A multinational post-war force in Gaza may be a non-starter

The war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas has expectedly caused a lot of friction in the region. The 7 October terror attack against Israel by Hamas pushed the former to launch a full-scale military operation to ‘eliminate’ the group’s political and military infrastructure. However, the challenges of an outright victory have only piled up over the past seven months for Israel. Hamas still holds multiple Israeli hostages captive, and internal Israeli politics is increasingly strained, complicating matters further.

The United States (US), Israel’s all-weather ally, is also scrambling to find alternatives not only for the war but also for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s adamance on an outright victory against Hamas. While the Israeli leadership struggles to define what an outright “end” of Hamas would look like, questions on what political structure replaces the group in Gaza remain unaddressed. The US is seen as pushing for a multinational peacekeeping force, including Arab states, to fill in the vacuum. However, there are multiple complications behind such an idea even taking off, let alone succeeding.

The United States (US), Israel’s all-weather ally, is also scrambling to find alternatives not only for the war but also for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s adamance on an outright victory against Hamas.

A multinational peacekeeping force, on paper, is not completely unheard of. Under the ambit of the United Nations, peacekeeping forces in contested areas such as the Golan Heights—the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)—have been operationalised since 1974. However, the most critical component for the mobilisation of the UNDOF by the United Nations Security Council was a political disengagement between Israel and Syria. In short, a political agreement was the foundation for a peacekeeping force.

Some Arab states have already hinted strongly towards not being part of any such multinational force, which could market their presence in Gaza as being complicit with Israel’s agendas. Such a force, in theory, would also only be successful in deployment if the US leads it by putting its own boots on the ground as well. This seems a far-fetched idea and could be political suicide for someone like President Joe Biden who is preparing to go into a tough election campaign towards the end of the year, once again taking on Donald Trump, the man who famously brought together Arab partners around an orb in Riyadh in 2017.

For the US, the problem goes beyond just how to engage with Netanyahu fruitfully. While the Biden administration has put its weight behind Israel and its security, frustration abounds. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has said that the US has been working side-by-side for a long time to develop ideas for a post-war Gaza both from governance and rebuilding perspectives while simultaneously telling Israel that support will be hampered if a full-scale military operation in Rafah is launched. However, Blinken added that such post-war plans are yet to come through from Israel itself.

Tensions between military and political bodies over the strategy and aims of the war have been spilling out in the public sphere for a while now, showcasing further brittleness.

The US concerns over the depth of Israeli strategy in its aim of eradicating Hamas are also playing out within Israel. Tensions between military and political bodies over the strategy and aims of the war have been spilling out in the public sphere for a while now, showcasing further brittleness. It is imperative to remember that a core aim for Israel as a state is to rebuild the aura of invincibility which it enjoyed unequivocally prior to October 2023. This, along with Netanyahu’s penchant for political survival, legacy, and to not be seen as a losing war-time leader, further complicates both a demanded clarity in strategy and the possibilities of relenting without the aims being met, which could be interpreted as weakness.

The recent public criticism by Israel’s Defence Minister Yoav Gallant of Netanyahu and prospects of a long-term Israeli civil or military control of Gaza as part of the ‘day after’ plan for the Strip highlights significant internal divisions on the direction of the war. And amongst the military hierarchy, it is not just Gallant, a civil politician, who has gone public with his ire. The Chief of Staff for the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), Lt Gen Herzi Halevi, reportedly “tore into” Netanyahu for failing to explicitly put forward a ‘day after’ strategy till now.

The Hamas chief for Gaza and Israel’s most wanted figure, Yahya Sinwar, is still known to be within Gaza itself and as having critical leverage and control over talks between the group and Israel being mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the US.

The above have been highlighted as alarmist analysis by some but a sense of urgency on what to do in Gaza politically is not without merit. Both US and Israeli reportage have highlighted the fact that Hamas is returning to fighting in areas previously declared as clear by the IDF. These include parts areas such as Khan Younis, the Jabalya refugee camp and some other areas of the north. The Hamas chief for Gaza and Israel’s most wanted figure, Yahya Sinwar, is still known to be within Gaza itself and as having critical leverage and control over talks between the group and Israel being mediated by Egypt, Qatar, and the US.

Washington is  in a good position to share the perils of the poorly thought-out counter-insurgency strategy and the costs of not having a structured blueprint. Over 20 years, the US battled the Taliban in Afghanistan only to finally leave in 2021 as a defeated power. While kinetic strategies of both counterterrorism and counterinsurgency in Afghanistan can be debated for a long time, the fact remains that the plug was pulled through a political decision, also causing some quiet criticism within the Pentagon’s corridors. While the US had the option of disengaging and leaving, putting thousands of miles between itself and a forgettable legacy, Israel does not have the same luxury, be it political or geographic.

Hamas, despite being a proscribed terror group even before Al-Qaeda was labelled as one, has caught hold of the pro-Palestine narrative by the jugular.

The contrarian view on the side of Hamas is in fact working in their favour, arguably adding to frustration within Israeli polity. Hamas, despite being a proscribed terror group even before Al-Qaeda was labelled as one, has caught hold of the pro-Palestine narrative by the jugular. Whether this is by design or sheer luck is up for debate. Its image makeover as a ‘revolutionary’ and not a terror group in a significant section of public and geopolitical discourse alike, from university campuses in the US to leaders like the Turkish President openly refusing to accept them under the label of terrorism, has added a larger crisis point not just regionally but to global counterterror gains as well. While many in the US acknowledge what Hamas really is, the overall discourse still works in the group’s favour at the moment.

All of the above add to the complications of finding a way out, including the idea of a multinational post-war force to control Gaza while an alternative political structure to Hamas is built. The sense of urgency for Israel to move towards more clarity of its military aims, the definition of ‘elimination’ of Hamas, and the ‘day after’ strategy is palpable. For now, the buck stops with Netanyahu, as both domestic and international political pressure and body count from the war mount.

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Kabir Taneja is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Observer Research Foundation

• International Affairs
• USA and Canada
• West Asia
• Biden
• Gaza war
• Hamas
• Israel
• Israeli strategy
• military operation
• Netanyahu
• peacekeeping force
• post-war Gaza
• UN
• US

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