The 50th anniversary of PNE highlights India's role as a responsible nuclear power, committed to full compliance and advancing global non-proliferation and export controls.
On 18 May 1974, India detonated its first plutonium device—“Peaceful Nuclear Explosion” (PNE). The PNE had domestic implications for India in terms of bringing a sense of national pride and enhancing the popularity of PM Indira Gandhi. However, internationally, it was criticised and the ‘London Club’— a group of 48 states that have committed to following a set of rules, known as the NSG Guidelines, when exporting nuclear and dual-use items. condemned and restricted—condemned and restricted India’s access to nuclear technology globally. The PNE had foreign components: the plutonium for the test came from the CIRUS reactor in Trombay, which was supplied by Canada and the heavy water was extracted from the imported nuclear technology from the United States. A ‘Nuclear Apartheid’ at a global level was practised, restricting India’s access to nuclear technology, thus impacting its nuclear energy programme in the immediate term.
Later, in 1998, India emerged as an overt nuclear power with a responsible approach to the use of nuclear technology. Gradually, India made its nuclear forces fully developed by achieving a nuclear triad with tested capabilities to deliver nuclear warheads from land-, air-, and sea-based vectors. At the same time, India standardised access to sensitive, strategic- and nuclear-related technologies.
This article assesses how India’s PNE in 1974 was a critical landmark in the journey of India’s achievement of status as a responsible nuclear power to employ nuclear technology and export control regulation for peaceful uses.
The London Club, which was initially a group of seven states, later became the 48-member Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and came into existence in response to India’s testing of a nuclear explosive device named ‘Smiling Buddha’ as part of PNE. The US also initiated the landmark 1978 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act as a federal law to regulate and re-negotiate its nuclear-related export controls.
At present, India, as a nuclear power, fully acknowledges the responsibilities that come with the possession of advanced technologies and dual-use items and goods. India has created and sustained a comprehensive network of export controls for decades by establishing statutory, regulatory, and institutional measures. These are evident in the form of India’s peaceful uses of nuclear technology and energy and its multilateral approach to integration with different sets of non-proliferation regimes while being a state outside the NPT framework. Beyond its political commitment, India is a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendments, Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and 1373 which are legally binding to states. These aim to ensure international cooperation and measures to contribute towards the regulation of sensitive materials and nuclear technology from falling into the hands of terrorists.
India has created and sustained a comprehensive network of export controls for decades by establishing statutory, regulatory, and institutional measures.
Further, India, to ensure regulation and licensing of strategic goods and items, came in with a first control list in 1995, described as Special Materials, Equipment and Technology (SMET) which later transformed into a more comprehensive Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies (SCOMET) in 2001 and was updated last in 2023 The list has remained subject to revisions with time and emerging threats to control dual-use items, nuclear-related items, and military items including software and technology.
The licensing part is strictly monitored with comprehensive guidelines and procedures to prohibit mala fide manufacturing and potentially diverting materials to terrorist groups. Enforcement is overlooked by agencies, primarily the Inter-Ministerial Working Group (IMWG) in the Directorate General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), with penalisation provisions and a risk management system. Domestically, India’s enactment of the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act of 2005 came as a comprehensive move in the existing body of laws to exercise control over a broad range of materials and technologies. It includes the regulation of export transfer, retransfer, and transhipment, which caters to the core agenda of non-proliferation despite India being a non-signatory to NPT. In addition, the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act of 1992, the Chemical Weapons Convention Act of 2000, the Environment Protection Act of 1986, the Explosives Act of 1884, etc. These provisions aim at the prevention, detection, and penalisation of unauthorised exports and exporters.
Thus, India’s domestic legislation and practices are in sync with the global regimes, norms and conventions.
Globally, India’s diplomacy successfully gained a non-NPT waiver through the civil nuclear deal with the US in 2005, which crossed its final hurdle with an NSG waiver in 2008, leading to exceptional treatment for India. Later, it opened a gateway for India regarding its acceptance and membership of MTCR in 2016, the Wassenaar Arrangement in 2017, and the Australia Group (AG) in 2018. India has been accepted and legitimised in the global non-proliferation regime, and this success can be attributed to its compliance vis-á-vis global expectations and pursuit of responsible behaviour in sync with a motive to address common non-proliferation challenges.
The politics of denial of technology through nuclear apartheid to India by nuclear-have states post-1974 PNE to maintain the nuclear ‘status quo’ has thus been overcome. It is evident in the form of multilateral engagement and a responsible non-proliferation track record ensured by a comprehensive export control network. India has proven itself to be a responsible player by integrating the three agenda goals of security, transparency, and accountability into its export control framework. This philosophical foundation, consistent with the “Make in India” programme, has opened the window of opportunities for Indian industry players to deal responsibly with high-end technology businesses and exchanges. The NSG membership remains an incomplete agenda in India’s pathway towards complete integration with export control regimes, providing it with the opportunity to become a rule-making player for a more responsible global nuclear commerce.
The politics of denial of technology through nuclear apartheid to India by nuclear-have states post-1974 PNE to maintain the nuclear ‘status quo’ has thus been overcome.
India’s nuclear journey pre-and-post PNE has a strong form of resistance to the pre-existing NPT regime and opposition to the politics of the nuclear status quo led by the nuclear weapon states. Although NSG membership is still a case in the making, India has overcome its resistance by integrating with the global non-proliferation and export control regime. The history of India’s integration with the non-proliferation and export control regimes, all except NSG, indicates that membership in NSG is more about the politics of denial of membership than India’s intentions and a proven track record of compliance.
India’s nuclear journey pre-and-post PNE has a strong form of resistance to the pre-existing NPT regime and opposition to the politics of the nuclear status quo led by the nuclear weapon states.
The 50th anniversary of PNE is a reminder of India’s full-grown stature as a responsible nuclear weapons state with full compliance and a consistent approach towards advancing the global agenda of non-proliferation and export controls.
The challenge remains for India’s diplomacy to integrate itself with the NSG regime and be a part of the decision-making processes concerning the supply of nuclear technology. Diplomacy, more than outcomes, is about a consistent process towards outcomes. Thus, India must consistently remind China of its relevance for the grouping, backed by its non-proliferation track record and increasing power profile in international affairs.
Rahul Rawat is a PhD candidate at the Diplomacy and Disarmament division, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University.
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