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Slovakia, heavily impacted by Ukraine’s refusal to renew the Russian gas transit agreement, seeking alternatives
Image Source: Getty
In January 2025, the Ukraine gas transit agreement expired, halting the Russian piped natural gas to Europe via Ukraine. The gas transit agreement was renewed in 2019 for five years, which was initially signed in 2009 for 10 years. Kyiv refused to renew it, arguing that the transit of Russian natural gas to Europe was aiding Moscow in financing its war against Ukraine, leading to a spike in the price of gas. This has impacted several European countries to varying degrees. While Western European nations managed to offset the loss of Russian gas with LNG imports from the US, Qatar, and Norway, Central and Southern Europe felt the impact more acutely. Among them, Slovakia—a landlocked Central European republic—has been the hardest hit by the halt in gas transit through Ukraine. Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico has vehemently opposed Ukraine’s decision and has threatened to halt aid to Ukrainian refugees living in Slovakia and stop the sale of electricity.
Southern and Central European countries, especially Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Slovakia, have a higher dependence on Russia for securing its energy security. However, while Italy, Austria, and Hungary faced disruptions due to the transit halt, they were better prepared, having secured alternative gas sources. Hungary was more dependent on Russian gas transit via the Black Sea through the TurkStream pipeline. Italy and Austria have ports equipped with LNG terminals to receive gas.
Slovakia proposed to renew the gas deal by changing the ownership of Russian gas before it entered Ukraine; in other words, transnational entities would purchase gas from the Russian-Ukrainian border and pay Ukraine for the transit for the same.
However, Slovakia has limited options. That said, Prime Minister Fico's reasoning for maintaining gas transit via Ukraine extends beyond just Slovakia’s energy security. In 2023, Slovakia received 12.67 billion cubic meters of Russian gas via Ukraine, of which it consumed 4.3 billion cubic meters of gas. The country generates a majority of its electricity needs through nuclear energy and uses gas only during peak periods. Thus, Slovakia made more revenue in the transit of natural gas, for which Slovakia received transit fees amounting to US$500 million a year.
In December, Slovakia proposed to renew the gas deal by changing the ownership of Russian gas before it entered Ukraine; in other words, transnational entities would purchase gas from the Russian-Ukrainian border and pay Ukraine for the transit for the same. Kyiv rejected this proposal. This has angered the Slovaks, who assert that Zelenskyy’s decision to end the gas transit was “politically motivated”, harming smaller EU nations.
This scenario needs to be studied through two lenses. First, Fico, like Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, has supported his country’s close relations with Russia and looks at Russian President Vladimir Putin, unlike the rest of Europe, rather favourably and has opposed (along with Orban) Europe’s aid to Ukraine during the Russia-Ukraine War. In December, he also paid a surprise visit to Moscow to hold talks with Putin. Ever since he returned to power in 2023, he has oriented Slovak foreign policy in favour of Russia. Thus, he is making every effort not to jeopardise his country’s relations with Russia, which might happen as a result of the end of the transit deal. It is worth noting here that Fico was not the first Slovak Prime Minister who wanted better relations with Moscow. Former Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar also leaned towards Russia. In the case of Fico, circumstances pushed him into the Russian embrace. After the investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancé were murdered in 2018, a political crisis erupted in Slovakia. The EU demanded a fair investigation, and protests erupted across Slovakia, which led to Fico’s resignation. Other instances, like his stance on refugees and criticism by the EU on values, have also played a role in Fico reaching out to Russia more than his European partners.
Second, the end of the supply of Russian gas poses a hurdle that has a logistical as well as a financial dimension to it. As regards the former, the country will have to find new suppliers to offset 4.3 bcm of gas volumes. New agreements will have to be arrived at through painstaking negotiations. It will translate to higher gas prices for Slovakia which is the financial dimension of this hurdle. Fico has argued that the search for alternative routes will cost Slovakia around 1 billion euros extra every year, and the country will lose around US$500 million it earned every year in transit fees by allowing the gas to pass through its territory to the rest of Europe.
Fico returned to power on the promise of stable governance following a previous administration that struggled with the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost of living crisis.
Presently, the financial drain is a concern for the Slovaks. However, not all are on the same page. In recent years, political polarisation has deepened in Slovakia. Fico returned to power on the promise of stable governance following a previous administration that struggled with the COVID-19 pandemic and the cost of living crisis. Surveys around election time indicated that around half of the population supported Russia in the war, and to this point, his promise of ending military support to Ukraine came in handy. However, on 10th January, thousands marched in the capital, Bratislava, in opposition to Fico’s support for the gas transit deal and Fico’s pro-Russian stance.
To offset short-term gas needs, in November, Slovakia’s main gas buyer, SSP (the largest buyer of Russian gas in Slovakia) signed a short-term contract to purchase natural gas from Azerbaijan. The gas needs for January were met using the country’s domestic reserves. On January 20th this year, Fico met Erdoğan and discussed the possibility of receiving Russian gas via Turkey through the TurkStream pipeline, which runs from Türkiye to Hungary before entering Slovakia. On February 1, Slovakia once again began receiving Russian gas when SPP started importing it via TurkStream. SPP intends to double the gas imports by April as the current imports are insufficient.
However, the cost of alternatively sourcing gas from other countries and Russian gas through alternative routes is not only exorbitantly high but also brings changes to Slovakia’s role in gas transit, which will have long-term impacts on Slovakia’s gas revenues as Europe plans to pivot from the use of Russian gas completely by 2027.
Two months since the cessation of Russian gas through Ukraine, the discourse on the conflict in Ukraine has shifted. Following the 90-minute-long phone call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin on 12 February, potentially restoring US-Russia relations, there has been a growing peace interest to bring the conflict to an end (this included the possibility of sanctions against Russia eventually being revoked). Thus, Slovakia’s stance on the endgame differs from other European countries. Fico has demanded a ceasefire and called for the resumption of gas transit through Ukraine. Furthermore, he has threatened to veto the decisions of the European Council on Ukraine if they go against the interests of Slovakia. With the simmering down of geopolitical risks, the possibility of the resumption of gas transit through Ukraine could be a likely agenda in the negotiations, but a deal being concluded in the short to medium term looks unlikely.
Abhishek Khajuria is a Junior Research Fellow at the Centre for European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.
Abhishek Khajuria is a Research Intern with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation ...
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia's domestic politics and economy, Russia's grand strategy, and India-Russia ...
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