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As the US-China rivalry intensifies, the middle powers must decide whether they want to be the norm-setters or let the world order limit their strategic autonomy
Image Source: Getty
This article is part of the series—Raisina Edit 2025
The Fourth Industrial Revolution taking place this century involves cutting-edge technologies such as quantum computing, Artificial Intelligence (AI), the Internet of Things (IoT), human-machine interfaces, and more. It is unfolding at precisely the same time as the greater multipolarisation of the international system. To be clear, this is correlation, not causation. However, the race to develop and adopt these advanced technologies is hugely significant for the prospects of middle powers to achieve strategic autonomy. Conversely, losing out in the great technology race or becoming overly dependent on the United States (US) or China could hamper their growth.
Kai Fu Lee, in his book AI Superpowers (2018) states that while some countries may become advanced technology hubs and providers of vital information and data flows to others, those at the periphery of these data flows risk becoming dependent on the hub-providers, creating new technology hierarchies.
For middle powers, this is extraordinarily important. What use is there in increasing your strategic autonomy in terms of hard and soft power when nations remain dependent on the goodwill and continued commercial interest of more advanced technology providers?
The race to develop and adopt these advanced technologies is hugely significant for the prospects of middle powers to achieve strategic autonomy.
We already have a preview of this from the Third Industrial Revolution. This unfolded during the 2000s, the latter part of the unipolar era of the US-led world order. The unipolar era itself arose partly because of the US’s vast technological advantage over the technologically moribund erstwhile Soviet Union.
After the Cold War, the US and its closest allies in Europe and Asia led the way in this era of technology. Those within the wider orbit of US partnerships including the innovation economies of Singapore, Taiwan, and South Korea, have significantly enhanced their status as middle powers by developing world-class technology capabilities.
The obvious example is in the global semiconductor supply chain, where Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TMSC) in Taiwan, and Samsung in Korea remain responsible for a high percentage of the worlds advanced semiconductors (albeit dependent on ASML—a Dutch company—and others in Japan that remain instrumental in making the lithography machines that chip makers rely on). By choosing to prioritise specific technology niches, they competed and emerged as the best in their class around the start of the millennium.
The difference now is that technology competition is not occurring in a US-led unipolar era but in a world of real multipolarisation. ost notably, amid increasingly fraught technology competition between the leading superpowers, the US and China. Their competition has become so bitter that it is now involving reciprocal technology bans in attempts to slow each other’s technology innovation.
The most optimistic reading of this suggests that superpower technology competition drives down costs and lowers the barriers to entry for others. Most sensationally, the Chinese AI system DeepSeek’s launch and its low cost of production indicate a trend towards making AI models less expensive to develop. If AI models don’t necessarily require vast resources or capital, which has been the US’s approach to tech innovation so far–lower barriers to entry indicate a faster diffusion away from an American-centric hub of advanced technology.
The Chinese AI system DeepSeek’s launch and its low cost of production indicate a trend towards making AI models less expensive to develop.
The word ‘disruptive’ is overused by tech startups, but there is currently a lot of disruption in the geopolitical technology landscape, and much of it could benefit middle powers.
The more pessimistic reading of the impact of the US-China technology competition, however, is of middle powers finding themselves forced to choose sides in ways that might be detrimental to their interests.
Middle powers are often forced to navigate between these two poles— as the United Kingdom (UK) experienced with Huawei in 2020 when it was compelled to sever ties with the company, not by its strategic instincts but due to US pressure. There are success stories of some countries navigating the two poles more successfully than others– for instance, Singapore– and seeing successes in a more multi-aligned technology policy.
Where does this leave the other middle powers that make up an increasingly multipolar world? How can they tap the best and avoid the worst of what contemporary technology cooperation has in store?
In general, middle powers have considerable and growing agency to operate their policies of multi-alignment and are not merely pawns in great power contests. Grasping this is an important step in understanding how international affairs are changing. This was one of the findings from the respondents to a recent survey on ‘emerging middle powers’ covering Brazil, India, and South Africa.
In technology, however, the story is more uneven. The best-case scenario is that technology competition transforms these nations from peripheral actors to critical nodes in global innovation networks. By investing in human capital, creating supportive policy environments, and maintaining technology autonomy, middle powers like these punch above their weight.
India is emerging as a success story in this regard, as well. It is well-poised in terms of new tech–Unified Payments Interface (UPI) is a great example of an interoperable tech system, given that pre-UPI, India was a 90 percent cash-dependent economy. This offers a useful lesson for other countries looking to transition to a less cash-dependent economy and boost commercial activity. Indeed, India successfully presented this and other technologies to the Global South countries during its hosting of the G20 in 2023, including for boosting cross-border payments.
Middle powers have considerable and growing agency to operate their policies of multi-alignment and are not merely pawns in great power contests.
India has a unique combination of advantages here, including a thriving tech landscape, a large population which is increasingly tech-savvy, a potentially favourable relationship with the US and a local manufacturing hub, which makes it at least somewhat less dependent on China.
India is poised to enhance its technology leadership potential by playing a leading role in AI action worldwide. Prime Minister Narendra Modi also co-chaired the AI Action Summit in Paris, whereas next year, India will be hosting the 2026 edition, allowing some conversations to tilt towards the role of middle powers in the Global South and their needs.
There is action taking place elsewhere, too. For example, this April, the inaugural Kigali Summit on AI will convene to discuss the economic opportunities of AI for Africa. The programme indicates that the event will highlight African AI success stories and draw African Union countries closer together to ensure that technology enhances borderless connections across Africa.
Those middle powers that can positively exploit the rapid advance of technology, whether as norm-setters or technology providers, stand poised to not just enhance the development of their societies but also dramatically extend and widen their influence. On the other hand, those that become trapped in the increasingly bitter contest between the US and China for securing technological advantages might find their strategic autonomy shrink.
In sum, becoming an advanced technology exporter and norm-setter provides an increasingly important route for countries to successfully compete on the world stage. However, if they get entangled in the US-China rivalry, they may never fully realise their potential as truly autonomous global actors.
Samir Puri is a Director at the Centre for Global Governance and Security at Chatham House.
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Samir Puri is a Director at the Centre for Global Governance and Security at Chatham House. ...
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