The challenges of disruption of critical undersea infrastructure loom large. Thus, significant emphasis needs to be placed on the security and protection of such assets.
Maritime security is conceptually complex and intersectional. With countries directing enhanced focus to the maritime domain on account of seaborne trade and connectivity, preparedness for the mitigation of maritime security challenges has followed as a critical policy priority. However, maritime security does not simply refer to securing the maritime domain. The oceanic geographies are intersectional spaces with increasing interface with other important spatial domains such as territorial spaces, polar regions, outer space, and undersea domains. Therefore, maritime security has a significant overlap with the security of these domains.
The undersea domain has increasingly evolved as one critical space which has a critical bearing on maritime security thinking. In this light, undersea infrastructure protection appears to be a key priority in broader thinking of maritime security. So, what does undersea infrastructure refer to? Simply put, undersea infrastructure refers to equipment and technology placed or anchored on the ocean floor such as cables for telecommunication, power transmission, or equipment for scientific research. In an increasingly globalised world, with exacerbated dependency on digital communication and energy security, the importance of undersea infrastructure is evident. Such infrastructure serves as the foundation of modern digital communication.
The undersea domain has increasingly evolved as one critical space which has a critical bearing on maritime security thinking. In this light, undersea infrastructure protection appears to be a key priority in broader thinking of maritime security.
Arguably, the recent developments in Europe have put critical undersea infrastructure on the map. The need to secure undersea infrastructure received salience recently in the aftermath of reports from Vice Admiral Didier Maleterre, the deputy commander of NATO’s Allied Maritime Command (Marcom) alleging the possibility of Russia’s pursuit of ‘hybrid warfare’ targeting underwater infrastructure rendering the West’s dependency on such assets vulnerable. Notably, following this, NATO has launched a new Maritime Centre for Security of Critical Undersea Infrastructure. A networking and knowledge centre focused on critical undersea infrastructure, this new centre is responsible for assisting NATO’s Marcom in the coordination and deployment of forces to monitor and deter aggressions on undersea infrastructure.
This merits a broader focus on the changing nature of maritime security. The maritime domain has emerged as a pivotal site of geopolitical contestations due to the growing reliance of states on seaborne trade and connectivity. This has been naturally followed by the need to secure assets in the ocean. These assets can be broadly classified into two categories: First are mobile assets such as vessels, ships, submarines, etc. Second are stationary assets such as island holdings, ports, military facilities at sea, etc. Critical undersea infrastructure falls within the latter category. Cables placed on seafloors are increasingly seen as important assets which need protection due to the growing threat. The maritime domain is increasingly emerging as a volatile space. Recent events have demonstrated how states increasingly face challenges at sea amounting to the risk of destruction of assets that are key to their national interest. These aggressions bear risks from both traditional and non-traditional actors. Even though it is true that the destruction of undersea infrastructure requires modern and nuanced weaponry, which is often accessible to state actors, the potential threats from non-state actors should not be discounted. Recent events in the Red Sea have evidenced that non-traditional actors at sea such as pirates and terrorist groups have often acted as proxies for states, with access to modern and sophisticated weaponry. This has further complicated the risks posed to undersea infrastructure. Importantly, undersea infrastructure assets are of use to all states. The cables on the ocean floors help in facilitating connectivity and energy resource availability. These are especially crucial for island states that are often dependent on these assets significantly for digital communication. Therefore, the cohort of stakeholders of such assets is vast and expansive. Thus, the protection of these assets is of key interest to all states.
The maritime domain has emerged as a pivotal site of geopolitical contestations due to the growing reliance of states on seaborne trade and connectivity. This has been naturally followed by the need to secure assets in the ocean.
This follows the question—how can safety and security of critical undersea infrastructure be ensured? The nature of threats looming over undersea infrastructure requires an approach driven by mechanisms of monitoring and deterrence. This is also underscored in NATO’s approach to securing critical undersea infrastructure. For this, states need to coordinate and cooperate on enhancing technical standards of maritime security, facilitating interoperability among naval forces, and working towards generating synergy in information dissemination. Towards this end, maximising the involvement of key stakeholders is required. Here, small states and major powers need to work together. Small states can contribute to efforts to secure critical undersea infrastructure owing to their geographical location, and major powers can contribute by sharing technical capabilities. For this, two important domains that require critical attention are information sharing and patrolling on the high seas. Major powers that have the capabilities and technical bandwidth to invest in efforts of securing undersea infrastructure assets need to work towards enhanced focus in this domain.
The nature of threats looming over undersea infrastructure requires an approach driven by mechanisms of monitoring and deterrence.
In the Indo-Pacific context, the challenges of disruption of critical undersea infrastructure loom large. The Indo-Pacific, in many ways, has evolved as the centre stage of geopolitical and strategic competition, with China’s increasingly aggressive naval advances and posturing. Growing instances of naval confrontation among China and other resident states such as the Philippines demonstrate the need to inject momentum in efforts to secure the seas. On the other hand, the spotlight is back on the Western Indian Ocean due to increasing instances of piracy attacks. The maritime security architecture in the Indo-Pacific region has largely remained fragmented with states focusing on sub-regional minilateral initiatives of naval security. To address the looming threats over the safety and security of critical undersea infrastructure, stakeholders need to deepen and expand efforts at a broader collective level. The Indo-Pacific geography houses major powers as well as small states, both of which need to increase synergy for the protection of undersea infrastructure to meet their energy security and connectivity interests. In this context, India’s role remains pivotal. New Delhi’s stake in the protection of undersea infrastructure is vital as it has key interests in regions housing such assets that are at risk of disruption, including the SCS, as well as the Western Indian Ocean. Notably, India is well placed to galvanise efforts for securing undersea infrastructure. India’s Information Fusion Centre—Indian Ocean Region, founded in 2018 has emerged as a vital apparatus for promotion and collaboration for maritime safety and security. It is essential to expand the scope of such centres in tandem with the emerging dimensions of maritime security such as the safety of critical undersea infrastructure.
However, this can materialise only after a broader shift in maritime security thinking. Security at sea has often been conceptualised through the singular prism of high seas. Increasingly, new domains have evolved that are vital in shaping maritime security architectures. This is most evident with the emergence of critical interfaces within the maritime domain such as outer space, polar regions, as well as undersea infrastructure. This merits a paradigm shift in the way maritime security is seen, by incorporating these vital facets. Threats emerging in the maritime domain are no longer limited just to naval assets, but also undersea infrastructure such as telecommunication and power transmission cables. Significant emphasis needs to be placed on the security and protection of such assets. For this, efforts to enhance the monitoring of such assets are key and thus a coordinated approach towards information dissemination and patrolling must be adopted.
Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. At ORF, Sayantan’s research focuses on Maritime Studies. He is interested in questions of ...
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