# Challenges In Designing Counterinsurgency Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective

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About the Author

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Challenges In Designing Counterinsurgency Policy: An Institutionalist Perspective

Abstract

Research on India's counterinsurgency practice is divided into two categories. One emphasises moderation in the use of coercive power, while the other highlights its wanton abuse. This paper attempts to bridge that divide. Comparing accounts of different conflicts in India and South Asia, it delineates two ideal types of counterinsurgency: 'population-centric' and 'enemy-centric'. While both models are institutionalist in nature—they assume the malleability of the population's preferences–they differ on whether persuasive or coercive institutions are used to mould those civilian attitudes towards the State. The study also explores the effects of mixing the two models and how this generates noisy signals that inhibit cooperation.

Introduction

Counterinsurgency (COIN) remains a bewildering subject. While civil wars comprise an overwhelming majority of conflicts,[1] the world's understanding of counterinsurgency fails to measure up to its grasp of inter-state wars. Much of the available literature tends to conflate COIN with other processes such as political order-making, revival of democratic institutions and, indeed, state-making.

Research on counterinsurgency has historically focused on the tradecraft of defeating insurgents in battle. This body of work explains how security agencies that are light, agile, and organised around small units are more efficient, and how the ability of local police agencies to provide 'actionable intelligence' leads to success. These studies also examine mostly the role of 'grids' to enable 'area domination', and the myriad laws that grant practitioners immunity against legal sanction. If these studies were to be the gauge, it would appear that politics is only secondary to military tactics, techniques and procedures.

In reality, however, various social processes unfold alongside the military contest: popular mobilisation, growth (or decay) of democratic institutions, and most importantly, non-coercive actions of state agencies to undermine insurgent popularity. Counterinsurgency's brick and mortar is eminently transposable to the broader language of social science. These building blocks include leveraging local power dynamics, improving intelligence, understanding the population's needs and improving delivery of services, shaping its preferences, disseminating a credible mass ideology, and killing intransigent insurgents.

Given the complexity of the subject, it is hardly surprising that the literature is characterised by often contrasting accounts. Security analysts and past practitioners tend to eulogise the Indian experience. They emphasise restraint in the use of force, prohibition of air strikes and artillery, and note that India has not suffered the ignominy of Iraq's Abu Ghraib torture facility, nor the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.[2] Instead, they highlight the time-honoured practice of holding elections and urging rebel leaders to participate in them. Democracy and development, according to them, are essential elements of India's COIN.

Human rights organisations and academics, on the other hand, are less impressed. While they note the absence of air power, they also point to the endemic use of collective punishment against civilians to deter rebel support. They report the widespread use of extrajudicial violence by the police and army and lament its sanction through laws that protect security forces. This school appreciates the role of democracy in reverting the region into its 'pre-conflict state', but carries a reminder that the pre-conflict state thus reverted, reeks of suppression of political rights, economic deprivation and exploitation of tribal communities, and violent assimilation of unwilling ethnicities into a fledging nation. Such observations resonate with accounts of COIN elsewhere in the world, where 'counterinsurgency in practice can be nasty, brutish and long rather than the intended surgical, scientific, and efficient'.[3]

The analytical ambiguity and the empirical inconsistency outlined above raise two important questions. First, how is 'counterinsurgency' defined in a manner that separates it from other social processes, or alternatively, explains its interaction with them? Second, which of the two accounts of COIN better capture reality? As reality is a combination of these

schematic ideal types, it is important to ask what motivates such wildly contrasting strategies to co-exist, and how the 'development' and 'coercion' strategies mix as well. The examination involves asking whether the different practices are a result of delegating decision-making to local leaders of small-sized COIN units, or if a more pervasive strategy that is simultaneously abrasive and persuasive is present.

This study will proceed by first clarifying common terminologies used in counterinsurgency research. A description of the attributes of insurgencies will be given, distinguishing them from conventional war. Second, using examples from conflicts in India and South Asia, this paper will argue that most counterinsurgency practices can be divided into two categories: one which aims to persuade the civilian population to gradually sever ties with insurgents, and the other which follows enemy attrition and forces civilian compliance through credible threat of coercion. The crux of the assessment is that both schools of counterinsurgency are institutionalist by design and share identical assumptions about the population's preferences of limiting danger, increasing well-being, and guarding against future contingencies. The paper will conclude with an explanation of the negative effects of mixing the two models.

Insurgency and its Logic, and Counterinsurgency

Not all insurgencies are the same. Yet irrespective of their diverse characteristics, all insurgencies are armed movements carried out by non-state organisations against a State and its social support base to pursue a set of political goals, in conditions of shared territorial control over indefinite periods of time, using military tactics different from

those practised in conventional inter-state war. Multiple goals can co-exist and change over time. They include State capture, eviction of foreign troops, secession, or other political objectives short of independence, such as demands for a separate province or even change in the State's foreign policy.[4]

Civil wars are distinct from conventional, inter-state wars in terms of the number of participants in individual battles and the nature of equipment used. Some characteristics of civil wars include a reduced battlefield scale, asymmetry of military resources, role of civilian actors and the information they possess, and absence of clear borders.

States trump insurgent groups in almost all aspects of material capacity—human resources, coercion-producing apparatus, capital, nationalised bureaucracies, and tools for diffusion of ideology and propaganda. To defeat a few hundred insurgents in Kashmir, for example, India is said to have deployed 500,000 troops. Liberal estimates of the Afghan insurgency account for no more than 70,000 rebels of all denominations, and yet, at one time, 450,000 international troops and Afghan security forces were assigned counterinsurgency roles.

The corpus of most insurgent organisations are easily dwarfed by the GDP of even modestly endowed States. The Communist Party of India (Maoist), despite running an array of proto-state functions such as security provision, tax collection, public administration, and goods delivery, has an annual budget of no more than INR1,000 crore, 150 times less than the GDP of Chhattisgarh alone.[5] In the face of such adversity, rebels are expected to be routinely routed. Still, insurgencies can rage for decades. As borders are not demarcated, the strategy of attacking 'safe havens' to destroy insurgents en masse does not work.

Instead, insurgents hide in plain sight. Once their small arms are obscured, they are able to merge with the civilians. The civilians, while in possession of intimate information about rebel identity, are generally disinclined to share it with State actors because of group loyalty, fear of social sanction, preference compatibility with rebels, and fear of insurgent reprisals.

Spared from set-piece battles and blessed with closer ties with the civilian population, rebels challenge State actors by harassing 'soft targets' like local administrators, pro-state civilians such as village chiefs, and isolated soldiers. Insurgent strategy is to aggregate such small skirmishes long enough to raise the cost for the State to a point where it either concedes defeat or agree to negotiate terms of ceasefire.

All State activity consciously conducted to defeat insurgent groups are aggregated under the rubric of counterinsurgency.[6] COIN, according to one soldier-turned-scholar, is counter-warfare, all measures taken to counter insurgencies.[7] A more specific definition of counterinsurgency is 'military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency'.[8] That a definition as expansive touches upon other State activities that are present during peace time has not gone unnoticed. Some scholars conceptualise COIN by integrating its macro and micro aspects –'competitive state-building combining targeted, selective violence and population control, on the one hand, with the dissemination of a credible mass ideology, the creation of modern state structures, the imposition of the rule of law, and the spurring of economic development, on the other'.[9]

Counterinsurgency can be simultaneously humane and abrasive. Stringent rules of engagement exist to minimise collateral damage, and

in such events, medical aid stations are present. Schools are built, and local communities are recruited through monetary and other incentives instead of threatening them with violence, a practice described as 'renting allies'.[10] Yet these are just as enduring as mass shootings, the practice of torture, arbitrary detention, and collective punishment.

Both forms of COIN share two fundamental beliefs. First, insurgents derive strength from their ability to hide by dissolving among the population; any successful state response requires information about the rebels' whereabouts which is possessed by civilian actors. Second, the preferences of civilian actors are malleable.[11]

Civilians seek to limit damage, maximise profit, and look out for future contingencies[12] while making decisions.[13] Scholars characterise civilians as 'danger-minimising', 'profit-maximising', and 'future-forecasting'.[14] Individuals, this school of thought says, are not bound by ancient hatreds, as the essentialist works of ethnicity would suggest.[15] They may empathise with the insurgent movement either due to alignment of ethnicity, ideology, nationalist sentiment, or culture. Irrespective of the prevalent cultural and ideological predispositions prior to conflict-onset, as war sets in, individuals assess the security capabilities of opposing belligerents and act rationally to comply with the actor that is more likely to protect them not only from its adversary but from itself. In time, civilians calculate the utility differential of the warring belligerents and comply accordingly. Civil war creates its own reasons; the side that packs the biggest gun, or the greatest number of guns, wins compliance. Note that complying with COIN institutions does not in any way signify a Lockean social contract. Civilian actors may comply with State actors without being conferred citizenship rights, and in turn, without

conferring the State with legitimacy. Compliance and legitimacy are analytically separable.

Besides seeking to limit damage, individuals also maximise their material well-being and accept incentives to do so when presented with the opportunity. This might take the form of accepting goods offered by the counterinsurgency program in exchange for cooperation, or complying with it when threatened with seizure or destruction of one's private property. Civilians cooperate with the government to obtain goods which range from essential government services and welfare measures, employment opportunities, increased prestige resulting from social capital or access to government (having the 'government's ear'), lucrative business contracts related to the logistics of the counterinsurgency effort (the 'vested interests' argument), the promise of political office through elections, and sometimes, the lure of bribery. Thus, material utilities reinforce the effect of security measures on civilian decision-making.

The dark side of counterinsurgency involves institutions which make such State services reciprocal to information on rebels, effectively turning carrots into sticks. It is not rare in local accounts of counterinsurgency, in India and elsewhere, for public goods like electricity and water to be curtailed in neighbourhoods known to support insurgents. More abrasive forms of coercion to elicit compliance include collective punishment in wake of insurgent attacks, holding civilians hostage to force rebel surrender,[16] and destruction of tube-wells and harvested crops to force a pro-insurgent population into submission.

These variations can be systematically explained. COIN can be typologised into two distinct models: 'population-centric' and 'enemy-centric'. Rather than a strictly dichotomous phenomenon that is either coercive or persuasive, COIN practices are spread across a continuous spectrum, with the population- and enemy-centric models as its end points. These are ideal types; like all models, they do not represent reality but merely provide us with an intellectual tool to better understand the broad range of COIN practices that States deploy.

Population-centric Counterinsurgency

This model believes that it is possible to mobilise an alienated population in favour of the State using a syncretic, inter-linked array of security and non-security incentives. Civilians seek security, well-being, and a predictable order to survive conflict. Effective counterinsurgency acknowledges this and designs institutions to maximise security and well-being in exchange for compliance in the form of information about rebel identity. In this method, the government first guarantees the safety of the civilian population by gaining control of its physical environment and minimising risk to life.[17] It stresses that all else, including insurgent attrition, should be made secondary. By physically insulating the population from rebels, demonstrating that it will be protected from both insurgent reprisals and punitive action by the government, and offering better delivery of government services and greater political rights, this model predicts that, in time, civilians will resume their economic activity, begin to participate in government programs, and gradually shift their preferences away from the rebel cause.

Insurgencies are marked by both segmentation of sovereignty wherein different zones are 'monopolistically controlled by rival actors' and dual

ownership of sovereignty (fragmentation).[18] Paradigmatic accounts depict government forces controlling roads and towns during the day as insurgents hold sway at night. In other cases, insurgents create 'bases' or 'no go areas' where they exercise permanent control in a manner associated with States. Naxal insurgents in central India, for instance, follow the Maoist doctrine of converting loosely controlled bases to strongly held zones.[19] In fact, 30 percent of local village councils (*panchayats*) are run by Naxal affiliates.[20] Barely 160 kms from Jhankhand's capital Raipur, the insurgent faction Jharkhand Sangharsh Jan Mukti Morcha's (JSJMM) iron-grip over Bishunpur block is such that the police remain hesitant to venture into their turf.[21]

To illustrate the changing nature of sovereignty in civil wars, one police officer in Jharkhand termed rebel 'Naxalite pockets' as 'death traps' where the writ of the state had ceased to exist, adding that police action had 'broken the dominance of extremists in *many* areas' [emphasis added].[22] Segmented sovereignty had transitioned to fragmented sovereignty. Despite the government's claim of restoring state control, most development projects suffer time delays, it is reported, because non-local contractors refuse to bear the high security risks and accept offers. Even the military-staffed Border Roads Organisation (BRO) projects are said to be incomplete because of insurgent threats.[23] Similar phenomena are observed in other conflicts as well. In Kashmir, for instance, insurgents remained active in Srinagar's inner city, or Downtown Srinagar, even as paramilitary troops established pickets and bunkers around major roads. In rural Kashmir, regions such as Kishtwar were considered an insurgent safe haven for years till security forces reasserted control.[24] In Punjab, insurgent chief Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale revived the traditional Raki system of protection and

social control wherein police officials suspected of being partisan in adjudicating land disputes faced retaliation.[25]

As a result, civilians are threatened with sanction by both armed groups when suspected of colluding with the rival side. Just like States, insurgents routinely intimidate the population and carry out selective violence against defectors. Analysts have described how Maoist insurgents define 'class enemies' as not only police constables and petty traders, but ordinary civilians who have been marked as 'informers and traitors'.[26] For instance, the CPI (Maoist) shot dead Gemmili Sanjeeva Rao, an influential spiritual leader in Veeravaram village in Andhra Pradesh after branding him a police agent.[27] Indeed, much of the violence against civilians has been directed against the cadre of the Parliamentary Left parties.

In the Left's traditional strongholds such as West Bengal, much of this fratricide has targeted 'middle peasants, school teachers, and party members'.[28] In north-east India, it has been observed, the internecine nature of civil war has blurred the line between insurgent and criminal violence.[29] In Kashmir too, contrary to popular perception, the majority of civilian victims of insurgent violence were Kashmiri Muslims, and not Hindu Pandits.[30] More recently, village elders running for Panchayat elections have been targeted.[31] Likewise, in Punjab, before the infamous Operation Blue Star, insurgent leader Bhindranwale's hit squads killed 298 co-ethnic Sikhs in six months.[32]

Political beliefs of prospective civilian collaborators matter little when cooperation with the State will lead to physical censure from rebels. Former Punjab police chief KPS Gill, who is widely credited for

defeating the Sikh insurgency, termed insurgent social control as 'societal Stockholm syndrome', a support derived from threat of physical censure from populations 'living continuously under the shadow of the gun'. Other scholars concur, writing that as the Raki system of protection and control was destroyed, popular support too died down.[33] Still others have agreed further, saying 'they themselves remained with the guerrillas only as long as the latter were able to give families in the rural areas a measure of protection. Once the security forces gained the upper hand, support fell away'.[34] Journalists and former police officials in Kashmir explain how civilian reaction to the use of force often hinged on 'military scale', or the civilian perception of State and insurgent forces' deterrence capacity.[35]

In such conditions, the first prerequisite for gaining civilian compliance is to ensure security guarantees against insurgent predation. The principal role of troops is to control the population, and create conditions favourable to the production of accurate information about rebels and selective violence against them. This makes it essential to have continuous troop presence in close proximity to the population. The practice of billeting counterinsurgents in heavily guarded bases away from population centres will secure the troops without meaningfully securing the population from insurgent reprisals. For this reason, instead of large garrisons akin to conventional war, COIN doctrine calls for stationing troops in smaller bases in proximity to population centres to influence their political behaviour. In contrast to the 'principle of mass' which calls for focusing maximum power at the 'point of decision', the Indian Army set up the counterinsurgency grid in Kashmir to spread its forces throughout the conflict region.[36] This also explains the influx of CRPF troops in the Naxal region to buttress the numbers of the state police force. The Modi government's revised policy against the Naxal

insurgency is uncannily similar to practice in Kashmir both in terms of its logic and the lexicon used; 'the CAPFs have the responsibility of holding the counterinsurgency grid together' and that the 'CRPF to act as "a glue" to hold the grid together across the states'.[37]

Where sovereignty is fragmented, control (in Weberian terms, monopoly over the use of violence) is regained by permanently deploying troops amidst population centres, instead of raiding insurgent hideouts from remote outposts. In regions where sovereignty is segmented, population control measures are preceded by 'sweep operations' that regain control over regions that were earlier under exclusive insurgent control. Pakistan's counterinsurgency experience is littered with typical examples of set-piece campaigns.[38] Naxal bases where the insurgency has created proto-states and expelled all agents of the Indian State are said to be regained through similar operations.[39] According to police officials, while roughly 85 percent of Naxal-affected regions in central India are partially controlled by rebels, insurgents exercise State-like sovereignty over the remaining 15 percent. The only way to dilute their presence, law enforcement officials add, is to mount kinetic, 'sweep' operations, and follow them with classic grid-based counterinsurgency. Besides proximity, troops have to be present over an extended period of time. Civilians base their decisions not just on present force projection, but also on the likelihood of the continuity of security guarantees in the distant future. The practice of deploying fewer troops and rotating them in different regions violates this principle. Local civilians notice periods when they are vulnerable to insurgents' reprisal, and choose to not side with such counterinsurgents whose continued presence cannot be guaranteed. When asked to explain why some villages complied with State coercion while others saw increased dissent, a Kashmiri insurgent supporter attributed it to the perception of troop presence. In villages

where troops are not permanently posted and patrol occasionally, he argued, coercion engenders increased rebel support. This phenomenon is known as 'ballooning effect' among COIN practitioners. Cooperation in civil wars thus depends on provision of *continuous* security.

How does the population-centric model, with its emphasis on rule of law, glean information from unwilling civilians? Trained in conventional war based on mass attrition, the practice of selective targeting of 'shadowy' insurgents is alien to security agencies called to perform counterinsurgency. To produce such precise violence, insurgents need to be stripped of their biggest shield: invisibility. Insurgents have to be distinguished from their social milieu of shared language, ethnicity, culture and appearance. Here lies the crux of the population-centric paradigm. Members of the civilian population know the whereabouts of insurgents; the operational art of counterinsurgency is to generate a steady flow of information from them without using excessive force. Civilians may not be needed to 'sanitise' a given area, but they are essential to keep it 'clean'. Separating rebels from civilians is extremely difficult; producing selective violence even more so, drawing the analogy of 'learning to eat soup with a knife'.[40]

Population-centric counterinsurgency makes two assumptions about the civilian population, without stating so explicitly. First, the population is not a monolithic actor with identical beliefs and preferences; rather it is a heterogeneous body of individuals and groups who have varied preferences. Sections of the population support rebels for reasons as varied as individual safety, financial gain, social capital, local rivalry, and personal animosity. Others identify with insurgent goals such as political autonomy or secession, class struggle, and ethnic supremacy. Contrast this with sweeping assumptions that *all* Afghans seek expulsion of

'occupation forces', *all* of Kashmir want independence in equal measure, and that grievances lie at the heart of Naxal support. Second, preference formation of these varied actors is constructivist; the preferences of civilians change over time as they react to the changing tides of war. Actors seeking political freedom above all else during the initial stages of war might become more sensitive towards personal security as the realities of war become more stark. Proponents of civil disobedience who refuse to accept goods from the government might grudgingly accept them as violence destroys the local economy. When viewed as a disaggregated body of actors with eclectic and shifting preferences, it becomes clear that security, or the threat of jeopardising it, is one of many incentives that draw out cooperation.

Despite large-scale sympathy to a cause, there are variations in rebel support. Governance is a key determinant at the micro level. For example, even though most of Iraq was under US occupation following the war of 2003, districts that witnessed better governance were less likely to support the insurgency. This was also noticed in the German occupation of France in World War II.[41] Other factors operate as well, including lack of employment opportunities, petty rivalries, revenge against dishonour, group-competition, and the pulls and pushes rooted in shared social networks.[42] The 'greed school' which associates rebel support with selective incentives lists more: attempts to capture power, profits from illicit trade and parallel taxation,[43] and increased status and prestige.

Even in the case of insurgents, preferences and motivation change with time. The degree of conviction varies from passionate activism to opportunism.[44] Some rebel supporters are ideologically invested in the movement. Celebrated as the 'revolutionary bulwark' by rebels and

rejected as 'irreconcilable' by the State, they are oblivious to material benefits and physical costs; sticks and carrots hold little meaning in their worldview. At the other end of the spectrum are those who have little conviction or ideology, such as the so-called 'lumpen youth' who allied with paramilitary forces as 'white terror ruled West Bengal for five years' from 1972.[45] The proliferation of insurgent groups in the Northeast has not only caused internecine violence but also led to the entry of criminal opportunists into the movement.[46] Similar tendencies are noted in both Kashmir and Punjab. By 1988, 'ranks became swollen with criminal elements seeking to establish spheres of influence as violent entrepreneurs... theft, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies and targeted and random killing..'.[47] In other instances, rebel and paramilitary recruitment has come to assume a zero-sum characteristic tribals in Chhattisgarh, for instance, are often forced to choose between being a police agent or a Maoist cadre.[48]

This shows that goals espoused by the insurgents are not the only goals that exist. Rebel support is both heterogeneous and endogenous to the movement; not all insurgent supporters are driven by the movement's principal ideology. When the sources of rebel support grievance addressal and greed satisfaction are multifaceted, it becomes prudent to disaggregate the insurgent support base, and apply non-security instruments when doing so becomes sufficient.

For this reason, 'COIN is best won on political grounds, not (conventional) military'.[49] The purpose of using security forces is to create conditions feasible for the application of non-security measures, and in doing so, not produce negative externalities that will harm the political phase. Rather, politics is urged to be seen as 'an active instrument of military operations'.[50] 'Politically', says a former

counterinsurgent, 'the more force you have to use, the worse the campaign is going. Marginalizing and out-competing a range of challengers, to achieve control over the overall socio-political space in which the conflict occurs, is the true aim'.[51]

This is particularly true where a State with limited military power and non-military capability is challenged by an insurgent organisation that mobilises support through distributing non-security goods. Mediation in local disputes, informal but often effective system of law and order, employment, prosecution of corrupt administrators, and at times wealth distribution all serve to increase the movement's membership.[52] Maoist spokesperson Azad insisted that the 'welfare of the masses is the first priority for Maoist revolutionaries'.[53] Another ideologue described Revolutionary People's Committees or unit-level rebel administrative units in several Naxal-controlled regions as 'new models of genuine people's democracy and development'.[54] Since 2001, governance in parts of the Dandakaranya forest is run by such committees, known as Janatanam Sarkar. Maoist rebels hold education programmes to inform the tribal population about their political rights and right to land and forest produce.[55] Rebel intervention in exploitative local markets led to a three-fold increase in the selling price of *tendu* leaves, a common forest produce used to manufacture *bidi* and a five-fold increase in the price of bamboo.[56] Similarly, labour wages negotiated by Maoists on behalf of the tribes in Chhattisgarh are said to be higher than those set by the State government.[57] They have also set up numerous civil society-like bodies to organise the tribes. The 100,000 member-strong peasant worker front, Dandakaranya Adivasi Kisan Majdoor Sangh (DAKMS), the women's Krantikari Adivasi Mahila Samity which has 90,000 members, and the Chetna Natya March, the rebel cultural body, boasts 100,000 members.[58] Archetypal accounts of such civic action are generally associated with

Marxist-Maoist rebellions. While the Maoist doctrine makes civic action a central plank of its strategy, similar practices are widespread elsewhere as well.

During the failed insurrection of 1965, Pakistani planners and their Kashmiri collaborators sought to establish 'parallel administrations, with local residents nominated to hold posts as revenue and police officials. "*Inqlabi*" (Revolutionary) councils were to be set up to run some of the local administrations'.[59] The twin Taliban movements across the Durand Line in Afghanistan and Pakistan are routinely criticised for their brutal treatment of women, children, ethnic-rivals, and dissenters. What is perhaps less well-known is the host of essential state-like functions they perform. Some studies have noted how the Taliban's Shariah courts in the autonomous tribal regions of north-west Pakistan are often considered superior to the cumbersome State judiciary that is infamous for favouritism and inordinate delays.[60] Similarly, while in power in the Swat valley, the Taliban took the side of landless corvee labourers against the Maliks and Khans, the traditional land-owning class, offered better 'terms of employment' to their cadre, and even undertook redistribution schemes by taking over local emerald mines. Insurgent strongholds in the valley are reported to overlap with its major agricultural tracts.[61]

Such quasi-state functions are not present in all insurgencies, but where they are, the need for non-security measures becomes more important. The plea that insurgencies be viewed as 'competitions for governance' is echoed by Indian counterinsurgents as well. A Madhya Pradesh cadre IPS officer has written that "if the relative deprivation felt by tribes is not addressed properly by the state, the insurgents can take advantage of them...if the state does not mobilize the isolated segmented populations in the desired direction, outsiders can mobilize them against the state".[62]

A State that does not realise this ultimately gets out-governed. Classical signs include conditions where the government "levies no taxes, relies largely on corruption and shakedowns of the population, has no functioning local court system, doesn't have a presence at the local level in about two-thirds of the country, and when it does have a presence, its local representatives tend to act so corruptly or oppressively that they alienate the population".[63] Kashmir may not fit this description, but it aptly describes insurgencies as varied as the Maoists in India, the LTTE in Sri Lanka, the situation in Afghanistan, and the FMLN in El Salvador.[64]

Enemy-centric Counterinsurgency

Enemy-centric counterinsurgency shares underlying assumptions with the population-centric variant: civilians respond to incentives and limit danger, maximise profit, and forecast future. The similarities end here, however, as this paradigm designs institutions based on the threat of coercion to leverage these preferences. Rather than reward the population with positive incentives of security, goods, and services, non-compliance is deterred through threat of punishments. As civilians value physical security, protection of private property, and material advancement, threats against these, when credibly enforced, will eventually compel even the most mobilised population to comply with the counterinsurgency.

Insurgent mobilisation is immaterial for enemy-centric counterinsurgents. This paradigm identifies insurgents as armed political entrepreneurs driven by the lure of political office, exploitation of natural resources, spoils of controlling lucrative trade routes, and contraband trade in guns and narcotics. Between the greed-grievance dichotomy, enemy-centric COIN places rebels firmly in the greed

category. The little support they receive from the population is derived from fear and coercion. One scholar has called counterinsurgency literature's focus on 'winning hearts and minds' misleading, adding that insurgent groups do not enjoy social bases of support, thrive by preying on people, and can be defeated by military measures: "The absence of popular support for the rebels on the other hand would make the contest purely one of *operational dominance*, and thus a counter-terrorist war".[65] Since they lack popular support and cannot stake claim to be armed representatives of the population, both their means and their goals are without merit and therefore do not deserve the legitimacy of political concessions.

The reduced salience of the population's mobilisation in favour of the insurgency alters the techniques of war as well as counterinsurgent-population interaction. Mao's famous aphorism that revolutionaries are like fish that find sustenance in the sea of the population is irrelevant in the world of enemy-centric COIN. The population's reduced traction with the insurgent movement implies that they are less inclined to bear high costs to continue to support rebels. The rebel's veil of invisibility, thus, is easier to penetrate.

It follows that the enemy-centric paradigm considers counterinsurgency as another variant of conventional war fought between two armed factions possessing unequal military capabilities.[66] The bilateral nature of the conflict puts a premium on enemy attrition. Stated otherwise, 'first defeat the enemy, and all else will follow'.[67] The contest is settled militarily; politics has little to do with it. As a corollary, this school does not envision significant negative consequences of the use of violence against insurgents, their civilian supporters, their kin and other social networks.

Operationally, this model measures success purely in military terms, that is, enemy attrition. As explained by KPS Gill, an insurgent movement's defeat is inevitable if the rate of insurgent attrition is kept greater than the rate at which the organisation replenishes its human resource.[68] The task of the counterinsurgent is to simply engage them in battle akin to a regular uniformed adversary and inflict maximum casualties. Suitably armed and mandated, motivated troops, when 'given a chance', are sufficient to rout any rebel group. Much of the counterinsurgency in Chhattisgarh and Odisha is believed to bear stark resemblance to the attrition-based, enemy-centric COIN.[69]

That said, just because enemy-centric counterinsurgents pursue strategies rooted in familiar grounds of their conventional warfare upbringing does not obviate the task of locating insurgents hidden among the population. The typical COIN dilemma discussed earlier still holds. Counterinsurgency operates in an environment of information asymmetry where civilians share common social networks with rebels (not the same as common goals or ideology) and possess information about their whereabouts. The following sections will describe how this model gleans this crucial information from civilian actors.

Enemy-centric COIN practitioners too turn to the population, but through institutions built on coercive, rather than persuasive, logic. In contrast with persuasive institutions which require around-the-clock security guarantees and material inducement, population control is exercised through episodic raids that produce collective punishment against population groups known to harbour insurgents. Rather than induce cooperation by guarding civilians against insurgent predation, the enemy-centric model threatens to maximise damage when civilians fail to share information. Non-compliance is met with physical censure,

which is mostly collectively distributed. Entire villages, neighbourhoods, city blocks and valleys are targeted. The logic of this counterinsurgency is that any decision on the part of civilians to support the insurgency or remain neutral will carry a cost and the response will entail physical damage. When sufficiently high, regularised, and predictable, coercion will compel damage-limiting civilian actors to 'give in' and support the counterinsurgency effort. Consider the views of the seniormost official of the Jammu and Kashmir government during the outbreak of the insurgency: The then State's Governor Jagmohan infamously remarked that 'the bullet is the only solution for Kashmir' and that 'collective punishment on a disloyal population' will solve the problem.[70]

In this model, COIN forces avoid the population and save themselves the logistical hassle of living among them. No longer required to demonstrate their credibility as security providers, they billet in secure bases away from population centres. Instead of protecting the population, the priority is to protect themselves from a cunning enemy. Changes in force deployments in Kashmir in the aftermath of the Kargil conflict in 1999 is a telling illustration of such calculations. Apart from sending infiltrators in Kargil, Pakistan launched fidayeen attacks on security camps throughout Kashmir. These audacious assaults were planned in such a way that ruled out escape, making them particularly lethal. In the face of increasing troop casualties, the army's senior leadership asked its unit commanders to shift bases located within population centres to more secure locations where their security would be buttressed with flood lights and other measures that provided early warning. These were not available when based near population centres. Local commanders, attuned to the primacy of population security, protested but were allegedly turned down by their seniors.[71] Base security was doubled which 'strained operational resources'.[72] This shows that

troop security often trumps population security and how even the most experienced armies do not have a consensus on COIN principles.

In this method, if ambushed by insurgents or when pursuing them, government forces target suspected population groups to extract information about rebels. Just like in conventional war, the killing of insurgents is incentivised through the 'body count' policy. Career-minded soldiers are conferred with individual and unit-level citations and gallantry awards based on the number of enemies killed, as opposed to indices that indicate return of normalcy—functioning local markets, increase in voluntary sharing of information by civilians, and progress of the political process. One astute counterinsurgent has called this the 'Banihal Syndrome', the pervasive mindset among army and paramilitary officers that sees tours in Kashmir as opportunities to win rewards.[73] In fact, such thinking permeates the government's new articulation of its policy against the Maoist insurgency as well. Performance, still measured with body counts, will be rewarded by gallantry awards and choice postings. A former director-general of the CRPF recently urged his troops to increase the 'haul' of medals won by the force.[74]

States employ a mix of large formations and specialised small-units to pursue insurgents. Large infantry-like formations are supported by aircraft, helicopter gunships and artillery to clear rebel-held areas and launch punitive strikes against populations supportive of roving insurgents. Small intelligence and special operations units, on the other hand, focus on attrition of insurgent leadership, financiers, specialists like bomb-makers, and ideologues. To generate compliance among the population, measures include collective punishment against communities whose select members are believed to collaborate with insurgents, indefinite curtailment of civil liberties such as independent

press, right to assembly, routine curfews, destruction of local economies that are believed to support insurgency, placing military authority over civilian leadership and often, suspension of elections.

Examples abound. Chinoy's review of counterinsurgency practice found widespread policy of retaliatory killings of kin of suspected insurgents and civilian populations sharing the same social networks, to raise the cost of joining armed movements.[75] In Punjab, anthropologist Joyce Pettigrew found a strategy of calibrated punishment in pro-insurgent villages – sanctions on services like water and electricity, destruction of tube wells, burning of crops, deliberate interruption of school activities, arbitrary detention of parents of suspected rebels, abduction of minors for indefinite periods, and intimidation and harassment of women members of the community.[76] Following the restoration of normalcy in Punjab, an investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation found out that in one district alone, some 2,097 cremations of victims of extrajudicial executions had occurred.[77] Turning to the Naxal conflict, in March 2011, three villages near Chintalnar in the Dantewada district were reportedly raided and burnt by paramilitary forces and local police. In all, 317 houses were looted and set on fire. Harvested paddy, stored in granaries was burnt.[78] Burning of villages, in fact, was a recurring feature of early phases of COIN in northeast India, which, despite being eventually discarded by the army, is still practiced by other security organisations elsewhere.[79] More recently, tribal villagers in Latehar district in Jharkhand accused CRPF troops of using them as human shields when ambushed by Maoist rebels during State Assembly elections in November 2014. Following the skirmish, more troops arrived and beat up locals before arresting them on the pretext of recovering traditional hunting rifles that are ubiquitous in the region.[80]

Similar anecdotes are abundant in local accounts of Kashmir. Cordon and Search Operations (CASO)—the practice of laying siege to entire, or parts of, city neighbourhoods and villages, and forcing male members to assemble in a public space before searching each house for insurgents or weapons—invariably caused physical discomfort and humiliation to communities irrespective of their political beliefs. The negative effects of such techniques are routinely cast aside as unfortunate but unintended consequences of military operations conducted keeping solely the arrest of insurgents in mind.

That said, the fact that CASO were carried out with greater frequency in home villages of insurgent leaders is widely seen in the Valley as a deliberate policy of punishing the civilian population to break ties with insurgents.[81] Similarly, civilian members forced by insurgents to provide shelter for the night were routinely punished the following day by security forces despite having aided rebels under duress.[82] When asked about how troops when ambushed in the vicinity of population centres proceed to gather information about the assailants, one army officer remarked that the standard practice is to approach the villagers and 'sort them out'.[83]

Aside from using collective violence as deterrence, enemy-centric COIN does not limit harsh interrogation methods to confirmed insurgents and instead casts a wider net to include civilians suspected of insurgent links through weak associations like neighbourhood and school networks. A Kashmiri journalist's 2009 memoir contains numerous accounts of widespread torture and physical intimidation merely on account of such tenuous associations, and illustrates how condoning selective torture trickles down to pervasive civilian abuse.[84] Such practices resonate with other conflicts as well. Another journalist, who travelled to the forested

regions of Bastar, found out that many civilians had stopped using roads monitored by security forces for fear of interrogation, arrest, and torture 'simply by association'.[85]

Still harsher methods exist. India has forced large populations to migrate to regions controlled by the State, or intern them in 'refugee camps' and 'strategic hamlets' so as to make their surveillance feasible and separate them from insurgents. Such strategies, apparently borrowed from British examples in erstwhile Malaya, were practiced against the Naga and Mizo insurgencies, and later replicated by the state-sponsored vigilante group Salwa Juduam against tribal groups either suspected of supporting Maoist rebels or simply living in areas held by the rebels.[86] Perhaps among the most barbaric methods practised is 'scorched earth', where government troops destroy civilian property and food supplies to force compliance.[87]

Though not explicitly stated, this model makes three assumptions that are essential for it to succeed. First, States possess sufficient coercive capacity; second, rebels have limited social support; and third, coercion can be produced over an indefinitely long period of time without domestic constraints from elites mindful of electorates who might not support the war effort. Indeed, when States have high capacity and resolve, and where domestic institutions of restraint are lacking, they often resort to unmitigated repression and indiscriminate violence.[88] Chechnya, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, and the last stages of the Tamil Eelam War in Sri Lanka in 2009 are examples where high asymmetry reduced the contest to a unilateral production of indiscriminate violence.

Table 1: Population-centric and Enemy-centric Counterinsurgency

	Population-centric COIN	Enemy-centric COIN
Understanding of the insurgency	Grievance motivated. Insurgency represents popular grievances rooted in political and economic deprivation.	Greed motivated. Insurgents motivated by greed of public office, resources, and wealth.
View of the insurgent	Insurgent strength derives from both military and political organisation.	Only strength possessed by insurgent is military strength, advanced by external powers.
View of COIN capacity	Unlimited production of coercion 'utopian'	States enjoy abundant asymmetry, applying it just a matter of 'political will'.
Operating Principles	Control the population Minimise their danger (from insurgent) Maximise their profit (through participation in state activity) Commit to future	Kill enemy Maximise civilian danger (from counterinsurgent) upon non-compliance Profit-maximisation not required Commit to future
How	Restrict population-insurgent interaction through population-control. Offer incentives, distribute goods and to gain voluntary information. Selective targeting of insurgents. Whenever possible, co-opt rebels through reconciliation programs. Ultimately, changing true preferences of population	Punitive raids from secure bases against population groups that support insurgents. Forced extraction of information from population through collecting sanction of public goods, and the use of torture. Targeted killing of insurgent leadership and indiscriminate violence against suspected insurgent supporters Changing preferences not part of the strategy
Troop placement	COIN troops live in close proximity with the population	COIN troops stay in bases with episodic integration with population
View on effects of coercion	Wanton coercion increases grievances Avoid torture as interrogation method	When costs of insurgent support are high, support will cease, grievances do not matter. Torture is acceptable
Resources	Intensive, especially troop requirements	Less intensive
Whole of government	Security, development, and politics are essential components of COIN	Military contest dominates
End-state	Voluntary cooperation from population, participation in state activity and restoration of favourable political order. Irrelevance of insurgents	Decay of insurgent organisation through attrition of insurgent organisation. (Rate of insurgent attrition > rate of insurgent replenishment)
Constraints on use of force	The goal of changing true preferences of population produces restrictions on the nature of sticks and carrots	No restriction on institutions to illicit compliance, tends to lean heavily towards collective punishment

Conclusion

Following the 2006 publication of the US Field Manual FM 3-24 the population-centric method of counterinsurgency re-asserted its dominance, influencing similar doctrinal rethinking in other western countries. The Indian Army's Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (DSCO) released around the same time shares much of its foundational principles with FM3-24, suggesting perhaps the common intellectual origins in the 'classical' texts of British and French vintage.[89] Under the veneer of doctrinal recognition, a deep chasm exists between adherents of the two schools. The so-called 'hearts and minds' sloganeering has been rejected by contemporary scholars, who characterise counterinsurgency as 'a subject whose wealth of detail is accompanied by a poverty of theory'.[90] Jagmohan's outburst that 'Kashmiris understand the language of the bullet' is hardly an elite opinion. Soldiers serving in units deeply ingrained in the ethos of COIN have termed the practice of collaborating with local tribes as cowardice 'because we aren't man enough to kill them all'.[91] Kashmiri youth routinely describe fear as the common currency of military presence in the Valley and for good reason.[92]

This paper has argued for the need for a systematic comparison of both population-centric and enemy-centric methods of counterinsurgency. An essential step towards this goal is to realise that insurgencies comprise a complex, heterogeneous phenomenon that begs for more nuanced theoretical treatment. Just as the prescription that all insurgencies are 'armed competitions for governance' needs qualification, the notion that each insurgency is unique and that its lessons are of limited value in other conflicts deprives research of any predictive power. Lessons need not keep their own company; neither

should they claim to fit all sizes. Instead, by disaggregating insurgencies based on non-arbitrary conditions that are conceptually well defined, one can begin to develop a template of counterinsurgency that is more sensitive to peculiar conditions.

The two schools of counterinsurgency, despite their vastly different prescriptions, share identical beliefs about the challenge of counterinsurgency: the primacy of the population in meeting that challenge, and the malleability of their preferences. The biggest challenge of COIN is to strip insurgents of their veil of invisibility. This in turn requires information about rebels which civilians possess, who limit damage, maximise gain, and are mindful of future contingencies. This provides a common ground for debate in integrating the two models. Table 2 gives a schematic layout of the two schools.

Table 2: Counterinsurgency ideal types as institutions

Counterinsurgency Ideal Type	Population's preferences	
	Limit Damage	**Maximise Profit**
Population-centric	Minimise threat of damage from rebel	Provide material incentives to generate cooperation
Enemy-centric	Maximise damage as deterrence against support for insurgents	No profits given

These are, of course, ideal types. In reality, every counterinsurgency campaign has elements of both. Goods might be handed out privately among pro-government supporters. Likewise, population-centric models do make delivery of goods conditional on support for government. These models provide a guide for investigating the virtue of mixed strategies, helping answer the question of which circumstances

necessitate the use of either model. These questions can be answered with greater clarity with the aid of these models.

Several conclusions emerge that can help craft an effective counterinsurgency policy. First, enemy-centric methods fail to produce desired outcomes, but not always. This suggests that enemy-centric COIN is effective when States enjoy asymmetry: when State capacity is high and insurgent capacity is low. State capacity in the context of counterinsurgency comprises high war-making capital, absence of external threats, relaxed constraints of domestic political institutions, ability to penetrate civil society through efficient bureaucracy, and immunity from international sanctions. Insurgent capacity, often underrated, is a product of distinct factors such as pre-war mobilisation, prominence of ethnicity, rebel 'political action' or distribution of goods through civic action, external support, knowledge of local social networks, favourable terrain, and the structure of irregular war. Enemy-centric COIN has worked when there is abundance of the former and paucity of the latter. From a policy perspective, this calls for calculating asymmetry rather than assuming it. Most failed COIN campaigns assume high war-waging capacity rather than assessing it in relation with insurgent capacity, and are forced to reorient their strategy after ceding ground to insurgents. It is not surprising that the first phases of COIN are marked by excessive use of coercion and the resultant increase in rebel support. This aptly describes counterinsurgency trajectories of conflicts as diverse as Punjab, Kashmir, and post-2003 Iraq. Unlike in conventional war, the weak are not condemned to 'suffer what they must'; they too possess indigenous sources of capacity.[93]

Table 3: Assymetry and Outcome of COIN Treatment

Level of Asymmetry	Population-centric	Enemy-centric
Low	'Normalcy' - compliance, generated through voluntary participation in political institutions	Increased rebel support
High	'Normalcy' - compliance, generated through voluntary participation in political institutions	'Occupation' - compliance, contingent on continued application of coercion

That said, origins of State and insurgent capacity are more exhaustive than the simplistic account presented earlier and require more rigorous research. Further, capacities do not remain constant throughout the conflict. Collateral damage, for instance, often increases insurgent support. Domestic audiences, previously distant and indifferent, might get incensed enough to oppose and punish office-seeking elites who remain bellicose. Also, while it is relatively easy to calculate power balance in hindsight, it is more difficult to do so 'at night, with the GPS down, the media criticizing you, the locals complaining in a language you don't understand, and an unseen enemy killing your people by ones and twos'.[94]

An important issue is the choice of the unit of analysis and, as a corollary, the question of whether COIN can be disaggregated with one valley treated to enemy-centric and the other to population-centric designs. Measuring insurgent capacity requires excellent anthropological skills and astute political analysis. US experiments in embedding anthropologists among military units have produced, at best, mixed results.[95] Finding a way around this problem requires another set of policy-related solutions that need further research.

Second, in the absence of precise knowledge of material and sociological sources of insurgent capacity, it is prudent to err on the side

of caution and follow the population-centric model. Admittedly, this is a more expensive policy and requires more resources like troops and time, and results in higher troop casualties in the initial phases. Still, the policy of starting with population-centric methods and persisting with it is better than starting with enemy-centric that soon alienates the public, ceding ground to the insurgent, and consequently forcing a shift in gears. Even worse is the use of population-centric rhetoric of 'addressing alienation' and spreading a 'healing touch' while deploying enemy-centric repertoires of crackdowns, collective punishment, and forced displacement. The pervasive tendency to start with enemy-centric beliefs explains why most COIN campaigns start on a poor note. The policy directive that flows from this calls for starting with population-centric method and to execute the first phase in such a manner that does not complicate the latter phases of COIN.

The third conclusion relates to how practitioners should mix strategies belonging to the two models. After all, most real-life examples of COIN feature a mix of strategies. Mixing strategies is a delicate practice and can often fail to tap the preferences of the civilian population. Counterinsurgency as understood in the cannons is essentially institutionalist; individual preferences are calculated, and institutions designed to provide incentives to channel them through participation in State activity. Moreover, COIN institutions operate in an environment marked by asymmetry of resources and information. States and rebels have coercive and non-coercive resources to offer, and the population has access to private information needed to produce selective violence. In an incomplete information space, institutions work well when the signals generated to elicit cooperation are unambiguous. Mixing strategies by using elements of population and enemy-centric models runs the severe risk of converting precise signals into ad-hoc noise.

Noisy signals deprive the order-making enterprise of its predictability where actions of civilian actors do not guarantee expected outcomes. If one COIN institution requests participation and guarantees security, and the other punishes civilians in the wake of insurgent attacks, the latter are left with little reason to understand, let alone trust, future signals. No longer sure of the consequences of their actions, they feel disenfranchised and alienated *despite* the continuation of formal electoral processes. Such practices are writ large over the behaviour of security forces in Kashmir. In remote countryside where the presence of the civilian administration is minimal at best, many communities depend on the army for medical aid, water supplies, and even employment needs as they seek recruitment as porters. Local journalists and scholars admit to the deep symbiotic relationship between border villages and security forces.[96] At the same time, in the aftermath of insurgent activity, rights abuse at the hands of the same security forces as they demand information about rebels produces conflicting signals. Cooperation is sought in both instances, but the mode shifts between persuasion and intimidation in ways that are difficult to predict.

Mixing strategies also has an adverse effect on the legitimacy of 'hearts and minds' and reconciliation program as they make the population-centric promises ring hollow. Schools may raise levels of education, and hospitals improve healthcare. But when combined with ill-treatment at checkposts, destruction of private property used by insurgents to punish owners who are in no position to reject rebels' demands, and arbitrary physical abuse in the aftermath of troop casualties, much of the population is likely to overlook the good and emphasise the bad. In a purely enemy-centric mode, such measures might be 'fair game', but when used in population-centric or hybrid strategies, it nullifies the effect of non-security measures. This in turn compromises efforts to create a

constitutional contract between the State and the population that alone can generate flow of voluntary information and change the population's true preferences. Wartime order should thus be as predictable as possible, to ensure that civilians understand what is at stake, realise the positive and negative consequences of their actions, and be assured that their actions will yield results as advertised by the COIN programme.

The last question is about the goals of counterinsurgency. Policies enacted to produce swift insurgent attrition are vastly different from strategies to create a political order that approximates 'normalcy'. India's empirical record suggests that while it achieves the former, it generally fails to attain the latter goal. This begs for a deeper study of the disjunction between India's stated policy goals of normalcy, and its operational goals that favour attrition and military 'area domination'.

This paper has argued that although population-centric counterinsurgency literature does not say it explicitly, the constitutional nature of the relations between the state and the population in this model lends itself well to creating a post-war political order that resembles normalcy and sustains without the continuous application of coercion. While it is true that excessive threat may succeed in breaking insurgent links with local social networks, they have no capacity to engender participation in liberal democratic institutions and a robust civil society.

As stated earlier, orders that rely on coercion are expensive to maintain over the long run, inherently instable, and incompatible with liberal notions of state-formation. This does not concern authoritarian regimes and military occupations. Such regimes prefer guns over butter, lack domestic institutions that restrict the use of force, and are immune to

international pressure. But if the state-making enterprise values citizenship and liberty, creating such a political order requires the population-centric paradigm. The strategy of eliciting cooperation from the population instead of forcing it through violence or the threat of it, is sensitive to renewing the social contract that is at the core of citizen-state relations. This COIN attacks the problem, and not the problem-maker. By striving to make insurgents irrelevant instead of killing them in maximum numbers, the true preferences of the population is more likely to shift in favour of the State.

Defeating insurgent groups is thus analytically distinct from achieving victory; the former by no means ensures the latter. COIN is not an end in itself, but a transition from insurgency to normalcy. The role of the military is simply to create conditions conducive to facilitate non-security measures in a manner that should not undermine it. Arguments that the role of the military in Kashmir is over and that it is not responsible for the political deficit that has accrued from poor governance and corruption creates an artificial firewall between military operations and their second-order political affects. Just as the absence of political mobilisation by well-meaning politicians aggravates the military challenge, the absence of constraints on the use of force makes political mobilisation difficult.

Counterinsurgency is not politics by other means; it *is* politics.

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Endnotes:

1. Correlates of War Project, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/definition_of_armed_conflict/.

2. Interview with Brig (retd) Gurmeet Kanwal, former Director, Centre for Land Warfare Studies, New Delhi.

3. Daniel Branch and Elisabeth Jean Wood. "Revisiting Counterinsurgency." *Politics & Society* 1(2010): 3–14.

4. The Naxal insurgency's ultimate goal is to replace the Indian state with a Communist state. The Taliban, on the other hand, seek to evict foreign troops from Afghanistan and have laid this as a pre- condition for talks with Afghan incumbents. Kashmir, Punjab, and Nagaland are paradigmatic examples of ethnic secessionist conflicts. Insurgent movements offer multiple goals within the overarching narrative of a master goal to maximise their social bases of support. At the tactical level, they offer to end exploitative practices by corrupt government officials, empower plebeian classes, promise culturally puritan order, all within the rubric of slogans such as *azaadi* (freedom), *jihad* (holy war), and *people's war* (class struggle).

5. "Naxal Inc worth Rs 1,000 crore", *The Economic Times*, April 9, 2008, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2008-04-09/news/27724420_1_chhattisgarh-police-naxal-material-jharkhand.

6. As explained later, some of the non-coercive policies carried out to defeat insurgents are indistinguishable from state practices in regions unaffected by violent conflict. Building of schools, roads, distribution of government services, dissemination of a popular mass ideology, after all, all take place in peacetime as well. What distinguishes their deployment in COIN is their intended effect on the 'targeted' audience.

7. David Kilcullen, "Counterinsurgency Redux." *Survival* 48(2006.): 111–30.

8. *U.S. Army. Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). The manual recognises insurgency as 'an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to

weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control'.

9.   Stathis N. Kalyvas in "The New U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual as Political Science and Political Praxis," *Perspectives on Politics*, 6 (June 2008): 351-57.

10.   David J. Morris, "Trophy Town", *VQR*, Winter 2008, http://www.vqronline.org/vqr-portfolio/trophy-town.

11.   Stathis N Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 8 (2008): 1043–68.

12.   Consider the well known Afghan 'tradition' of backing the winning horse. An illustrative account of how antagonists set aside rivalries and before allies as the tide of battle turn is provided in Dexter Filkins, *The Forever War* (New York: Vintage Books, 2008).

13.   The underlying principles of both schools bear uncanny resemblance with core assumptions of the rational choice mode of social science that individuals are self-interested actors who respond to incentives and are driven by strategic rather than purely normative concerns.

14.   Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts*. (Chicago: Markham, 1970).

15.   For review of literature on ethnic conflict, read Ashutosh Varshney, "Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict," in *The Oxford Handbook Of Comparative Politics*, in ed. Charles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).

16.   This is evident in the case of police investigations of crime and terrorism in India. See Suketu Mehta, *Maximum City Mumbai Lost and Found* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004).

17.   David Kilcullen, "Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency", *Small Wars Journal*, January 27, 2007, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency.

18.   As noted earlier, unlike in conventional wars, internal wars lack clearly demarcated borders, and as a result feature both fragmented sovereignty,

jointly exercised by both belligerents (like in Kashmir) and a combination of segmented and fragmented sovereignty where the conflict region is spatially divided among rebels and government troops (like in Bastar). The distinction between segmentation and fragmentation of sovereignty is borrowed from Stathis Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

19.   Nirmalangshu Mukherji, *The Maoists in India: Tribals Under Siege* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 92,93.

20.   Nirmalangshu Mukherji, *The Maoists in India: Tribals Under Siege* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 91.

21.   "Fake 'Maoist' rebels turn Gumla into killing fields", *Hindustan Times*, October 31, 2014, http://www.hindustantimes.com/ranchi/fake-maoist-rebels-turn-gumla-into-killing-fields/article1-1276495.aspx.

22.   "India: Red Retribution In Jharkhand – Analysis", *Eurasia Review*, August 17, 2014, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17082014-india-red-retribution-jharkhand-analysis/.

23.   "Development works in Naxal-affected areas to be reviewed soon: Government", *The Economic Times*, August 14, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-08-14/news/52807835_1_development-works-speedy-completion-naxal-affected-areas.

24.   G D Bakshi, *Kishtwar Cauldron: The Struggle Against ISI's Ethnic Cleansing* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2013).

25.   Laurent Gayer, "The Khalistan Militias: Servants and Users of the State", in *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists, and Separatist*, ed. Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Hurst, 2009).

26.   Nirmalangshu Mukherji, *The Maoists in India: Tribals Under Siege* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 15.

27.   "Forces deployed at Balapam to check Maoist backlash", *The Hindu*, October 22, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/

Visakhapatnam/forces-deployed-at-balapam-to-check-maoist-backlash/article6524277.ece.

28.	Nirmalangshu Mukherji, *The Maoists in India: Tribals Under Siege* (London: Pluto Press, 2012), 15.

29.	Bethany Lacina, "Rethinking Delhi's Northeast India Policy: Why neither Counter-insurgency nor Winning Hearts and Minds is the Way Forward", in *Beyond Counter-Insurgency: Breaking the Impasse in Northeast India Lacina*, ed. Sanjib Baruah (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009).

30.	Navnita Chadha Behera, *Demystifying Kashmir* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 2006); Sumantra Bose, *Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace* (London: Harvard University Press, 2003).

31.	"Kashmir's besieged panchayats", *The Hindu*, September 27, 2012, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/kashmirs-besieged-panchayats/article3939281.ece; "How militants, govt killed the Panchayati Raj in Kashmir", *First Post*, May 11, 2014, http://www.firstpost.com/india/how-militants-govt-killed-the-panchayati-raj-in-kashmir-1517711.html.

32.	"Bhindranwale reborn", *The Hindu*, June 4, 2014, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/bhindranwale-reborn/article6079108.ece?homepage=true.

33.	Laurent Gayer, "The Khalistan Militias: Servants and Users of the State", in *Armed Militias of South Asia: Fundamentalists, Maoists, and Separatist*, ed. Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Hurst, 2009).

34.	Joyce Pettigrew, "Parents and Their Children in Situations of Terror: Disappearances and Special Police Activity in Punjab", in *Death Squad: The Anthropology of State Terror*, ed. Jeffrey A. Sluka (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999).

35.	Interviews with journalists and Jammu and Kashmir police's Special Operations Group (SOG) officers in Jammu, and Srinagar, November 2014.

36.   Many experts believe that Indian Army's conventional war bias prevents it from fully embracing such counterinsurgency principles. For instance, small unit patrolling continues to be shunned in favour of large units operations, at times, involving entire battalions. See Rajesh Rajagopalan, *Fighting Like a Guerrilla: The Indian Army and Counterinsurgency* (New Delhi, India and Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2008).

37.   "Govt can use any element of its national power against Maoists: Rajnath Singh's new anti-Naxal Policy", *The Economic Times*, October 17, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-10-17/news/55148242_1_new-policy-interventions-insurgency.

38.   See, for example, Kaustav Dhar Chakrabarti, "Military Operation in Bajaur - Operation Sherdil", *Observer Research Foundation*, October 18, 2008, http://orfonline.org/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=15333&mmacmaid=15334.

39.   Interview with former police officials who participated in COIN operations against the Naxal insurgency, March 2014.

40.   John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam: Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

41.   Jeremy Ferwerda and Nicholas L. Miller, "Political Devolution and Resistance to Foreign Rule: A Natural Experiment." *American Political Science Review* 3 (2014): 642-660.

42.   Consider this anecdote. A domestic help of a retied Pakistan Army officer who hailed from Swat valley returned to his native village to verify the safety of his family and, possibly, make arrangements for their migration to the relatively safer parts of Punjab. After a few months, much to the General's surprise, he joined the Taliban, as they offered better remuneration and increased prestige that came with being a rebel instead of a domestic help. Also, see Roger Petersen, *Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

43.   For instance, conflicts that take place in a state's peripheral territory are often marked by reduced state presence, a condition that prompts contraband traders to support insurgent groups and earn a windfall.

Students of both the Afghan insurgency and India's Northeast will readily acknowledge this.

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