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DCS Mayal, “Decoding Chinese Military Diplomacy in South Asia,” ORF Issue Brief No. 744, October 2024, Observer Research Foundation.
Introduction
“To win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill.
To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.”
~ Sun Tzu
Nations are increasingly using military power as a form of diplomacy,[1] with a notable surge in military diplomacy[a] stemming from overt displays of hard power. This escalation is largely attributed to the engagement of armed forces in civilian affairs through what is referred to as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)[b] both domestic and overseas, with minimal risk, cost, and time. A revolution in communication technologies has led to increased interactions and interdependencies in the global community, resulting in the influence of soft power extending beyond government domains. Non-traditional threats such as terrorism and climate change have further underscored the significance of military diplomacy in addressing new challenges that transcend geographical and political boundaries.
In this context, the role of the military has transformed from traditional defence, deterrence, compulsion, and intervention to non-traditional peace-time activities such as crisis prevention, early warning, and post-conflict rebuilding. The aim is to establish stability and security through a “disarmament of the mind”, i.e., a change in the attitudes and perceptions of participants and stakeholders. Countries are forming alliances, coordinating operations, working towards interoperability, and sharing technology to achieve a pragmatic strategic outlook towards lasting peace.[2]
Chinese military diplomacy has played a crucial role in advancing the overall political and diplomatic objectives of Beijing and safeguarding the country’s strategic interests. Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has departed from Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “Hide your strength, bide your time”[c] and replaced it with a more aggressive policy that emphasises defence and security and seeks to address the historical grievances the nation endured during the period referred to as the ‘Century of Humiliation'.[d] The United States’ (US) heightened focus on Afghanistan, Iraq, terrorism, and the 2008 financial crisis created space for China to strengthen its international presence, enabling it to expand its global influence and enhance regional security.[3] The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has become more active in military diplomacy, as emphasised by Chinese military writings over the past decade. The stated objectives of military diplomacy, derived from broader PLA missions, include supporting national foreign policy, protecting sovereignty, advancing the national interest, and shaping the international security environment.[4]
China’s Military Diplomacy
Despite possessing the second most powerful army in the world, China is a late entrant in military diplomacy. Eventually, military diplomacy emerged as an important tool for China to leverage its global influence, assisting in the development of a comprehensive approach to evolving multidimensional security threats. China’s approach since the beginning of the 21st century has been marked by a paradigm shift from inward to outward, with the expansion and modernisation of the PLA aimed at protecting China’s expanding overseas interests. Historically, the PLA has played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, following the establishment of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA began serving strategic and operational goals to aid the national diplomacy and security strategy.[5] Thus, tracking the PLA’s diplomatic activities[e] could help in better understanding the trends in China’s diplomatic goals and interests.
China’s expanding international interests necessitate enabling a favourable security environment that can facilitate overseas investments and safeguard its citizens and assets globally. Chinese leadership has also indicated that it expects the PLA to play a larger role in expanding Chinese national and security interests abroad through military diplomacy. At an All-Military Diplomatic Work Conference and the 16th Military Attaché Working Conference in 2015, President Xi Jinping highlighted the role of military diplomacy by stating that the PLA’s external activities must serve China’s larger foreign policy strategy, uphold national security and sovereignty, and promote the military’s development. One of the key elements of this goal is building and maintaining the ability to control the narrative and shape favourable global perceptions.[6]
Indeed, military diplomatic activities have increased under Xi. From 2003 to 2012, China averaged 151 military diplomatic activities[f] per year. The average from 2013 to 2018 was 20 percent higher, at nearly 179 activities per year.[7] The April 2024 edition of the China Maritime Report highlights a notable but partial recovery in China's military diplomacy activities in 2023, following a decline in engagements with foreign militaries during the COVID-19 pandemic.[8] This international exposure has also provided valuable insights into foreign military strategies, training methods, management techniques, technologies, equipment, and tactics.[9]
A 2019 defence white paper stated that China’s security cooperation around the world supports Xi’s vision to create a “community with a shared future for mankind” and “building a new model security partnership”.[10] Articles published in January 2023 reiterated the importance of military diplomacy in achieving China’s national rejuvenation, serving the country’s diplomatic interests, and protecting or defending national interests abroad. A number of authoritative books from PLA institutes on military diplomacy were also published around 2015, highlighting the emphasis placed on military diplomacy by the Chinese leadership.[g]
To counter Western domination and highlight its role as global security provider, Chinese military diplomacy aims to cultivate relationships with developing and underdeveloped countries. The year 2023 was the first year for fully implementing the guiding principles laid down at the 20th CCP National Congress. In the area of military diplomacy, the PLA relied on the “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military”[h] and “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy”,[i] followed the lead of the head of state, and undertook high-level exchanges focused on practical cooperation, with an emphasis on multilateral platforms.[11] China’s military diplomacy activities in 2023 included senior-level visits and meetings, joint exercises, naval port calls, humanitarian activities, and academic exchanges.[12] According to Ministry of National Defense (MND) spokesperson Wu Qian, China’s military diplomacy in 2023 “served the overall political and diplomatic objectives of China”; “resolutely safeguarded national sovereignty, security and development interests”; “expanded foreign-related military operations”; “made innovative efforts in multilateral diplomacy”; and “contributed to building a community with a shared future for mankind.”[13]
Beijing also promotes various global and regional initiatives, the largest of which are the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and three other global initiatives—i.e., the Global Development Initiative (GDI),[j] the Global Security Initiative (GSI),[k] and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).[l],[14] These three have been introduced as part of the country’s foreign policy under Xi, with the aim of establishing China as a leader in global governance and offering alternatives to the Western-led global order. The complementary and amorphous GDI, GSI, and GCI concepts in China’s “Community of Common Destiny”[m] can be viewed as components of a larger push to establish China as a leader in global governance.[15]
The GDI and GSI can support military diplomacy by fostering strategic partnerships and military economic activities through dual-use infrastructure and development projects, enhancing security cooperation through joint exercises, intelligence- and infrastructure-sharing agreements, defence industrial cooperation, technology transfer, humanitarian aid, military training, educational exchanges, and peacekeeping efforts. These actions would boost China’s global influence and reinforce military relations.
Following purges of the foreign ministry and military in 2023,[16] Xi is likely to install new field commanders to marshal the civilian and military envoys he has called on to forge a “diplomatic iron army”.[n] In December 2023, former Navy chief Dong Jun was appointed defense minister—a rank-and-file Central Military Commission role whose primary responsibility is liaising with foreign militaries.[17]
Every Chinese leader since Mao Zedong has implemented a programme to compel the commercial and civil sectors to support the PLA. These programmes are known by various terms, including the Civil-Military Integration (CMI) and the Military-Civil Fusion (MCF). Under Xi, the role of the military and the MCF have been increasingly promoted.[18] The MCF replaced the CMI and has been frequently discussed in China’s Five-Year Plans (FYP) and academic literature.
The MCF strategy is more complex than the CMI; the CMI refers to the cooperation between government and commercial facilities in Research & Development, manufacturing, and maintenance operations, whereas MCF is a state-led, state-directed programme that leverages state and commercial power to strengthen the PLA. The strategy is aimed at promoting the sharing of resources and collaboration in research and applications to ensure mutually beneficial economic cooperation and national defence construction.[19] MCF aims to enable China to become an economic, technological, and military superpower by fusing the country’s military and civilian industrial and Science & Technology resources.[20] The PLA also uses military diplomacy through the MCF to gather intelligence, learn new skills, benchmark PLA capabilities against those of other nations, and build interoperability with foreign partners.[21]
The exposure to innovative Western scientific technologies has enabled China to redirect its intelligence collection towards acquiring advanced dual-use technologies and equipment and leveraging the capabilities of research institutes, universities, and companies. Additionally, collaborative operations with foreign armed forces have not only contributed to the enhancement of Chinese military capabilities but also stimulated the Chinese economy and exports by showcasing cheap Chinese military technologies on the global stage. The military use of Chinese-operated foreign infrastructure is also set to increase as key projects and security relationships mature. Chinese integration into global transport networks allows China to monitor, delay, and potentially obstruct the activities of US and other competitors.[22] For the purposes of analysis, Chinese military diplomacy objectives can be divided into strategic and operational goals (see Table 1).
Table 1: Chinese Military Diplomatic Activities
| Activity | Strategic Goals | Operational Goals | ||
| Support PRC Diplomacy | Shape Security Environment | Collect Intelligence | Learn New Skills and Benchmarking | |
| Senior-Level Visits | ||||
| Hosted | X | X | X | |
| Abroad | X | X | X | |
| Dialogues | ||||
| Bilateral | X | X | X | |
| Multilateral | X | X | X | |
| Military Exercises | ||||
| Bilateral | X | X | X | X |
| Multilateral | X | X | X | X |
| Naval Port Calls | ||||
| Escort Task Force (ETF) | X | X | X | X |
| Non-Escort Task Force | X | X | X | |
| Functional Exchanges | X | X | X | |
| Non-Traditional Security Operations | ||||
| HA/DR | X | X | X | X |
| Peacekeeping | X | X | X | X |
Source: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies[23]
In its Annual China Military Power Report 2023, the US Department of Defense highlighted that, besides the existing overseas military base in Djibouti, China has likely considered adding military logistics facilities in 19 countries.[o],[24] PLA Navy (PLAN) vessels make extensive use of Chinese firms’ network of commercial transport infrastructure around the globe to safeguard China’s overseas interests and carry out far-seas protection across the long, vulnerable sea lanes stretching to coastal China. The most significant observations of this existing dual-use capability emerge from the network of nearly 100 ocean ports owned and/or operated by Chinese firms in foreign jurisdictions.[25] PLAN warships have now made port calls at over one-third of these facilities, utilising China’s trade-centric infrastructure network.[26]
A number of Chinese multinationals, including the China Ocean Shipping Corp (COSCO) and China Merchants Group (CMG), operate global port terminals. Their assets form a vertically integrated transport network that supports China’s international trade. These facilities are preferred by the PLAN and also enable PLA peacetime operations far from China. Domestic laws require Chinese firms to give PLA vessels preferential access, share information, and support defence mobilisation. Additionally, these ports collect extensive data on vessels, routes, cargos, and personnel, providing valuable intelligence, especially since military vessels often use commercial ports.[27] Notably, the PLAN has surpassed the PLA in exercise involvement, underscoring China’s commitment to building a blue-water navy.[28]
China has integrated the trillion-dollar BRI connectivity project with military diplomacy to leverage its leadership role on security issues. Following the launch of the BRI in 2013, China has made infrastructure developments in the vicinity of South Asia, including in Djibouti, the Melaka Gateway port in Malaysia, and an industrial park near Duqm port in Oman.[29] In South Asia, Chinese military diplomacy footprints are being created in Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka), Coco Island (Myanmar), and Uthuru Thila Falhu Island (Maldives).[30] In the Indian Ocean and the West Philippine Sea, a covert conflict is underway, driven by China’s maritime militia, known as the Third Sea Force which, disguised as civilian research vessels, pursue Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions.[31] Despite international rulings against its South China Sea claims,[32] China is militarising the region by building artificial islands and releasing a “new standard” map to assert territorial claims and position itself at key maritime routes to challenge its rivals.[33]
Besides supporting foreign policy objectives and securing the lines of communication for energy resources and raw materials, military diplomacy has provided China with the opportunity to expand the range and geographic reach of PLA operations globally without raising red flags. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA provided military medical assistance and donations to 56 countries around the world and participated in a UN peacekeeping mission. With the exception of two countries, all of the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities targeted BRI countries.[34] Beijing is the 10th largest troop and police contributor (2,274 personnel) of any country and the second largest financial supporter, providing nearly 19 percent of UN peacekeeping programme funding.[35] Four out of six major BRI continental/maritime projects are located in South Asia and are in close proximity to India, including the Chinese China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) flagship project.
The integration of the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), the Maritime Silk Route (MSR), the Digital Silk Route (DSR), the Space Information Corridor (SIC), and the Health Silk Road (HSR) with the BRI has further placed China in an unassailable position to monitor, scan, and govern global dynamics at critical choke points through military diplomacy.
Most South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan, have joined the BRI. Since 2018, China has committed or invested over US$150 billion in the economies of Bangladesh, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan; China is now the largest overseas investor in the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka.[36]
South Asia has long been the hotbed of Sino-Indian strategic competition. A strategically located South Asia in the Western periphery of China, which has almost a quarter of the global population concentrated in only 3.5 percent of the total landmass, provides an ideal opportunity for Chinese westward expansion to the Middle East, Africa, and Europe through both continental and maritime routes and would be instrumental in relieving China from its ‘Malacca Dilemma’[p] and helping fulfill its ‘Middle Kingdom Dream’.[q] An underdeveloped but fertile South Asian region also provides China with ample opportunities to ensure uninterrupted connectivity for its energy, raw materials, and finished products to fuel its economy, ensure food security for its largest population, and absorb surplus capital, production, and construction capabilities particularly to fill the vacuum created after the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan. China could also use the BRI to win the favour of the large youth population in South Asia to overcome challenges such as unemployment, rampant corruption, illiteracy, and ageing populations.
Chinese military diplomacy in South Asia, with the exception of Pakistan, was limited till the end of the 20th century. Chinese approach in the region shifted in the beginning of the 21st century. The approach aims to encircle India through continental and maritime routes for effectively pursuing its String of Pearls strategy.[r] India contributes 68 percent of the total landmass, 75 percent of the population, and 79 percent of the economic output in South Asia.
The PLA’s military diplomacy has grown in the last three decades.[37] China has prioritised military interactions over civilian engagements, viewing military diplomacy as more enduring and conducive to advancing security objectives. Almost half of all official visits or exchanges with other nations have been spearheaded by military officers. PLA military diplomacy places emphasis on Asia, which accounted for 41 percent of all interactions in 2003 to 2016. [38] Since 2013, the PLA has increased its military diplomacy activities, especially joint military exercises. Nearly a third of these exercises between 2003 to 2016 were with Pakistan, and India was among the top five PLA partners globally for such drills. Sri Lanka and Pakistan were among the top five global destinations for port calls.[39] Since 2020, however, joint military exercises with South Asia have declined compared to pre-COVID years, due to geopolitical tensions between China and India, leaving Pakistan as the only partner.[40]
To augment its expeditionary capabilities and protect its overseas strategic interests, China is increasing the strength of its marine corps from 20,000 in 2017 to 100,000 according to latest data.[41] There are speculations about China’s plans to deploy these personnel overseas at the Gwadar Port and Djibouti. China has also enlisted Pakistan to deploy 30,000 Pakistan military personnel to protect Chinese citizens in the CPEC and is also in talks with the Taliban about the safety of Chinese citizens.[42] After the March 2024 suicide attack on Chinese engineers at Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in Pakistan, China is also considering deploying PLA personnel for the protection of its CPEC assets.[43]
China has enacted laws and regulations to strengthen the legal framework for implementing military strategies both domestically and internationally. The extraterritorial application of these laws aims to secure cooperation from Chinese citizens, diaspora, and foreign entities, posing distinct challenges to global freedom of expression. Key laws that bolster the legal basis for security and military activities abroad include the National Security Law (2015), the National Intelligence Law (2017), the new maritime law (2021), and the new land border law (2022). Additionally, in June 2022, China signed an order to implement the “Action Guidelines on Military Operations Other Than War” on an experimental basis, allowing the Chinese military to conduct “special military operations” abroad.[s],[44]
While China tailors its public diplomacy approach for each South Asian country, the following tools are common:
China’s Footprints in South Asian Military Diplomacy
Pakistan is a lynchpin for China to leverage its military diplomacy footprints in South Asia. Chinese military diplomacy in Pakistan can be identified from China’s clandestine assistance in the nuclearisation of Pakistan,[49] the manufacture of military hardware including ballistic missiles at National Defense Complex, Rawalpindi[50] and JF-17 fighter jet at Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) Kamra,[51] leasing land to China in Gilgit-Baltistan,[52] Pakistan gifting two Sindh islands to China,[53] and the repatriation of Uighurs to China.[54]
After the March 2024 suicide attack on Chinese nationals in Pakistan, there are speculations that Beijing may push Islamabad to accept Chinese security agencies to guard CPEC projects.[55] China and Pakistan are also reportedly about to sign a deal that would involve setting up joint security companies and deploying Chinese security personnel for the protection of Chinese projects and workers.[56]
Chinese military diplomacy in Nepal can be identified from professional military and language training, capacity-building for UN Peacekeeping forces, the establishment of a defence university,[57] the installation of a 5G tower on Mount Everest,[58] restrictions on Nepalese citizens joining the Indian Army Agniveer Scheme, the possible employment of Gurkhas in the PLA,[59] the construction of the Lumbini airport,[60] and the elimination of Tibetan activism in Nepal.[61]
Bangladesh is China’s second-largest arms importer (17 percent of total export between 2016-20), after Pakistan.[62] Chinese military diplomacy footprints in Bangladesh can be identified from the delivery/training of military equipment,[63] regular military exchanges, the construction of a submarine base in Cox Bazar in 2023,[64] and the modernisation of Chittagong Port. Bangladesh has also allocated two SEZs to China—in Chittagong Port and Dhaka.[65]
Since Muizzu became president in November 2023, there has been an increase in Chinese military diplomacy in the Maldives. The Feydhoo Finolhu island is leased to China,[66] artificial islands are being developed,[67] Indian troops have withdrawn from the country,[68] and the China-Maldives military agreement was signed in March 2024.[69]
Chinese military diplomacy footprint in Bhutan remains insignificant despite sharing a land border. Through their salami-slicing strategy, the Chinese have built roads and erected new villages and administrative centres for their military in Bhutan.[70]
Following US withdrawal, Chinese military diplomacy in Afghanistan can be identified from the setting up of a mountain brigade by China, the reported PLA deployment in Wakhan corridor,[71] and the creation of the Quadrilateral Coordination and Cooperation Mechanism.[72] In May 2023, the Taliban agreed to allow China to extend BRI infrastructure into Afghanistan from Pakistan.[73]
In addition to the lease of Hambantota port, Chinese military diplomacy in Sri Lanka is seen in the provision of Mandarin language classes for the police,[74] the construction of an artificial island off Colombo,[75] the docking of a surveillance ship at a Sri Lankan port,[76] and the supply of arms and ammunition to Sri Lanka. There are also rumours that Beijing plans to build a radar facility at Dondra Bay, to monitor maritime activities in the IOR.[77]
Conclusion
Since the beginning of the 21st century, China has increased its military diplomacy footprint in South Asia. With financial and military support, China is increasing its influence in South Asia, which could pose a security threat and isolate India in its IOR backyard.[78]
China’s military diplomacy leverages the MCF to extend its global reach through economic initiatives like the BRI for dual-use infrastructure projects, defence industrial cooperation, arms export, Chinese space technology, salami-slicing tactics, IUU fishing, and strategic bases at key global chokepoints, including South Asia. In contrast, India’s military diplomacy is focused on counterbalancing China in South Asia and the Indian Ocean.
India appears to be ambivalent about using military diplomacy to further its national interests. Instead, it emphasises humanitarian aid, joint exercises, defence cooperation, and regional engagement to build strategic partnerships and regional stability. Overall, India’s military diplomacy is yet to reach the desired levels. However, there have been a few qualitative developments in the last decade.[79]
To offset the military diplomacy by the Chinese as an extra-regional power in South Asia, there is a need to take cognisance of growing Chinese footprints in the region and initiate appropriate timely steps. India’s armed forces have versatile capabilities across terrains and climates for conventional and non-traditional operations. Adopting military diplomacy similar to those of China could boost India’s global standing and serve as a vital tool for achieving national objectives.
Col (Dr) DCS Mayal (Retired) is Senior Fellow, Center for Land Warfare Studies; and Adjunct Faculty, Manipal Academy of Higher Education. Views expressed are personal.
Endnotes
[a] ‘Military diplomacy’ can be defined as a set of non-combat activities carried out by a country’s armed forces to advance its national diplomatic interests. Military diplomacy aims for the peaceful utilisation of military resources to establish positive and cooperative relations with foreign nations. See: https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/military-diplomacy-a-vital-tool-for-furthering-national-interests/
[b] MOOTW entails peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace enforcement, and peace building, with a focus on deterring war, resolving conflict, promoting peace, and supporting civilian authorities during domestic crises.
[c] The “Hide your strength, bide your time” approach advocated for China to conceal its capabilities and patiently await opportune moments to assert influence. This philosophy underscored China’s cautious diplomacy and gradualist economic policies, fostering stability while cultivating long-term power.
[d] The “Century of Humiliation” refers to the period from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century, marked by China’s internal turmoil and external aggressions, notably from Western powers and Japan. It encompasses unequal treaties, territorial losses, and military defeats and shaped Chinese nationalism and foreign policy perceptions.
[e] The PLA views military diplomacy as “an important component of a country’s foreign affairs, and it can even be considered the ‘ballast stone’ of a nation’s diplomacy.” See: http://news.china.com.cn/2022-06/17/content_78273730.htm
[f] Chinese military diplomatic activities entail senior-level meetings between PLA leaders and their counterparts, joint bilateral and multilateral military exercises or manoeuvres, and naval port calls by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to foreign ports, or vice-versa. Senior-level meetings, strategic dialogues, and exchanges often convey diplomatic messages. Beijing views press releases supporting the “One China Principle” after such meetings as international solidarity for its sovereignty claims over Taiwan. Additionally, showcasing advanced weapons during visits, joint drills, and naval port calls are part of the PLA’s strategic deterrence against challengers. See: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1037&context=cmsi-maritime-reports
[g] One Chinese scholar described the role of China’s military diplomacy as “the pursuit of foreign policy objectives under the guidance of China’s national grand strategy through the peaceful employment of military resources and capabilities to maintain national interests, security, and development.” See: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA2500/CTA2571-1/RAND_CTA2571-1.pdf
[h] “Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military” emphasises modernising China's military to build a world-class fighting force capable of safeguarding national security and supporting China's global ambitions. It calls for military reforms, technological advancements, and the strengthening of combat readiness.
[i] “Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy” focuses on enhancing China’s global influence, advocating for multilateralism, and promoting a community with a shared future for humanity. It prioritises China’s active participation in global governance and pursues diplomacy that reflects China’s interests and values.
[j] The GDI was launched in September 2021 and is committed to promoting global development and foster a development paradigm that ensures benefits for all, balance, coordination, inclusiveness, mutually beneficial cooperation, and common prosperity. See: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-three-initiatives-china-put-forward-have-resonated-warmly-with-the-world-302039940.html
[k] The GSI was launched in April 2022 and calls for adapting to the changes in the international landscape through solidarity, addressing traditional and non-traditional security risks and challenges with a win-win mindset, and creating a new path to security that prioritises dialogue over confrontation, partnership over alliance, and mutually beneficial results over zero-sum game. The initiative aims to build a security community. See: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-three-initiatives-china-put-forward-have-resonated-warmly-with-the-world-302039940.html
[l] The GCI, launched in March 2023, advocates respect for the diversity of civilisations, the common values of humanity, the importance of continuity and evolution of civilisations, and closer international people-to-people exchanges and cooperation. It promotes tolerance, coexistence, exchanges, and mutual learning among different civilisations. See: https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/the-three-initiatives-china-put-forward-have-resonated-warmly-with-the-world-302039940.html
[m] The ‘Community of Common Destiny’, introduced by Xi Jinping, promotes global cooperation on shared challenges like poverty, security, and climate change. It envisions a world where nations work together for mutual benefit, advocating for multilateralism and inclusive global governance. The concept emphasises respect for all nations’ interests, especially developing countries, and aims to create a more equitable and sustainable international order, fostering peace, stability, and shared development across the globe.
[n] The Chinese “diplomatic iron army” symbolises a formidable diplomatic corps comprising adept negotiators and diplomats. This force engages globally to advance China’s interests, extend diplomacy, and navigate geopolitical landscapes to showcase China’s diplomatic strength and strategic acumen on the world stage.
[o] These are: Cambodia, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, UAE, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria, Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Tajikistan.
[p] The ‘Malacca Dilemma’ describes China’s concerns over its heavy reliance on the narrow Strait of Malacca for energy imports and its vulnerability to disruptions. It underscores the need for China to diversify supply routes and bolster naval capabilities to ensure energy security amid geopolitical tensions and maritime risks.
[q] The ‘Middle Kingdom Dream’ embodies China’s ambition to restore its historical prominence in global affairs, striving for prosperity, power, and cultural influence. Anchored in China’s rich history, it aims to position the nation as a pivotal force in shaping future world order, marking its resurgence on the global stage.
[r] The ‘String of Pearls strategy’ refers to China’s maritime approach for acquiring key ports and infrastructure throughout the Indian Ocean area. These strategic assets support China’s naval activities, energy needs, and economic goals and have sparked apprehensions among neighbouring powers and influenced geopolitical dynamics in the region.
[s] In 2022, Xi Jinping authorised the PLA to conduct “special military operations”, enabling it to undertake missions that fall short of full-scale war. These operations include activities like counterterrorism, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and safeguarding China's interests abroad. The move broadens the PLA's mandate, allowing for more flexibility in responding to emerging threats, protecting strategic assets, and enhancing China's global military presence, particularly in regions tied to the BRI.
[1] Maj Gen Rajan Kochhar (Retd), “India’s Military Diplomacy Takes Wings,” Defence Research and Studies, February 17, 2024, https://dras.in/indias-military-diplomacy-takes-wings/.
[2] Kochhar, “India’s Military Diplomacy Takes Wings.”
[3] N. Goyal, “China's Military Diplomacy - Heads and Tails of China,” The Geostrata, March 11, 2024, https://www.thegeostrata.com/post/chinas-military-diplomacy.
[4]Kenneth W. Allen, John Chen, and Phillip C. Saunders, Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003-2016: Trends and Implications, Virginia, National Defense University, 2017): 9.
[5]Meia Nouwens, “The Evolving Nature of China’s Military Diplomacy: from Visits to Vaccines,” The International Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2021: 6, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/ media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/the-evolving-nature-of-chinas-military-diplomacy---from-visits-to-vaccines.pdf.
[6] Nouwens, “ The Evolving Nature of China’s Military Diplomacy: from Visits to Vaccines,”6.
[7]China Power Team, “How is China Bolstering Its Military Diplomatic Relations?,” ChinaPower, August 26, 2020, https://chinapower.csis.org/china-military-diplomacy/.
[8] Jie Gao and Kenneth W. Allen, Re-Engaging with the World: China’s Military Diplomacy in 2023, China Maritime Report 37, Newport, RI: Naval War College: China Maritime Studies Institute, 2024: 19, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2024/04/china-maritime-report-37-re-engaging-with-the-world-chinas-military-diplomacy-in-2023/.
[9] Siebens, James and Ryan Lucas, Military Operations Other Than War in China’s Foreign Policy, Washington DC, The Stimson Center, 2022:62
[10] Kristen Gunness, China’s Overseas Military Diplomacy and Implications for U.S. Interests, California, RAND Corporation, 2023, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CTA2500/CTA2571-1/RAND_CTA2571-1.pdf, 4.
[11] K. A. Allen, “PLA Military Diplomacy During 2023,” China Maritime Studies Institute, April 15, 2024, https://www.andrewerickson.com/2024/04/pla-military-diplomacy-during-2023/.
[12] “Re-Engaging with the World,” 1.
[13]Li Weichao, “Regular Press Conference of China’s Ministry of National Defense on December 28,” PRC Ministry of National Defense, January 8, 2024, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16279128.html.
[14] John S. Van Oudenaren, “How to Respond to China’s Global Security Initiative,” War on the Rocks, March 1, 2024, https://warontherocks.com/2024/03/how-to-respond-to-chinas-global-security-initiative/.
[15]Dipanjan R. Chaudhury, “China’s New Global Initiatives Mask an Intrusive Agenda,” The Economic Times, October 12, 2023, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/chinas-new-global-initiatives-mask-an-intrusive-agenda/articleshow/104360749.cms?from=mdr.
[16] Oudenaren, “China’s Global Security Initiative.”
[17] Oudenaren, “China’s Global Security Initiative.”
[18]“PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China's Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces (4th Edition),” China Aerospace Studies Institute, 2024, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article /3840174/pla-aerospace-power-a-primer-on-trends-in-chinas-military-air-space-and-missile/
[19] Audrey Fritz, “China’s Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2, 2019, https://www.csis.org/blogs/trustee-china-hand/chinas-evolving-conception-civil-military-collaboration.
[20] Fritz, “China’s Evolving Conception of Civil-Military Collaboration”.
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[79]Lt Gen Kamal Dawar (Retd), “Military Diplomacy: A Vital Tool for Furthering National Interests,” Indian Defence Review, April 17, 2018, https://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/military-diplomacy-a-vital-tool-for-furthering-national-interests/.
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Col (Dr) DCS Mayal was commissioned in 3 Mahar in 1991 and transferred to the Intelligence Corps in 1997. As an Intelligence Corps Officer, he ...
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