The strategic convergence between India and the US might be weakening as the US increasingly focuses on the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Eurasia.
The assassination attempt on a Sikh separatist in the United States (US) has become a bone of contention between New Delhi and Washington. It has also led to intelligence agencies of the two countries now sniping at each other. There is a possibility that this issue, if not handled maturely, can create further problems in the bilateral relationship. However, this issue merely represents the symptom, not the cause of problems in India-US ties. If the structural factors pointed to a strong strategic convergence between India and the US, the alleged assassination attempt would have been quietly and quickly dealt with.
It is well-understood that the strategic convergence of India and the US is because of the common threat posed by China. The more the US focuses on Russia or any other adversary and India focuses on Pakistan, the more their strategic convergence weakens. The US focus on Russia is the most damaging factor because the latter is the leading military supplier of India. If the US and Russia are at loggerheads, it weakens Russia’s ability to deliver military supplies to India and it also threatens New Delhi with economic sanctions, should it go ahead with significant military purchases from Russian suppliers. In the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war, US aid enhances the strength of Ukrainian defence and counteroffensives. Russia, therefore, has had to increase its reliance on China for military and diplomatic support. This has an impact of diminishing Russian autonomy and, consequently, its ability to potentially honour defence agreements with India in case of an India-China conflict. The assumption is that no other country can replace Russia as India’s leading military supplier in the short to medium term—and that should be a reasonable assumption despite India’s ongoing defence indigenisation efforts.
It is well-understood that the strategic convergence of India and the US is because of the common threat posed by China. The more the US focuses on Russia or any other adversary and India focuses on Pakistan, the more their strategic convergence weakens.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict has shifted the focus of the US away from China, and has, therefore, contributed to considerably eroding the strategic convergence between India and the US. A simple look at the budgetary allotments would suggest that the US regards supporting Ukraine in its war against Russia as the single biggest priority. Of the US$95 billion aid package recently passed by the US Congress, a whopping US$61 billion is meant for Ukraine and only US$8 billion for the Indo-Pacific, the theatre relevant to countering China. Since the war began in February 2022, the US has committed a total of US$175 billion to assist Ukraine’s war efforts. Further, the war in the Middle East has diverted US attention away and Indo-Pacific in general and India, in particular, have suffered neglect. Earlier, the US President Joe Biden declined India’s invitation to be the Republic Day chief guest. The National Security Advisor, Jake Sullivan has postponed his visits to India twice this year. Evidently, the India relationship is not a priority for the current US administration.
lThe Russia-Ukraine conflict has shifted the focus of the US away from China, and has, therefore, contributed to considerably eroding the strategic convergence between India and the US.
It can be argued that the current shift towards weakening Russia is only a short-term deviation and the US would come back to deterring, containing, and, if need be, fighting China. However, there are two problems with this argument. First, beyond giving out continuous aid, the US has no planning for the endgame in Ukraine. As three leading US experts recently pointed out, “There appears to be no plan other than to try to keep the money flowing—the new aid could last as little as six months or as long as 18 months—which will work until it doesn’t.” If the US aid contributes to Ukrainian successes on the battlefield, there will be a temptation, as there has been in the past, to keep fighting until Russia is defeated. Whereas when Ukraine suffers reverses, it is again not deemed to be a good time to bring the war to a negotiated end because Russia would demand a bigger pound of flesh. Second, Russia seems to evoke an emotional response from members of the US strategic community much more than China does. Anyone critical of the aid to Ukraine or questions its logic or efficacy even slightly is tarred as a pro-Putin traitor. Indians do recognise and have been a victim of, this problem. Even though China is a much bigger threat, for a long time—and sometimes even today—many Indians reflexively focused on and prioritised the threat from Pakistan. Something similar is at play in the US today.
The US seeks greater alignment from its allies and partners against Russia. Unsurprisingly, distant countries like South Korea and Australia have sent military aid to Ukraine. Pakistan, which is back in the good books of Washington, too has sent arms to Kyiv. On the other hand, India is seen in the US and the West as a state that has opportunistically taken advantage of the war to buy more oil from Russia. The Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar also claimed recently that there was “immense pressure” not to buy oil from Russia, but India refused to cave in.
Does all of this mean that the US is not serious about China at all? And if it is, will it not need India to deal with the China challenge? This deserves a two-part answer. First, there are indications that the US believes it is a strong enough power to deal with multiple adversaries. When asked if the US can deal with the wars in Ukraine and Gaza simultaneously, President Joe Biden responded: “We are the United States of America, for God’s sake. The most powerful nation in history, not in the world — in the history of the world. We can take care of both of these and still maintain our overall international defence.” This statement about the enormity of US power complements a lot of mainstream analysis in the country that suggests how inferior its adversaries are. Russia is regularly mocked for its bad showing in Ukraine. The fact that Russia had to seek military supplies from Iran and North Korea is pointed out as evidence of the weakness of its adversaries. Similarly, Iranian missiles are now, after the recent engagement with Israel, considered unreliable. The opinion in the US about the challenge from China is more divided. If the rivals outside China are weak, then the US —“the most powerful nation in history”—is unlikely to lose much by taking them on while preparing to deal with China.
Second, it is easy to conclude that India’s utility to the US will be limited in the case of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The most talked about contingency in the Indo-Pacific is the possibility of a Chinese invasion or a naval blockade of Taiwan. The US military may have to get involved in the defence of Taiwan. It is often pointed out that India would avoid getting entangled in such a military conflict between the US and China. This does not, however, mean that India will do nothing. There are two significant actions that India is likely to take and those will benefit the US. One, the Indian Army’s continued, and likely alert, presence on China’s southern border will create complications for the People’s Liberation Army. Two, India will cooperate with the US in implementing economic sanctions on China.
Second, it is easy to conclude that India’s utility to the US will be limited in the case of a conflict in the Indo-Pacific. The most talked about contingency in the Indo-Pacific is the possibility of a Chinese invasion or a naval blockade of Taiwan.
The problem for India is that it will likely do both without needing any incentives from the US. With a spate of incursions and standoffs in the last decade on the Line of Actual Control, the Indian forces cannot rest easy on the long and disputed border with China. Moreover, China may create another problem on the border either to stop India from assisting the US or in response to Indian cooperation with the sanctions regime. On the sanctions too, it is in India’s interest—and not just the US’s or Taiwan’s—to reduce China’s economic might. Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants to build India into a manufacturing powerhouse but has only achieved mixed success so far. If the US and Europe impose tough sanctions on China, it would be a golden opportunity for India to buttress its own manufacturing prowess and also reduce the massive trade imbalance vis-à-vis Beijing. In other words, the US does not need to ‘give’ anything to ‘get’ India’s cooperation. New Delhi lacks leverage and the US has several other allies in the Indo-Pacific.
To be sure, there are some new initiatives in India-US ties. The US has greenlit a GE-HAL deal to manufacture jet engines in India, a move that has been hailed as “revolutionary”. Besides, India and the US announced the initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) in May 2022. However, we still do not know the level of technology transfer to India that will be allowed in the jet engine manufacturing process. Moreover, not every new initiative with a shiny name succeeds. With the strategic convergence weakening, the bureaucratic and political pressure to deliver may also go down. In addition, an irritant in the ties like the current disagreement on the Khalistan threat attempt can take life of its own. The India-US ties have indeed come a long way in the last 25 years, but it is time we moved past writing odes to past achievements. Looking at it today, the relationship seems hitting a ceiling as the strategic glue in the foundation is coming apart.
Kunal Singh is pursuing a PhD in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Kunal Singh is pursuing a PhD in political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. His research interests include the politics of nuclear weapons acquisition ...
Read More +
PREV
.png)
.png)