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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
Calls for reforms of the International Financial Architecture (IFA) are foregrounded by the growing financing needs of developing countries, driven by mounting climate-related challenges; conflict and violence; rising numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs); and macroeconomic imbalances, including crippling debt service and debt distress.
Debates on IFA reforms have particularly centred on International Financial Institutions (IFIs), including the two Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs)—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group (WBG)—as well as other Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs).[1] There are proposals to expand the financial firepower and lending capacity of these institutions through a combination of financial engineering, aimed at optimising MDB balance sheets, and increased capital commitments from developed nations.
However, in the current global political landscape, these efforts face massive obstacles. Geopolitical competition may divert resources away from international cooperation, as advanced economies prioritise military spending and investments in infrastructure, manufacturing, and research, development, and innovation (RD&I) in biomedical, digital, and green technologies. Great-power rivalries could weaken multilateral institutions and governance mechanisms by reducing the willingness to compromise and negotiate.
This essay argues that IFI resources are unlikely to increase remarkably in the short to medium term, even as the financial needs of developing countries continue to grow. Developing nations must therefore mobilise alternative resources beyond traditional official development assistance (ODA), including international private capital and domestic savings.
In this context, IFIs play an increasingly vital role. Over the years, they have accumulated unparalleled knowledge of the policy environments and institutional frameworks necessary for success. This expertise, derived from deep and practical experience across diverse economies, offers developing countries valuable, impartial insights.
Developing nations can leverage this expertise to strengthen domestic capabilities, frameworks, institutions, policies, and projects that attract international private investment, enhance the effectiveness of public spending, and mobilise domestic capital. These efforts, in turn, contribute to well-designed growth strategies, for which these authors have earlier proposed a general framework.[2]
The WBG, one of the oldest IFIs, was originally designed for post-Second World War reconstruction in Europe and economic development in developing countries. Over time, the WBG expanded its mandate by establishing two affiliates: the International Finance Corporation (IFC) in 1956, and the International Development Association (IDA) in 1960.[a]
In the 1970s, the WBG shifted its focus to poverty reduction, expanding lending into new sectors such as environmental protection and rural development. During the 1980s and 1990s, it responded to global challenges by promoting structural adjustment policies (SAPs) and supporting pro-market reforms in former Soviet-aligned nations.
Since the late 1990s, the WBG has prioritised sustainable development, community-driven initiatives, climate change mitigation, anti-corruption efforts, and transparency.[b] However, the WBG has faced criticism for neglecting the social consequences of SAPs and enforcing a one-size-fits-all approach under the so-called Washington Consensus.
To be sure, the BWIs have undergone recalibration and self-reform since the mid-1990s, marked by several initiatives. These include the launch of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Program in 1996, the introduction of the Strategic Compact and staff decentralisation in 1997, the creation of the Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) in 1999, and the establishment of the Capital Markets Consultative Group (CMCG) in 2000 and the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) in 2001.[c],[3]
The strategic reflections continued following the COVID-19 pandemic. During the October 2022 Annual Meetings of the BWIs in Washington, D.C., shareholders called on the WBG to develop a roadmap for addressing poverty reduction, shared prosperity, and global challenges. The resulting roadmap, published in December 2022,[4] focused on Global Public Goods (GPGs), including climate adaptation and mitigation, as well as pandemic preparedness, prevention, and response. Further reforms were proposed in 2023 by the Independent Expert Group (IEG), commissioned by the Indian Presidency of the G20. Their two-volume report advocated for “better, bigger, and bolder” MDBs.[d],[5] In 2024, an external advisory group was formed by the BWIs to lead stakeholder consultations on the future of the global economy, international cooperation, and the role of BWIs in ending poverty and fostering shared prosperity on a liveable planet.[e]
The Financing for Sustainable Development Report (FSDR) 2024 estimates6 that the annual SDG financing gap in developing countries ranges from US$2.4 trillion to US$4 trillion. The compounded crises of the early 2020s—including the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and runaway inflation—have placed additional strain on developing nations, worsening public finances and deepening vulnerabilities. Proposed reforms of MDBs are inadequate to meet these financing needs. During the 2024 Spring Meetings of the IMF and the WBG, 10 MDBs announced that balance sheet optimisation measures could generate an additional US$300 billion to US$400 billion over the next decade—equivalent to just US$30 billion to US$40 billion per year—far short of what is required to bridge the SDG financing gap.[7]
Indeed, recent years have seen the erosion of hard-won gains in reducing hunger and extreme poverty. Undernourishment has steadily increased, and in Africa, one in every five are suffering from food insecurity—a trend that accelerated following the pandemic. The prevalence of undernourishment has risen sharply since 2020, making Africa the worstaffected region, where nearly 20 percent of the population faced food insecurity as of 2023.
Figure 1. Prevalence of Undernourishment Globally and in Select Regions (in %, 2017-2023)
Sources: FAO, IFAD, UN F, WFP, WHO. (2024)[8] Note: Figures for 2021 to 2023 are estimates.
The polycrisis has further strained public finances in developing nations, as governments struggled to cushion its effects while coping with rising interest rates. Public debt in developing countries has increased at roughly twice the rate of that in developed economies. By 2023, external sovereign debt (excluding China) had surged to nearly 2.5 times its 2008 level.[9]
Public debt-to-GDP ratios have risen sharply since 2010. The median ratio in developing countries increased from approximately 35 percent in 2010 to 55 percent in 2023. While the overall median has declined from its pandemic peak (over 60 percent of GDP in 2020), it has continued to rise in Africa, reaching 62 percent in 2023.[f],[10]
Another acute challenge confronting developing nations, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), is forced displacement due to both climate-related disasters and conflict. As of 2023, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) globally had more than doubled over the past decade, with SSA accounting for nearly half of all IDPs[11] despite having only 15 percent of the world’s population. Conflict-driven displacement alone was 70-percent higher in 2023 than the average for the previous decade.[12
Figure 2. Number of Internally Displaced Persons Globally and by Select Region (in million people, 2014-2023)
Source: IDMC (2024)[13]
Note: EAP: East Asia & Pacific: MENA: Middle East & North Africa; SA: South Asia.
These surging needs are compounded by adverse geopolitical conditions, which are likely to block any meaningful reforms of IFIs and MDBs.
Geopolitical polarisation is likely to hinder meaningful reforms of IFIs. The following are the key aspects of this polarisation:
The U.S.-China Rivalry. In the United States (US), bipartisan consensus has shifted towards maintaining global primacy, particularly in response to China’s rising economic and strategic influence. China’s growing share of global GDP, industrial output, military spending, RD&I, and trade—combined with its deep integration into global value chains for clean and critical technologies—has fuelled this competition.
Washington’s approach is reflected in its obstruction of appointments to the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Appellate Body and the introduction of new industrial policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS and Science Act of 2022. Early decisions by the Trump administration to withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2025 have further reinforced this trend. At the time of writing, even continued US participation in the BWIs—and the implications for their credit ratings—remain uncertain.[14]
Europe’s Economic Model Under Pressure. In the European Union (EU), a report led by Mario Draghi, former Italian Prime Minister and European Central Bank (ECB) governor, emphasised the urgent need for increased financial resources to address clean energy, defence, digital technology, and healthcare—sectors essential to competitiveness, innovation, productivity, and welfare.[15] However, financing these priorities, alongside ageing-related social costs and automation-driven job displacement, places additional strain on European governments, limiting their ability to meet ODA commitments.
Defence spending is set to rise among NATO countries, with US President Donald Trump proposing a target of 5 percent of GDP for all 32 members.[16] This goal has already been adopted by Poland[17] and embraced by Baltic states such as Estonia and Lithuania.[18] The increase in European defence budgets comes in response to Russia’s military spending surge, which reached 6.7 percent of GDP in 2024—exceeding the total military expenditure of European NATO members combined.[19]
Declining ODA. ODA from high-income countries and other major economies has come under increasing pressure. Excluding contributions to Ukraine and in-donor refugee costs, as well as the tail-end of COVID-19-related aid, total ODA from the 32 member states of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) declined by 2 percent in 2023 compared to 2019.[20] In 2023, total ODA stood at US$223.3 billion. Had all DAC countries met their 0.7 percent Gross National Income (GNI) commitment, an additional US$196 billion—roughly 5 percent of the SDG financing gap—would have been available.
The early 2025 freeze of US Agency for International Development (USAID) operations further underscores a shift in Western conservative-populist movements away from international development cooperation.[g] Given these trends, it is reasonable to assume that official external resources available to developing countries will not increase in the next five years. This makes it imperative for these nations to explore alternative financing sources, particularly in international private capital markets.
This section explores how the relationship between developing countries and IFIs can, and should, evolve.
Priority Areas of Joint Action and Collaboration
The future of cooperation between IFIs and developing countries should centre on four priority areas that require urgent attention. Addressing these challenges can effectively generate benefits in the short to medium term.
A pillar of this collaboration must be climate change adaptation and mitigation. IFIs should assist developing countries in managing climate risks and transitioning to low-carbon economies by facilitating access to climate finance and promoting innovative mechanisms such as debt-for-climate swaps. Beyond financing, they should provide technical expertise on climate-smart agriculture, energy efficiency, and renewable energy while supporting the development of carbon pricing mechanisms and green investment strategies.
Equally critical is the issue of debt sustainability and fiscal resilience. IFIs should offer technical assistance to help developing countries strengthen debt management and enhance fiscal stability. This support should include advocating for transparent debt practices and taking a more proactive role in debt restructuring to prevent financial crises and ensure macroeconomic stability.
Digital public infrastructure (DPI) presents another transformative opportunity for developing economies. India’s success in this area offers valuable lessons on how DPI can improve public service delivery, foster competitive markets, and drive innovation. IFIs should help developing countries adopt a needs-based approach to digital transformation, ensuring that digital ecosystems are inclusive, rights-preserving, and sustainable. Additionally, they should assist in assessing infrastructure readiness and establishing governance frameworks to guide this transition.
Finally, addressing the growing challenge of IDPs is becoming increasingly urgent, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, where displacement due to conflict and climate-related disasters continues to rise. IFIs should provide financial and technical assistance to host countries, enhancing infrastructure and public services in affected areas. In parallel, they should support programmes that foster economic opportunities and promote social inclusion for IDPs while strengthening local governance capacity to manage displacement effectively.
By prioritising these areas, IFIs and developing countries can create a more resilient, sustainable, and inclusive development framework that responds to today’s most pressing challenges.
Mobilising Private Capital
As ODA plateaus and faces increasing constraints, developing countries must find more effective ways to engage the private sector. IFIs can provide crucial expertise in designing strategies to mobilise private capital and foster sustainable private sector participation in development efforts.
IFI assistance can operate at multiple levels, depending on a country’s stage of economic development and specific needs. At the macroeconomic level, particularly for low-income countries (LICs), the focus should be on ensuring macroeconomic stability to create a favourable investment climate. At the sectoral level, IFIs should work to identify and address sector-specific constraints that hinder private capital inflows, whether from foreign or domestic sources. At the project level, assistance should be directed toward establishing institutions for project selection, appraisal, and evaluation to maximise investment efficiency.
For middle-income countries (MICs), IFI support may concentrate more on sectoral and project-level interventions. This approach represents a shift from traditional practices in several ways. First, it redefines economic development in terms of concrete, measurable short- and medium-term goals for resource mobilisation. Second, it moves away from a one-size-fits-all model by tailoring IFI assistance to each country’s unique needs. Finally, it emphasises efficiency, ensuring that every dollar of IFI support is strategically leveraged for the greatest possible impact.
Beyond policy support, IFIs should act as catalysts by offering guarantees and risk mitigation instruments to attract private investors. They can also facilitate public-private partnerships (PPPs), which combine public and private resources to finance essential infrastructure and services. Additionally, innovative financing mechanisms such as blended finance—which merges public and private funds—should be promoted to stimulate investment in highimpact sectors.
Another critical priority is fostering responsible and sustainable business practices. IFIs should provide technical assistance to help companies integrate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, ensuring that investments align with long-term development goals. They should also support the development of local supply chains and facilitate technology transfers, enabling domestic businesses to access global markets and innovation. By strengthening private sector engagement, IFIs can help bridge funding gaps, enhance economic resilience, and promote inclusive, sustainable growth in developing countries.
Indeed, the past two decades have seen the rise of financial actors with unprecedented capital resources. By the end of 2023, the top 500 asset management firms managed US$128 trillion in discretionary assets—an increase of 12.5 percent from 2022.[21] Moreover, private equity deal-making reached US$2 trillion in 2024,[22] while sovereign wealth funds managed US$1.8 trillion in the same year.[23]
Additional capital flows are being fuelled by trade surpluses—China alone recorded a nearly US$1 trillion surplus in 2024—and energy windfalls, such as Qatar’s expanding liquefied natural gas (LNG) projects. Meanwhile, the speculative investment appetite of retail investors, as seen in the cryptocurrency market, suggests that substantial savings could be redirected toward high-return, productive sectors such as computing power, renewable energy, and utilities like clean water and transportation infrastructure.
Moving forward, the relationship between IFIs and developing countries must evolve to become more targeted and strategic. IFIs should prioritise technical assistance in key areas that support pro-growth strategies, helping developing nations strengthen their domestic capacities, frameworks, institutions, and policies to attract private investment and mobilise sustainable development financing.
Recommendations for Developing Countries
Building on the post-Washington Consensus economic framework outlined earlier in this article,[24] developing countries must adopt a new approach to engaging with IFIs. They should collaborate with IFIs to design domestic growth strategies rooted in their comparative advantages, ensuring that economic policies align with national strengths and potential. Maintaining fiscal responsibility, practicing prudent debt management, and strengthening institutional integrity and governance are essential for preserving credibility and fostering investor confidence. Enhancing inclusive and transparent decision-making will build trust and ensure that policies reflect broader societal interests, allowing economic frameworks to adapt to global uncertainties without compromising long-term growth.
Harnessing technology to boost productivity is another priority. By fostering digital transformation, encouraging innovation, and expanding access to modern infrastructure, countries can unlock efficiencies and enhance competitiveness in global markets. Investing in education and skills development is essential to ensure that technological advancements translate into broad-based economic gains.
Sustained growth also requires structural transformation—shifting from reliance on lowvalue- added sectors to higher-productivity industries. This involves diversifying exports, supporting industrial upgrade, and fostering an environment conducive to entrepreneurship and investment in high-growth sectors. Strengthening supply chains, integrating into global trade networks, and building linkages between agriculture, manufacturing, and services will drive long-term prosperity.
Financial sector development should focus on mechanisms that efficiently allocate resources towards economic complexity, fostering innovation, and driving productivity gains. Incorporating science and technology into decision-making and public policy will enhance efficiency and responsiveness to development challenges. Strategic investments in connectivity, green infrastructure, and human capital will lay the foundation for sustainable growth and long-term competitiveness.
Rather than passively adopting external prescriptions, developing countries should engage with IFIs strategically, shaping financing and advisory services to align with their unique economic trajectories. This approach reinforces sovereignty while leveraging global expertise for national development.
Recommendations for IFIs
IFIs should strategically allocate their resources to maximise impact across key policy areas. A priority must be enhancing technical assistance to help developing countries attract private investment, implement governance reforms, and strengthen institutions. By equipping governments with the necessary expertise, IFIs can foster more resilient and dynamic economies. For example, instead of merely financing infrastructure projects, IFIs should focus on establishing institutions for project selection and execution in recipient countries. By doing so, they can enable the identification of viable road projects, which can then attract funding from emerging sources of capital. While this objective was sometimes implicit in past projects, it was never explicitly defined or made a measurable goal. This shift in approach will influence how IFI performance is evaluated, requiring adjustments over time.
Beyond technical support, IFIs should act as impartial advisors, offering evidence-based policy recommendations tailored to each country’s context. Facilitating policy dialogue and knowledge sharing will ensure that development strategies are responsive to local challenges. Additionally, IFIs must play a catalytic role in mobilising private capital by providing guarantees and risk mitigation instruments, making investments in critical sectors more attractive to private investors.
Collaboration with public institutions is also essential. IFIs should focus on building trust among member countries, fostering cooperation, and overcoming political barriers that hinder coordinated action. A decentralised, client-centric approach will help tailor assistance to each country’s needs, making IFI support more effective and responsive to national priorities.
For middle-income countries, IFIs should adopt a differentiated approach, recognising their distinct challenges and development paths. Providing incentives for reform and offering customised support will help these countries sustain progress and avoid stagnation. IFIs must also prioritise the climate-development nexus, investing in climate adaptation and mitigation, promoting green technologies, and supporting sustainable development practices. By focusing on these strategic areas, IFIs can enhance their effectiveness, strengthen partnerships, and better support developing countries in achieving inclusive and sustainable growth.
Global challenges call for a paradigm shift in the relationship between IFIs and developing countries. Rather than relying primarily on international assistance, developing nations should leverage technical expertise to mobilise private capital—both foreign and domestic— for development.
In turn, IFIs must prioritise technical assistance, institution-building, and private capital mobilisation to help countries achieve sustainable and resilient growth. To maximise these opportunities, developing nations must proactively strengthen their domestic capacities and engage strategically with IFIs to advance their development goals.
In an increasingly fragmented global landscape, strong government leadership and committed public actors are essential to making the most effective use of the limited resources available from IFIs.
Endnotes
[a] The International Finance Corporation (IFC) was set up to support private sector development, and the International Development Association (IDA), to assist less-credit-worthy nations.
[b] Other MDBs have since followed similar paths.
[c] More recent milestones include the adoption of the Twin Goals of eradicating extreme poverty and promoting shared prosperity in 2014 , the Forward Look strategy in 2016, the IBRD/IFC capital package in 2018 , and the first WBG strategy on Fragility, Conflict, and Violence (FCV) in 2020. See: https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/statement/2023/01/13/ world-bank-group-statement-on-evolution-roadmap
[d] The progress of MDBs in their reforms is tracked by the Center for Global Development (CGD) through the Multilateral Development Bank Reform Tracker. See: https://www.cgdev.org/media/mdb-reform-tracker
[e] The group of external advisors is composed of Sri Mulyani Indrawati, Minister of Finance of Indonesia; Patrick Achi, former Prime Minister of Côte d’Ivoire; and Mark Malloch Brown, former Deputy Secretary-General of the UNI. See: https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2024/06/28/pr24250-imf-wbg-announce-joint-bretton-woods-80-initiative. One closed-door meeting under Chatham House Rules was organised in the framework of this initiative at the Policy Center for the New South (PCNS) in February 2025. See: https://www.policycenter.ma/events/bwi-80-dialogue-futureworld- bank-group-and-international-monetary-fund
[f] The share of African countries with public debt exceeding 60 percent of GDP grew from 25 percent in 2013 to 46 percent in 2023. As of 31 October 2024, the IMF reported that 11 countries were in debt distress—9 of them in Sub- Saharan Africa (SSA)—while 24 countries were at high risk (including 8 in SSA), 25 at moderate risk, and 7 at low risk.
[g] An illustration of this posture can be found in reports from conservative think tanks in the US. See: https://www. heritage.org/progressivism/commentary/how-usaid-went-woke-and-destroyed-itself
[l] MDBs include the WBG and other Regional Development Banks (RDBs). RDBs include major and so-called legacy institutions such as the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB), Development Bank of Latin America (CAF), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), European Investment Bank (EIB), Inter American Development Bank (IDB or IADB), and Islamic Development Bank (IsDB). Two new RDBs have been established in the past decade. These are the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB). There are other, smaller RDBs, such as the Eurasian Development Bank (EDB). There are also Sub Regional Development Banks (SRDBs), which include institutions such as the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) and the Central American Bank of Economic Integration (BCIE) in the Americas. In Africa, SRDBs include “the Southern African Trade [and] Development Bank ([former]ly referred to as the PTA Bank), East African Development Bank (EADB), West African Development Bank (BOAD) and Ecowas Bank for Investment and Development (EBID)”. One can also mention the Pacific Islands Development Bank, in Oceania. See: https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/gca-africa-adaptationfinance/ actors/sub-regional-development-banks-srdbs-2/
[2] The framework is based on Karim El Aynaoui and Hinh T. Dinh, “Economic Development of the New South After the Washington Consensus,” Groupe d’études géopolitiques, 2024, https://geopolitique.eu/en/2024/12/18/navigatingtodays- complex-economic-policy-triangle-a-view-from-the-south-en/
[3] Otaviano Canuto et al., “The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture: Toward a System that Delivers for the South,” Atlantic Council/Africa Center & Policy Center for the New South, 2024, https://www.policycenter.ma/publications/ reform-global-financial-architecture-toward-system-delivers-south
[4] Canuto et al., “The Reform of the Global Financial Architecture: Toward a System that Delivers for the South”
[5] G20 International Expert Group, Strengthening Multilateral Development Banks: The Triple Agenda, 2023, https:// www.gihub.org/resources/publications/strengthening-multilateral-development-banks-the-triple-agenda-reportof- the-g20-independent-experts-group/.
[6] UN, Financing for Sustainable Development Report 2024. Financing for Development at a Crossroads, United Nations, 2025, https://sdg.iisd.org/news/annual-sdg-financing-gaps-measured-in-trillions-fsdr-2024/
[7] OECD, Multilateral Development Finance 2024, Paris, OECD Publishing, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1787/8f1e2b9b-en. Retrieved from: https://www.oecd.org/en/publications/multilateral-development-finance-2024_8f1e2b9b-en.html
[8] FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO, The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2024 – Financing to End Hunger, Food Insecurity and Malnutrition in All Its Forms, Rome, 2024, https://doi.org/10.4060/cd1254en
[9] Marina Zucker-Marques, Kevin P. Gallagher, and Ulrich Volz, Defaulting on Development and Climate: Debt Sustainability and the Race for the 2030 Agenda and Paris Agreement, Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Centre for Sustainable Finance, SOAS, University of London; Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2024, https://drgr.org/research/ report-defaulting-on-development-and-climate-debt-sustainability-and-the-race-for-the-2030-agenda-and-parisagreement/
[l0] UNCTAD, A World of Debt Report 2024. A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity, 2024, https://unctad.org/publication/ world-of-debt
[l1] IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024, 2024, https://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/ grid2024/
[l2] IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024
[l3] IDMC, Global Report on Internal Displacement 2024
[l4] Marc Jones, “Moody’s Warns World Bank’s Triple-A Rating Threatened if Trump Pulls Support,” Reuters, February 11, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/business/finance/moodys-warns-triple-a-threat-if-trump-pulls-world-banksupport- 2025-02-10/
[l5] Mario Draghi, The Future of European Competitiveness, European Commission, 2024, https://commission.europa.eu/ topics/eu-competitiveness/draghi-report_en#paragraph_47059
[l6] “Remarks by President Trump at The World Economic Forum,” The White House, January 23, 2025, https://www. whitehouse.gov/remarks/2025/01/remarks-by-president-trump-at-the-world-economic-forum/
[l7] The Economist, “How Poland Emerged as a Leading Defence Power,” https://www.economist.com/europe/2025/01/22/ how-poland-emerged-as-a-leading-defence-power
[l8] Richard Milne and Marton Dunai, “Lithuania and Estonia Pledge to Meet Donald Trump’s 5% Target on Defence Spending,” The Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/a999f239-3104-419a-95dc-bf9c04242b2f
[l9] Fenella McGerty and Karl Dewey, “Global Defence Spending Soars to New High,” Military Balance Blog, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), February 12, 2025, https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/militarybalance/ 2025/02/global-defence-spending-soars-to-new-high/
[20] “Official Development Assistance (ODA)”, The One Campaign, https://data.one.org/topics/official-developmentassistance/
[2l] Thinking Ahead Institute, The World’s Largest 500 Asset Managers, A Thinking Ahead Institute and Pensions & Investments Joint Study, October 2024, https://www.thinkingaheadinstitute.org/research-papers/the-worldslargest- asset-managers-2024/
[22] Alexander Edlich et al., Global Private Markets Report 2025: Private Equity Emerging from the Fog, Private Capital Practice, McKinsey & Company, February 2025, https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/private-capital/our-insights/ global-private-markets-report#/
[23] “Sovereign Wealth Funds Managed a Total of $13.2 Trillion of Assets in 2023, Up 14% on the Previous Year, According to a Report by IE University and ICEX-Invest in Spain,” IE University Center for the Governance of Change, November 2024, https://www.ie.edu/university/news-events/news/sovereign-wealth-funds-managed-total-132-trillion-assets- 2023-14-previous-year-according-report-ie-university-icex-invest-spain/
[24] El Aynaoui and Dinh, “Economic Development of the New South After the Washington Consensus”
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Karim El Aynaoui, Executive President, Policy Center for the New South Morocco ...
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Hinh T. Dinh is Senior Fellow, Policy Center for the New South and President, Economic Growth and Transformation. ...
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Akram Zaoui is Chargé de Mission to the Executive President, Policy Center for the New South. ...
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