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This article is part of the series — Raisina Files 2025
The intensifying rivalry between the United States (US) and China is casting a long shadow on the current geopolitical scenario in Latin America. This article, written from a Brazilian perspective, explores historical contexts while remaining attentive to the evolving dynamics and collateral effects of this power struggle in the region. From this author’s view, the situation appears highly consequential for all parties involved.
Commencing this analysis with a bold theoretical assertion about Latin America, one can rightfully claim that the region distinguishes itself as the most “Westernised” portion of the Global South. It exhibits common features with the West in terms of religion, language, legal institutions, market capitalism, and representative democracy. Building upon this premise, various reverberations may manifest.[1]
When one examines surveys conducted among Latin American populations, it is clear that the US continues to wield societal influence. Faced with a binary choice between China and the US, a majority of respondents almost invariably favour the latter. This trend is particularly evident in Brazil, where a significant portion of the population holds a more favourable view of the United States, compared to, say, Canada, Israel, or the United Kingdom.[2],[3] Such pro-US sentiment extends into Brazil’s governmental agencies and military, echoing broader regional preferences that underscore America’s enduring influence across Latin America.[4]
According to a 2022 report, A World Divided: Russia, China, and the West, Latin America, where relatively positive feelings toward the US have reached record highs, is an exception within the Global South. On average, the United States enjoys a 24-percentage-point popularity lead over China in the region, with countries such as Venezuela and Nicaragua— whose governments have strained relations with Washington—showing, respectively, a 40 percent and 10 percent preference for the US.[5]
This reflects an enduring phenomenon of cultural hegemony whose consequences permeate everyday life. The United States maintains a cultural edge, a legacy of decades of soft power projection and media influence. For instance, in 2022, 79 percent of internet users in Latin America watched Netflix, followed by 43 percent who watched Prime Video and 41 percent who watched Disney+, indicating high levels of consumption of American media content.[6] English remains the most sought-after second language in schools across the region.[7]
Indeed, walking through the streets of San Jose in Costa Rica, Bogotá in Colombia, or Asunción in Paraguay, one would easily observe unmistakable markers of US influence in food, fashion, and music. There is little evidence of a “Chinese way of life” taking root in the region, even as China’s economic presence grows at a fast pace. Brazil, with the widespread presence of American brands like McDonald’s, Nike, and Apple, is no exception. Despite the geopolitical competition, the dominance of American symbols remains palpable.[8]
Since the early 20th century, the United States has played a major role in Latin America as primary trading partner, surpassing Europe and solidifying its position as the region’s most influential external actor. Countries in the continent, except for Cuba, remained under the security umbrella of the US during the Cold War and chose not to join the Non- Aligned Movement in the late 1950s and early ‘60s. Brazil, albeit consistently adopting a third-worldist foreign policy—especially from an economic perspective—deviated from the Bandung Conference approach by aligning diplomatically with Washington.[9]
This trend shifted in the 21st century when China outpaced the United States as the primary export destination for many commodities from Latin American nations. By 2022, China had become the largest trading partner for countries like Brazil, Chile, and Peru, fuelled by its demand for commodities such as soybeans, copper, and iron ore. For instance, Brazil’s exports to China accounted for 32 percent of its total exports in 2021, surpassing the 10 percent of the US by a considerable margin . The foreign policy shift has not only reshaped trade dynamics but has also resulted in broader implications for geopolitical alignments. Countries participating in China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has seen over US$4 trillion in investments committed globally, have become increasingly tied to Chinese infrastructure and financing projects.[10]
While China has augmented its presence in Latin America through investments and trade bonds over the years, the US’s political influence has not had an inexorable retreat. However, the decline in the US share of global GDP—from 40-45 percent in 1945 to a far lower 14 percent in 2023—mirrors Latin America’s gradual distancing from White House worldviews.[a] This is evident in voting patterns at the UN General Assembly. In Brazil, during the presidential administrations of Eurico Gaspar Dutra (1946-1951) and Juscelino Kubitschek (1956-1961), the country’s representatives aligned with American diplomats at a rate of 90 percent. Nowadays, the convergence percentage between Brazil and the US will not be higher than 25 percent.[11] This general trend applies to the rest of Latin America as well.
There is an additional layer to consider, however. Since the early 1970s, when mainland China replaced Taiwan at the United Nations, Latin America—and Brazil, particularly—have shown increasing alignment with Chinese delegates in votes at the UN General Assembly. This connection has a fundamental rationale: both China and Latin American countries have, for decades, shared similar concerns related to development, finance, peace and security, decolonisation, international law, and other international issues. Such diplomatic like-mindedness cannot be downplayed.[12]
Another crucial factor to note, given the increasing polarisation of global affairs, is the assertive position taken by countries like Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico regarding contemporary international conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Gaza. It can be argued that the region is no longer issuing a blank cheque to the West or the US, indicating resistance to unilateral influence.[13] Against this backdrop of international security concerns, the waning ability of the United States to co-opt Latin America serves as a cautionary signal.
Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted deep-seated inequalities between the Global North and Global South, particularly in vaccine access and distribution. Wealthier nations, including the US, prioritised vaccinating their populations, often leveraging vaccine exports for economic gains, while less affluent countries experienced delays in vaccine access until 2021 or 2022. In response, Russia, India, and China engaged in vaccine diplomacy, extending their efforts to Latin America to expand their influence.[14]
As the US and China vie for influence through strategies like friend-shoring, near-shoring, and decoupling,[b] Brazil and Mexico have emerged as net beneficiaries as Joe Biden finished his presidential term. The US has designated Mexico as its preferred trade partner and investment destination, while China directed substantial investments to, and imported commodities from Brazil.[15] Overall, both Brasília and Ciudad de México had reasons to be content with the previous, pre-Trump era.[16]
If Brazil’s President Lula resists becoming merely a passive recipient of external influence, the unfolding scenario could serve as a litmus test of his third mandate. During his first days in office in January 2025, Trump promised not to allow the de-dollarisation of the global economy, almost simultaneously announcing the US’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement—actions that foreshadow the hostile posture Brazil will most likely face while hosting the BRICS annual summit and the COP30 conference on climate change in the latter part of 2025. Bilateral trade could also suffer under Trump’s second term, particularly due to the tariffs that his administration aims to impose on Brazilian imports.[17] There is also the issue of the massive deportations of Brazilian citizens residing in the US, which have just begun at the time of writing this article.[18]
In Mexico, something new is emerging on the horizon of North American affairs. Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo, inaugurated as Mexican president in October 2024 and the first woman to hold the position in her country, has been pressured to respond to Trump’s disrespectful and confrontational remarks regarding the Gulf of Mexico—referred to as the “Gulf of America” by the new US administration—and his rhetoric about stopping Mexican immigrants.[19] Similarly, Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino was challenged by Trump’s promise to make the Panama Canal “American again”, citing concerns over a perceived future Chinese takeover, to which Mulino has responded assertively.[20]
Perhaps the most striking example of resistance to Trump’s imperial foreign policy has come from one of the US’s long-time allies in the region: Colombia. President Gustavo Petro initially refused to accept deportees from the US. After denying authorisation for their landing in Bogotá, he faced threats from Trump, who warned of imposing trade tariffs on Colombian goods. Ultimately, Petro relented and agreed to the return of his country’s nationals. However, he still claimed a diplomatic victory over Trump, as the deportees were no longer transported on American military planes but instead by the Colombian Air Force. Additionally, they were allowed to travel without being restrained by handcuffs or chains. The next chapters of this story have yet to unfold, but there is no doubt that Petro demonstrated how a courageous stance—despite limited leverage—could challenge Trump’s agenda in the region.[20]
Amidst these developments, accusations of pursuing an anti-US or anti-Western foreign policy, which could be levelled against leaders like Brazil’s Lula, Mexico’s Sheinbaum, and Colombia’s Petro, should be considered from a different perspective. These actions suggest that Latin America is navigating the US-China power struggle with pragmatic ambivalence while striving for an autonomous diplomatic approach. After all, proactiveness and selfassuredness should not be misinterpreted as defiance or non-collaboration.[22]
In a starkly different direction, Buenos Aires now faces the risk of distancing itself from Beijing, as Trump has positioned President Javier Milei as one of his protégés. However, despite Milei’s welcoming tone toward the West, Argentina had previously committed to agreements and initiatives suggesting a pro-China stance, such as its membership in the BRI. Further complicating matters, the Argentinian leader has pledged to leave Mercosur—the South American Free Trade Area—should Trump’s US sign a bilateral free trade agreement with Argentina.[23]
The transition ahead may not play out as seamlessly, as the ongoing dynamics of the USChina competition will undoubtedly continue to shape the geopolitical future of the region. Time will reveal the full extent of its impact.
Endnotes
[a] Such contrasting foreign policy approaches were epitomised by Brazil’s foreign ministers, Celso Lafer and Celso Amorim, in the early 21st century. While the former advocated for Brazil to pursue alignment with the Western canon, the latter endorsed some degree of structural revisionism. The global political and economic establishment celebrated President Cardoso as the reinventor of Brazil, attributing to him the successful modernisation of the country’s public administration and national finances, preparing it for progress and sustainability. However, Cardoso faced accusations of mimicking Western practices and uncritically incorporating international treaties that unfavourably regulated areas of national concern, such as human rights, the environment, and nuclear non-proliferation. In contrast, President Lula da Silva was perceived as a trailblazer for the Global South, implementing a foreign policy characterised as brave and solidary, challenging the prevailing cynicism of realpolitik. Nevertheless, he was perceived as too ideological in the handling of international relations, potentially jeopardising Brazil’s Westernised diplomatic traditions. See: Dawisson Belém Lopes, and Karin Vazquez, “Brazil’s position in the Russia-Ukraine war: Balancing principled pragmatism while countering weaponized interdependence,” Contemporary Security Policy, v. 45, issue 4, 2024, p. 599–611.
[b] ‘Friend-shoring’ is encouraging companies to shift manufacturing away from authoritarian states and toward allies. ‘Near-shoring’ is the practice of relocating business operations to a nearby country. ‘Decoupling’ means divesting from a country.
[1] Dawisson Belém Lopes, “De-Westernization, Democratization, Disconnection: The Emergence of Brazil’s Post- Diplomatic Foreign Policy,” Global Affairs 6 (2020): 1-18.
[2] Dawisson Belém Lopes and Karin Vazquez, “Peace as a Hypothetical Imperative: Brazil’s Foreign Policy Standpoint on the War in Ukraine,” Global Policy 15, no. 4 (September 2024): 752-756.
[3] Roberto Foa et al., A World Divided: Russia, China and the West (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Centre for the Future of Democracy, 2022), https://doi.org/10.17863/CAM.90281.
[4] Dawisson Belém Lopes et al., “Did the Far Right Breed a New Variety of Foreign Policy? The Case of Bolsonaro’s “More- Bark-Than-Bite” Brazil,” Global Studies Quarterly 2 (2022): 1-14.
[5] Foa et al., A World Divided: Russia, China and the West
[6] Valentina Duque, “Media Consumption in Latin America 2023 and Its Impact on Marketing,” 2023, https://americasmi.com/insights/media-consumption-latin-america/?utm_source=chatgpt.com
[7] British Council, “Learning English in Brazil: Understanding the Aims and Expectations of the Brazilian Emerging Middle Classes,” 2014, https://www.britishcouncil.org.br/sites/default/files/learning_english_in_brazil.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com, accessed 24 January 2025.
[8] Lopes, “De-Westernization, Democratization, Disconnection: The Emergence of Brazil’s Post-Diplomatic Foreign Policy”
[9] Dawisson Belém Lopes and Karin Vazquez, “Brazil’s Position in the Russia-Ukraine War: Balancing Principled Pragmatism While Countering Weaponized Interdependence,” Contemporary Security Policy 45, no. 4 (2024): 599-611.
[10] Foa et al., A World Divided: Russia, China and the West
[11] Dawisson Belém Lopes, “Americanismo, antiamericanismo ou desamericanismo?,” In Uma parceria bicentenária: passado, presente e futuro das relações Brasil-Estados Unidos, Fernanda Magnotta, ed. (Brasília: Funag, 2024), p. 361- 376.
[12] Lopes, “De-Westernization, Democratization, Disconnection: The Emergence of Brazil’s Post-Diplomatic Foreign Policy”
[13] Lopes and Vazquez, “Brazil’s Position in the Russia-Ukraine War: Balancing Principled Pragmatism While Countering Weaponized Interdependence”
[14] Dawisson Belém Lopes, “The Place of Brazil at the Vaccine Line,” In 2021: The Year of Vaccines, New Delhi, Observer Research Foundation, March 11, 2021; Dawisson Belém Lopes, “Leadership Challenges in Covid-19 Vaccine Campaigns: The Story of Brazil,” Observer Research Foundation, 2021.
[15] Jeongmin Seong et al., Geopolitics and the Geometry of Global Trade: 2025 Update, McKinsey Global Institute, 2025, https://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/our-research/geopolitics-and-the-geometry-of-global-trade-2024-update
[16] Dawisson Belém Lopes, “US-China Power Struggle and Its Ripple Effects in Brazil and Latin America,” WBO Newsletter, February 22, 2024, https://www.braziloffice.org/en/articles/us-china-power-struggle-and-its-ripple-effects-in-brazil-and-latinamerica
[17] Leonardo Miazzo, “Brasil certamente terá prejuízos com Trump e 2026 preocupa, diz 1º embaixador de Lula nos EUA,” CartaCapital, January 23, 2025, https://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/brasil-certamente-tera-prejuizos-com-trump-e-2026-preocupa-diz-1oembaixador- de-lula-nos-eua/
[18] CNN Brasil, “Primeiro voo com brasileiros deportados por Trump chega ao Brasil hoje,” 2025, https://www.cnnbrasil.com.br/nacional/sudeste/mg/primeiro-voo-com-brasileiros-deportados-por-trump-chegaao- brasil-hoje/
[19] David Alire Garcia, “Mexican Leader Stresses Sovereignty, Holds Off on Retaliatory Tariff Threats,” Reuters, January 21, 2025, https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/mexico-president-stresses-defense-countrys-sovereignty-after-initialtrump- 2025-01-21/
[20] Dearbail Jordan, “Panama Rejects Trump Vow to ‘Take Back’ Panama Canal,” BBC News, January 20, 2025, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c2egwzvp080o
[21] Redação G1, “Após briga entre Trump e Petro, deportados colombianos chegam a Bogotá: ‘Dignos, sem algemas’,” 2025, https://g1.globo.com/mundo/noticia/2025/01/28/primeiros-deportados-dos-eua-chegam-a-colombia-emaviao- da-forca-aerea-do-pais.ghtml
[22] The President of Brazil’s Office, “Lula Speaks with Mexican President,” 2025, https://www.gov.br/planalto/en/latestnews/ 2025/01/lula-speaks-with-mexican-president
[23] France 24, “Argentina’s Milei Says Would Leave Mercosur for US Trade Deal,” 2025, https://www.france24.com/en/livenews/ 20250122-argentina-s-milei-says-would-leave-mercosur-for-us-trade-deal
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Dawisson Belém Lopes is professor of international and comparative politics, Federal University of Minas Gerais (UFMG); and research fellow, National Council for Technological and Scientific ...
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