The ‘India’ factor in China-Russia ties

Since the onset of the Ukraine War, a discourse gaining currency both within and outside India is that a burgeoning China-Russia alliance will eventually derail the traditional Russia-India friendship and hurt India’s national interest, making it much more vulnerable to the China threat. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s recent visit to China has set the alarm bells ringing in New Delhi, where voices are getting louder, demanding India to pivot away from Russia. 

Offering a counterpoint, this piece, based on the study of Chinese literature, argues that in the triangular dynamics between China, Russia, and India, China has little option but to accept a deeper India-Russia ties or face the risk of (a) losing Russia to the Indo-Pacific geopolitics; or (b) India slipping further into the arms of the United States (US).

In June 2023, when China and some other G20 member states boycotted the G20 Tourism Summit hosted by India in Kashmir, Russia chose to ignore the boycott and attend the summit with a high-profile representation. This development attracted much attention in China and also put the Russian support base in China in an awkward position. Again, in mid-August of 2023, as India and China held their latest round of commander-level talks, reports that Russia will hand over the S400 missile defence system to India as scheduled broke out. This caused public outrage in China and questions were raised about the sanctity of the China-Russia “limitless friendship” and “back-to-back strategic coordination”.

Online reactions often blast Russia for essentially “stabbing China in the back” by extending military support to India, with whom China has an active border dispute.

A survey of Chinese media reveals China’s deep exasperation over strong Russia-India ties. Online reactions often blast Russia for essentially “stabbing China in the back” by extending military support to India, with whom China has an active border dispute. Russia’s intentions are often questioned as it is perceived to be extending various favours to India, be it in terms of offering fourth-generation tank technology or by including India in every China-Russia initiative, from the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to Far East development. Some Chinese observers even wonder, in the case of a large-scale war between China and India in the future, which side would Russia take?

A section within the Chinese strategic community grudgingly acknowledges that the China-Russia-India strategic triangle might be somewhat skewed in favour of Russia-India strategic relations. For Russia and China, it is a marriage of convenience, a temporary arrangement in the face of common challenges emanating from the US and the West. On the other hand, India and Russia “have no border, no hatred, no grudges, no disputes, …. natural allies for each other”.

Others, however, believe that although the close relationship between Russia and India poses a certain geopolitical constraint on China and hurts the Chinese public sentiment, China still needs to play down these differences for several reasons.

First, a joint front with Russia is critical (for China) to not just advance a China-led world order, but also to avoid isolation amidst growing interest in the Indo-Pacific. For example, China is concerned over several European countries being drawn into the Indian Ocean (by the US and India) to participate in the Indo-Pacific strategic game and they are also actively seeking their military presence in the region. China is well aware of India’s interest in reviving Russia’s role in the Indo-Pacific. However, in a great relief to China, the Ukraine war has, for now, averted such possibilities. Even then, developments like Russia and the US participating in India’s largest maritime exercise ‘Milan’ raise alarm bells in Beijing. It is interesting to note that at a time when the global discourse is abuzz with the China-Russia “no-limit” friendship, the Chinese strategic community has been deliberating upon the sustainability of Russia’s turn to China in the longer run, particularly after the end of the Ukraine conflict. It is against this backdrop that China seemingly wants to hold on to Russia and not alienate it by forcibly jeopardising Russia-India ties, which Russia considers one of its last remaining economic and geopolitical lifelines in the current international situation.

China understands that if Russia-India relations actually deteriorate and India reduces Russian weapons purchases due to Chinese interference, it will end up buying more from the US or other Western countries.

Second, China understands that if Russia-India relations actually deteriorate and India reduces Russian weapons purchases due to Chinese interference, it will end up buying more from the US or other Western countries. This will put India and the West in an even tighter embrace, which is extremely detrimental to China’s interests. After all, what can be more disadvantageous for China than a stronger alliance between two of its biggest adversaries—the US and India? Presently, the “Russia factor” disrupts US-India relations to a certain extent. As a result of which, there is comparatively lesser pressure on China on the issue of the Indo Pacific, leaving it with greater latitude to influence developments in the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes.

To summarise, China has deep insecurity over Russia-India ties, and is much tempted to use its influence over war-ravaged Russia to drive the relationship (Russia-India) in a direction beneficial to China’s interest. However, China, at the same time, is mindful of Russia’s importance in forming a joint front against the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and thus is unwilling to alienate Russia over its longstanding relationship with India. It also serves the Chinese interest well to use Russia as a useful chess piece that keeps India from inching too close to the US.

The complex dynamics of India-Russia-China triangle merit greater investigation, before we give in to the discourse trap of an impending India-Russia break-up over the China factor.

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Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• China
• India
• Russia and Eurasia
• USA and Canada
• China threat
• China-Russia alliance
• India’s national interest
• Indo-Pacific
• Russia-India ties
• Ukraine war
• US-India relations

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