Does the Quad have a security agenda?

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The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), a group of four major democracies in the Indo-Pacific region—India, Australia, Japan, the United States—came together to bolster Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) efforts in the wake of the 2004 earthquake and tsunami in the Indian Ocean. However, much later, in 2017, the four countries resumed engagements to reiterate their commitment to herald an open and free order in the Indo-Pacific. Arguably, the group sought to respond to the shifting strategic dynamics in the region and harness the shared opportunities in this vital geopolitical theatre.

What brings the Quad countries together? Despite palpable divergences on key issues of interest, the fundamental bedrock for the Quad member countries has remained their shared normative commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific. This can be read in two ways: First, the idea of a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific may be read as a bid to resist China’s belligerent and unilateral activities across the Indo-Pacific which risks jeopardising freedom of navigation, sea-borne trade, and uses of the seas at large. Second, it seeks to foster synergy among these four important political and economic players in the Indo-Pacific to harness shared opportunities in the region, which has increasingly emerged as the epicentre of global geopolitics. While the former appears to be tacitly manifest, the grouping has chosen to positively define itself, and not as against something.

China’s expanding naval footprint in the Indo-Pacific, and continued disregard for international law is seen as the biggest challenge to a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific.

Critics have argued that the group lacks a meaningful security agenda. The need for a robust security agenda for the Quad is buttressed by the shifting security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific. In many ways, China’s expanding naval footprint in the Indo-Pacific, and continued disregard for international law is seen as the biggest challenge to a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific. This argument assumed greater heft with the formation of other groupings among like-minded countries such as the AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) trilateral, and more recently the Squad (Australia, Japan, Philippines, US). These groupings have articulated a clear security-oriented agenda. While the stated objective for the AUKUS has been to deliver eight nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) to the Australian Defense Force to deter war in an increasingly volatile Indo-Pacific, the coming together of the Squad stemmed from growing Chinese aggressions in the East and South China Sea regions. It is often stated that India’s reluctance to be a stakeholder in a formal security treaty is what holds the Quad back from becoming an alliance-like model. Far from it, the Quad’s continued resilience is a testament to the maturity of the grouping, given it has remained active in accommodating India’s strategic choices, despite the temptations of turning into a security alliance.

However, the argument that the Quad does not have a security agenda merits inquiry. It is  true that, unlike AUKUS and Squad, the Quad does not have a stated comprehensive security goal. However, it would be remiss to argue that the Quad lacks a security agenda. The strategic and security compulsions in the Indo-Pacific necessitate the Quad to deliberate on the shifting dynamics at sea in the region. It may be argued that the bedrock of convergence among the Quad countries lies in the quest for a peaceful and stable Indo-Pacific. As a dominant priority, Quad’s emphasis on peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific is tied to a normative security outlook. What does a free and open Indo-Pacific mean for the Quad? Since the group became active again in 2017, it has continued to underscore the need to have a free and open order in the Indo-Pacific—ensuring freedom of navigation, maintaining peace and stability in the region, need to uphold international law, and lamenting coercive action. While the group has been reluctant to name China, it is abundantly clear that the focus has remained on Beijing’s coercive tactics and sustained disregard for international law.

The strategic and security compulsions in the Indo-Pacific necessitate the Quad to deliberate on the shifting dynamics at sea in the region.

However, Quad’s signalling towards China in the Indo-Pacific reveals a nuanced view guiding the strategic compulsions of the member states of the group. The shared geography among the Quad member states involves both the Indian and the Pacific oceans. While China’s activities in the South China Sea region have drawn criticism from countries advocating for a free and open order in tune with international law, Beijing’s forays into the Indian Ocean are not of a similar nature. Over the years, China has sent various research vessels into the Indian Ocean, which have docked at countries such as Sri Lanka and Maldives. This has prompted a sense of suspicion in India and its like-minded partners but has not escalated to the extent of confrontations such as that in the South China Sea region.

It would be inaccurate to posit that the Quad has had a muted maritime security agenda. An overview of the Quad joint statements would reveal that increasingly, the group has sharpened its criticism against Chinese actions in the South China Sea expressing concern over the worsening growing militarization of disputed pockets in the region. The compilation of excerpts on the South China Sea dispute from the Quad joint statements indicates a steady evolution of Quad’s focus on Chinese coercive actions in the region, and their critical implications for a free and open order in the region.

Excerpts from the Quad Joint Statements

Additionally, apart from exhibiting its concerns over Chinese actions in the Indo-Pacific, the Quad has also steadily expanded its maritime security agenda by announcing new initiatives to strengthen cooperation. On the non-traditional maritime security front, in 2022, the group announced two key initiatives – the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA) and the Quad Partnership for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) in the Indo-Pacific. Given the imminent threats induced by climate crises in the Indo-Pacific, and the widespread asymmetry in capacities among resident countries, Quad’s emphasis on the HADR initiative is important in enhancing cooperation and synergy on this important front. Additionally, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is vital for enhancing maritime security efforts. Through this initiative, the Quad has sought to enhance cooperation among regional partners by providing near-real-time data tracking illegal activities at sea. Furthermore, in 2023, the group sought to expand the coverage of its MDA partnerships to include the Indian Ocean region demonstrating continued focus on the initiative.

The Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission—a joint initiative of the coastguard services of the four Quad members was announced to improve interoperability and advance efforts to ensure maritime safety and security.

The 2024 Quad summit also resulted in several important announcements. The IPMDA was scaled up by synergising with the Pacific Island Forum Fisheries Agency (PIFFA) in Southeast Asia and the Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) in the Indian Ocean. This initiative is sought to be aided by the Maritime Initiative for Training in the Indo-Pacific (MAITRI) which seeks to foster the development of technology and tools to bolster MDA efforts. The Quad-at-Sea Ship Observer Mission—a joint initiative of the coastguard services of the four Quad members was announced to improve interoperability and advance efforts to ensure maritime safety and security. On the HADR front, Quad has announced the launch of a Quad Indo-Pacific Logistics Network to improve air-lift capacities during natural disasters.

*The Malabar naval Exercise consists of the four Quad navies but is not an initiative of the group.

A salient maritime security agenda is thus embedded in Quad’s manifold efforts to expand cooperation in non-traditional areas. On the question of China and the South China Sea, the group has been increasingly vocal in articulating its concerns over the imminent threats to a peaceful and stable order that risk being disrupted due to Beijing’s belligerent activities at sea. Quad’s maritime security agenda appears to have evolved in relation to the strategic and security compulsions of its member states. However, a careful consideration of the Quad’s evolving efforts to foster maritime security cooperation would reveal that it would be remiss to entirely discount the group’s steadily calibrated security outlook.

Sayantan Haldar is a Research Assistant at ORF’s Strategic Studies Programme. 

• International Affairs
• Maritime Security
• China
• India
• USA and Canada
• The Pacific, East and Southeast Asia
• AUKUS
• AUKUS and Squad security
• china in indo pacific region
• China South China Sea actions
• Free and open Indo-Pacific
• Indo-Pacific security
• objective of quad
• Quad
• quad and china
• quad countries
• Quad disaster response
• quad in indo pacific
• Quad joint statements
• Quad maritime security
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