The new operation Azm-e-Istehkaam is designed to curb Islamist terror networks and is clearly undertaken to allay the fears of China.
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Source Image: Al Jazeera
Military operations by Pakistan Army against Islamist radicals and terrorists are like the country's annual budgets: They all pretend to be aimed at solving the critical problems but they all falter because they never address the underlying structural causes that gave rise to the problem in the first place. And, quite like the budgets, military operations are often devised and designed not so much to address the principal problem as they are to satisfy and appease foreign players—the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in case of the budget, and increasingly China, in case of the anti-terror operations.
Once again, Pakistan’s hybrid regime has announced yet another military operation—Azm-e-Istehkaam (Resolve of durable stability)—to “combat the menaces of extremism and terrorism in a comprehensive and decisive manner”. Since 2007, this is the twelfth major anti-Islamist terrorist military operation, there have been many minor ones as well. Most of the earlier operations were of a tactical nature, focusing on a particular area that had become particularly troublesome. For instance, the Operation Rah-e-Rast and Rah-e-Haq were in Swat region, Sherdil was in Bajaur and Rah-e-Nijaat was in South Waziristan agency. The two big operations on a much broader front were the Zarb-e-Azb, which started in North Waziristan and then was extended to other regions, followed by Radd-ul-Fassad which was more an intelligence based operation to strike at terrorist networks which had spread throughout Pakistan.
The new operation Azm-e-Istehkaam is aimed at curbing the Islamist terror networks which have resurfaced with renewed vigour and virulence after the Afghan Taliban shattered the "shackles of slavery" of US and its allies, ironically enough with Pakistan's assiduous assistance.
The new operation Azm-e-Istehkaam is aimed at curbing the Islamist terror networks which have resurfaced with renewed vigour and virulence after the Afghan Taliban shattered the “shackles of slavery” of US and its allies, ironically enough with Pakistan’s assiduous assistance. Ostensibly, it aims at “full-blown kinetic efforts of the armed forces [which] will be augmented by full support from all law enforcement agencies, empowered by effective legislation to address legal voids that hinder effective prosecution of terrorism-related cases and award of exemplary punishments to them [terrorists].” Every military operation bears the unique imprint of the Army chief: Gen Ashfaq Kayani was very cautious and worried about the blowback, and therefore preferred limited operations; Gen Raheel Sharif preferred an all-out kind of operations without bothering too much about consequences; Gen Qamar Bajwa preferred small, tactical, intelligence based operations. The next few weeks will give a good idea about the military approach of the current Army Chief Gen Asim Munir.
However, what is clear is that this is the third military operation that is being taken to assuage the Chinese. In 2007, the Lal Masjid operation which became the catalyst for the formation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and led to a massive spike in terrorist activity inside Pakistan was launched after the Islamist radicals in the mosque raided a Chinese massage parlour and abducted the Chinese workers. The Chinese government is reported to have leaned very heavily on the then military dictator Pervez Musharraf to send in the Army to clean up the Lal Masjid. The Zarb-e-Azb operation was also prompted in part by Pakistan wanting to assure the Chinese that the operation was aimed at Uyghur militants. This latest operation has once again been forced on Pakistan by the Chinese. On 29 May, the Business Recorder newspaper reported that Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong told a visiting Pakistani delegation that was in Beijing to prepare for Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif’s visit about “the need for another Zarb-e-Azb against terrorist forces such as TTP, Majeed Bridge, BLA and others to crush them once and for all”. Recent attacks on Chinese—the latest being the suicide bombing in March of a bus carrying Chinese engineers working on the Dash dam project—had angered the Chinese who had been given repeated assurances by the Pakistanis of fool proof security.
Not only were Chinese investments in Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) proving to be a loss-making venture, even the physical security of Chinese workers in Pakistan was in grave jeopardy. It was made clear to the Pakistanis that future Chinese investments were contingent on Pakistan getting its act together on providing security to the Chinese workers. During Shehbaz Sharif’s visit to Beijing in June last, despite all the hyperbole that usually accompanies anything to do between China and Pakistan, there was very little outcome in substantive terms. Speculation has been rife that there is a visible cooling off in the bilateral relationship. The Chinese seemed to be losing interest in at least the economic side of things which was supposed to have added a new dimension to the security and strategic relationship when CPEC was initiated 10 years ago. For a couple of years now, the Chinese have been trying to impress on Pakistan that without political stability (Istehkaam) and security, there was no way that the CPEC projects could move forward. The same message was given by Xi Jinping during Shehbaz Sharif’s visit. And just a day before the announcement of the new military operation, the visiting Chinese minister Liu Jianchao bluntly informed his Pakistani hosts that “security threats are the main hazards to CPEC cooperation…In the case of Pakistan, the primary factor shaking the confidence of Chinese investors is the security situation.”
The Chinese have, for long, been trying to impress upon the Pakistanis that if they are unable to protect Chinese workers, China should be allowed to bring in their own security. But Pakistan has balked at this demand and reiterated assurances of providing complete security to all Chinese.
The Chinese have, for long, been trying to impress upon the Pakistanis that if they are unable to protect Chinese workers, China should be allowed to bring in their own security. But Pakistan has balked at this demand and reiterated assurances of providing complete security to all Chinese. However, things seem to be reaching the point where Pakistani assurances need to be backed by concrete action on ground. This is required not just to satisfy the Chinese who are critical because they are really the only economic game in town for Pakistan, but also to push back the alarming inroads made by the TTP and other armed groups, including Baloch separatists. With Pakistan's economy in a mess, it desperately needs both foreign and domestic investment. But given the political instability and the deteriorating security situation, neither domestic nor foreign investors are ready to invest in Pakistan. However, conducting a large scale anti-terrorist military operation will not be an easy option for a variety of reasons.
First, there is no political consensus behind such an operation. In the fractious political environment, there are already carping sounds being made by the opposition. Add to this the fact that the civilian government does not really have the mandate to govern because they have come into power through a very controversial and tainted election. Second, a military operation is an expensive exercise. Although the defence budget has been increased by around around 18 percent, more money will need to be pumped into what is essentially both a war of attrition accompanied by some higher intensity combat. Third, if the military operations lead to greater violence, then it will spook most potential investors. The economic crisis is immediate and if there are major terror attacks then whatever negligible chance there is of the economy recovering will go up in smoke. Fourth, Pakistan is increasingly getting embroiled in what threatens to be an endless war, especially because the Afghan Taliban are unlikely to dump the Pakistani Taliban. Taking the war into Afghanistan to force compellence on the Afghan Taliban will mean a conflict that will suck Pakistan into the Afghan vortex.
Fifth, Pakistan has a fundamental ideological confusion in both state and society that militates against successfully fighting terrorism. It is not possible to extol the virtues of jihad against India, nurture and support terrorist organisations active against India, but fight against similar organisations that target Pakistan. Add to this the growth of fundamentalism and radicalism inside Pakistan, and it becomes even more difficult to prosecute this war. Soft-peddling and encouraging groups like the Barelvi radicals of Tehrik-e-Labbaik and turning a blind eye to extremist ideology and indoctrination that is running rampant in society will only increase the complexity of the task of fighting terrorism. Pakistan Army just doesn’t get it that the antidote of terrorism is not extremism. Finally, at a time when Pakistan has ramped up tensions against India—the recent terrorist attacks in Jammu are an example—can it afford a three active fronts, i.e., against India, Afghanistan and internal?
Pakistan has a fundamental ideological confusion in both state and society that militates against successfully fighting terrorism. It is not possible to extol the virtues of jihad against India, nurture and support terrorist organisations active against India, but fight against similar organisations that target Pakistan.
While the economic aspect could be addressed with assistance from the US (which appears to be cozying up to the idea of cooperating with Pakistan on the terrorism issue) and China, the bigger problem will be the political crisis which is likely to deepen in coming weeks with rising economic difficulties being faced by an already squeezed citizenry that is increasingly blaming the Pakistan Army and the incumbent regime for much of its woes. On the flip side, the Pakistani state doesn’t have the luxury of time to wait until the economic and political situation stabilises before it grabs the bull of terrorism by its horn. The longer it waits, the greater the ingress of the Taliban and the more difficult it will be to extirpate them.
Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation.
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Sushant Sareen is Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation. His published works include: Balochistan: Forgotten War, Forsaken People (Monograph, 2017) Corridor Calculus: China-Pakistan Economic Corridor & China’s comprador ...
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