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Even though China-India relations made important progress in recent months, China remains highly vigilant about the ongoing interactions between India and the United States (US).
China kept a close eye on the six-day visit of Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) S Jaishankar to the US. This was not only the last high-level contact between India and the Joe Biden administration, but also the first visit to the US by a senior Indian official since Donald Trump's election victory. While some Chinese observers joked that the visit is India’s letter of surrender to Trump, other reports in Chinese media wondered if this would be followed by Modi visiting the US, or Trump visiting India in the coming months, further taking US-India bilateral ties to a higher level. Chinese observers’ key concern was whether EAM Jaishankar was able to convince President Trump that India could replace China and provide the US with cheaper products, as Trump imposed high tariffs on Chinese products. They speculated if the Modi government, in tandem with Trump's “Made in America” strategy, will now offer more preferential conditions to American companies to set up supply chains in India and produce low-end products. The other interesting issue that featured in Chinese discussions was India’s role in the Ukraine crisis. Given Trump’s interest in ending the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and India being on particularly good terms with Russia, Chinese observers evaluated if Russia can be an additional factor that brings India and the US together.
While some Chinese observers joked that the visit is India’s letter of surrender to Trump, other reports in Chinese media wondered if this would be followed by Modi visiting the US, or Trump visiting India in the coming months, further taking US-India bilateral ties to a higher level.
Chinese observers also closely followed former US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s recent India visit on January 5-6, 2025. The Chinese side lamented that, even as the Biden administration is about to bid farewell to the White House, it is making big diplomatic moves in Asia, dispatching its core team to various countries in the continent including Japan, South Korea, India, Singapore, and the Philippines. This, they argued, shows that the Biden administration remains committed to the mechanisms and arrangements created between the US, Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia in the last four years that primarily targeted China, thereby consolidating Biden’s diplomatic legacy in the Indo-Pacific before Trump takes over.
There has been an online uproar over Sullivan’s farewell visit to New Delhi, which, Chinese media argues, is aimed at stirring up antagonisms between China and India, seeking to win over India, particularly on the dam issue. It was also argued that, on the surface, this visit might be about strengthening cooperation with India, but in fact, the United States is likely worried about the evolving cooperative dynamics between China and India, and it intends to negotiate “new rules” of engagement with India, ensuring that it continues cooperating with the US’ China strategy.
On one hand, Chinese observers criticised Sullivan’s proposition of the United States and India working together to develop semiconductors. and accused the US of attempting to build a technology supply chain in cooperation with India, weakening China's influence in high-tech fields. They also objected to US-India “military cooperation”, accusing it would lead to an arms race in the region and deteriorate China’s security environment.
On the other hand, they lambasted Sullivan for allegedly raising the issue of China's dam project in Tibet with Indian National Security Advisor Ajit Doval during the visit. Various articles in Chinese media emphasised that China and India have their own communication channels to resolve this issue and that there is no need for third-party intervention in this sensitive matter. Former editor-in-chief of Global Times Hu Xijin was quoted in a media report: “Sullivan wants to create trouble for China-India relations before he leaves. Americans are like this, poking (their nose) wherever there is conflict, fearing global peace.”
There has been an online uproar over Sullivan’s farewell visit to New Delhi, which, Chinese media argues, is aimed at stirring up antagonisms between China and India, seeking to win over India, particularly on the dam issue.
Going forward, there was much unease within the Chinese strategic community as the “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue” foreign ministers' meeting took place, just one day after Trump took office. Neither was the symbolism of Minister Jaishankar on the front row at Trump’s inauguration on January 20, 2025, lost on Chinese strategists.
Overall, Chinese observers inferred that, although Sino-Indian relations have warmed up recently, India has not relaxed its diplomatic interactions with the US. How will the US-India relationship develop in 2025? What impact will the US-India interactions during Trump 2.0 have on China? These were some of the questions that gripped China’s strategic community, which worryingly noted that both the 2017 Doklam conflict and the 2020 Galwan conflict happened during Trump’s first term in office.
Possibly, as part of Beijing’s coping strategy, Chinese scholars are building up a discourse that stable ties with China are, in fact, a great bargaining chip for India, vis-à-vis the Trump administration’s policy uncertainty. If India tries to curry favour with the US at the cost of China, they warn, it will not only fail to gain much from the Trump administration, but it will also lose out on the prospect of benefitting from Chinese capital and technology.
The evolving strategic dynamic between India, China, and the US is most likely going to be a defining factor of global politics in 2025—something that is worth watching.
Antara Ghosal Singh is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation.
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