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The Indo-Myanmar border's complex topography and shared ethnic ties on either side complicate the border fencing initiative
Recent media reports have highlighted that India is planning to spend US $3.7 billion to fence its international border with Myanmar, spanning over 1,610 kms This initiative follows the Indian government's decision to revoke the Free Regime Movement (FMR) agreement with Myanmar which previously allowed people from both sides to cross the border up to 16 kms without a visa. The cessation of the FMR and the implementation of stringent military checkpoints along the border are being considered as timely measures to mitigate the persisting challenges in India’s North East Region (NER), such as drug trafficking and the influx of Myanmar refugees. However, it is essential to acknowledge the potential limitations of this decision. The complex topography along the Indo-Myanmar border, coupled with the shared ethnic ties among communities residing on either side, complicates the effective implementation of this decision. Thus, New Delhi should consider NER states' socio-economic and political challenges before implementing this policy.
The complex topography along the Indo-Myanmar border, coupled with the shared ethnic ties among communities residing on either side, complicates the effective implementation of this decision.
Since the 1970s, India's NER has been grappling with the challenge of drug trafficking, primarily due to its proximity to the Golden Triangle—the geographic area encompassing Northwestern Myanmar, Northern Laos, and Northwestern Thailand which is one of the world’s biggest centres of drug trafficking. This geographic proximity, coupled with the unfenced porous Indo-Myanmar border, facilitates a substantial flow of narcotics into India, thereby significantly impacting the socio-economic of India’s NER. Myanmar's ascent as the world's top opium producer in 2023, with illicit crop cultivation expanding from 99,000 to 116,000 acres, intensifies the drug trafficking threat in NER. Official reports revealed that in the fiscal year 2022-23, NER states alone recovered contraband worth over INR 2,000 Cr (around US$267 million). For instance, in 2023, Assam alone reported drug confiscations valuing INR 718 Cr (US$86 million)and the apprehension of over 4,700 drug traffickers. Similarly, the Manipuri police seized contraband worth INR 1,610 Cr (around US$193 million) between July 2022 and July 2023. Experts posit that 90 percent of the smuggled drugs to NER originate from Myanmar. The year 2024 demonstrates a continuation of this concerning trend, as evidenced by drug seizure reports across several NER states. An assessment of different media reports shows that Assam has intercepted narcotics amounting to over INR 454 Cr (around US$54.4 million). The primary substances trafficked include heroin, YABA tablets, Ganja, brown sugar, etc. These illicit narcotics are trafficked through India’s NER, with Manipur and Mizoram serving as transit routes for onward distribution to mainland India.
As a landlocked and less developed state with a primarily agrarian economy, there is a possibility of potential competition for essential resources between the local Mizos and the incoming refugees in the future.
Another contributing factor is the influx of Myanmar refugees to India's NER, especially in Mizoram and Manipur. Manipur has witnessed a significant rise in refugee numbers after the 2021 military coup, with the Chief Minister (CM) Biren Singh and the majority community (Meitei) accusing it as one of the main reasons for the ongoing conflict. While Mizoram welcomes these refugees based on shared ethnicity, the long-term sustainability of this acceptance remains uncertain. As a landlocked and less developed state with a primarily agrarian economy, there is a possibility of potential competition for essential resources between the local Mizos and the incoming refugees in the future. On top of that, the ongoing clashes between the Tatmadaw and the resistance groups in Myanmar are likely to cause a surge in refugees fleeing the violence. These concerns highlight the need for stringent measures along the porous Indo-Myanmar border to address the challenges arising from immigration.
The Indian government's decision to cancel the FMR and the proposition of border fencing has sparked responses from key political figures and entities in the NER. The CMs of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur have extended their support to New Delhi's decision, arguing that such measures are essential to curb cross-border insurgency, illegal refugee infiltration, and drug trafficking along the porous Indo-Myanmar border. Conversely, Nagaland, despite being under the BJP rule, has opposed the Centre's decision. The Mizoram assembly also passed a resolution opposing the Centre’s decision two months ago. Another complexity is the opposition from the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah)—a prominent Naga insurgent group currently under ceasefire with the Indian government. They argued that it would disrupt the longstanding ethnic ties binding the Naga communities on both sides of the border. This position underscores their aspiration for a unified Naga homeland, ‘Nagalim’- entailing territories in India and Myanmar.’ Several North East Tribal Organizations from Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland have also strongly opposed the Central government's decision, highlighting their rejection of the colonial border demarcation. Thus, the fencing could further heighten regionalist aspirations within these communities, thereby straining their relationship with the Indian state and distancing them from India. Unless mediation is undertaken between the government and the two communities, the situation can potentially exacerbate existing tensions.
The fencing could further heighten regionalist aspirations within these communities, thereby straining their relationship with the Indian state and distancing them from India.
The presence of these significant tribal populations along the Indo-Myanmar border underscores their interconnectedness. This demographic reality suggests that border fencing and FMR cancellation would likely be a primary grievance of the people on both sides. Furthermore, the Central government's decision could disrupt the existing people-to-people connections, which is crucial for India's ambition to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian countries through its Act East Policy. The geographical complexities of the Indo-Myanmar border pose formidable challenges to implementing border initiatives. The terrain varies from low mountains in the south to rugged ridges and peaks in the north. These logistical difficulties further complicate New Delhi's initiatives. Moreover, in the past, such initiatives of border projects have been largely inefficient; for instance, fencing only 10 km along the Manipur-Myanmar border took a decade. This highlights the logistical difficulties associated with the border fencing project with Myanmar, further adding another complexity to the Indian government's initiative.
India's decision to strengthen its border with Myanmar through fencing and the cancellation of the FMR presents a complex scenario with potential negative consequences. The porous border has undoubtedly facilitated illegal activities, impacting the socio-economic stability of the NER. However, the complex topography along the Indo-Myanmar border, coupled with the shared ethnic ties among communities residing on either side, complicates the effective implementation of this decision. Opposition from key political figures, insurgent groups, and local communities in the NER can further exacerbate the existing tensions. Moreover, New Delhi's actions can further heighten regionalist aspirations within the NER, hindering its Act East Policy. India's border strategy with Myanmar requires a nuanced approach that acknowledges both the security concerns and the region's complexities.
Ophelia Yumlembam is an M.A. Political Science graduate from Delhi University, India. She is currently working as a Research Assistant at Delhi University, Dept. of Political Science.
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Ophelia Yumlembam is a Research Assistant at the Dept. of Political Science, University of Delhi (DU). She graduated with an M.A. in Political Science from ...
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