Putin’s recent visit to Vietnam is driven by his intention to establish closer ties with the ASEAN member states, especially amidst West-imposed sanctions.
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Source Image: BBC
After creating ripples across the Asia-Pacific in the aftermath of Russia signing the Comprehensive Strategic Treaty with North Korea, Putin visited Vietnam on 20 June 2024, after a gap of seven years. A lot has changed since then: a war in Ukraine and the Western sanctions have led to Southeast Asia gaining a new emphasis in Russian foreign policy, as reflected in the Russian Concept of Foreign Policy 2023, where a significant emphasis was laid on increasing economic, security and humanitarian cooperation with ASEAN member states. Hence, it is important to assess the implications of the visit not only from the point of view of understanding bilateral relations but also to understand what it means for the Southeast Asian region.
Russia and Vietnam share historical ties, Moscow supported the communist forces during the Vietnam War and was the leading economic partner for Vietnam. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was a slight dip in bilateral ties in the 1990s, but the warm relations continued. In 2001, when Putin visited Hanoi, both nations concluded a strategic partnership, deepening economic and political cooperation. Cooperation in the energy sphere intensified after the Russian gas giant Gazprom and Petrovietnam built a modern refinery. Further, Petrovietnam has been implementing projects in the Nenets Autonomous Okrug in the Russian Arctic since 2008. Moscow has assisted Vietnam in building hydroelectric projects such as the Son La hydropower plant. Vietnam has strategically used Russian firms and investments in oil drilling projects in the South China Sea. By doing so, Vietnam can maintain its sovereignty and keep China at bay.
Russia and Vietnam share historical ties, Moscow supported the communist forces during the Vietnam War and was the leading economic partner for Vietnam.
The military partnership with Russia is another major driver in this dyad, with Moscow supplying Hanoi with military platforms such as the Su-27, Su-30 MKI, S-300 missile system, corvettes, Gepard class frigates, Svetlyak-class patrol boats, Kilo-class submarines, T-90 tanks, etc. In 2012, Russia concluded a Comprehensive Strategic Treaty in 2012. Hanoi was the only Southeast Asian nation to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the Eurasian Economic Union. A military agreement was signed in 2016, and Russia has been granted access to the Cam Ranh Naval Base on a preferential basis.
During this visit, Putin and Vietnamese President To Lam signed 11 agreements in education, nuclear technology research, disease prevention, oil exploration, and justice. The meeting witnessed the participation of leading Russian companies like the state-owned nuclear company Rosatom, the natural gas company Novatek, and the state-controlled oil company Zarubezhneft. Among the important ones, a joint statement on furthering strategic cooperation between Russia and Vietnam was signed. An MoU between Novatek and PetroVietnam on oil and gas cooperation was also inked, whereby Moscow will help build a 10 MW nuclear research facility in Vietnam and another agreement on cooperation on tax administration and countering customs offences. According to President Putin, 40 percent of the trade took place in national currencies, and that cooperation in the Vladivostok and Ho Chi Minh maritime corridor is promising.
Moscow’s outreach to North Korea was largely geopolitical. But his visit to Vietnam has strong geoeconomic undertones with a hint of symbolism. This is because there is a degree of economic dependence due to historical ties, even though bilateral trade was only US$3.6 billion in 2023, which is far less than the US$175 billion trade with China and US$123 billion with the US and is not a major source of trade for Vietnam. Now, with the imposition of international sanctions on Russia, the trade potential will be even lower. But Hanoi is still a crucial partner, as some Vietnamese banks continue to process ruble transactions. Vietnam emerged as a major destination for Russian tourists, with Vietnam ranking 6th in the number of tourists it receives.
Moscow’s outreach to North Korea was largely geopolitical. But his visit to Vietnam has strong geoeconomic undertones with a hint of symbolism.
With the initiation of the Russian concept of Foreign Policy 2023, the Russian Federation emphasises heightened cooperation with ASEAN countries. As part of its broader Look East policy proposed a decade ago, ASEAN is further a target region within the ambit of Russia’s Greater Eurasian partnership, connecting the Far East with Southeast Asia, and therefore Vietnam emerges as a major player in Russia’s outreach to Southeast Asia. This visit solidifies Russia’s relations with Vietnam while signalling growing multipolarity in the foreign policies of Southeast Asian nations.
Putin’s visit to Vietnam is driven by his intention to demonstrate the diplomatic support he still enjoys in the region, especially among the non-Western countries amidst West-imposed sanctions and attempts of isolation. During this visit, Putin stated, he wants to build a “reliable security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region.” By hosting Putin, Vietnam, in turn, became the only country to have successfully hosted the leaders of the US, China, and Russia in recent times. This is clearly reflective of the hedging strategy that most countries in Southeast Asia are employing to deal with the brewing great power competition in the region. The Communist Party of Vietnam calls this strategy as ‘bamboo diplomacy’, that is, “bending with the buffeting winds of great power rivalry without being forced to take sides.” This is also in line with Vietnam’s age-old foreign policy belief of ‘being friends with everyone and avoiding any formal alliances’.
Although there is scepticism and the awareness that Russia is possibly not in a position to supply any major weapons to Hanoi at the moment because of the Ukraine crisis, according to analysts, “Vietnam is still extraordinarily grateful for what was then the Soviet Union's massive support for the Vietnamese forces in the long Indochina wars," and this is also the reason as to why Vietnam is in a predicament as to how to address the war in Ukraine and has therefore maintained a ‘neutral stance’ on this issue as well. Vietnam has chosen to abstain from various resolutions passed at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions while maintaining cordial relations with Ukraine by sending some aid to Kyiv as well. Ahead of his visit, Putin was even seen as complimenting Vietnam for its ‘balanced position’ on the Ukraine crisis. Vietnam is also trying to seek alternate sources for acquiring military weapons and diversifying its security partnership with other countries as well, but it will still take time for Hanoi to completely end its dependence on Russia in this aspect.
Vietnam has chosen to abstain from various resolutions passed at the United Nations condemning Russia’s actions while maintaining cordial relations with Ukraine by sending some aid to Kyiv as well.
During his visit, Putin noted that 'strengthening the strategic comprehensive partnership with Vietnam has always been a priority for Russia’. For Vietnam, this visit is mostly being seen as an opportunity to discuss concrete measures to boost the bilateral trade and economic cooperation between the two countries. Vietnam has also expressed interest in joining the BRICS, where Moscow has assumed the rotating chairmanship this year alongside two other Southeast Asian nations, Malaysia and Thailand.
This visit has not been well-received by the US, with which Vietnam upgraded its relationship to a when US President Joe Biden visited the country last year. An US State Department spokesperson commented that, “no country should give Putin a platform to promote his war of aggression and otherwise allow him to normalize his atrocities.” Trade between the US and Vietnam has also accelerated in the recent times, and the US is currently reviewing to upgrade Vietnam’s market economy status, which would allow Hanoi to benefit from lower tariffs on goods imported into the US.
The US and its allies are important to Vietnam in dealing with the security challenges posed by China’s growing assertive actions in the South China Sea. The clash between Vietnam and China in the South China Sea is also becoming intense, even if not as intense as in the case of the Philippines. But at the same time, Vietnam does not intend to get too close to the US as this might lead to China applying more pressure on Vietnam in the South China Sea as is the case now with the Philippines.
It is obvious that this visit will not bode well with the US and its allies, but for Vietnam, this is about not choosing sides and sacrificing its ties with one country to satisfy the other. It is essentially about keeping up with its “foreign policy of diversification and pursuing a strategy of autonomy.”
Adopting a hedging strategy to deal with the US-China great power competition in the region has been the go to policy adopted by most Southeast Asian nations. For some in Southeast Asia, the Ukraine crisis is also seen as a ‘faraway crisis’. For instance, for a country like Thailand, a US ally, public opinion on the Russia-Ukraine war is just as divided as in Vietnam. With countries like Malaysia and Thailand, along with Vietnam, also expressing interest in joining the BRICS at a time when Moscow has assumed the rotating chairmanship, it shows that most countries in Southeast Asia want to keep their options open and diversify their partnerships by not heavily relying on any one country for fulfilling their needs both in the economic and the security domain.
Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation.
Premesha Saha is a Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Rajoli Siddharth Jayaprakash is a Research Assistant with the ORF Strategic Studies programme, focusing on Russia's domestic politics and economy, Russia's grand strategy, and India-Russia ...
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Premesha Saha is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses on Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania and the emerging dynamics of the ...
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