PM Meloni’s Mattei Plan for Africa aims to diversify Italy’s energy supply, enhance trade for securing critical raw minerals, and boost economic growth in the EU’s southern neighbourhood
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Since being sworn in as the Prime Minister of Italy in 2022, Giorgio Meloni’s foreign policy has been defined by unwavering support for Ukraine, aligning herself with Italy’s Atlantic and European partners and active collaboration with Brussels in the European Union’s (EU) policymaking. Another central tenet of Prime Minister Meloni’s foreign policy is the outreach to Africa, especially the EU’s southern neighbourhood, Maghreb. In the two years since becoming Prime Minister, she has made nine visits to Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Mauritania collectively, highlighting the centrality of the Mediterranean Sea in general and North Africa in particular in her foreign policy.
Rome’s renewed interest in North Africa derives from a deteriorating economic security architecture, emblematic of the EU’s economic woes as a whole. Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine, geoeconomic contestation with China, and the war in Gaza have upended energy security and international trade policy assumptions upon which the EU’s policymakers built their policies. PM Meloni’s economic outreach to Africa builds on a need to diversify and bolster Italy’s energy supply chains through old and new energy investments in Africa, enhance trade and investment with African partners to secure critical raw minerals value chains, and bolster economic growth in the EU’s southern neighbourhood.
Rome’s renewed interest in North Africa derives from a deteriorating economic security architecture, emblematic of the EU’s economic woes as a whole.
This article assesses the potential of Italy’s Africa outreach and the recently launched Mattei Plan for Africa (MPA) and evaluates its flagship and pilot projects across Africa. Additionally, it analyses the existing complementary and competing connectivity alternatives in Africa and how the MPA compares against or complements them.
On 29 January 2024, during the 2024 Africa-Italy summit, Prime Minister Meloni unveiled the MPA in a speech to the 21 African Heads of Government, the President of the African Union, the European Commission President, the Chief of the World Bank and representatives from various United Nations (UN) agencies. The MPA is named after Enrico Mattei, founder of the Italian state-owned oil major, National Hydrocarbons Agency (Eni), which is also a major partner under the MPA. Under this plan, the Italian government will provide US$ 8.2 billion in development finance through loans, investments and equity across five policy sectors—energy, education, water, capacity-building and agriculture—in Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Egypt, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Morocco, Mozambique, and Tunisia.
The National Climate Fund and the Italian Development Cooperation budget finance the MPA. The plan builds on Mattei’s work in the 1960s, wherein Enrico Mattei, as head of Eni brokered deals heavily favouring West Asia’s oil-rich countries. In turn, Italy became a secondary supplier to the rest of Europe. Since then, using this blueprint, Eni has enhanced strategic cooperation for energy supplies in the Maghreb, venturing into politically-fragile countries, where most Western oil majors have hesitated to tread.
Building on Eni’s experience, the plan envisions an integrated approach to bilateral development rather than a top-down, donor-recipient approach, wherein African stakeholders will be regularly consulted.
Building on Eni’s experience, the plan envisions an integrated approach to bilateral development rather than a top-down, donor-recipient approach, wherein African stakeholders will be regularly consulted. The plan will also map the existing strategic Italian investments in Africa’s infrastructure and energy sectors to avoid duplication. Major projects already announced include a green hydrogen pipeline in Tunisia, connected to Italy, an interconnected electricity grid between Morocco and Italy and renewable energy projects in Angola, DRC and the Ivory Coast.
Yet, the plan has its own set of problems. Africa needs close to US$ 150 billion annually to fill its infrastructure development gap and US$ 8 billion will not have much impact. Moreover, much of the MPA and projects under it remain shrouded in mystery. The Italian government first announced the plan in 2022, and not much progress has been made since then besides feasibility studies and consultations with African partners. To succeed, the Mattei Plan therefore needs extensive consultations with African and private stakeholders and expand its financing for a developmental result that will positively impact its relations with Africa in the medium to long term.
A key geopolitical factor for Italy’s outreach to the Maghreb and Africa, in general, is the creeping Chinese and Russian influence all over the continent. China’s major instrument for its Africa outreach is its signature connectivity initiative—the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Under it, China has loaned over US$ 185 billion and invested close to US$ 60 billion across critical economic sectors such as gas, oil, renewables, transport, port infrastructure, coal, power, electricity grids, hydroelectric power plants, roads, railways and social infrastructure. China also has wide-ranging Free Trade Agreements with 12 African nations and is the continent’s largest trade partner. Africa is also critical to Beijing for its energy security and global value chains. Beijing imports close to one-third of its oil and gas supply through Africa and has stakes in multiple critical raw minerals mines in Africa that are necessary for the green transition and EV supply chains. China has an edge over the West because of its domestic non-interference, aid-without-reform and quick finance disbursement policies in addition to its first-mover advantage in the continent.
A key geopolitical factor for Italy’s outreach to the Maghreb and Africa, in general, is the creeping Chinese and Russian influence all over the continent.
Similarly, Moscow has been consolidating its economic and security relations with several African nations, through a tandem of security and economic initiatives. Russia offers regime stabilisation packages and weapons trade deals to these countries in return for access to natural resources and infrastructure development contracts. Moscow also plays an outsized role in niche yet critical economic sectors such as agriculture and food security through fertilisers, wheat, and bushels supply. Russia’s trade with Africa has also increased by 56 percent since the beginning of its military operations in Ukraine: in 2023, it stood at US$ 28.3 billion from US$ 18.4 billion in 2022, with Egypt accounting for over a quarter of total trade. Russia’s overtures in Africa are also aimed at garnering support for its “special military operation” in Ukraine. Africa is the largest voting bloc in the UN, with 51 of 169 votes, and in most global multilateral forums. Most African nations have abstained from voting during important UN General Assembly resolutions such as war damage repayments from Russia and its dismissal from the United Nations Human Rights Council.
To counter Chinese and Russian influence in its neighbourhood, bolster its energy security, curb illegal migration and provide development assistance in its neighbourhood, Rome launched the MPA in 2024. To bridge some gaps, it was further aligned with the EU’s Global Gateway and the G7’s Partnership for Global Infrastructure (PGII) and Investment in the latest summit at Apulia during Italy’s G7 Presidency. Italy’s development assistance is mostly targeted at North Africa, its immediate neighbourhood, and a key region for its economic and national security. As long as Prime Minister Meloni delivers on the promises made at the Italia-Africa Summit 2024 and drives development in the region through the PGII, Rome may yet achieve its strategic and geoeconomic objectives in the Maghreb, and Africa at large.
Prithvi Gupta is a Junior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Prithvi works as a Junior Fellow in the Strategic Studies Programme. His research primarily focuses on analysing the geoeconomic and strategic trends in international relations. ...
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