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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
Trump 2.0’s overall policy directions in critical and emerging technologies will likely hew to common expectations. The details, however, of what technologies the new administration will prioritise and how actions, such as tariffs and export controls for example, will affect the United States’ (US) innovation and technology leadership remains underexplored.
The US administration will continue a hardline stance on China’s access to cuttingedge technology, even as the US and its allies, on one side, and China on the other, remain intertwined in relevant areas of science and technology. Moreover, in the case of quantum technologies, there are significant and extensive dependencies on China. Such technological, scientific, and geopolitical entanglements of the two countries in the field of quantum information science and technology (QIST) begs the question: How can the US rapidly advance its position in the field, at least in the short term, given China’s control, especially over critical quantum materials?
This article seeks to provide an overview of the current technical and geopolitical hurdles that will confront the United States in the near future as it pushes for quantum supremacy. It outlines the emerging classes of materials needed to reach those goals.
2025 is anticipated to be a big year for QIST, not only in the US but globally. The United Nations has declared 2025 as the International Year of Quantum Science and Technology in celebration of the 100th year of modern quantum mechanics. On the home front, the National Quantum Initiative Reauthorization Act is expected to pass, with US$1.8 billion in appropriations over five years from FY 2025-2029.[1] The bill aims to establish and fund new quantum research centres, workforce training hubs, quantum testbeds, and quantum standards; it will be overseen by the US Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Science Foundation (NSF), with assistance from the National Institute for Science and Technology (NIST) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). In addition to NQIA’s funding, the Chips and Science Act, if the funding gets appropriated, will also provide coverage for QIST research across the agencies.[2]
As the international scientific community advocates for research collaboration, the US is increasingly decoupling from China on geopolitical grounds. Yet China’s recent research achievements rival, if not surpass, those of the US.[3] After some delay, the US renewed its Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement (STA) with China in December 2024 for another five years; the narrowed-down pact covers basic science but excludes collaboration on critical and emerging technologies.[4] The US might have little choice but to depend on China as the field of QIST advances. After all, China is home to, and seller of critical elements necessary for developing the next-generation quantum technologies, especially for sourcing these materials and advancing QIST fundamental scientific research.[5]
Quantum Information Science and Technology (QIST) is an interdisciplinary field that focuses on understanding and manipulating the quantum nature of matter (i.e., its dual waveparticle behaviour) and its research can lead to new technologies like quantum computers, communications, and sensors, among others. Particles such as photons, phonons, and electrons are usually the test subjects for QIST research. These particles can exhibit superposition and entanglement, both underpinned by a phenomenon known as coherence[a] or, on the flip-side, weakened by decoherence; these quantum properties, if they can be controlled and fine-tuned, will result in unique capabilities.[6].[7] Increasing computational speed, breaking communication encryption, and enhancing detection of chemical analytes are a few disruptive capabilities. Different approaches—including designing chemical structures, engineering instruments, coding quantum algorithms—are being employed to improve the understanding of the qubits’ behaviour. Today, extensive fundamental research and new quantum materials are necessary in order to realise the potential technological disruptions and societal impacts; in other words, to bring quantum computing, in particular, to practical applications at scale.
Each quantum subdomain comes with its own set of scientific and engineering challenges. The commercially available quantum computer, for example, hosted by D-Wave, is using superconductors that require -264°C to be operable. On the Kelvin (K) scale, that temperature would be 9K, which is close to as cold as it gets. Absolute zero (0K or -273 °C) is the lowest possible temperature at which molecular motion comes to a stop. Reaching this temperature requires highly specialised laboratories and is a resource- and cost-intensive process. Even proposed scalable fabrication approaches rely on these conditions.[8] In addition to the ultra-cold challenge, error correction and scalability are major parameters that are being optimised. Error correction refers to techniques (e.g. codes) used to protect quantum information stored in qubits from propagating errors caused by interference. By managing the number of errors that occur in the system, there is a higher chance for scalability—increasing the number of qubits, and in turn, logical qubits, in a system in order to solve more complex problems.
As recently as November 2024, Google’s Quantum AI’s team achieved a milestone with its latest superconducting processor, “Willow”, where its system maintained belowthreshold performance when decoding in real-time.[9] They demonstrated that they could drive errors down while scaling up the number of physical qubits, which is a minimum criteria for moving towards scalable fault-tolerant quantum computers.[10] While this achievement is significant for a field that has been working on this problem for the past 30 years, the authors of the paper recognise the real-world challenges of scaling this technology, “although we might in principle achieve low logical error rates by scaling up our current processors, it would be resource intensive in practice.”
Similarly, quantum communications networks that must retain entanglement across long distances and not propagate error during teleportation also require temperatures close to absolute zero. The real paradigm shift, however, involves deploying these technologies across numerous sectors—such as finance, energy, military, and healthcare—and they will need to, at a minimum, overcome the temperature constraint. As scientists try to probe deeper into understanding fundamental quantum properties like increasing coherence time (T₂) and reducing decoherence rates, they are also trying to create long-term stable qubits at ambient room temperature (293K or 20°c), the holy grail for engineers and scientists alike. This feat is not trivial.[11] As of October 2024, a team of American researchers using a sophisticated vanadyl porphyrin, holds the world record for longest T₂ of a fully saturated array of molecular qubit at room temperature with a modest time of 31 ns.[12] For comparison, the longest T₂ for an operating qubit at ultra-cold temperature is 10 minutes and this record is held by a Chinese research group.[13] If in theory, qubits could operate at room temperature, this process would likely require very high pressure, which presents its own logistical challenges. Quantum sensors (e.g., ytterbium complexes) face a different challenge.[14] These systems must retain short decoherence times and remain stable in complex environments, such as liquid or high thermal fluctuation, in order to be useful as a detection tool (i.e., giving a readout with a low signal-to-noise ratio) for chemical analytes or even dark matter.
Overcoming the ultra-cold temperature limitation and achieving chemical stability, alone, will take several years, if not decades, for researchers across the globe to accomplish. According to a recent RAND report, the United States is in the lead for developing quantum sensors, but lags behind China in quantum computers and quantum communications.[15],[16] However, another report claims that the US is ahead of China in quantum computing, but lags behind in sensors.[17] Despite the conflicting findings, both state that each subdomain, regardless of country, remains several years away from possible commercialisation. Only new materials and new chemicals with their unique physical properties will open technological frontiers as current engineering manipulation are constrained by the issues discussed above. Stateof- the-art QIST materials that are being explored include: quantum dots, superconductors, nitrogen-vacancy centres, and molecules (e.g., molecular frameworks, 2D arrays, organicbased donor-acceptor radicals).[18] These diverse classes of compounds are typically composed of transition metals, lanthanide (rare-earth elements), actinides, or mixed-metal systems that will require sourcing from different countries, yet there is an unbalanced dependency on China for these materials for all aspiring leaders in QIST.
As a result of state policies starting in the 1970s, China overtook the United States as the leading producer of critical minerals in the 1980s.[19] Today, China produces 70 percent of the global supply of rare-earth elements.[20] It also processes almost 90 percent of the global supply. China announced export control bans on separation technologies in December 2023.[21] American researchers do not source these elements directly from Chinese companies, typically purchasing the compounds through US chemical companies such as Thermo Scientific, Millipore-Sigma, and Fisher Scientific. However, the US chemical companies still rely on China for the raw resources. The US is playing catch-up: for only the second time in the 74-year history of the Defense Production Act, Congress has expanded the definition of ‘domestic source’ for DPA Title III Awards in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act, allowing companies and projects in the UK and Australia, in addition to the US and Canada, to be considered domestic sources for DPA funds.[22]
In the future, the US quantum industry will likely face a similar critical mineral dilemma currently plaguing the domain of renewable energy transition.[23] This problem also includes serious supply chain and geopolitical risks—resource nationalism, market manipulation, and political instability, among them—and some of the nations that are supplying these elements also have large debts to China, leaving them exposed to China’s geoeconomic pressures.[24],[25] Unlike the renewable energy sector, which has for the most part achieved technological readiness for large-scale deployment, quantum technologies are still in the basic scientific research stages, possibly prototyping at best.[26],[27]
Outside of securing raw elements, the US also relies on Chinese manufacturing companies for critical components needed to build quantum devices because they are still in the nascent stages of development and are usually built in-house, thus requiring niche parts. While US policymakers have made grand advertisements for funding new mining and recycling projects, the reshoring of high-tech minerals and manufacturing companies will take a couple of decades to become “mineral independent” and come at a great cost.[28]
As the new Trump administration prepares to define policies that will shape the US science and technology leadership trajectory in the next four years and beyond, it needs to project a clear and actionable vision to how the country can reach quantum superiority.[29] The US’s ability to advance in QIST strongly depends on its ability to have access to Chinese-controlled minerals and resources. Over geopolitical tensions, China has in the past two years furthered its restrictions on critical mineral and metal exports.[30] The move is seen as a signal in anticipation of further US tariffs and trade restrictions.[31]
Against this backdrop and with a need to advance US scientific quantum leadership, directives are needed for the academic community to pursue QIST research while policymakers need to ensure US access to critical components, materials, and talent. Recognising that QIST research and development (R&D) is still nascent, and it is too early to accurately predict which country has the lead in the quantum race, for the former, fundamental research areas need to be identified.
To that end, the US National Academies report outlines priorities to either maintain or retain a competitive quantum edge by focusing on (a) design and synthesis of molecular qubits, (b) measurement and control of quantum systems, and (c) experimental and computational approaches for scaling qubit design and function.[32] For the latter, policymakers need to strike a balance to secure US access to critical components, materials, and talent—including from China—while working with US allies and partners to strengthen sources and supply chains, and also allowing for cooperation with Chinese researchers. For example, recent US export control restrictions on China excluded deemed export provisions, allowing Chinese nationals to conduct scientific work in the United States and US companies with US team members without running afoul of export regulation.
In summary, the escalating export bans between the United States and China against the backdrop of QIST research could derail technological progress in the domain. China has already retaliated with bans on key raw materials needed for semiconductors, renewable energy, and QIST itself. The trade war is likely to get worse under the Trump administration, which is bad news for QIST R&D. Despite heated rhetoric and political stances on China, practical solutions and fundamental research are still needed to secure and advance the US technological leadership in QIST. If the United States is honest about the international QIST R&D trajectory, given that it is riddled with technical challenges, policymakers should match their risk-mitigation strategies to the science and engineering realities. The United States government must find ways to negotiate with China on strategic trade without impeding the ability of US researchers and companies to develop quantum technologies. If the US is willing to lose access to essential prototyping elements, and therefore forgo its competitive edge in QIST R&D, how can these actions possibly be justified as enhancing national security?
Endnotes
[a] ‘Coherence’ is broadly defined as a quantum property that describes the relationship between two waves that are well defined, having the same phase and amplitude; and their correlations between the wave are preserved over space (spatial) or time (temporal). On the other hand, the process of losing coherence, often through interference, is known as decoherence.
[1] Matt Swayne, “Congressional Budget Office Reviews $1.8 Billion, 5-Year National Quantum Initiative Reauthorization Act,” Quantum Insider, November 2, 2024, https://thequantuminsider.com/2024/11/02/congressional-budget-office-reviews-1-8-billion-5-yearnational- quantum-initiative-reauthorization-act
[2] Jeffrey Bean, “All Chips, No Science: Why Congress Must Act Now,” ORF America, September 9, 2024, https://orfamerica.org/orf-america-comments/chips-science-congress
[3] Jennifer Wong et al., “Critical Technology Tracker: Two Decades of Data Show Rewards of Long-Term Research Investment,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, September 5, 2024, https://www.aspi.org.au/opinion/critical-technology-tracker-two-decades-data-show-rewards-longterm- research-investment
[4] Natasha Gilbert and Smriti Mallapaty, “US and China Sign New Science Pact — But with Severe Restrictions,” Nature, December 13, 2024, https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-024-04175-7
[5] Federation of American Scientists, “National Security Decision Directive [189]: National Policy on The Transfer of Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information,” September 21, 1985, https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-189.htm
[6] Samantha M. Harvey and Michael R. Wasielewski, “Photogenerated Spin-Correlated Radical Pairs: From Photosynthetic Energy Transduction to Quantum Information Science,” Journal of the American Chemical Society 143, no. 38 (2021), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/jacs.1c07706
[7] Jonathan D. Schultz et al., “Coherence in Chemistry: Foundations and Frontiers,” Chemical Reviews 124, no. 21 (2024), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.chemrev.3c00643
[8] Yun Zheng et al., “Multichip Multidimensional Quantum Networks with Entanglement Retrievability,” Science 381, no. 6654 (2023), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adg9210#supplementary-materials
[9] Google Quantum AI and Collaborators, “Quantum Error Correction Below the Surface Code Threshold,” Nature, December 9, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-08449-y
[10] Hartmut Neven, “Meet Willow, Our State-of-the-Art Quantum Chip,” Google Blog, December 9, 2024, https://blog.google/technology/research/google-willow-quantum-chip
[11] Rahaf Youssef and Adam Lyon, Measuring and Simulating T1 and T2 for Qubits, Batavia, INDICO, 2020, 1–5, https://indico.fnal.gov/event/44309/contributions/190723/attachments/132025/163067/Final_ Report_-_Rahaf.pdf
[12] Cassandra M. Moisanu et al., “A Paired-Ion Framework Composed of Vanadyl Porphyrin Molecular Qubits Extends Spin Coherence Times,” Journal of the American Chemical Society 146, no. 41 (2024), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/jacs.4c07288?goto=supporting-info
[13] Ye Wang et al., “Single-Qubit Quantum Memory Exceeding Ten-Minute Coherence Time,” Nature Photonics 11, 2017, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41566-017-0007-1.epdf
[14] Ashley J. Shin et al., “Toward Liquid Cell Quantum Sensing: Ytterbium Complexes With Ultranarrow Absorption,” Science 385, no. 6709 (2024), https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.adf7577#supplementary-materials.
[15] Edward Parker et al., An Assessment of the U.S. and Chinese Industrial Bases in Quantum Technology, Santa Monica, RAND National Security Research Division, 2022, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA869-1.html
[16] Greg Austin, Quantum Sensing: Comparing the United States and China, Washington DC, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/researchpapers/ 2024/02/iiss_quantum-sensing_022024.pdf
[17] Hodan Omaar and Martin Makaryan, How Innovative is China in Quantum?, Washington DC, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, 2024, https://itif.org/publications/2024/09/09/how-innovativeis- china-in-quantum
[18] Xin Gui et al., “Chemistry in Superconductors,” Chemical Reviews 121, no. 5 (2021), https://pubs.acs.org/doi/abs/10.1021/acs.chemrev.0c00934
[19] Andreas Kuhn, “Materials that Matter,” ORF America, April 25, 2022, https://orfamerica.org/newresearch/materials-that-matter
[20] Mai Nguyen and Eric Onstad, “China’s Rare Earths Dominance in Focus After it Limits Germanium and Gallium Exports,” Reuters, December 21, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/chinas-rare-earths-dominance-focus-after-mineralexport- curbs-2023-07-05/.
[21] U.S. Department of the Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries 2024, Virginia, U.S. Geological Survey, 2024, https://pubs.usgs.gov/periodicals/mcs2024/mcs2024.pdf.
[22] Defense Industrial Base Consortium, “DIBIC is Now Open to Industry Partners Based in Australia, Canada and the UK,” https://www.dibconsortium.org/event/dibc-is-now-open-to-organizations-based-inaustralia- canada-and-the-uk
[23] IRENA, Geopolitics of the Energy Transition, April 2024, UAE, International Renewable Energy Agency, 2024, https://www.irena.org/Digital-Report/Geopolitics-of-the-Energy-Transition-Critical-Materials#page-0
[24] Jeffrey D. Bean and Andreas Kuehn, “Building Resilient Supply Chains: The Case of Semiconductors,” ORF America, August 2024, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5ca0ec9b809d8e4c67c27b3a/t/66d1de3adc34050f408893 5b/1725029947840/ORFAmerica_BP26_Chips_Supply_Chain.pdf
[25] Marcus Lu, “Ranked: The Top 20 Countries in Debt to China,” Visual Capitalist, April 29, 2024, https://www.visualcapitalist.com/ranked-the-top-20-countries-in-debt-to-china
[26] U.S. Department of Energy, https://www.energy.gov/oe/articles/doe-announces-11m-high-voltage-direct-current-transmissionprojects
[27] U.S. Department of Energy, “Quantum S&T Innovation Chain Database,” Office of Science, https://nqisrc.org/research/nqisrc-quantum-tech-database
[28] “United States Ranks Next to Last in Development Time for New Mines that Produce Critical Minerals for Energy Transition, S&P Global Finds,” S&P Global, July 18, 2024, https://press.spglobal.com/2024-07-18-United-States-Ranks-Next-to-Last-in-Development-Time-for- New-Mines-that-Produce-Critical-Minerals-for-Energy-Transition,-S-P-Global-Finds
[29] Wilson Beaver and Wyatt Eichholz, “The Urgency of the Quantum Computing Race With China,” The Heritage Foundation, September 14, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/big-tech/commentary/the-urgency-the-quantum-computing-race-china
[30] Keith Bradsher, “China Tightens Its Hold on Minerals Needed to Make Computer Chips,” New York Times, October 26, 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/10/26/business/china-critical-minerals-semiconductors.html
[31] Diego Mendoza, “China Targets Critical Metal Exports in Anticipation of Further US Tech, Trade Curbs,” Semafor, November 17, 2024, https://www.semafor.com/article/11/17/2024/china-expands-export-controls-on-critical-minerals
[32] NAP, Advancing Chemistry and Quantum Information Science: An Assessment of Research Opportunities at the Interface of Chemistry and Quantum Information Science in the United States, Washington DC, National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, 2023, https://nap.nationalacademies.org/download/26850
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Linda Nhon is Senior Fellow, Global National Security Institute, University of South Florida. ...
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Andreas Kuehn is Senior Fellow, Observer Research Foundation America. He oversees ORF America’s Technology Policy Program, and leads ORF’s US-India AI Fellowship Program. ...
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