Iraq is back in the headlines, loaded with euphoria. The electoral exercise has been undertaken; the results have yet to be announced. The running commentary on CNN on January 30 tended to suggest a near perfect exercise. No mention of course was made of the invasion, the occupation, the Iraqi dead, the reduction of Iraq to a stone-age condition, the falsehood of the pretext for war and the failure to find traces of weapons of mass destruction.
Many beyond the shores of the United States have joined the chorus. Talk of vigorous diplomacy and of "short-term alliance with the U.S." on Iraq policy is again being advocated with a view to counter "religious fundamentalist forces." Henry Kissinger's thesis, that a U.S. failure in Iraq would cause problems for India with its large Muslim population, is being advocated. Once again, as at the time of the debate on sending Indian troops to join the `Coalition of the Willing', national interest is cited as the supreme determinant. In the process "coercive democratisation" is endorsed, forgetful of the lessons of history, forgetful of the fact that Rousseau's theory of the General Will taking precedence over the Will of All became the basis of all forms of European dictatorships.
Facts are pertinent to the argument. The U.S. had brushed aside talk of a withdrawal timetable. Contracts have been awarded for building 12 new bases in Iraq. Iraq's Interior Minister has suggested that a withdrawal may be possible after 18 months. The training of a new Iraqi security force is well behind schedule; it is anyway intended to undertake internal policing rather than guard the country's borders. No plans seem to exist to provide armour, air force and other ingredients of a modern army to Iraq. Would a new Iraq then be as un-militarised as the proposed Palestinian state?
In such a backdrop, what would be the authority of the newly elected National Assembly to draw up a Constitution for a state whose sovereignty is being restored? It is already being conceded that the Assembly would not be representative enough. Leslie H. Gelb, a former chairman of the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations, has opined that it is unlikely to write a constitution that would protect minorities and inspire popular loyalty and that it should, therefore, delegate its authority to a more representative constitutional committee.
On another front an informal referendum in Kurdish areas, on election day itself, suggested an 11 to 1 opinion in favour of an independent Kurdish state that, in a practical sense, already exists. As a result, the constitution-making exercise cannot but be torturous from the point of view of the majority Shia alliance that may see the fruits of electoral success based on demographic realities slip away in a loose federal arrangement that would give de facto independence and financial autonomy to the Kurdish areas who would also retain their control over security and borders. Nor would the question of sharing of oil revenues, and of control over large mixed cities, be any easier to resolve.
The National Assembly would confront other challenges. It has to elect the Presidency Council of three members that in turn would select a new Prime Minister. The latter exercise may be difficult since Ahmad Chalabi is reported to be at the head of the list of candidates of the Alliance supported by Ayatollah Sistani. Where would this leave Iyad Allawi?
The preoccupations of the post-election Iraq would be with matters domestic with a focus on internal security, provision of essential services, constitution-making and power sharing. There is little that outside powers - other than America - can do in relation to these. Peace will presumably return to Iraq when levels of resentment begin to level off and when the government of the day begins to address the real concerns of the public. India can and should take serious and continuous interest in these developments. A federal arrangement in Iraq would not impinge on our interests; a break-up of Iraq - de facto or de jure would. The new Iraq's relations with its neighbours would determine the security environment in the region and would be of paramount interest to us. So would Iraqi views on the 1975 Treaty with Iran and on the Security Council determined borders with Kuwait. If Iraq's immediate neighbours convene a meeting to guarantee its territorial integrity and friendly relations - with or without outside the participation of extra-regional powers, we should be fully supportive of it. We should reiterate - as we have already done - our commitment to cooperate with Iraq in its reconstruction in every possible way.
Vigorous diplomacy is desirable; it has however to be realistic and based on capacity and capability. Cooperation with the United States is desirable but does it need to extend to its ideological predilections? The doctrines of pre-emption, regime change, coercive democratisation, cartographic engineering, and "Islamic threat" do not respond to Indian needs or Indian thinking. India should steer clear of them. West Asia does have problems but correct diagnosis should take precedence over treatment.
The author is Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. He is a former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations.
Courtesy: The Hindu, Chennai, February 4, 2005
* Views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Observer Research Foundation.
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