out India as a special partner with a dual role – it continues to face substantial domestic challenges while rising as a global power. The strategy highlights India's potential as a source of low-cost, pro-poor innovations in areas such as health and pharmaceuticals that could be applied to different contexts across the developing world, especially in Africa. The strategy emphasises the diversity of Indian partners, including research institutions, CSOs and the private sector, as a strength that should be leveraged to help share innovations and knowledge with developing countries.

Triangular cooperation plays an important role in the implementation of this strategy. In recent years, the UK has supported several triangular projects and programmes with Indian partners. In November 2015, the MEA and DFID signed the “Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries”.⁴⁷ The statement reaffirms India's and the UK's commitment to jointly “assist[ing] developing countries to enhance their capacity to address their development challenges”. The MEA and DFID agree to “work together to identify and mutually support activities” in close coordination with developing countries and in a demand-driven manner. The document provides a flexible framework, leaving priorities, sectors, scope and aspects of implementation open.

Key features of triangular cooperation in the India-UK partnership

This section draws on six triangular programmes summarised in Table 1 of the annexe. The listed examples share the ambition to broker new partnerships that leverage India's experience to address development challenges in other developing countries in South Asia and Africa. In these initiatives, DFID mainly draws on technical assistance to build the capacity of partners in India and other developing countries, and facilitate their relationships. The overarching objective is to maximise the development impact of Indian partners in their varying roles of generating research, mobilising innovations, delivering services and promoting economic exchange through investment and trade.

The selected examples cover a broad range of sectors, including nutrition, health, gender equality, trade and investment, and clean energy. For instance, the completed DFID-TERI Partnership for Clean Energy Access and Improved Policies for Sustainable Development piloted models for clean cooking stoves and solar lighting, and supported their replication in India and Africa. The most recent example, Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa (SITA), is a South-South Aid for Trade and value-chain programme. The programme aims to upgrade and diversify exports from East African countries to India and other countries.

Some projects are completely designed as triangular partnerships; others include triangular cooperation as a sub-component. The Global Research Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security, Health and Women (GRP), for instance, is designed as a “trilateral collaborative research programme”. The programme promotes the generation, testing and use of research conducted by consortia of

institutions from India, the UK, and developing countries. Other projects focus mainly on cooperation in India, but have a component for cooperation in third countries. For instance, the Strategic Health and Nutrition Partnership (SHNP) included the Health Financing Support Programme, which aimed to generate evidence on health financing reforms in India and build networks for learning and dissemination of evidence in India and other developing countries.

Projects also vary with regard to types of partners. The Global Knowledge Partnership (GKP) Programme, for instance, works with a broad range of partners, including think tanks, international organisations and CSOs to generate analysis and evidence about India's impact on global public goods and to share Indian expertise for policy making in developing countries. Other programmes, such as Innovative Ventures and Technology for Development (INVENT), focus especially on the Indian private sector. INVENT aims to tap the innovative potential of the Indian private sector to make technological and business solutions available to the poor in low-income states in India and in developing countries in Africa and South Asia.

An important feature of triangular cooperation in the India-UK partnership is the role played by DFID/India (with its "Global Partnerships Team") in building partnerships. Formally, the above mentioned examples have been planned and designed as UK/DFID programmes. DFID draws on a variety of formats to establish partnerships, such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), accountable grants, and contracts. Preparation involves comprehensive consultation with partners from India, developing countries and the UK. Third countries participate on the basis of formal requests. However, the identification of demand

is an ongoing and interactive process in which DFID facilitates the exchange among stakeholders.

Programmes are usually structured around a lead partner that has the required management experience and sector-specific expertise. Examples of lead partners include the International Trade Centre in the case of SITA, and the UK Research Councils and their Indian counterparts in the case of the GRP. Lead partners also have experience and networks in other countries. TERI, for instance, has a track record and presence in Africa. In addition to the pivotal role of lead partners, active engagement by DFID in terms of management, expertise and networking remains important throughout the duration of initiatives to make partnerships work and deal with transaction costs.

Notwithstanding DFID's central role, Indian partners emphasise the collaborative nature of the partnerships in which they actively seek to benefit from a range of comparative advantages offered by the UK. A key UK contribution consists in the identification of partners and the support of implementation in African countries. Although some Indian partners have own networks in African countries, these are usually less dense than in India or neighbouring South Asian countries. DFID's importance as a broker of cooperation is also a consequence of the fact that the Indian government's operational support for the implementation of triangular projects outside of India remains currently weak, given line ministries' focus on domestic concerns and capacity limitations in the foreign service. Another comparative advantage lies in DFID's role as a provider of analytical services and project management methodology.

The emphasis on DFID's role as a "knowledge broker" should not diminish the importance of funding, which remains a key comparative

advantage in the perception of Indian partners. The UK is perceived as one possible funding source amongst others in an increasingly diverse and competitive development finance landscape. Partners value especially the possibility to fund exchange visits and pilot projects. They perceive the need for flexible funding as new opportunities might arise unexpectedly. Partners also stress the need for patience and long horizons to ensure the uptake and sustainability of projects.

The India-UK practice of triangular cooperation in comparative perspective

Compared to other examples of triangular cooperation, India-UK cooperation is characterised by a weak government-to-government dimension. According to the above-mentioned OECD survey, governments and international organisations are the most typical actors in triangular cooperation. The survey also identifies a trend towards a stronger involvement of CSOs, research institutions and the private sector. The India-UK practice of triangular cooperation can be seen as spearheading this trend by focusing especially on non-state actors as partners.

The absence of a strong governmental dimension in the India-UK partnership is due to large differences in development cooperation approaches. The UK and India occupy different ends in the international architecture of development cooperation. India and the UK have been engaging in conversations on development cooperation that could contribute to greater convergence in the future. Similarly, programmes such as SITA, have reflected characteristics of South-South cooperation, comprehensively combining aid, trade and investment. Overall, however, the current practice of India-UK cooperation in third countries reflects prevailing differences.

The India-UK partnership has given rise to a sui generis model of triangular cooperation. Although the global practice is generally heterogeneous, the more conventional cases work either entirely through existing bilateral cooperation (e.g. Japan) or permanent triangular funds (e.g. the Triangular Cooperation Fund set up by South Africa and Germany). India-UK cooperation is operationally relatively disconnected from their respective bilateral programmes with third countries. On both sides, constraints on how to use funds contribute to this separation (e.g. UK aid cannot directly fund governmental bodies in India anymore; Indian development finance is often tied to Indian implementation partners). While the UK's bilateral programme with India can fund non-state partners, funds for partners in third countries do not come from the UK's or India's bilateral portfolios for these countries, but from a separate UK funding source (initially from the centrally managed Global Partnerships Programme, then from regional departments). Compared to approaches that work through given structures of bilateral cooperation or permanent funds, the India-UK practice is more flexible. DFID's Global Partnerships Team (similar to the USAID's CIP) provides an adaptable structure to identify potential areas of cooperation, convene partners and establish relationships. This way of working corresponds to an explorative and demand-searching approach that allows room for innovative ideas. At the same time, this approach can be seen as being more prone to high start-up and transaction costs.

The India-UK practice of triangular cooperation is also less formalised than other examples. An increasing number of countries and multilateral organisations work on the basis of guiding frameworks for triangular cooperation to reduce transaction costs (for

example Germany's position paper or the UN's framework guidelines on triangular cooperation).⁴⁸ The India-UK "Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries" is less detailed than other similar joint statements or MoUs. The informal and flexible nature of the partnership corresponds to India's preferences. India perceives formalisation as making cooperation overly bureaucratic and curtailing the autonomy to decide on a case-by-case basis. At the same time, the India-US "Statement of Guiding Principles on Triangular Cooperation for Global Development" demonstrates that there is scope for a higher degree of detail.

Another practical implication of differences in approaches is that India-UK cooperation corresponds to what is called a "broad" definition of triangular cooperation, with varying involvement of partners throughout the programme phases (e.g. DFID leads the design and planning in consultation with relevant stakeholders; lead partners manage the implementation, etc.). In contrast, "narrow" concepts, such as the one used by Germany, define triangular cooperation as "jointly planned, financed and implemented" by all partners together.⁴⁹ The stricter definition might be more practicable when traditional donors and pivotal countries both have implementing agencies (e.g. Brazil's Agência Brasileira de Cooperação and Germany's Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit), which is not the case in the India-UK partnership. Ultimately, moving the India-UK approach closer to the stricter definition of triangular cooperation raises the question of joint programming, such as for instance practised in Japan's Partnership Programs with pivotal countries.⁵⁰

A final observation in comparison with other examples of triangular cooperation is that India-

UK cooperation is characterised by higher volumes of funding and longer durations. According to the 2015 OECD survey, the average duration of triangular cooperation projects was 32 months, with 71 percent of the projects lasting between 12 and 48 months. The average budget was \$1.7 million, ranging from \$2000 to \$40 million.⁵¹ In contrast, the more programme-oriented India-UK initiatives have durations ranging from five to eight years. Budgets range from \$5 to \$38 million (although some of these programmes only have a sub-component for triangular cooperation). Co-funding is so far less present in India-UK cooperation than in other examples.

V. TRIANGULAR COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF THE INDIA-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP

The role of triangular cooperation in the India-Africa partnership

India and the UK have identified Africa as a main region where they want to deepen their cooperation in third countries. This section therefore looks into how triangular cooperation fits into the context of the existing India-Africa partnership. India and African countries have a long history as development partners; triangular cooperation has entered this partnership only recently. India's development partnerships with African countries are predominantly bilateral, complemented by growing ties with African regional and continental frameworks. In recent years, triangular cooperation with multilateral organisations and traditional bilateral donors in African countries has gradually become a more visible aspect of India's developmental footprint on the African continent. The announcement of the AAGC signals India's willingness to confer a more substantial role to triangular cooperation in the India-Africa partnership.

The historical framing of the India-Africa partnership in terms of Afro-Asian solidarity and anti-colonialism has long prevented closer cooperation with traditional donors. Moreover, Africa has been the arena of a strong (re-)engagement of major powers, including India and China, since the turn of the century.⁵² The renewed interest of established and emerging powers in Africa has been marked by competition over natural resources, market access and diplomatic influence. As a result, India's more immediate priority has been to search for an own robust role in Africa.

The expansion of India's development partnerships since the end of the 1990s has especially contributed to deepening relations with African countries.⁵³ Capacity-building and human resource development are at the heart of India's Africa engagement.⁵⁴ African individuals are among the main participants in training and scholarships provided in the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC) programme. India has been supporting the creation of educational and training institutions across the continent. The Pan-African e-Network connects much of Africa through a fibre optics and satellite network to promote e-learning, tele-education and tele-health. Moreover, India provides grants and more than half of its government-backed LOCs go to African countries.⁵⁵ The private sector as well as growing trade and investment ties are another main feature of India's engagement in Africa. Trade has risen from \$967 million in 1990/91 to \$68 billion in 2013/14.⁵⁶ Since 2008, India offers preferential trade access to Africa's LDCs. India is the seventh investor country in Africa.⁵⁷ India's close ties with Africa also encompass its role in peace-keeping missions and the presence of a large Indian diaspora in some African countries.

In addition to expanding South-South ties with African countries, India has become more open to working with other international partners on the continent. There is a strong feeling that India has lost ground in Africa, especially considering "China's 'deep pockets'"⁵⁸, by sticking too long to non-alignment traditions. European partners might not be the first choice due to their historical baggage in Africa; the US and Japan might be more uncontroversial partners. However, India has generally shown to be open for dialogue with traditional donors by attending their main forums on cooperation with Africa. For instance, India participates in the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Japan's high-level Africa forum. In November 2017, India was invited as observer to attend the summit between the African Union and the European Union. The above-mentioned high-level joint statements with the UK, the US, Japan and the EU all mention Africa as a focus region for cooperation.

The Delhi Declaration, agreed at the third India-Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2015, provides the current overarching framework for the India-Africa partnership.⁵⁹ This framework does not mention triangular cooperation explicitly, but is sufficiently flexible to accommodate new modalities. For instance, the presentation of the AAGC at the annual meeting of the African Development Bank in 2017 demonstrates emerging linkages between cooperation structures of the India-Africa partnership and new triangular initiatives.

The relevance of triangular cooperation for the India-Africa partnership also depends on the motivation of African countries. Although they have increasingly been participating in varying roles, African perspectives have received little attention so far. Triangular cooperation relates

to a more fundamental question of ownership and choice in an increasingly diverse development cooperation landscape. Some have argued that the diversity of international partners has given African countries greater choice, provided that they are able to actively steer partnerships.⁶⁰ The period of sustained economic growth in Africa after the turn of the century has contributed to more assertiveness in dealing with external partners. African countries could today choose to deal with traditional donors and providers of South-South cooperation separately to take advantage of balancing their influence.⁶¹ Others are more sceptical, arguing that growing convergence between traditional donors and rising powers might actually constrain policy space for African countries. They see the risk that triangular cooperation “may effectively close down the negotiation space that has been opened” by the growing role of rising powers in Africa.⁶²

The implications of triangular cooperation for African agency are still insufficiently understood. The sceptical voices in this debate can offer a warning that the perspective of partner countries and the South-South relationship must be at the centre of triangular cooperation. Cooperation should be aligned with national development strategies, use country systems, and avoid new layers of coordination. Moreover, the attractiveness of triangular cooperation depends on the additionality of cooperation, i.e., it needs to provide an added value compared to bilateral or multilateral cooperation.⁶³

Opportunities and challenges for India-UK cooperation in Africa

The India-UK partnership has a track record of cooperation in Africa. Programmes such as the DFID-TERI partnership and SITA have a

distinct Africa profile. Prospects for expanding India-UK cooperation are promising in areas where development priorities of African countries overlap with the cooperation strategies and comparative advantages of India and the UK. The South-South relationship between India and African countries is the starting point for identifying such overlaps. Triangular cooperation would subsequently have a useful role to play in areas where unexploited opportunities exist and the UK has an added value in enhancing or removing hurdles from South-South cooperation.

The Delhi Declaration provides a good indication for overlaps identified by India and African countries. It emphasises the alignment of the India-Africa partnership with important frameworks for African development, especially the African Union’s Agenda 2063 and initiatives related to specific sectors, such as the Comprehensive African Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP). The Declaration also highlights areas in which African countries and India work together, such as agriculture, health, and education and skills. Moreover, India supports the priorities of the African Development Bank, the “High 5s”.⁶⁴ Ultimately, specific triangular initiatives have to be seen in the context of the domestic development strategies of individual African countries.

By way of example, this section draws on the case of the United Republic of Tanzania, which already participates in triangular cooperation with India and the UK, most notably in the SITA programme (see description in Box 1 of the annexe). The “Tanzania Development Vision 2025” outlines the national development strategy.⁶⁵ The country has the objective to achieve middle-income status by transforming the economy from a predominantly agricultural to a more diversified and semi-industrialised

economy. The central theme of Tanzania's development strategy is therefore structural transformation, i.e. moving the economy towards higher-productivity activities. With previous East Asian development models based on mass-manufacturing being less practicable for Tanzania, the strategy focuses on key drivers in a range of sectors, including agriculture and services, to stimulate productivity increases and job creation.⁶⁶ The current five-year development plan (2015/16-2020/21) also refers to lessons from other countries, such as India, and stresses the opportunities of broadening Tanzania's partnership base beyond traditional donors.

India's development partnership with Tanzania dates back to the 1960s, having evolved from its origins in anti-colonialism and non-alignment into a "modern and pragmatic relationship".⁶⁷ Both countries share the experience of economic liberalisation after the Cold War and now face similar challenges of structural transformation. Tanzania is a major partner in ITEC training courses, capacity-building initiatives and the Pan-African e-network. India provides grants and soft loans for projects in information technology, health and education. Since 2007, LOCs with a total credit volume of \$1.115 billion have been extended to the Government of Tanzania, especially in the area of water supply and the procurement of vehicles and equipment for agriculture. India is an important trading partner, accounting for over 17 percent of Tanzania's exports and over 14 percent of imports. India is also the sixth largest source of investment. Private companies operate in various sectors, especially construction, manufacturing, ICT and Internet infrastructure, business services and extraction. India's experience and the comparative advantages of its development partnership with Tanzania suggest large scope for South-South cooperation.

The main question for triangular cooperation is to what extent the UK would provide an added value to this relationship. The UK is an important provider of development cooperation in Tanzania as well as the largest source of foreign direct investment. The UK's development cooperation in Tanzania has relevant thematic overlaps with India's development partnership, notably education and cooperation with the private sector.⁶⁸ Tanzania sees considerable potential in cooperating with India, but is concerned that opportunities might remain unexploited in the absence of a more strategic approach.⁶⁹ Such considerations about clearly identifiable unexploited opportunities or hurdles in South-South cooperation serve as a useful guidepost for identifying future opportunities. SITA, for instance, builds on the finding that preferential trade access granted by India does not directly lead to improved trade. Tanzania has remained locked in low added-value exports and requires aid-for-trade measures to upgrade and diversify its trade relations. In such a situation, triangular cooperation can contribute to improving the development impact of South-South cooperation by addressing existing constraints.

Capacity deficits on both sides are one of the main challenges in the cooperation between India and Tanzania. The SITA programme document points out that "India places great emphasis on demand-led assistance but does not always have the networks and frameworks to organise its response."⁷⁰ Triangular cooperation could combine India's demand-driven, sector-specific and project-based approach with larger programming frameworks required to address issues that cut across sectors and involve a diverse range of partners. Based on a strong country presence and networks in both India and Tanzania, the UK is well placed to bridge capacity deficits in South-South cooperation.

Limited awareness of possibilities to cooperate with India is another impediment. India's development experience undoubtedly attracts demand for cooperation from African countries. India is especially perceived as an important trade and investment partner. However, awareness about India's role as a development partner and possibilities to learn from Indian experiences is still limited. According to an Afrobarometer survey, African perception of international partners is still dominated by the US, China and the former colonial powers.⁷¹ Similarly, the SITA programme highlights that exporters in Tanzania have not been sufficiently aware of preferential trade offered by India.

Evolving attitudes towards rising powers in African countries, including in Tanzania, are an additional aspect where a UK added value could emerge. African countries are increasingly seeing the need for an active strategy to realise the full benefits of cooperation with rising powers. Moreover, local CSOs have started to observe the role of rising powers in Africa more critically, focusing especially on China's growing footprint.⁷² So far, India enjoys a positive image by default, being in the "slipstream" of China.⁷³ However, India is likely to become more exposed to scrutiny as its development partnerships are expanding. Triangular cooperation can provide a conducive environment to share expertise on the management of development cooperation. The UK could also promote analytical work and evidence on India's development impact in Africa, for instance similar to the work done in the DFID-supported Growth Research Programme.

As a modality that specifically targets unexploited opportunities of the India-Africa partnership, triangular cooperation with the UK has strong potential. At the same time, triangular cooperation comes with challenges of

its own at the country level. Country ownership and uptake of initiatives can be difficult to achieve as India-UK cooperation in third countries is mainly driven from New Delhi. Another challenge is coordination between India and the UK at the country level. India does not take part in donor coordination forums and coordinates with other international partners informally on a case-by-case basis. The DFID country offices in African countries have to play an important role to overcome these challenges. However, they lack a more formal and explicit role and engage in triangular cooperation on top of the work agreed in the UK bilateral country programmes with the third country. This arrangement can lead to an ad hoc involvement depending on available time and staff resources.

VI. CONCLUSION

India's growing presence in triangular cooperation is adding weight to this modality, and opening up opportunities to address global development challenges in new partnerships. In the context of a shifting geopolitical environment, India has become more open towards triangular cooperation to overcome capacity constraints and shape new narratives of global development. A broad range of Indian partners has gained experience working with traditional donors, such as the UK and the US, in third countries. Moreover, India has shown leadership in shaping triangular funds in the UN system. India's official endorsement of triangular cooperation in joint statements with several key partners and high-profile initiatives such as the AAGC signals that this modality is on the cusp of becoming a more dynamic aspect of India's foreign policy.


The India-UK partnership has been instrumental in establishing a practicable model for India's growing participation in triangular cooperation. The emphasis on mobilising India's rich landscape of non-state and parastatal actors

is a valuable addition to the global practice of triangular cooperation. At the same time, India's growing engagement in triangular cooperation creates additional momentum that India and the UK can use to deepen the dialogue on how to move their relationship forward. Possible modifications could include: giving stronger strategic orientation to India-UK cooperation in third countries, strengthening Indian leadership, and supporting ownership in partner countries.

First, India and the UK could increase the strategic orientation of their cooperation in third countries. Ensuring the dynamism of India-UK cooperation appears to be contingent on finding common ground in their respective broader foreign policy directions. Integrating triangular cooperation in a shared global vision would bring out more explicitly the relevance for India and clarify incentives. A longer-term perspective would also help to strike the right balance between feasible cooperation on a case-by-case basis and the need to limit transaction costs, facilitate scaling up and provide frameworks that can address complex development challenges. Upgrading the India-UK "Statement of Intent on Partnership for Cooperation in Third Countries" could be part of this process. India and the UK could specify future priorities and objectives in alignment with the India-Africa partnership and African frameworks.

Second, India-UK cooperation in third countries could benefit from stronger Indian leadership. Such leadership could result from linking triangular cooperation more systematically with existing India-led initiatives and the India-Africa partnership. SITA, which relates to India's preferential trade regime for

LDCs, is already doing this. Moreover, Indian leadership could emerge from a genuine India-UK ("MEA-DFID") approach. India and the UK could engage in technical and policy dialogues in view of designing and evaluating some of the future triangular programmes together. Finally, the implementation of India-UK programmes could draw more strongly on some components from India's development partnerships, for instance India's training, capacity-building, and skills development instruments within ITEC.

Third, India-UK cooperation could give more weight to the countries where programmes are implemented, especially in the case of African countries. Given capacity constraints of both Indian overseas representations and African partner governments, DFID country offices are likely to continue to play a crucial role. Integrating country offices more closely into the design of programmes and explicitly allocating time and resources for this purpose could improve their ability to facilitate country ownership and the uptake of programmes. The designation of focal points for triangular cooperation in Indian overseas representations and DFID country offices could also improve coordination and facilitate the interaction with African partner governments. Another way to support uptake of triangular cooperation at the country level is to strengthen transnational networks, for instance among research institutions. Based on the partnerships created in individual India-UK programmes, networks could be nurtured beyond the duration of programmes under the umbrella of the IAFS process. In the long term, these networks would reduce dependence on DFID as broker of partnerships. 

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ANNEXES

Table 1: Examples of India-UK cooperation in third countries

Project title	Duration	Funding	Main partners	Countries	Project description
DFID-TERI Partnership (as part of the India Partnership Framework)	2011-2015	Up to £9M (£8 m from DFID India and £1 m from Global Development Partnership Programme (GDPP) for activities in Africa	TERI – The Energy and Resources Institute	UK, India, Ethiopia, Kenya	The DFID-TERI Partnership for Clean Energy Access and Improved Policies for Sustainable Development supported the replication and implementation of pilot models for clean cook stoves and solar lighting in India and Africa.
Knowledge Partnership Programme (KPP)	2012-2016	Up to £9 m (£7 m from GDPP and £2 m from DFID India)	Collaboration with more than 55 partners including UN organisations, International and national NGOs, academic institutions, Chambers of Commerce etc.	UK, India, outreach to 38 developing countries with varying levels of engagement	KPP supports gathering and uptake of evidence, and sharing of knowledge and expertise, on India's impact on global public goods (such as trade, climate change, and food security), and on poverty reduction in third countries (e.g. supporting India to share evidence and expertise with LICs).
Strategic Health and Nutrition Partnership (SHNP)	2013-2018	Up to £15 m (including £12m from DFID India and £3m from the GDPP)	Access Health International	UK, India, Nepal, Ghana, Afghanistan	The Health Financing Support Programme of the SHNP supported dissemination of best practices and lessons learnt in health financing in Indian states to other developing countries, e.g. on India's innovative financing reforms (including health insurance) and private sector engagement.
Innovative Ventures and Technologies for Development (INVENT)	2013-2019	Up to £38 m (£5 m in GDPP grant funding for output 3: Global knowledge sharing)	Various (e.g. Intellectap/Sankalp Forum, Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry - FICCI)	UK, India, Ethiopia, Kenya, Bangladesh, Nepal, Uganda, Afghanistan	INVENT supports technological and business innovations for the poor in the low-income states of India and in developing countries in Africa and South Asia. The global component includes technical assistance to exchange and adapt proven innovations from India to LICs.

Global Research Partnership on Food and Nutrition Security, Health & Women (GRP)	2013-2020	£5 m (£3 m SARH; £2 m GDPP); co-funding from UK Research Councils (RCUK) and Government of India	Research Councils in the UK and India; researchers in low-income countries	UK, India, Bangladesh, Malawi, Nepal, Zimbabwe	The GRP creates collaborative trilateral research partnerships between the UK, India and LICs to generate, test and use innovative research products, facilitate cross-fertilisation of ideas and build research capacity in LICs. Thematic focus: food security, health, and women.
Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa (SITA Africa)	2014-2020	£19 million	International Trade Center	Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda	SITA is DFID's first South-South Aid for Trade and value-chain programme. It supports higher value exports from African countries to India and other countries by using Indian know-how, technology and investment.

Sources: Business cases and most recent annual reviews by December 2017 via Development Tracker)

Box 1: Supporting Indian Trade and Investment for Africa (SITA Africa)

SITA is DFID's first South-South Aid for Trade and value-chain programme. The rationale for the programme is to partner with India to support higher value exports from Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda to India and third countries. Despite India's trade preferences for African LDCs, trade between African economies and India risks mirroring the unequal patterns between developing and industrialised countries. The programme leverages Indian knowhow, technology and investment to support partner countries to upgrade their export baskets from low value-added, natural resources-based exports to higher-value exports. The programme outcomes are 1) attracting more Indian FDI and 2) increasing higher value exports to Indian as well as third countries. To achieve these objectives, SITA supports investment and trade links, market and value chain intelligence, the operational efficiency of companies, and Trade Support Institutions. The programme also raises awareness of trade and investment opportunities and addresses business constraints. The programme focuses on seven value-chains: cotton, clothing and apparel; leather; IT enabled services (ITES); spices; sunflower oil; pulses; and coffee. Within the framework of SITA, partners implement a range of activities, including outreach to potential investors in India, business fairs and other events, exposure visits, training, study tours, buyer-seller meetings to facilitate trade, e-auctions, analytical work, such as Value Chain Roadmaps and Strategies, and awareness raising. SITA is managed by the International Trade Center, a joint agency of the World Trade Organization and the UN.

Source: author's summary based on business case and most recent annual review.