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Beginning in the early 2000s, the Arctic was increasingly seen as the region that will underpin the vector of world economic and geopolitical development in the 21st century.[1] Paradoxically, however, until 2007—when Russia resumed maritime and air patrols in the Arctic and North Atlantic and planted its titanium flag at the North Pole at the bottom of the Arctic Ocean—the rest of the Arctic and non-Arctic states paid little attention to this region. During the Cold War, the Arctic was of geostrategic importance mainly in the context of the rivalry between the United States (US) and the erstwhile USSR: in the event of a full-scale war between the two powers, the shortest routes for intercontinental ballistic missiles and strategic bombers would run through the North Pole.
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the threat of global nuclear war disappeared, and geopolitical interest in the Arctic declined. Domestically, Russia, suffering systemic economic crises in the 1990s and early 2000s, stopped paying attention to the development of its Arctic territories, whose economic and human potential had significantly decreased.
It was only towards the end of the noughties that the situation began to change. Russia “returned” to the Arctic, both domestically and internationally. At the same time, other Arctic countries began to pay closer attention to their northern territories and the region as a whole. The Arctic has once again, and to a much greater extent than before, returned to the radar of global geoeconomics and geopolitics, and the ‘great game’ idea appeared in the global political discourse in relation to the region.
In this backdrop, this essay explores a number of interrelated questions: What attracts global attention to the Arctic? Who are the key players in the region? How will this ‘great game’ likely evolve and what will be its consequences for the world?
Map 1. Natural Resources in the Arctic
Source: Nordegio[2]
The Arctic region holds immense energy resources which, according to many experts, could drive humanity’s future (see Map 1). According to estimates, the Arctic is endowed with 90 million barrels of oil, 47.3 trillion cubic meters of gas, and 44 billion barrels of gas condensate;[3] it is also home to nearly 25 percent of hydrocarbon unproven reserves.[4] Over 60 percent of the Arctic oil and gas reserves are in territories that Russia owns.[a] Potential coal reserves in Russia’s Arctic region account for nearly half of the country’s coal resources—780 billion tonnes, of which 81 billion tonnes are coking coals.[5]
The Arctic region is also rich in non-ferrous and rare-earth metals, minerals, ores, and other raw materials of strategic importance (see Map 1). The Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation (AZRF) boasts the biggest share of these minerals (see Table 1).
Table 1. AZRF Share in Russia’s Mineral Reserves
Source: Arctic Today[6]
The third source of natural wealth in the Arctic region are the massive biological resources of global importance. The Arctic seas are the habitat of numerous unique marine mammals including the polar bear, polar fox, narwhal, killer and white whales, and the walrus. Over 150 fish species live in the Arctic and sub-Arctic waters, including the important ones for fisheries—the cod, herring, haddock, pollock, and flounder. The Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea fisheries account for nearly 15 percent and 50 percent of the fish catch and sea food production in Russia and the US.[7]
Fourth, the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Northwest Passage (NWP) along the northern coasts of Russia and Canada are critical transport routes not only for these two countries but for other states and regions. The passage from East Asia to Europe and North America along these routes is shorter and safer (i.e. piracy-free) than via the Suez Canal (see Map 2).
For example, the route from Yokohama (Japan) to Hamburg (Germany) via the NSR is 11,000 km, while the length of this route through the Suez Canal is 18,350 km. This reduces the journey time from 22 to 15 days, i.e. by about 40 percent.[1b] The route between the US northeast coast and East Asia through the NWP is 17-percent shorter than through the Panama Canal. Although the NSR and NWP cannot compare with their competitors (the Suez and Panama Canals) in terms of traffic volumes, they remain potential alternative routes to southern destinations. In addition, the NSR is the only route for the delivery of LNG (liquefied natural gas) from Russia’s Yamal Peninsula to both Asia and Europe.[c]
Map 2. The Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route
Source: Grid-Arendal[8]
Furthermore, the Arctic region is critical as it has consequences to the global environment in terms of parameters such as climate and sea levels. As the Arctic ice thaws,[9] the natural resources and transport communications are becoming more accessible to stakeholders. The same factor is facilitating the emergence of Arctic tourism, which will likely grow and become increasingly profitable in the foreseeable future.[d]
Figure 1 visualises the five ‘circles’ of competition and cooperation in the Arctic.
Figure 1. The Five Circles of Arctic Competition and Cooperation
Source: Authors’ own
The Arctic five are Russia, the United States (US), Canada, Denmark, and Norway, all of which compete with each other and with non-Arctic countries for natural resources and control over the maritime transport routes of the Far North. Having a coast along the Arctic Ocean, in accordance with the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), these five nations have preferential rights to develop the resources of the marine Arctic within their territorial waters and exclusive economic zones (EEZs). At the same time, it should be noted that the US, unlike other coastal states, has an Arctic strategy characterised by a reliance on unilateral actions, ignoring (or belittling) those international institutions that are completely beyond their control, including the Arctic Council, the Arctic Economic Council, the Northern Forum, as well as UN specialised agencies dealing with the Arctic. As recent moves by the Trump administration demonstrate,[e] the US does not hesitate to put pressure on its closest allies (for example, Canada or Denmark) to achieve its goals in the region.
A second group of actors in the region comprise the sub-Arctic states that, having no direct access to the Arctic Circle, nevertheless are either located in close proximity (Iceland) or possess territory located in the Arctic (Sweden and Finland).[f] Also actively involved in Arctic affairs are certain international organisations of Western countries (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO and the European Union, EU), as well as organisations of Nordic countries.[1g]
Comprising the fourth set of stakeholders are the various institutions and programmes of the United Nations (UN): the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, UN Development Program, UN Environment Program, International Maritime Organization, and UNESCO. These agencies are mandated to act in the interest of the global community, as well as to serve as arbitrator in disputes between Arctic players.
In addition to these four, another fifth and relatively new circle of cooperation and competition in the Arctic has emerged in recent years—the non-Arctic states (primarily East Asian countries, as well as a number of European states), which in the last two decades have also begun to show interest in the development of the region. This inevitably leads to the growth of economic and political tensions in the region, since the Arctic legal regime is not the ideal one and allows some ambiguity regarding the rights of both regional and non-regional actors. For example, under UNCLOS, non-Arctic states do not have the rights to explore and develop natural resources in the EEZs and continental shelves within the national jurisdiction of the ‘Arctic Five’. Therefore, they are objectively interested in reviewing the already established legal norms and spheres of influence, and they favour the “internationalisation” of the region, especially of its maritime transport routes and the Central Arctic Ocean, an area located outside the national jurisdiction of coastal states.
The following paragraphs outline the past, existing, and potential conflicts in the Arctic region.
Maritime delimitation
Disputes are ongoing over the delimitation of maritime space between the US and Canada in the Beaufort Sea and between Canada and Greenland (Denmark) in the Lincoln Sea. The Canadian-Danish dispute over the delimitation of the Lincoln Sea in the part that concerned the small Hans island was resolved in 2022: an agreement to divide the island nearly in half along a natural fault line was signed by the Danish, Greenlandic, Canadian, and Nunavut governments.
Extension of the continental shelf
In 2001, Russia became the first country to apply to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) with a claim on expansion of its shelf in the Arctic Ocean.[h] Moscow claimed sovereign rights over resources on the seabed area of some 1.2 million km2 outside the 200-mile line. However, the CLCS found Russia’s claim to be insufficient. Russia organised comprehensive research expeditions and in 2015, submitted a revised application. The Commission has almost fully approved Moscow’s application, with the exception of one small area. Since Russian claims overlap with similar ones to parts of the Arctic shelf of Denmark and Canada, which filed their applications in 2014 and 2019, respectively, Moscow will have to negotiate with them after the Commission decides on their applications.
Map 3. Ongoing Territorial Claims in the Arctic Ocean
Source: Stratfor[10]
Other coastal states (except the US which has not ratified the UNCLOS) followed Russia (see Map 3). Norway was the second after Russia to submit its application to the CLCS in 2006 and the first among the Arctic states to get a positive decision from the Commission in 2009. At the end of 2023, the US unilaterally announced the expansion of its continental shelf in the Arctic Ocean and the Bering Sea. This action did not affect Russian interests in the region but was consequential to Canadian claims to a part of the shelf in the Beaufort Sea.
International legal status of the Northern Sea Route and Northwestern Passage
While Moscow and Ottawa believe that they have historical and legal rights to control and regulate navigation through the Northern Sea Route and Northwestern Passage, other countries (including the US and China) insist on the freedom of navigation principle. For example, Moscow defines the NSR as a historically existing national unified transport route of the Russian Federation in the Arctic and therefore considers it to be under its exclusive jurisdiction. Canada considers that it is sovereign over the waters of the NWP on the ground that those waters are internal.
Both Russia and Canada invoke the UNCLOS Article 234, which provides coastal states with the right to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the EEZ limits, where particularly severe climatic conditions and the presence of ice covering such areas for most of the year create obstructions or exceptional hazards to navigation, and pollution of the marine environment could cause massive harm to or irreversible disturbance of the ecological balance.
In order to insist on the international status of the NSR and the NWP, the US initiated the Freedom of Navigation Operation Program (FONOP) back in 1979. So far, Washington has been hesitant to send commercial and military vessels to these maritime areas, as it cannot provide icebreaking escorts and fears a harsh reaction from Russia and Canada. However, the US has not ruled out the possibility of implementing FONOP in the Arctic Ocean when it has the appropriate resources.[11] Both Moscow and Ottawa regard these plans as a serious destabilising factor that could negatively affect the security of the entire region.[12]
Is a Military Conflict Inevitable?
One school of thought believes that the Arctic Five will fight hard for their sovereign rights in the region and push for a further delimitation of the continental shelf and maritime spaces, with Russia and Canada seeking to establish exclusive control over the NSR and NWP. This scenario could lead to the region’s remilitarisation. With the outbreak of the war in Ukraine in 2022, relations between the Western Arctic countries and Russia have deteriorated. The Arctic institutional system has also degraded.[i] The pessimists maintain that even a military conflict cannot be ruled out in the foreseeable future involving both the regional and non-regional actors.
However, regional players do not yet have a sufficiently serious motivation to initiate an armed conflict in the Arctic, and are unlikely to have one in the foreseeable future.[1j] All the actors believe that the challenges in the region can be resolved through negotiations and diplomacy rather than by military force. The current regional military buildup is, from the point of view of Arctic actors, more a means of deterring each other than a preparation for a real military conflict.
This essay argues that the Arctic players will work to resolve existing and potential disputes not by force but through negotiations and international arbitration. Indeed, the countries of the region have more common interests than conflicting ones, and therefore the tendency to cooperate will eventually prevail despite current tensions.
While Western countries may be currently pursuing a confrontational policy in the Arctic, there are still areas that are open to cooperation with all stakeholders, among them: climate action, environmental protection, biodiversity conservation, monitoring ice and permafrost dynamics, search and rescue operations, prevention and dealing with the consequences of natural and man-made disasters, the well-being of indigenous peoples, and sustainable development.
Despite the serious crisis of the regional institutional infrastructure, it would be premature to talk about its collapse. The UN structures—specifically the IMO, UNEP, UNDP, and UNESCO— remain operational in the Arctic. The Northern Forum and the Arctic Economic Council also continue their activities, albeit not as actively as in the earlier years. There are signs of a revival of the Arctic Council’s activities at the working group level.
It is safe to assume that after the end of the Ukrainian conflict, which will reasonably happen sooner or later, it is likely that international Arctic cooperation and regional institutional infrastructure will be fully restored and the ‘great Arctic game’ will end, to the mutual benefit of all players.
Endnotes
[a] In absolute figures, this equals 375 billion barrels of oil compared to the 261 billion barrels of Saudi Arabia. See: Smith and Giles, Russia and the Arctic, 1. Only an insignificant part of the Arctic reserves has been prospected so far.
[b] Using the NSR, it is possible to reduce the cost of cargo delivery between Europe and East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea) by 20-40 percent compared to the southern route.
[lc] Before the COVID-19 pandemic, both the NSR and NWP were common destinations for Arctic tourist cruises. The so-called cross-polar air routes (especially between North America and Asia) run through the Arctic, which remain popular despite the ban on Western airlines flying over the territory of Russia.
[d] Western countries like Norway, Iceland and Greenland are already aggressively expanding Arctic tourism.
[e] Even before his inauguration, Donald Trump announced that he intended to make Canada the 51st US state and purchase Greenland from Denmark. Although these initiatives were unrealistic, they seriously damaged relations with these US NATO allies.
[f] On this basis, these states are included in both the Arctic Council and Barents Euro-Arctic Council (BEAC), the region’s leading governance institutions.
[g] These include the Nordic Council, the Council of Ministers of the Nordic Countries, the Northern Investment Bank, and the Northern Environmental Finance Corporation.
[h] According to UNCLOS, a coastal state has exclusive sovereign rights to explore and exploit the natural resources of its continental shelf up to 200 nautical miles from its shores. Beyond this limit, a coastal state has to provide scientific evidence to establish the extent of the legally defined continental shelf up to 150 nautical miles to exercise the same rights.
[i] Its central component, the Arctic Council, is in a semi-frozen state. The BEAC, after Russia’s withdrawal from it and Finland’s planned withdrawal, may finally disintegrate. The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO has led to even greater tensions in the region and increased military preparations on both sides.
[lj] It should be taken into account that most of the proven and unproven mineral deposits in the Arctic are located in the EEZ of coastal states which, according to international law, no one can claim. Despite the rhetoric of some countries (namely, the US and China) about the need to turn the NSR and NWFP into global commons, these sea lanes are not among the vital interests of these states that would be worth fighting over.
[l] See, for example, Lawson W. Brigham, “Think Again: The Arctic,” Foreign Policy, September-October 2010, 71-74; Peter Arbo et al., “Arctic Futures: Conceptualizations and Images of a Changing Arctic,” Polar Geography 36, no. 3 (2013): 163-182.
[2] “Resources in the Arctic,” Nordregio, https://nordregio.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/0881a_arctic_resources-2-scaled.jpg
[3] U.S. Geological Survey, “Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,” Washington, D.C., GPO, 2008, http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/fs2008–3049.pdf
[4] Mark A. Smith and Keir Giles, “Russia and the Arctic: “The Last Dash North”,” Advanced Research and Assessment Group, Russia Series 07/26 (2007), Defense Academy of the United Kingdom.
[5] Northern (Arctic) Federal University, “Mineral Resources,” 2025, https://arctic.narfu.ru/infologia-arktiki/geo-arktiki/mineralnye-resursy?ysclid=m6wg6xq0g6437947092
[6] “The Fundamentals of the Sustainable Development Strategy of Russia’s Arctic Zone,” Arctic Today, January 29, 2012, https://web.archive.org/web/20121027124152/http://www.arctictoday.ru/council/654.html
[7] Yuri V. Kochemasov, Boris A. Morgunov, and Vladimir I. Solomatin, “Ecological-Economic Assessment of Perspectives of the Arctic’s Development,” Energy: Economy, Technology, Ecology 12 (2005), https:// www.elibrary.ru/download/elibrary_17677837_45050179.pdf (in Russian).
[8] Grid-Arendal, “Northern Sea Route and the Northwest Passage Compared with Currently Used Shipping Routes,” 2008, https://www.grida.no/resources/7150
[9] Mohamed M. Ezat, Kirsten Fahl, and Tine L. Rasmussen, “Arctic Freshwater Outflow Suppressed Nordic Seas Overturning and Oceanic Heat Transport During the Last Interglacial,” Nature Communications 15 (2024): 8998, DOI: 10.1038/s41467-024-53401-3.
[l0] Stratfor, “Territorial Claims and Oil and Gas Development in the Arctic,” 2017, https://www.stratfor.com/sites/default/files/styles/wv_small/public/arctic-territorial-claims-090415_0. png?itok=NFROLl3O
[l1] U.S. Department of State, “Freedom of Navigation Report Annual Release,” March 16, 2021, https://www.state.gov/freedom-of-navigation-report-annual-release/
[l2] V.N. Konyshev and A.A. Sergunin, “Military Security in the Arctic: New Threats to Russia,” Lomonosov World Politics Journal 16, no. 3 (2024): 127-152, DOI: 10.48015/2076-7404-2024-16-3-127-152.
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Alexander Sergunin is Professor of International Relations, St. Petersburg State University. ...
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Valery Konyshev is Professor of International Relations, Russian Academy of National Economy and Public Administration. ...
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