As the next US elections approach with both Democratic and Republican prospects equally uncertain, Seoul is alarmed by the looming possibility of Trump's return
Under Biden’s political leadership, the United States (US) reached out to its allies and partners with a reassuring slogan: ‘America is Back’. The message was resoundingly meant to be for the Asia-Pacific where America’s hub-and-spokes system of alliance has buttressed its reach and influence and had come under duress under the Trump administration. Both Japan and South Korea faced political pressure from the Trump administration. Trump’s grand bargain included propositions of the US troop withdrawal from its allies, should they fail to pay more money for US deployment in their countries. One of the pressing priorities of the Biden administration has been to reverse any doubt about America’s alliance commitments alongside assuring its allies about its support. The attempt was to put the US diplomatic machinery back on the global map and dispel fears of American diplomatic and political retrenchment. Under the Biden administration, there have been conscious efforts from Washington to allay fears of the US allies in the Indo-Pacific, of a self-centered America. South Korea is at the heart of that effort, along with other critical allies like Japan. It did not come as a surprise when President Biden invited leaders of both Japan and South Korea to Camp David in August last year. The purpose was twinfold: Assure America’s two most critical allies in the Pacific of a common deterrence strategy against China and script a diplomatic détente between Tokyo and Seoul.
One of the pressing priorities of the Biden administration has been to reverse any doubt about America’s alliance commitments alongside assuring its allies about its support.
The US relations with South Korea, its treaty ally in Northeast Asia, suffered most under the Trump presidency, as diverging issues dictated the relations. Biden's Indo-Pacific outreach sought to assuage Seoul’s concerns by working towards strengthening its presence and network in the Pacific theatre. As the next US elections seem delicately poised with both Democrat and Republican possibilities equally alive, alarm bells are ringing again in Seoul as the fear of Trump coming back to power looms over bilateral and regional ties. Such apprehensions have raised an important question: What will be the future of US-ROK relations under the next US president?
As US President Joe Biden and his political rival Donald Trump look to face off in two debates on 27 June and 10 September this year, Seoul will be keenly watching. Already, Trump's interview with the Time Magazine last month, in which he reiterated the issue of the US allies’ military spending in the context of NATO and South Korea, has raised some hackles in Seoul. On the question, ‘Would you [Trump] withdraw US troops from South Korea’, Donald Trump replied, ‘I want South Korea to treat us properly’ and further added that ‘We've [US] essentially paid for much of their military, free of charge. And they agreed to pay billions of dollars. And probably now that I’m gone, they're paying very little. I don't know if you know that they renegotiated the deal I made.’ These comments have widened a trust gap for many in Seoul and is reminiscent of the sentiments which Trump evoked in 2019.
The negotiation of the new SMA two years before its expiration date in late 2025 points towards an understanding in both capitals that this may become an irritant in the ties should Trump assume the White House.
The Biden administration has rushed to put in place some strong structural measures to strengthen US-ROK relations so that they remains future-proof to leadership transitions in both countries. Fearing that the negotiations would again become a point of contention between Seoul and Washington, both countries fast-tracked the Security Measures Agreement (SMA) in January this year which will finalise defence cost-sharing for the 28,500 US Forces Korea (USFK) soldiers deployed in South Korea. Under the SMA, costs related to the Korean workers in the US Forces Korea (USFK), construction costs and other expenditures related to logistical support are included. The negotiation of the new SMA two years before its expiration date in late 2025 points towards an understanding in both capitals that this may become an irritant in the ties should Trump assume the White House. The earlier SMA was signed in March 2021 for six years, with both sides agreeing on a 13.9 percent increase with an amount of USD 1.03 billion favouring South Korea as opposed to the 400 percent proposed under the Trump administration with some additional guarantees. On 16 May 2024, the second round of defence cost-sharing talks were held.
Another significant point of contention between Washington and Seoul during Trump's tenure could be the issue of denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. If elected, Trump would likely adopt a markedly different approach towards the DPRK, thereby impacting the broader agenda of denuclearisation. During his presidency, Trump created history by stepping onto North Korean soil and meeting with Kim Jong Un on three occasions. While these actions showcased Trump's unpredictability and unconventional diplomatic style, they also engendered distrust in South Korea and destabilised the strategic equilibrium in the region. Given that deterrence relies heavily on signalling and state behaviour, South Korea, reliant on US extended deterrence, found itself in a precarious position. Indeed, more openness in engaging with Pyongyang from a Trump presidency could create dissonance between the two sides. If Trump wins, he is expected to engage with Kim Jong Un again and even accept the DPRK’s condition to retain its nuclear weapons. This stance will likely create a fissure in the alliance and embolden a section of conservatives who support South Korea’s nuclearisation.
The Yoon-Biden period in bilateral leadership has focused on removing structural inconsistencies and infusing predictability in relationships.
Biden, through his Indo-Pacific policy and other regional policies such as a tripartite alliance between the US, Japan, and South Korea at Camp David and the AUKUS agreement has tried to restore the strategic balance in the Pacific. The Yoon-Biden period in bilateral leadership has focused on removing structural inconsistencies and infusing predictability in relationships.
Since Trump left the White House in January 2021, positions on either side, in China and the US, have hardened on the issue of Taiwan. While the US Senate has proposed the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022 which seeks to overhaul the US’s bilateral relationship with Taiwan, China’s actions suggest that it may be working against a deadline towards invading Taiwan. These circumstances have left both the security balance of the Pacific in the doldrums: conventional and strategic. The emerging competitive mix in the region has enforced a strategic dilemma on Seoul, one of choosing between its alliance commitments and the fear of entrapment with the US alliance against China. Although under President Yoon, South Korea has leapt forward by taking a clear position, emphasising the need to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan strait, it has still not committed any combined assistance with the US in any Taiwan contingency, in contrast to Japan. This will likely become a point of contention as the US plans to re-strategise its assets in the Indo-Pacific aimed at deterring China. If Trump wins, the role of USFK apropos Taiwan will take centre stage shifting the alliance focus from North Korea to China. In a recent interview, Elbridge Colby who occupied a senior position in the Trump administration voiced this opinion, even as he expressed the need to ‘overhaul the USFK to China-related contingencies’ rather than just North Korea. This has generated a debate among South Korean strategic experts concerning the importance of self-defence and having a re-look at the US-ROK alliance. Its historically complicated relationship with Japan has not been particularly helpful in providing strategic clarity to Seoul.
The emerging competitive mix in the region has enforced a strategic dilemma on Seoul, one of choosing between its alliance commitments and the fear of entrapment with the US alliance against China.
Trump and some of his decisions in dealing with South Korea like his revision of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) loom large, even as Trump maintains a lead over Biden in election polls and fundraising. On the contrary, the Biden administration will bet on stability in US-ROK relations under the next Democratic presidency given some of the groundwork in this direction in the last four years, most profoundly in the areas of tech-cooperation.
Vivek Mishra is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation
Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation
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Vivek Mishra is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research interests include America in the Indian Ocean and Indo-Pacific and Asia-Pacific regions, particularly ...
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Abhishek Sharma is a Research Assistant with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. His research focuses on the Indo-Pacific regional security and geopolitical developments with a special ...
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