Speculation is rife on both sides of the Radcliffe Line about a possible re-engagement between India and Pakistan. However, it remains uncertain whether this policy will work.
On 30 May, answering a question on former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s remarks that Pakistan violated the peace agreement (Lahore Declaration] with India in 1999 by engaging in military adventurism in Kargil, the Ministry of External Affairs spokesman said that India was “seeing that an objective view is now emerging in Pakistan as well”. Perhaps it was an off-the-cuff remark by the spokesman, but people who keep a hawk eye on all things India-Pakistan saw this response from MEA as a sign that the door that was shut on Pakistan could reopen after the elections are over in India. Speculation is rife on both sides of the Radcliffe line that post elections, there could be a re-engagement between the two countries.
What is driving this optimism is difficult to say. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made it clear in an interview that he has “locked the box of Pakistan”. As far as he is concerned, Pakistan can do its own thing. India’s development will no longer be held hostage to Pakistan. Modi also disabused all those who think that if he gets a third term he will be focused on his legacy and will therefore make an outreach to Pakistan. According to Modi, he seeks his legacy in building a bright future for Indian children, and not in normalisation of relations with Pakistan. On the Pakistani side, even as Nawaz Sharif and other civilian leaders make the occasional statement in favour of engaging India, the real power wielders in the country have made it quite clear that they have no intention of diluting their belligerent posture against India. The recent meeting of the Formation Commanders of the Pakistan Army not only reiterated the mantra of self-determination for Kashmir and implementing UN resolutions but also waded into India’s domestic politics by showing “concern over the treatment of minorities, especially Muslims, in India and noted the growing fascism being perpetrated to achieve vested political ends”. There was also some good old-fashioned nuclear sabre rattling by the Pakistanis, in all likelihood responding to remarks by Prime Minister Modi that he wasn’t impressed by Pakistan's nuclear threats.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made it clear in an interview that he has “locked the box of Pakistan”. As far as he is concerned, Pakistan can do its own thing. India’s development will no longer be held hostage to Pakistan.
The fact of the matter is that the Modi government’s policy since the Uri terrorist attack in 2016, and even more since the Balakot air strikes and the constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, has worked quite well. This policy is basically of keeping the lines of communication open but disengage otherwise. Over the years, the Pakistanis have painted themselves in a corner with their Pavlovian responses, especially to the constitutional reforms in J&K by downgrading diplomatic relations and banning virtually all trade. There is really no reason for India to cut any slack for Pakistan at this stage, even less so because fundamentally nothing has changed insofar as Pakistan's inimical attitude towards India is concerned. Boxed in as it is on its Western front with both Iran and Afghanistan, and with the China track not really proving to be the game-changer it was touted to be, Pakistan needs India. But Pakistan wants it for free. Worse, Pakistan wants to cherry pick what works for it—trade, for instance—and keep the rest—terrorism—on the back burner. All those advocating re-engagement with Pakistan do not explain how this kind of a re-engagement works for India. If anything, re-engaging Pakistan at this stage will tantamount to reverting to the old pattern and losing the gains of the last eight years.
The fact of the matter is that the Modi government’s policy since the Uri terrorist attack in 2016, and even more since the Balakot air strikes and the constitutional reforms in Jammu and Kashmir in 2019, has worked quite well. This policy is basically of keeping the lines of communication open but disengage otherwise.
There is, however, a body of opinion in India which believes that Pakistan has understood the folly of its past ways and that India should encourage Pakistan along this path. At the very least, India should test the waters. But all that is offered in defence of this argument is certain statements that have emanated from Pakistani civilian politicians. What is also offered is the usual cliches: we can choose our friends, but we cannot choose our neighbours. That there is no profundity in this kind of cliche, and little merit in it in the context of international relations, escapes those who mouth it ad nauseam. And yet there are Indian politicians who are ready to play on the wicket prepared by Pakistan. Regardless of whether this is because of exigencies of electoral politics and trying to reach out to lobbies to win votes, it undermines a national policy.
Beyond the politics, there is the question of whether such a policy of re-engagement will work. If statements are what some people are basing their optimism on then such statements have come in the past not just from civilian leaders but also military generals in Pakistan. But neither the civilian nor the military leaders have ever gone beyond making empty statements. Fundamentally, they have taken no action on ground that would give any indication whatsoever that Pakistan has given up its irredentism and the use of terrorist proxies. Pakistan thinks it can engage India on the old terms of engagement and keep stringing India along on issues that matter to it. Under these circumstances, if there is re-engagement, what we will see is Pakistan adopting a dual parallel approach.
The first parallel track will be to engage India in talks and re-open trade (along with restoring full diplomatic relations). Alongside, Pakistan will keep the pot of terrorism on the sim. Terrorism will be carefully calibrated to ensure it doesn’t create too much heat. What will continue is low-level, low-intensity attacks to keep the jihad factory going. Meanwhile, all attempts will be made to rebuild the partially dismantled ecosystem of terrorism, not just in Kashmir but also on the Khalistan issue. In the case of the latter, Pakistan has been collaborating with China to destabilise Punjab by inciting Khalistani elements. In J&K, suddenly the mothership of terrorism, the banned Jamaat Islami has come out of the woodwork and is pretending to participate in mainstream politics, even contest elections. In the past, every time the heat got too much, the Jamaat would publicly either disassociate itself from terrorism or from politics, and then continue to infiltrate the system, below the radar screen. The same is being attempted again.
The first parallel track will be to engage India in talks and re-open trade (along with restoring full diplomatic relations). Alongside, Pakistan will keep the pot of terrorism on the sim. Terrorism will be carefully calibrated to ensure it doesn’t create too much heat.
The second parallel track will be that while the civilians will appear to be friendly, reasonable, the military will keep the hardline and the civilians will seek carve outs to keep the military in line. This is an old tack of the Pakistanis—“support the civilians otherwise the military will destabilise us”. The Indian leaders are patsies in this game, and will be encouraged to buy Pakistani snake oil by the legions of Pakistani advocates in India. There will also be a temptation on the Indian side to indulge in some virtue signalling by mouthing fatuous statements like ‘strengthening democracy in Pakistan’. Alongside, another snake oil will be sold in India that there is a new civilian government in Pakistan and it is an opportunity for re-engaging them. The fact, however, is that Pakistan has a hybrid pro-max regime that is only nominally headed by a civilian Prime Minister. The civilians have nothing in their store. The Shehbaz regime came into office and stayed in office on the sufferance of the Army Chief Asim Munir. His government has no agency of its own, even less so on relations with India. Given the multiple crises that surround Pakistan, its longevity is riven with uncertainty. Any deal or engagement with such a regime, which might not last even a year, will not be worth a dime.
There is an argument that is made that precisely because Pakistan is in such a mess that it needs to normalise with India. This is what is often referred to as the ‘Mother India’ complex or even the ‘Prithviraj Chauhan Syndrome’—rescue your enemy when he is down and out. But the makers of this argument claim (without any evidence to back it) that the Pakistan Army cannot afford to open another front with India. That might well be true. But that doesn't mean that the Pakistan Army is ready for peace and normalisation with India. If it is then it will stop inciting violence in Punjab, it will not keep terrorism alive in Kashmir, it will hand over or even eliminate some of India’s most wanted—Indian fugitives like Dawood Ibrahim and Tiger Memon, and internationally designated terrorists like Hafiz Saeed and Masood Azhar. Unless this happens, there is no reason to believe that Pakistan is ready to turn a new page in its relationship with India.
Whoever forms the next government, needs to stick with the policy that is currently in play. Such policies take years to start showing results. Within three months of this policy of dis-engaging started being questioned by the usual suspects because it had shown no tangible results. Eight years later, with Pakistan is crisis and seeking a political bailout of sorts from India, the effectiveness of this policy is manifest. To change it now would be to undo the gains of the last eight years. Even more importantly, it would be a blunder of Himalayan proportions to do anything that gives succour to an implacable enemy state. But most of all, the government of India needs to have a clear policy on how to handle Pakistan. It must be a policy shorn of emotion or nostalgia. The policy must also go beyond just turning India’s back on Pakistan and pretending it doesn’t exist. Disengagement can only be a part of the policy, and not the policy. New Delhi needs to be clear that Pakistan is not just an enemy state; it is also a pernicious mindset. India’s policy must effectively address both these dimensions of the problem called Pakistan.
Sushant Sareen is a Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. His published works include: Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017) Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador ...
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