With Indonesian President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo’s tenure nearing its end and Indonesia’s Election Commission having confirmed Prabowo Subianto’s victory in the February 2024 elections, it is time to look at how India-Indonesia relations will shape under the Prabowo administration. Prabowo is set to take over the country's top leadership position from Jokowi in October this year. This will be the first time that Indonesia will witness a power transition between two administrations of the same political alliance. Jokowi endorsed Prabowo’s bid for the presidency this year and his eldest son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka as the vice presidential candidate. It has been pointed out that “the next administration appears as a de facto third term for Jokowi, or at least as representing continuity”. Therefore, the question that arises is will we witness a continuity and adherence to the policies of his predecessor not just in domestic politics and issues but also in foreign policy? How would the Indonesian foreign policy shape under Prabowo and where will India figure in it?
During much of his election campaign, Prabowo pledged continuity with incumbent President Jokowi’s policies. Prabowo will carry forward the long-time sacrosanct principles of free and active (bebas dan aktif) and non-alignment underlining Indonesian foreign policy. But like Jokowi, whether his foreign policy’s focus is primarily on economic diplomacy remains to be seen. Many analysts opine that the foreign policy discourse of the Prabowo administration will not be “economics-heavy diplomacy” but instea he will want to work towards pushing Indonesia to play a much bigger role in global affairs. Alongside economic, defence and security issues will be paid similar attention. During his election campaign, while he mentioned that Indonesia is a non-aligned nation and is looking to form partnerships and friendships with other nations. He also underscored that “National power must be military power. Without military power, the history of human civilisation will teach us that a nation will be crushed like Gaza is currently.” Therefore, it can be expected that Indonesian foreign policy under Prabowo will be more focused on security. Entering into security and defence partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region will be a priority for this administration.
Prabowo will carry forward the long-time sacrosanct principles of free and active (bebas dan aktif) and non-alignment underlining Indonesian foreign policy.
This provides India with an opportunity to deepen its strategic and security partnership with Indonesia. India in a bid to boost its own defence exports recently delivered the first batch of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Philippines. India in 2022 also delivered 12high-speed patrol boats to Vietnam, inked a mutual logistics sharing agreement with the country and the two countries signed a vision statement on defence ties till 2030. India is looking to cement its strategic and defence partnerships in Southeast Asia. The initial steps have already been taken with the Philippines and Vietnam. This aligns with India’s growing ambitions to emerge as a global player and a leading voice in the Global South. It is time for India to look into entering into similar defence acquisition agreements with Indonesia, which is not only India’s maritime neighbour in the Indian Ocean but is also perceived to have the most influence within the ASEAN. Prabowo had visited India in July 2020 with the aim to boost the defence partnership between the two countries. The two countries entered into a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2018 and have engaged in bilateral naval exercises, Samudra Shakti since 2018. The two countries affirmed a ‘Shared Vision of India-Indonesia Maritime Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific’ in 2018. It is time for India to take the bilateral relationship a step further.
Given Prabowo’s military background and his ongoing tenure as the Defence Minister, changes are expected to be seen in Indonesian foreign policy under Prabowo. In his capacity as Indonesia’s Defence Minister since 2019, Prabowo has entered into defence cooperation agreements with a range of countries like the Lao PDR, France, Malaysia, and the United States (US) and is looking to conclude one with Australia in the coming months this year. He signed contracts for acquisition from the US, Türkiye, France, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. Prabowo also undertook a defence modernisation programme that led to the rise in defence spending to US$9.4 billion, which is by 15.1 percent in 2020, with the spending reaching touching US$10.2 billion in 2022. It is expected that during the period of 2024-2029, another US$46.6 billion is going to be spent mainly on equipment purchases and for building up a domestic defence industry. Prabowo will choose to continue with the defence modernisation programme by upgrading the Indonesian Navy and the Air Force to strengthen the maritime defence capability of the archipelagic nation. In terms of boosting the capability of the Indonesian Navy, Prabowo may upgrade the fleet by purchasing new patrol boats and frigates to strengthen surveillance capabilities and facilitate an increased maritime presence within the country's exclusive economic zone. Improved maritime domain awareness could come through the deployment of advanced radar systems, maritime patrol aircraft and aerial drones to monitor and respond to security threats. Boosting the maritime defence capability of Indonesia is necessary given China’s growing assertive behaviour with other Southeast Asian nations like the Philippines in the disputed waters of the South China Sea. Indonesia and China also have overlapping claims in the Natuna Sea.
Prabowo will choose to continue with the defence modernisation programme by upgrading the Indonesian Navy and the Air Force to strengthen the maritime defence capability of the archipelagic nation.
His first overseas trip after the elections has been to Japan, China, and Malaysia in early April this year. So it is also clear that Prabowo will want to maintain a cordial relationship with China to reap economic benefits contributing to the infrastructure development in Indonesia. There are talks underway for the possibility of extending the Whoosh high-speed rail line linking Jakarta to Bandung by another 700 kilometres. At the same time, Indonesian analysts are of the opinion that with the coming of Prabowo, a recalibration of Indonesia’s South China Sea policy can be expected. It has been pointed out that, “Prabowo would likely focus on building up the naval forces as a deterrent in the waters around the Natuna islands, where encroachments by Chinese fishing vessels and patrols have become regular. The focus will be on expanding the defence and maritime capabilities of the Indonesian navy. With such a strategy, Prabowo would implement a more assertive policy in the North Natuna Sea. Given he visited both Japan and China reflects that, “Prabowo sees Japan as an equally important partner as China”. It has been pointed out that the main purpose of his visit was to update the security agreement of 2021 for the transfer of defence technology and equipments. He also expressed his desire to strengthen relations with countries like Japan, South Korea, China, and India. Indonesia could work with countries like Japan, Australia, India, US to boost maritime defence cooperation and ensure regional security.
For the first time, the ‘India-Indonesia Defence Industry Exhibition-cum-Seminar was organised in Jakarta on 30 April 2024 by Embassy of India, Ministry of Defence, Government of India and Ministry of Defense, Republic of Indonesia to mark the 75th year of diplomatic ties. The event saw the participation of 36 prominent defence companies from India including 12 Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU or SOEs) and 25 private companies, alongside several Indonesian Defence State Owned Enterprises and Private Defence establishments. This is indeed a step in the right direction. But there needs to be regular meetings and discussions between the armed forces of the two countries, the defence ministries and the ministers besides the existing India-Indonesia Joint Defence Committee meetings, defence industries of the two countries both from the public and private sectors to discuss a ‘collaborative approach to defence development’. It seems to be the opportune time for India and Indonesia to also consider the possibility of hosting 2+2 meetings in the future.
Maritime cooperation, maritime connectivity and maritime capacity building should be the main driving factors in further cementing the India-Indonesia ties under Prabowo.
Such defence exhibitions and seminars should also include both Indian and Indonesian maritime and shipbuilding companies as well in the future. Maritime cooperation, maritime connectivity and maritime capacity building should be the main driving factors in further cementing the India-Indonesia ties under Prabowo. As stated above, modernisation of the Indonesian defence forces, especially the naval forces are expected to be one of the main policies which the Prabowo administration will likely undertake, so a lot of focus needs to be put from India’s end to help Indonesia in achieving its targets. It has been reported that 51 percent of its modernisation targets for the air force, and 60 percent and 76 percent for the army and navy, have been met respectively. There is a need to work together to strengthen the ‘collective maritime security posture’. Strengthening defence ties with Indonesia will also help India as being viewed as an emerging strategic, defence, and security player in Southeast Asia. As recent surveys have shown India is faltering behind in Southeast Asia in this aspect and is seen as one of the least strategically relevant players in this region. Additionally, it will also help India move toward its goal of becoming one of the leading defence exporters by 2030.
Premesha Saha is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation
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Premesha Saha is a Fellow with ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. Her research focuses on Southeast Asia, East Asia, Oceania and the emerging dynamics of the ...
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