Pakistan’s TNWs could deter India's conventional military superiority, preventing territorial gains. The threat of tactical nuclear escalation might compel India to maintain a measured response in conflict.
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After the overt nuclearisation of India and Pakistan in 1998, the Indian subcontinent sits under the ominous shadow of nuclear weapons. The effects of the long-standing rivalry between India and Pakistan, fuelled by historical baggage and territorial disputes, have also manifested in the nuclear realm of the relationship. While the possession of nuclear weapons has added a new lethal arrow in the quiver of both nations, the introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan injects a new element of uncertainty into this volatile relationship. Pakistan’s perceived threat from India which emanates from its structural, institutional, and military weaknesses, has prompted it to undertake military adventures in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. Failing which, it has come to a broader strategic conclusion that the Indian military modernisation, enabled by rapid economic and technological strides, makes India conventionally superior. India’s conventional military superiority and Pakistan’s desire to neutralise it through its TNWs have shaped Pakistan’s defence build-up and its nuclear doctrine as a whole.
While the possession of nuclear weapons has added a new lethal arrow in the quiver of both nations, the introduction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) by Pakistan injects a new element of uncertainty into this volatile relationship.
There is a contentious debate surrounding Pakistan's TNW programme, with proponents arguing that these weapons function as a vital deterrent against large-scale Indian conventional aggression. By introducing a new “rung” on the escalation ladder, TNWs supposedly compel India to exercise restraint in launching a conventional conflict, fearing the potential for rapid escalation to a nuclear exchange. This view, in theory, maintains a precarious form of deterrence stability. However, critics vehemently challenge this view. They argue that TNWs lower the nuclear threshold and introduce a far greater risk of unintended escalation or miscalculation. This is central to understanding the implications of Pakistan's TNW policy. It hinges on whether the perceived deterrent effect genuinely enhances stability or whether the heightened risk of unintended nuclear escalation outweighs any potential benefits.
Nuclear weapons have a popular notion of having massive destructive potential, high yield rate, prolonged residual radiation, and extended nuclear fallout. However, the tactical version of it is majorly attributed to four major factors. First, the range and payload capacity of the delivery vehicle. Second, the yield of the device. Third, the geographical location or deployment area of the weapon. Fourth, the command and control. Tactical nuclear weapons have a low range and low yield capacity to limit the destruction to a certain targeted area. The presumed area is the battlefield, unlike the countervalue or counterforce targets in the case of strategic nuclear weapons. The command and control of the TNWs are seemingly delegated to the area commander or a middle-rank military official conducting tactical operations on the field.
Nuclear weapons have a popular notion of having massive destructive potential, high yield rate, prolonged residual radiation, and extended nuclear fallout. However, the tactical version of it is majorly attributed to four major factors.
To understand the theoretical frame of this issue, it is essential to understand the need for Pakistan to acquire such capabilities. There are two major views on this. One is a short-term tactical view that says that it is to counter the ‘Cold Start Doctrine’ of the Indian Army, which is to conduct quick military strikes inside the Pakistani territory in a pre-emptive way to inflict significant attrition on the enemy. The Cold Start Doctrine emerged after Operation Parakram between 2002 and 2003.
For more than seven decades, since its Independence, Pakistan’s foreign policy and its larger security strategy have revolved around the question of how to balance, counter, or neutralise the perceived Indian threat. The experts have tried to address this dilemma by adopting three approaches: Alliances with major powers to acquire high-tech defence capabilities, terrorism and proxy wars and nuclear deterrence have been integral to Pakistan’s strategy. However, the most sustainable option is nuclear deterrence, which makes the strategic equation between India and Pakistan more precarious. In fact, according to G. Parthasarthy, former ambassador to Pakistan, Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear weapons, was not because India had them, but because such weapons were necessary to balance India’s conventional superiority. Pakistan’s commitment to full-spectrum nuclear deterrence means that the use of TNWs is integral to it.
When will Pakistan use its TNWs and what are the red lines drawn for their use? Lt. Gen Khalid Kidwai, Head of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD) that oversees Pakistan’s nuclear command and control system, claimed that “nuclear weapons (strategic or tactical) would be used only if the very existence of Pakistan is at stake”. He further elaborated a framework for its usage, in case deterrence fails.
If India,
1. Attacks and conquers a large part of its territory (Territorial or Space Threshold)
2. Destroys a large part of Pakistan’s land or air forces (Military Threshold)
3. Proceeds to strangulate Pakistan economically. (Economic Threshold)
4. Pushes Pakistan into political destabilisation or creates internal subversion. (Domestic Threshold)
Introducing TNWs into the conventional battlefield generates apprehensions. The American expert Peter R. Lavoy observes that the last two red lines created by Pakistan, i.e. economic and domestic destabilisation are vaguely drawn and are a prelude to conventional war. The development and deployment of TNWs by Pakistan would lower the threshold for nuclear use. Pakistan’s redlines drawn vaguely give it the room to instigate and initiate low-level attacks against India. As strategic nuclear weapons, to some extent prevent a major all-out war between two nuclear-powered nations, they provide a playfield for smaller and minimally scaled conflicts to increase. This creates an unstable environment for the relationship due to Pakistan’s TNWs. Given the undeclared First Use (FU) doctrine of Rawalpindi, Pakistan has a long-held belief that being the weaker state in this relationship, it can compensate for that by using its TNWs in a conventional war with India. The first use of nuclear weapons by Pakistan would unsurprisingly escalate the conflict from a conventional war to a nuclear one. Another facet that is being missed by the Pakistanis is the massive retaliation enshrined in India’s nuclear doctrine. If Pakistan uses its TNWs in a conventional battle, India’s massive retaliation may not be restricted to the tactical sphere of warfare escalating to a strategic nuclear exchange. But the larger question still remains, does Pakistan possess the necessary political will to escalate the conflict?
According to Bernard Brodie, the chief purpose of the states after the advent of nuclear weapons must be to avert wars and not to win. To avert wars would mean engaging in active efforts on the part of adversaries to not enter into a war but at the same time saying not to win seems to implicitly mean a war may be fought, yet not to achieve an absolute or decisive goal. Due to ‘mutually assured destruction (MAD)”, which is the foundation of deterrence, no two nuclear-armed nations, would ever win if atomic weapons in a conflict were to be ever used. The destruction would be mutually assured, be it strategic or tactical. Consequently, nuclear adversaries would at most continue to strengthen their deterrent capabilities between each other to avoid any chance of a nuclear or conventional conflict.
Pakistan’s TNWs might deter India's conventional military superiority from translating into territorial gains. The mere threat of nuclear escalation, even at a tactical level, could compel India to maintain a measured response in a potential conflict. However, the actual use of TNWs carries immense risks of uncontrollable escalation and catastrophic humanitarian consequences. Therefore, Pakistan's TNW programme likely functions as a deterrent through credible signalling, not a tool for actual battlefield use.
Pakistan’s TNWs might deter India's conventional military superiority from translating into territorial gains. The mere threat of nuclear escalation, even at a tactical level, could compel India to maintain a measured response in a potential conflict.
However, strategic stability in South Asia is more likely to be affected in the foreseeable future by the growing asymmetry in conventional forces and the modernisation of strategic forces. In essence, strategic stability will also rest on both sides’ willingness to take the risk of calling the other’s bluff. The costs are high because a limited war started by Pakistan that involves the use of TNWs can potentially become a total war of annihilation.
Amey Velangi is a Research Intern at the Observer Research Foundation.
Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme. Kartik specialises in space military issues and his research is primarily centred on the ...
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